TULLY's
MORALS.

TULLY's

Three Books

OF

OFFICES,

In ENGLISH.

With NOTES Explaining the *Method* and *Meaning* of the AUTHOR.

LONDON:

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M DC XC IX.

TO
Mr. *Will. Bedingfield,*
AND
Mr. *John Wallis.*

I Beg leave, Gentlemen, to prefix your Names to this little Treatiſe about Moral Duties, which the wiſe Author of it thought fit to recommend to his own Son, and which has uſually been look'd upon as one of the perfecteſt and compleateſt in its kind. It has alter'd its Dreſs indeed ſince it came under my Hands, and I am afraid, may have ſuffer'd very much by the Alteration: however, as to the Body and more ſubſtantial Parts of it, I hope 'tis ſtill the ſame, and worthy of that Opinion, which the Author himſelf had of it, *That 'twas a very good Preſent, if made ſuch Uſe of, as the Nature and Importance of its Argument requir'd.* 'Twas at firſt deſign'd for a Perſon in your Circumſtances, a Student in an Univerſity, a young Gentleman of great Hopes, one from whom his Country did expect to receive Benefit, and his Friends no ſmall Comfort and Satisfaction: I thought I could not do better therefore, after once I had reſolv'd to Tranſlate it into Engliſh, than Dedicate it to You, who have ſo good

a Title to it, as well upon this as upon ſome other Accounts. The Honour and Happineſs I have in being appointed the Director of your Studies, the many Favours and Obligations I have receiv'd upon that account, together with a great many other Inducements ariſing from ſo cloſe and endearing a Relation, almoſt forc'd me to make this publick Acknowledgment. And I confeſs I was deſirous my ſelf of doing it, both that it might ſerve for a Teſtimony of that Value and Eſteem which I have for you; and that I might oblige you by it, in ſome meaſure, to read theſe Precepts, when you are gone from under my Care, which moſt People in thoſe Circumſtances are but too ready to forget. You will find here all the more uſeful Parts of Virtue ſo clearly ſet before you; the Excellence and Importance of it ſo judiciouſly enlarg'd upon; the Neceſſity of it toward the procuring a Reputation, toward the meeting with Encouragement and Succeſs in our Undertakings: and, in a word, toward the obtaining any tolerable degree of Happineſs, in whatever State of Life, ſo abundantly made out; that I hardly know of any thing (relating to meer Morality) that could more fitly be recommended to Perſons in *Your* Circumſtances, by one in *Mine*, than this excellent Treatiſe. 'Tis true you have read it in its Original Language, and my Requeſt to you is, that you would continue to do ſo; the Deſign of this Tranſlation being not to exclude, but to aſſiſt the Latin: which if it may but do in any tolerable manner, ſo as to help toward the Underſtanding of ſuch excellent Rules of Living, I have obtain'd my End.

Such as it is, Gentlemen, I heartily preſent it to you; wiſhing that it may be in ſome meaſure ſerviceable

viceable to thoſe Ends, for which it was at firſt deſign'd; and that all, but eſpecially Men of Eſtate and Fortune, and ſuch as are likely to make ſome Figure in the World, would be perſuaded to learn ev'n from an Heathen Writer, That there is no true Profit or Advantage, no ſolid Reputation or Honour, and, in ſhort, no real Happineſs any where to be found, except in the Practice of Virtue and Honeſty. I am,

GENTLEMEN,

Your moſt affectionate

humble Servant,

T. C.

ERRATA.

P. 129. *l.* 23. r. *any by-ends.* p. 161. *l.* 22. r. *filed off.* p. 204. Note *b*. r. *ſix Books.* p. 281. *l.* 14. for *now living*, r. *lately dead.*

THE PREFACE.

THE turning into English so excellent a Discourse as this is, I suppose, will hardly stand in need of an Apology: But the attempting it after so eminent a Person as Sir R. L' Estrange, perhaps will hardly admit of any. I do not design to spin out a long Preface, in making Excuses for so bold an Undertaking; much less in finding fault with the Performance of that Gentleman: I have more regard to the Reader's Patience than to do the former; and am too sensible of His great Worth and my own Miscarriages, to be guilty of the latter. I shall only beg leave to assure the Reader, That this Translation was well-nigh finish'd, before I saw the last Edition of Sir Roger's, in which he hath corrected some very notorious and palpable Faults, that were in all the former. I hope therefore it could be no Presumption in me to think his Translation faulty, since he himself by this late Alteration, has in effect acknowleg'd it. I might, 'tis true, have suppress'd my own Work, when I saw he had corrected those Mistakes and Oversights I had formerly found in his, and which first put me upon making this new Attempt: But beside that all Men, when once they are pretty far advanc'd in any Business, (as I then was) are naturally unwilling to have it taken out of their Hands, and desirous of going

on

on to see an end of it; and beside that, I think there are still some places, in which he hath mistaken, or not clearly enough explain'd, the Meaning of the Author: I was always of Opinion, That there would be something further neeessary, before Tully's Offices could be throughly understood; and that a bare Translation, and especially so close an one as Sir Roger's is, could never give the Reader a View of the deep Sence, and sometimes intricate Method of that Book. I resolv'd therefore to go on with my design'd Translation of it, and to add such things to it by way of Explication, as seem'd necessary or convenient for the better understanding the Design, Meaning and Method of the Author. Those People therefore, that can understand Cicero by Sir Roger's Translation, may still make use of it if they please, notwithstanding any thing I have said to the contrary, and I hope there's no harm done: and for those that cannot, I have attempted this new one, which I hope may be in some measure serviceable to that End.

The Author of this Book is so well known, that 'twould be altogether needless to give any Account of him in this place: As for the Book it self, it has always been look'd upon as one of the perfectest Pieces of his Writings, and one of the noblest Systems of Moral Precepts, that have ever been left us by the ancient Heathens; and not without reason: There appears all along in it so great a Love and Concern for Virtue, which he recommends to his Son with all imaginable Earnestness; so deep a Sence of the Obligations to Honesty, and Aversion for every thing that's contrary to it; such an admirable Inclination for the Virtues of Plainness, Truth and Sincerity, and such a generous Contempt of all shuffling, mean and under-hand Dealings; such Piety toward his Native Country, and hearty Concern for the Calamities it

groan'd under, and withal ſo much Hatred and Deteſtation for thoſe Men, who had been the Cauſes of its Misfortunes; and, in a word, ſo many excellent Rules of Life, with reference to our Duty either to God or Men, and to thoſe in their ſeveral Capacities and Relations, whether of Kindred, Friends or Benefactors, as have juſtly recommended it to the Eſteem of all the World, and given it the firſt place among the eminent and moſt celebrated Writings of this kind. The Scope and Deſign of it in his own words is, To lay down ſome Directions and Precepts of good Living, according to which upon all occaſions Men ought to govern their Lives and Actions; ſo that whatever State of Life a Man is in, whether Publick or Private, of Governour or Governed, of Proſperity or Adverſity, old Age or Youth, he will here find Rules how he ought to demean himſelf in any of thoſe Capacities; and will be told what that is, which the Dignity and Excellence of his own Nature requires in regard to himſelf; and what the ſeveral ſorts of Alliance or Society among Men demand, in relation to other People: So that while other parts of Learning and Knowledge are moſt times confin'd either to certain Ages, certain Times, or certain Places, this is of general and univerſal Uſe; 'tis (as our Author ſays upon another Subject) neceſſary for Youth as well as old Age; it directs in Proſperity as well as in Adverſity; 'tis a Delight to us at home, and a Companion for us abroad; Pernoctat nobiſcum, peregrinatur, ruſticatur.

'Twas principally deſign'd for the Uſe of his own Son, whom he had ſent to Athens for the benefit of Study, while all things were in Diſorder and Confuſion at Rome, after Pompey's Defeat in the Pharſalian Field: But he tells us he has purpoſely fram'd it in ſuch a manner, as that it might be equally ſerviceable to all other People. The time of its writing

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was after Cæsar's *Murther, when* Mark Anthony *and his Adherents had got the Power into their Hands, and* Cicero *(as he complains at the beginning of the third Book) was by wicked Arms driven away from the City, and forc'd to betake himself to his private Retirements. At this time he thought to have gone to* Athens *to his Son, and was accordingly on his Journey, when he was call'd back again by the loud Cries of his Country, as he intimates in the conclusion of this Discourse, and explains more at large in the beginning of his first* Philippick. *He return'd to* Rome *upon this Recal, but found things very different from what he expected, when he came thither: Hereupon he withdrew himself to his Houses in the Country, resolving to wait for some fitter Opportunity of being serviceable to the Republick. From this Retirement he sent these Precepts in writing to his Son, which he design'd to have given him by word of Mouth, had he arriv'd at* Athens. *The Method he proceeds in is this which follows: After a short Discourse by way of Preface to his Son, and fixing the right Notion of the Subject he is to treat about, he endeavours to beget in him a Love of* Honesty, *by representing it as amiable and commendable in it self, and agreeable to the Nature and Reason of Mankind. He divides it into four Parts or general Heads,* Prudence, Justice, Fortitude *and* Temperance, *which are usually call'd the four* Cardinal Virtues, *and Discourses in order upon every one of 'em, with all their several Species or Branches, and the Vices that stand in opposition to 'em. And this he does, not in a dry and scholastical Manner, by enquiring nicely wherein the strict Nature of the several Virtues consists, and which of their opposite Vices they are nearest to, (which my Lord* Bacon *somewhere very ingeniously observes, is like a Master's setting a Boy a Copy to write after, without ever shewing him how he should make his Letters)*

ters) but by laying down ſuch Rules under each of theſe Heads, as may direct Men in the Practice of the Duties requir'd of 'em. Afterwards he compares them *with one another, and ſhews in what Order they are to be perform'd by us: As,* Juſtice, *for Example, before* Knowledge, Fortitude, *&c. All theſe Virtues, when taken together, make up the general Notion of* Honeſtum; *and when taken ſeparately, are ſo many Branches or diſtinct Members of it.*

But ſeeing ſomething elſe beſide Virtue *or* Honeſty *is neceſſarily requiſite, or at leaſt uſeful and convenient, for our well-being here; ſuch as are the* Comforts *and* Conveniences *of Life,* viz. *Riches, Glory, Honours, Succeſs in Buſineſs,* &c. *which are all comprehended under the Notion of the word* Profit: *therefore in the ſecond Book he endeavours to ſhew how theſe are to be obtain'd: And having made it appear, That all the* Advantages *Men enjoy, and the* Evils *they endure, are principally owing to Men themſelves: From thence he infers, That the Way whereby we may obtain the* former, *and avoid the* latter, *is to procure the Endeavours of* Men *on our ſide, ſo as to have* them *ready to aſſiſt us upon occaſion. This he ſhews can be done no other way, than by performing thoſe Duties which* Honeſty *requires of us:* viz. *by* Prudence *and* Wiſdom, *by* Juſtice *and* Integrity *in our Words and Actions, whereby Men are drawn to place their Truſt and Confidence in us; (where alſo he particularly ſhews, that Pretending and Hypocriſie can never get a Man any laſting Honour) by* Kindneſs *and* Beneficence, Courteſie *and* Affability, *which beget in Men a Love and Affection toward us: and laſtly, by* Fortitude, Contempt of Money, *&c. which are Virtues that draw Men to Wonder and Admiration, and make 'em think us Perſons that really deſerve to be promoted.*

But becauſe Riches, Honours, Power and the like, which ſeem *to be a Profit and Advantage to us, may often in-*

interfere with Virtue and Duty, which really *are such; therefore in the third Book he endeavours to shew, How a good Man ought to carry himself in such a Case; and makes it appear, That Riches, Honours, Kingdoms and Empires are far from being truly an Advantage to any Man, whenever they are gotten by unlawful means; and that no Honest Man would do any thing that's contrary to Conscience or Honesty, tho' sure to obtain even the whole World by it. All which he builds upon this Foundation,* That the Goods of the Soul, *viz.* Virtue and Honesty, are, if not the *only*, yet infinitely the *greatest* Goods; *(which is a Principle allow'd of by all the wiser Philosophers) from whence it must follow, That whoever parts with* these *upon the account of any Riches, or other seeming Advantage, be it never so great, must needs be a Looser; for he forfeits a* greater *for the sake of a* less *Good, and in hopes of getting a* seeming, *deprives himself of a* real Interest. *Here he goes over each of the Virtues mention'd in the first Book, and proves that nothing can be a Man's true Profit, tho' it should bring him all the appearing Advantages in the World, and tho' he were sure to keep it secret from the Eyes of all Men, and even the Gods themselves, that is contrary to the Duties of Prudence and Justice, of Fortitude and Moderation. In a word, Here are Rules for the Government of our Lives in relation to* God, *our* Neighbours *and* Ourselves, *such as are deservedly admired in a Heathen, and might have well become even a Christian Writer: He tells us, That to procure the Favour of the* Former, *we must live a religious and holy Life: That, as to the* Second, *there's an Alliance or Society between all Mankind, whereby each Particular is oblig'd to do his best, toward promoting the Happiness and Welfare of the whole Body, and rather to die than do another any Injury: That, as to* Ourselves, *we should always consider the Dignity and Excellence*

cellence of our Reaſonable Nature, and take care that we never be guilty of any Action, that may any wiſe ſtain or unbecome its Honour: This, as he goes on, will quickly teach us, how baſe a thing it is to diſſolve in Luxury, Softneſs, &c. —— Thus have I endeavour'd to preſent the Reader with a general View of this incomparable Treatiſe: ſhould I proceed to tell him, That ſome of the moſt eminent Writers in the World have ow'd great part of their Credit to it: That the Sanderſons, Grotiuſes, Pufendorfs, *&c. are particularly oblig'd to it for their Skill in determining Moral Caſes, perhaps he might think me rather zealous, than impartial, in my Account of it: Tho' I can aſſure him 'tis no more than what is ſtrictly true. The firſt of thoſe great Perſons (as the Writer of his Life tells us) had it all by heart; and how much Uſe the two latter have made of it, I leave thoſe to judge who have been converſant with their Writings ——. But the Book can much better recommend it ſelf by its own true Value, than I can do by any thing I am able to ſay of it: thither therefore I ſhall refer the Reader for his further Satisfaction, after I have told him, in a few words, what has been attempted in this new Tranſlation.*

I have endeavour'd to expreſs what I conceiv'd to be the Sence and Meaning of the Author, in as full and comprehenſive words as I was able, attending all along to the principal Scope and Deſign of his Diſcourſe, rather than to the particular Words and Expreſſions. I have taken care however to let none of his Words eſcape, without giving the Sence of 'em in our own Language: So far from that, that I rather expect to be condemn'd, on the other hand, for explaining ſome of 'em a great deal too much, and ſpending a Line perhaps, or more, in that, which the Author expreſs'd in but one ſingle Word: But whoever conſiders the Nature of the Latin *Tongue, and our*

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Author's Way of Writing, especially in this Book, will easily perceive that 'twas necessary for me to do so, otherwise the English *would have been almost as hard to be understood, as the* Latin: *For the Truth of which I refer the Reader to Chap.* 35, 36, 37. *Book* 1. *not to name innumerable other places. I have had a peculiar Eye all along to the Method of the Discourse, and the Connexion or Dependance of one part of it upon another; which because it is oftentimes very obscure, I have generally added the distinguishing Terms of* first, second, *&c. and where that could not be done, have sometimes added a Line perhaps, to shew how he passes from one thing to another: But this I have generally told the Reader of, or else have printed what is so added in a different Letter; as may be seen at the beginning of Chap.* 6, *and the end of Chap.* 7. *Book* 1. *As to some things, that are of little or no consequence toward understanding the Author, as if I have translated* Cæna *Dinner;* Hominis honorati & principis, *a Gentleman, or a Person of Honour;* Convivium, *sitting at a Table, and over a Glass of Wine, &c. or if in a philosophical Discourse as this is, I have sometimes made use of an unusual Word; I suppose they'll be counted not unwarrantable Liberties, but such as are commonly taken by Translators. If in the main I have hit upon the true Sence and Meaning of my Author, and express'd it in such clear and intelligible Terms, as may make the Reader see what is the Force of his Arguments, the Reasonableness of his Precepts, the Fitness of his several Illustrations and Examples, with those other Virtues which have rendred this Book so deservedly Famous; I have obtain'd what I principally design'd by this Attempt.*

The Design of the Notes is chiefly to point out the Author's Method, and explain some Passages in him that seem'd more obscure than the rest: If the Reader find fault, that some of 'em regard rather the Latin *than*

than the English; *and others seem trivial and inconsiderable: I desire he would take notice, that I would not have the* English *thrust out the* Latin, *but rather promote and facilitate the Reading of it; and that I did not design to make Notes for Men of Learning, (by whom I am fitter to be taught my self) but rather for the Young and Less-knowing sort of People.*

I have gone according to that Division of Chapters, which is usually receiv'd, because the Book has been quoted according to it, and to have made any Alteration would but have bred Confusion; tho' otherwise I think 'tis the most ignorant and ridiculous one that was ever made, except in some other of our Author's Writings. I have put before each Chapter a Summary of what is contain'd in it: and to the whole have subjoyn'd an Index, referring to all the principal Matters that are mention'd in the Book. In a word, I have not wilfully omitted any thing, as far as was possible in so small a Volume, (for I did not design to write a large Commentary, or play the Critick upon my Author) that seem'd necessary or useful toward a full Explication of this excellent Discourse. I have made some use of Sir R. L'Estrange's English, *and especially Mr.* Du B.'s French *Translation; which I gratefully acknowledge. I have follow'd that Sence which to me seem'd most agreeable to the Author's Design, without finding fault with the Interpretations of other People, or speaking Ill of those who have not been of my Mind; and if I have been mistaken my self in any thing (as I don't question but I many times have) I desire the Reader to use the same Candor and Forgiveness toward me: that as, I think, I have giv'n no body any just Cause of Complaint, so I may not have any my self from other People. In fine, I am sure my Design was commendable; the Success of it I must leave to the Reader's Judgment: I shall only say, That as I look for no Honour from any thing I can do, more especially of this nature; so I hope that however I may expect a Pardon.* TUL-

TULLY's OFFICES.

The First Book.

CHAP. I.

Cicero *exhorts his Son, a young Student at* Athens, *not to forget his* Latin, *tho' he was in a* Greek *University: but to mix the Studies of both those Languages, and also learn to Write both as a Philosopher and an Orator. To this purpose he advises him to read his Works, as having equally written in each of those kinds, which none of the* Grecians *had ever done. But he modestly adds, That he thinks they could have done it, but that they apply'd themselves wholly to one of them.*

Dear Son MARCUS,

THO' after a Year's Study under [a] *Cratippus*, and that at such a Place as [b] *Athens*, you can't but have abundantly furnish'd your self with Knowledge in the Doctrins and Rules of Philosophy; having had the Advantage of so eminent a

[a] The most noted Peripatetick Philosopher of that Age, a familiar Acquaintance of *Cicero*'s, and by him often equall'd to the greatest of the Ancients. He was of *Mytilene* the chief City in the Island *Lesbos*, and there taught for some time. Afterwards he remov'd to *Athens*, where *Cicero* among others entrusted his Son with him. *See Famil. Epist. Lib.* 16. *Epist.* 21.

[b] The famousest City in the World for Politeness and good Literature; whither all the great Men of Antiquity re-

a Maſter to ſupply you with Learning, and a City that affords you ſuch excellent [c] Examples: Yet I ſhould think it convenient for you (which is a Method I took for my own profit) always to mingle ſome Latin with your Greek, in the Study of Eloquence as well as Philoſophy; that you may be equally perfect in both [d] thoſe ways of Writing, and make your ſelf Maſter of either Language. For the furtherance of which, I am apt to imagin, I have done no inconſiderable Service to our Country-men; ſo that not only thoſe who don't underſtand Greek, but even the Learned themſelves will confeſs, that, by reading my Works, they have mended their Stiles, and ſomewhat improv'd their Reaſon and Judgments. Wherefore I am willing, 'tis true, you ſhould learn of your preſent Maſter, the greateſt Philoſopher of this Age, and *learn* of him too as long as you deſire it; and ſo long I think 'tis your Duty to *deſire* it, as you find your ſelf ſufficiently benefited by it: But withal, I would have you to read my Writings, which very little differ from thoſe of the Peripateticks;

ſorted for Learning; where *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, *Demoſthenes*, *Sophocles*, and innumerable others the greateſt Wits of the World in old time flouriſh'd: therefore by our Author in his firſt Book *de Orat.* ch. 4. call'd, *The Inventreſs of all Arts*. His Son then being at ſuch a place, and under ſuch a Maſter, he expects he ſhould have made a ſuitable Improvement.

[c] Not of Perſons then living only, but of thoſe alſo that were dead and gone: nothing ſo bringing to our remembrance the Virtues and Learning of great Men, as being in the Places where they once flouriſh'd: which is one great Advantage of a Publick Education.

[d] *Utriuſq; orationis*, may mean either the two Languages of *Latin* and *Greek*, or the two kinds of Stile that are proper, one for the Bar, and the other for Philoſophical Diſcourſes. I have taken both Senſes into the Tranſlation.

teticks; for [e] both we and they profess our selves Followers, not of *Socrates* only, but of *Plato* likewise. As for the Matters contain'd in them, use your own Judgment with Freedom and Impartiality, for I lay no manner of Restraint upon you: your Improvement in the *Latin* is what I chiefly desire, which I am confident must follow from a careful Perusal of 'em. Nor let any one think that I am Vain or Pretending when I speak thus: For, allowing some others the precedence in Philosophy, should I assume to my self what's the Part of an Orator, *viz.* to speak [f] suitably, methodically and handsomely upon any Subject, seeing I have spent my whole Life in that Study, I think 'tis no more than what I might reasonably and fairly lay claim to. I can't but very earnestly desire you therefore, my dear *Cicero*, to read my Books with care and diligence; not my *Orations* only, but these Pieces also that concern *Philosophy*, which are now of a bulk almost equal to them: For tho' in the former

[e] So I understand the word *Utriq;* to mean both the Academicks of whom *Cicero*, and the Peripateticks of whom *Cratippus* was. These two Sects at first were almost one and the same, as appears from several places of *Cicero*; [See Book 3. ch. 4.] *Xenocrates*, the chief Author of the former, and *Aristotle* of the latter, being each of them Scholars to the incomparable *Plato*, who was Hearer of the wise *Socrates*. The Academicks therefore and Peripateticks were both of them Followers not of *Socrates* only, (for that almost all the Philosophers were) [*See* Cic. de Orat. 3. 16, 17.] but of *Plato* too, and so were very nearly ally'd to each other.

[f] *Apte, distincte*, &c. The word *Apte* properly denotes the Conformity of our Stile to the Subject we are handling, and is call'd by our Author in other places *Apte ad rerum dignitatem dicere*; and he tells us, that those Men may be said to speak *apte*, *Qui ita moderantur Orationem, ut rerum & personarum dignitates ferunt*, which I think answers to our *English* word *suitably*. *Distincte* refers to the Method of a Discourse, and is oppos'd to Confusedness: *Ornate* to the Figures and Ornaments of Rhetorick. So that the three

mer there is more of the force and power of Eloquence, yet is the ſmooth and even Stile of the latter by no means to be neglected. And of all the *Grecians* I find not one, that has employ'd his Pen in both theſe kinds; and been at once ſucceſsful in the Language of the Bar, and this other more gentle and eaſie Stile of Philoſophical Diſcourſes: Unleſs [g] *Demetrius Phalereus* may be reckon'd for one, who is ſubtle enough in his Diſputes of Philoſophy, but methinks in his Oratory, wants that Spirit and Vehemence that is requiſite; however, has ſo much of Sweetneſs in him, that one might know he had been [h] *Theophraſtus*'s Scholar. Whether I have had any better Succeſs in both theſe ways, muſt be left to

words ſeem indifferently well to comprehend the whole Buſineſs of an Orator; which is, *Invenire præclare, inventa diſponere, diſpoſita exornare*; To invent what is ſuitable and proper for the Subject, to put it into a good Method, and to give it the Ornaments of Eloquence, *&c.*

[g] A Peripatetick born at *Phalerum*, a ſmall Town on the Sea-coaſt of *Attica*, from whence he had his Name. He was ten Years Governour of *Athens*, in which time he was honour'd with 300 Statues. Being afterwards driven out by *Demetrius Poliorcetes*, Son of *Antigonus*, *Alexander* the Great's Captain, he fled to *Ptolomy* King of *Ægypt*, by whom he was ſet over the famous *Alexandrian* Library, which contain'd in it (as ſome write) 700000 Volumes. He perſwaded that Prince to get the Old Teſtament tranſlated into *Greek*, which is what we now call the Tranſlation of the Seventy. Moſt of his Works are loſt.

[h] A noble Philoſopher of the Peripatetick Sect, Scholar firſt of *Plato*, and afterwards of *Ariſtotle*, whom he ſucceeded in his School. He was Son of one *Melantes*, a Fuller, and born at an obſcure Place of the Iſle *Lesbos*, nam'd *Ereſius*, whence he himſelf is call'd *Ereſius*. His firſt Name was *Tyrtamus*, that of *Theophraſtus* being afterwards given him by *Ariſtotle* for his Divine Eloquence. He was mightily admir'd by *Cicero*, who us'd to call him his *Delight*, and is often commending him for the Sweetneſs of his Stile. Several of his Works are ſtill remaining, one of the chief of which is his *Characters*.

[i] An

to the Judgment of others to determin: I can only ſay that I have attempted 'em both. And 'tis my Opinion, That if ever [i] *Plato* had undertaken to plead, he'd have been a moſt copious and powerful Orator; and if [k] *Demoſthenes* had ſtudied and diſcours'd of thoſe things, which he learnt of *Plato*, he'd have done it with a great deal of Ornament and Majeſty. The ſame I think true of [l] *Iſocrates* and *Ariſtotle*; each of which, pleas'd with his own way of Writing, [m] neglected to cultivate and improve the other.

[i] An incomparable Philoſopher, born at *Athens*, who travell'd over great part of the World for Knowledge; He is often mention'd, and in ſeveral places tranſlated by *Cicero*, who follows him very much in his Philoſophical Writings. His Works ſtill remain, which are ſo excellent, as to have juſtly got him the Name of the *Divine Plato*.

[k] The moſt famous *Greek* Orator that ever was, Son of a Blackſmith in *Athens*, and Scholar to *Plato*. His Works are ſtill extant. See his Life in *Plutarch*.

[l] *Iſocrates* was a notable Teacher of Rhetorick, and *Ariſtotle* a moſt eminent Philoſopher in the famous City of *Athens*: both of them very well known by their Works, which are ſtill, the greateſt part of them, remaining.

[m] That is, *Iſocrates* never try'd how he could ſucceed in Philoſophical Diſcourſes, nor *Ariſtotle* in Orations.

CHAP. II.

The Reasons why he Writes upon this Subject. The general Use and Importance of it. All Philosophers have handled it; tho' some, by their false Notions of Happiness and Misery, utterly pervert it. What Sects they are, that have a Right to lay down any Rules or Precepts concerning it. He designs in this Work to follow the Stoicks principally. The Subject of a Discourse ought first to be defin'd, before we begin to say any thing upon it.

BUt having resolv'd to write some thing at present, and a great many others hereafter to you, I thought I could begin upon no better Argument, than that which is fittest for your Age, and most becoming my Authority as a Father: For, of all those useful and important Subjects, which Philosophers have handled so largely and accurately, the Precepts they have deliver'd about [a] *Offices* or *Duties*, seem of the largest extent and comprehension: For they take in every part of our Lives, so that whatever we go about, whether of publick or private Affairs, whether at home or abroad, whether consider'd barely by our selves, or as we stand in relation to other People, we lye constantly under an *Obligation* to some Duties; and, as all the Virtue

[a] *Officium* in our Author, which I beg leave to render either *Office* or *Duty*, signifies especially two things; Sometimes the Duty or Obligation it self, as when he says, *Peregrini Officium est*, 'Tis the Duty of a Stranger, *i. e.* He is oblig'd to do so, or so, *&c.* At other times, the Action whereby that Duty is perform'd, as when he divides *Officia*, Virtues, into *media* and *perfecta*, ordinary and compleat ones: so *Officia Justitiæ, liberalitatis*, &c. are the Actions of those Virtues; which may be worth observing thro' the whole Work.

[b] He

tue and Credit of our Lives proceeds from the due Diſcharge of *This*, ſo all the Baſeneſs and Turpitude of 'em reſults from the Non-obſervance of *It*. Now, tho' this be a Subject which all Philoſophers have buſied themſelves about, (for, who ever dar'd to aſſume that Name without laying down ſome Inſtructions about Duty?) yet have ſome [b] Sects of 'em given ſuch accounts of Man's Happineſs and Miſery, as deſtroy the very Being of Virtue and Honeſty. For he that makes any thing his chiefeſt Good, wherein Juſtice or Virtue does not bear a part, and ſets up Profit, not Honeſty for the Meaſure of his Happineſs; as long as he acts in conformity with his own Principles, and is not overrul'd by meer Dictates of Reaſon and Humanity, can never do the Offices of Friendſhip, Juſtice or Liberality. Nor can he be ever a Man of Courage, who thinks that Pain is the greateſt Evil; or he of Temperance, who imagins Pleaſure to be the Sovereign Good. Which things are all ſo obvious and plain, that one would think they could never ſtand in need of a Diſpute: however, I have largely

[b] He means chiefly the *Epicureans*, who made Man's Happineſs to conſiſt in Pleaſure, and his Miſery in Pain, which is indeed to ſubvert the very Foundations of Honeſty. For ſeeing there is nothing that Men will not do, for the obtaining their chief Good, and avoiding the greateſt Evil; it neceſſarily follows, that (as long as they act conſiſtently with their Principles) theſe Men will betray their Friends, break their Oaths, or do any thing in the World, rather than forego any Pleaſure, or endure any Pain. Therefore he has reaſon to ſay, *They can never do the Duties of Friendſhip*, &c. For certainly, if I count Pleaſure my greateſt Good, I ſhall rather part with my Honeſty than that; and if I reckon Pain the greateſt of Evils, I'll rather loſe a Friend, be Unmerciful, or Unjuſt, than ever undergo it. The ſame may be ſaid of thoſe that place their Happineſs in Riches, Honours, *&c.* and their Miſery in the contrary. *See* Tuſc. Queſt. 2. 6.

ly diſcours'd upon them in [c] another Work. Theſe Sects therefore, unleſs they are reſolv'd to be inconſiſtent with themſelves, ought wholly to abſtain from ſpeaking any thing about Duties: Nor indeed can any conſtant, unalterable, [d] rational Rules of them at all be given, unleſs it be by thoſe who go upon this Principle, [e] *That 'tis Virtue alone*, or at leaſt That *chiefly, which ought to be deſir'd for its own ſake.* So that only the [f] Stoicks, [g] Academicks and [h] Peripateticks, have a Right to lay down any Rules upon this Subject: For as to the Opinion of [i] *Ariſto*, *Pyrrho* and *Herillus*, that has been exploded a good while ago; who might have claim'd a Priviledge to treat about Duties, *as well as the former three*, had they but left a poſſibility of

[c] His Books *De finibus Bonorum & Malorum.*

[d] 'Tis a Stoical Principle, *That the Happineſs of Man conſiſts in acting agreeably to his Nature*; by *Nature*, underſtanding nothing elſe but *Right Reaſon*, whereby Man is diſtinguiſh'd from all other Creatures. By *conjuncta naturæ*, therefore in this place, I ſuppoſe he means, ſuch as are agreeable to the Dictates and Rules of Right Reaſon, *i. e. Rational.*

[e] For if any thing elſe may be deſir'd more than Virtue, I may part with my Virtue for obtaining of it; and by conſequence can't obſerve any ſettled, unalterable Rules of Duty.

[f] Who held that *nothing* was good or deſirable for its own ſake, but Virtue or Honeſty.

[g] Who deny'd there was any ſuch thing as Certainty, and were not tied to any particular Opinions, but always follow'd what appear'd moſt probable; tho' generally inclining to the Peripateticks. *See Book* 2. *ch.* 2. *Book* 3. *ch.* 4.

[h] Who held that *Virtue* was the chief, and abundantly moſt deſirable Good, [*See Book* 3. *ch.* 3.] but yet allow'd the Name of *Good* to ſome other things, *viz.* Riches, Friends, Health, *&c.* which the Stoicks did not.

[i] Theſe three Philoſophers were of different Opinions about Man's Happineſs; *Ariſto* and *Pyrrho* making it conſiſt in *Virtue alone*, with a perfect *indifference* as to every thing elſe, ſuch as Health, Riches, Honours, *&c.* [*See* Cicer. de Fin.

of Chuſing, and allow'd at leaſt ſo much Difference between things, as to put us into a capacity of finding out our Duty, and diſtinguiſhing it from that, which is not ſo. I ſhall [k] follow therefore at this time, and on this Subject more eſpecially the Stoicks; not as a bare Tranſlator of them, but (according to my uſual Cuſtom) ſhall take out of their Stores ſo much, and after ſuch a manner, as in my own Judgment I ſhall think moſt convenient. Seeing then the whole of our following Diſcourſe is deſign'd to be about *Offices* or *Duties*, I think 'twill be neceſſary for me in the firſt place, to [l] determin and fix the Signification of the word *Office*, which I can't

Fin. *Book* 4. *ch.* 16. Acad. Queſt. *Book* 4. *ch.* 42.] *Herillus* made it to conſiſt in *Knowledge*, with a like *indifference*. Tho' they did diſagree therefore in their Notions of Happineſs, yet they were all agreed in what *Cicero* here taxes them with, *viz.* taking away all *delectus rerum*, difference, or power of Chuſing, between things: by which means they left no *aditus* (as he ſpeaks) *ad inventionem Officii*, no way of finding out what is our Duty. For how can that Prudence which is ſeen in wiſely chuſing one thing before another, have any place, if all things are equally in themſelves indifferent? And if there be no difference between Sickneſs and Health, Riches and Poverty, and 'tis as good for a Man to be in one, as the other of theſe, this takes away all obligation of aſſiſting thoſe, who are in Sickneſs or Want; ſeeing, according to this Opinion, they are not any wiſe in a worſe condition, than the Healthy or Rich: and by conſequence all Juſtice, Charity, Bounty, *&c.* muſt fall to the Ground. This is what *Cicero* often objects to them, That they did *Virtutem ipſam, quam amplexabantur, tollere*, take away and ruin, by juſt conſequence, that Virtue, in which their Opinion made Happineſs to conſiſt. *See* Cic. de Fin. *Book* 2. *ch.* 13. *and ſeveral other places.*

[k] For being an Academick, he was not tied to any Set of Opinions, but allow'd to chuſe that, which he thought moſt probable; whether Stoick, Peripatetick, or any other.

[l] The word *definire* does not neceſſarily ſignifie to define, in the ſtrict acceptation of that word; but in a larger ſence, to ſet bounds to the meaning and ſignification of any word.

can't but admire to find omitted by [m] *Panætius*: for every clear and rational Diſcourſe upon any Subject, ought firſt to begin with an Explication of that Subject, that ſo we may have a diſtinct Conception of what we are afterwards to diſcourſe about.

[m] An eminent Stoick, Scholar of *Antipater Tarſenſis* or *Sidonius*. He writ three Books concerning *Offices*, which *Cicero* follows in this Work. He was a *Rhodian* by birth, and greatly admir'd for his Learning and Wiſdom by the ſecond *Africanus*, and the wiſe *Lælius*, &c. *Cicero* often makes honourable mention of him, calling him *One of the greateſt of all the Stoicks, and worthy of that Familiarity with thoſe two great Men.*

CHAP. III.

The whole Subject of Duties conſiſts of two Parts. Ordinary and perfect Duties, and what they are. Panætius *made but three general Heads of Deliberation, to which* Cicero *adds two more. The general Method he deſigns to take in the whole Work.*

[a] THe whole ſubject of Duties then, in its greateſt Latitude, comprehends under it theſe two Parts: The firſt is taken up in explaining what is *Good*, and what our *greateſt Good*. The ſecond in certain Directions and Precepts, according to which, upon all occaſions, 'tis our Duty to govern our Lives and Actions. To the firſt Part belong ſuch Queſtions as theſe, *Whether all Duties are perfect, or not?*

[a] The whole of Morality conſiſts of two Parts; in one of which, 'tis enquir'd, What the Happineſs or chief Good of Man is: in the ſecond are laid down ſome Rules of Action,

not? And, *Whether one can be greater or leſs than another?* With ſeveral others to the ſame purpoſe. Not but that [b] the Duties of this ſecond Part, the Rules and Precepts of which are laid down, have ſome tendency and relation to our chiefeſt Good; but only it does not ſo plainly appear, becauſe they ſeem to concern more immediately the Government of our Lives, and Regulation of our Manners: and theſe are they I deſign to explain in the following Treatiſe. There is alſo another [c] Diſtribution of Duties, ſome of 'em being call'd *Middle* or Ordinary, and others *Perfect* or Compleat. To the latter, I think, we may give the name of *Right* or *Strait*, which ſort by the *Greeks* is call'd Κατόρθωμα; as the former *ordinary one* Καθῆκον. By that which we have call'd *Right* or *Strait*, as they explain it, is meant a Virtue, *That is wholly Compleat in all its Parts, without any manner of Flaw or Im-*

on, by living up to which he is to obtain that Happineſs. Of the former he has diſcours'd in his Books *de Finibus*: the latter makes the Subject of his preſent Enquiry.

[b] Such are the Actions of Juſtice, Temperance, *&c.* the performance of which tends directly to Man's Happineſs, tho' they immediately relate to the Conduct of his Life.

[c] Philoſophers uſually reckon three Degrees or States of Virtue; The *firſt* utterly imperfect, before a Man has gotten an Habit of it; which is rather an Entrance into, than a State of, Virtue, therefore not mentioned here by our Author. The *ſecond* more perfect, when a Man hath got a Habit of it, but yet may ſometimes fall into Vice; ſuch was the Virtue of *Cato*, *Lælius*, and other wiſe Men. The *third* abſolutely perfect and compleat, by *Ariſtotle* call'd *Heroick*, and by the Stoicks, *The State of Wiſdom*: When a Man has perfectly got the maſtery of his Paſſions, and with all the Powers and Faculties of his Soul, from a perfect Habit of the trueſt Wiſdom and Prudence, doth nothing but what is wholly agreeable to right Reaſon. An *Office* or *Virtue* of this third kind the Stoicks called κατόρθωμα; and the Man that does it a *wiſe Man*, ſuch a one as (by their own confeſſion) never was in the World, but only in Idea. A Virtue of the ſecond

Imperfection; and by that, which we have call'd *Ordinary*, ſuch a one, as, *A fair and reaſonable Account may be given for the doing of it.* [d] Now theſe *fair and reaſonable Accounts* are all to be drawn from ſeveral Heads, which are by *Panætius* reduc'd to three, and may be call'd general Heads of Deliberating or Doubting concerning any Action, whether it ſhould, or ſhould not be done. The firſt is when 'tis conſulted or doubted, Whether the Action, that's under Conſideration, be Honeſt or Diſhoneſt; in which Enquiry Men are often divided between ſeveral Opinions. The ſecond is, when 'tis enquired and conſulted, Whether the Action, that's under Deliberation, will ſupply us with the Pleaſures and Conveniencies of Life, furniſh us with Plenty of outward things, ſuch as Riches, Honors, Power, *&c.* which may put us into a capacity of doing good to our ſelves, and to all thoſe for whom we are more nearly concern'd; all which Enquiry comes under the general Head of [e] *Profit*. The third Ground or Reaſon of Doubting is, When that thing, which [f] ſeems to be profitable for us, comes into competition with that which is Honeſt: For then our Intereſt drawing us one way, and Honeſty pulling us back

ſecond is called κατόρθωσις, which I have Engliſh'd *Ordinary*, which does not require a perfect imaginary Wiſdom, but is ſuch as ordinary Men are capable of in the Affairs of Life. *See Book* 3. *ch.* 3, 4.

[d] I have enlarg'd a little upon our Author here, to make his Sence more plain.

[e] He comprehends then under the Notion of Profit, not only Riches and Honors, but all the other Conveniencies and Pleaſures of Life; ſuch as Health, Strength, bodily Pleaſures, *&c.* And an Action that will ſupply us with any of theſe, is what he calls by the name of a *profitable* one.

[f] He ſays *ſeems to be*, becauſe however it may ſupply us with the Conveniencies of Life, yet 'tis not really, but only ſeems to be profitable, if it thwart Honeſty. For Honeſty being

back another, the wavering Mind is, as 'twere, toru in ſunder between the two, and is rack'd with doubting and anxious Thoughts. There's no greater fault in any Diviſion, than not to take in all the ſeveral parts of the Matter to be divided; and yet two are omitted in the now mention'd one of *Panætius*. For Men not only conſult and deliberate, whether ſuch an Action be Honeſt or Diſhoneſt; but alſo, Of two Honeſts, that are both propos'd to 'em, which is the moſt ſo; and, in like manner, Of two Profitables, which is the moſt profitable. From whence it appears, That what he thought was contain'd in three, ought rather to be divided into five Heads. [g] We muſt then, in the firſt place, diſcourſe about *Honeſty*, and this we ſhall do under theſe two Enquiries; *Whether the thing propos'd be Honeſt or Diſhoneſt?* And, *Of two that are Honeſt, which is the moſt ſo?* which will make up the Subject of our Firſt Book. We ſhall treat in our Second of *Profit* or *Intereſt* under the ſame Heads. And laſtly, in our Third, we ſhall endeavour to ſhew, *When a ſeeming Advantage and Honeſty come into competition, how a good Man ſhould determin his Judgment.*

being the *greateſt*, if not *only* Good, as he before laid down, whatever takes away our Honeſty, muſt needs be unprofitable for us, tho' it ſhould ſupply us with all the Pleaſures and Glories of the World, as he ſhews at large in the third Book.

[g] Having thus laid down his five Heads of Deliberation, he tells you in what Method he deſigns to diſcourſe of 'em. In the firſt Book he'll handle the two about Honeſty: Firſt, *Whether an Action be Honeſt or Diſhoneſt?* to ch. 43. Secondly, *Of two that are both Honeſt, which is the moſt ſo?* to the end. In the ſecond Book he treats of Profitable, enquiring, Firſt, *Whether an Action be Profitable, or not?* to ch. 25. Secondly, *Of two that are both Profitable, which is the moſt ſo?* to the end. The whole Subject of the third Book is the fifth Head, *When a ſeeming Profit interferes with Honeſty, how a Man ſhould do to know what is his Duty?* I have added ſomething to the Text here, to make the Method more plain.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

The Excellence of the Nature of Man, above that of Brutes. How the ſeveral Virtues, Prudence, Juſtice, *&c. are agreeable to its Dictates, and reſult from 'em. Wherein* Honeſtum *in general conſiſts.*

THe firſt thing then to be taken notice of is this, That every Creature doth by Nature endeavour to preſerve its own ſelf, its Life and Body; and to ſhun and avoid thoſe things which appear prejudicial and hurtful to it; but to ſeek and procure whatever is neceſſary for the ſupport of its Being, and advancement of its Happineſs, ſuch as Food, Shelter, and the like. There is likewiſe common to all ſorts of Animals, a Deſire of Copulation, for the continuance and propagation of their ſeveral Species; together with a Love and Concern for their young Ones. Now there's this ſpecial Difference between Men and Brutes; that the *latter* are govern'd by nothing but their Senſes, never look any farther than juſt to what ſtrikes and affects 'em at preſent, and have a very little, if any Concern for what is paſt or to come: But the *former* are Creatures endow'd with Reaſon, which gives 'em a power to carry their Thoughts to the Conſequences of Things; to diſcover Cauſes before they have yet produc'd their Effects; to ſee the whole Progreſs,

* His Deſign he has told us is, to treat of the Means for attaining Man's Happineſs. Now the Happineſs of any thing is the higheſt Perfection of its Nature, which conſiſts in acting moſt agreeably to its Dictates: as that's a perfect Horſe or Dog, which does thoſe things beſt, which are moſt according to the Natures of thoſe Animals. The Duties therefore, of which he is to treat, ſince their Deſign is to bring Men to Happineſs, muſt needs be ſuch as are perfective of, and conſequently ſuch

as

greſs, and even the firſt Seeds, (as it were) and Appearances of 'em; to compare like Occurrences with like; and by joyning what is paſt, and what is to come together, to make a juſt Eſtimate of the one from the other; whereby they are able at once to take a View of their whole Lives, and accordingly make proviſion for the Neceſſities of 'em. [b] And the ſame force of Reaſon makes all Men by nature to Love one another, and deſire an Intercourſe of Words and Actions. It begets in 'em likewiſe [c] a ſomewhat extraordinary Love and Affection for their own Children, and ſtrongly enclines 'em to frequent Publick Meetings, and keep up Societies one amongſt another. For the ſame Reaſon alſo they are very induſtrious, to provide for the Neceſſaries and Conveniencies of Life; and that not only for themſelves in particular, but for their Wives, their Children, and others, whom they have a Kindneſs for, and are oblig'd to take Care of; which Concern is very proper to rouſe up the Spirits, and make 'em more vigorous and active

as are agreeable to, the Nature of Man. And to ſhew that they are ſo, and how they are deduc'd and deriv'd from it, 'twas neceſſary for him in the firſt place, to ſhew wherein the Nature of Man conſiſts, and how it differs from that of other Creatures; which is therefore the Deſign of this Chapter. *See his* de Fin. *Book* 2. *ch.* 14. *and Book* 5. *ch.* 9, 10, *&c.*

[b] How *Juſtice*, or the Virtues relating to Human Society, ſuch as Liberality, Good-nature, Gratitude, *&c.* are agreeable to the Dictates and Principles of Human Nature.

[c] That is, Much greater than that which Brutes have for their young Ones: one is the Effect of only natural Inſtinct, the other of Reaſon together with it: the one laſts but a little while, till the Young is able to ſhift for it ſelf, the other till Death: the one prompts Brutes only to take care of the Bodies of their Off-ſpring; the other, Men to take care of the Minds of theirs, by inſtructing 'em in Principles of Virtue and Honeſty, *&c.*

[d] *Pru-*

ctive in Buſineſs. [d] But of all the Properties and Inclinations of Men, there is none more natural and peculiar to 'em, than an earneſt Deſire and Search after Truth. Hence 'tis our Minds are no ſooner free, from the Thoughts and Engagements of neceſſary Buſineſs, but we preſently long to be either ſeeing, or hearing, or learning of ſomething; and eſteem the Knowledge of things ſecret and wonderful, as a neceſſary Ingredient of a happy Life. From whence it appears, That nothing is more agreeable and ſuited to the Nature and Minds of Men, than undiſguis'd Openneſs, Truth and Sincerity. Next to this Love and Affection for Truth [e], there follows in the Soul an impatient Deſire and Inclination to Rule; ſo that whoever has the genuin Nature of a Man in him, will never endure to be ſubject to another, unleſs he be one that inſtructs, or adviſes, or is inveſted with a juſt and lawful Authority, for the Benefit of the Publick. From whence there ariſes a Greatneſs of Soul, [f] which ſets it above all the petty Concerns, and trifling Enjoyments of this preſent World. 'Tis another, and that too no mean Prerogative of our reaſonable Nature, [g] That Man alone can diſcern all the Beauties of Order and Decency, and knows how to govern his Words and Actions in conformity to them. 'Tis he alone, that of all the Creatures, obſerves and is pleas'd with the Beauty, Gracefulneſs and Symmetry of Parts

[d] *Prudence*, or the Virtues relating to Truth, ſuch as Wiſdom, Knowledge, Plainneſs, *&c.* agreeable to Nature.

[e] How *Fortitude*, or *Greatneſs of Soul*, is agreeable to Human Nature.

[f] For this deſire of Rule, and being ſubject to no body, makes a Man ſcorn to be a Slave either to his own Paſſions, or Inclinations; or part with his Liberty to any one elſe, for the ſake of Honors, Preferments, *&c.* *See ch.* 20.

[g] Decency, Modeſty, *&c.* derived from the Dictates and Principles of Nature.

Ho-

Parts in the *Objects of Senſe*; which Nature and Reaſon obſerving in them, from thence take occaſion to apply the ſame alſo to *thoſe of the Mind*; and conclude that Beauty, Conſiſtency, and Regularity, ſhould be much more kept up in our Words and Actions; and therefore command us, That nothing be done that is effeminate or unbecoming; and, That ſo ſtrict a Guard be kept over every Thought and Action, as that no Luſt or Filthineſs be either conceiv'd or practis'd by us. From theſe Inclinations and Inſtincts of Nature, ariſes and reſults that [h] *Honeſtum* we're ſeeking for; which however little valu'd and eſteem'd it may be, is nevertheleſs virtuous and aimiable in it ſelf; and which we may juſtly ſay, tho' 'twere commended by no one, is yet in its own Nature truly Commendable.

[h] Honeſty then in general is nothing elſe, but the acting according to the Dictates and Inclinations of Nature or Right Reaſon; and conſiſts of four general Virtues, *Juſtice*, or the keeping up Society and Entercourſe among Men; *Prudence*, or the Contemplation of Truth; *Courage*, or Greatneſs of Soul; and *Temperance*, or the Virtues of Decency, Modeſty, *&c.* of each of which he diſcourſes afterwards in particular.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

The admirable Beauty of Honesty. *Four general Heads of* It, *from which all the several Duties arise; and what the Object of each of 'em is, about which 'tis employ'd.*

THus, Son *Marcus*, have I giv'n you a rough Draught, and just the Outlines, as it were, of *Honesty*; which could she be seen in her full Beauty with mortal Eye, would make the whole World (as *Plato* has said) be in love with [a] Wisdom. Now whatever's contain'd under the Notion of Honesty, arises from one of these four Heads; *First*, A sagacious Enquiry and Observation for the finding out of Truth; *which may be called by the general name of Prudence. Secondly*, A Care to maintain that Society and mutual Entercourse, which is between Men; to render to every Man what is his due; and to stand to one's Words in all Promises and Bargains; *which we call Justice. Thirdly*, The Greatness and unshaken Resolution of a truely brave and invincible Mind; *which goes by the name of Magnanimity or Fortitude.* And, *Lastly*, A Keeping of our Words and Actions within the due Limits of Order and Decency; under which are comprehended [b] *Temperance* and *Moderation.* Now every one of these

[a] For what else is it but only Wisdom, that leads us to the attainment of Virtue and Honesty? Or rather indeed what else is Wisdom, but Virtue and Honesty it self? He therefore that can behold the glorious Beauties of Honesty, must needs fall in Love with Wisdom; which indeed is nothing but Honesty it self; it being impossible for any One to be Wise, that is not at the same time Virtuous and Honest; Knavishness and Roguery being always the greatest Folly.

[b] He doth not therefore restrain Temperance, as *Aristotle* did,

theſe ſeveral Heads, tho' they [c] all have a mutual Connexion and Dependance on one another, has yet its particular *Claſſis* (as it were) and reſpective Set of Duties ariſing from it. From that, for example, which is mention'd firſt, and under which *Prudence* and *Wiſdom* are contain'd, ariſes the Duty of Seeking, Contemplating and Finding out of Truth, which is the proper and peculiar Buſineſs of thoſe Virtues: For 'tis then, and then alone, that we juſtly eſteem a Man prudent and wiſe, when we find that he's able to ſee and diſcover the Truth of things; and of an active, vigorous and piercing Mind, to give an account of the Reaſons of 'em; ſo that 'tis *Truth* that is the proper Object of both theſe Virtues, and that about which they are [d] only concern'd. The other three Heads more peculiarly belong to the *active Life*, and their Buſineſs lies in procuring and maintaning what is uſeful and neceſſary for the preſervation of it; as in keeping up mutual Love and Correſpondence among Mankind; in an elevated greatneſs and ſtrength of Mind;

did, and we in our Language do, to obſerving a Mediocrity in Eating, *&c.* but makes it belong to all the other Virtues, and ſet 'em their Bounds, which if they paſs they degenerate into Vices. 'Tis the buſineſs of Prudence, for inſtance, to Search out Truth; but this may be done intemperately, *i. e.* too much, *&c.* 'Tis the Work of Temperance therefore to determin, how far, and after what manner, it ought to be Sought for; in which ſence the Word's to be underſtood, as alſo proportionably its oppoſite *Intemperantia*, in other places of this and other Authors: So *Intemperantia Pauſaniæ*, is his Pride and Inſolence, *in* Corn. Nep.

[c] This is true of the Virtues in the State of *Perfection:* for he who is virtuous to that degree, muſt have a perfect Prudence, [*See Note* 3. *ch.* 3.] and by conſequence muſt act prudently, *i. e. virtuouſly*, as well in one, as another caſe. As we know whoever is Honeſt out of a Principle of Conſcience, will be Honeſt in every thing; and won't think it enough to be Juſt and Bountiful, but will alſo be True, Sincere, *&c.*

[d] *See Note* 4. *ch.* 6.

[e] Not

Mind; which appears, as in getting things profitable and pleaſant for our ſelves and Dependants; ſo more eſpecially in deſpiſing and being above 'em. Then as for the laſt, *viz.* Order, Uniformity, Moderation and the like, 'tis plain they belong not only [c] to Contemplation, but have alſo a reſpect to our outward Actions; ſince from keeping of *theſe* within the bounds and limits of Order and Moderation, we are ſaid to obſerve what is virtuous and becoming.

[c] Not but that they are ſeen in Contemplation too; for there is ſuch a thing as Moderation to be obſerv'd, even in our Searches after Truth; but they are ſeen more eſpecially in our outward Actions.

CHAP. VI.

Prudence or Contemplation of Truth, the firſt of the general Virtues, is the neareſt ally'd to the Nature of Man. Two Cautions concerning it. It ought to give place to the Duties of the Active Life. What it ought eſpecially to be employ'd about.

[a] HAving thus explain'd how the whole Nature, and Power of Honeſty, is deduc'd from ſome one of theſe four Parts, we are now to diſcourſe of 'em each in particular. And, firſt, Of *Prudence*, which is wholly taken up in the knowledge of Truth, and has the neareſt Affinity of any with the reaſonable Nature of Man. For how are we all of us drawn and entic'd with the Deſire of Wiſdom? How noble and glorious a thing do we imagin it to

[a] I have added ſomething to the beginning of this Chapter, to make the Connexion with the foregoing plainer. C.

to excel in Knowledge? And how mean and reproachful do we count it on the other hand, to slip, to be in an Error, to be Ignorant, or to be impos'd upon? In gratifying this so natural and virtuous Inclination in the Mind of Man, there are two grand Faults to be carefully avoided: The *first* is an over-great Hastiness and Rashness in giving up our Assent, presuming that we know things before we really do so. Whoever desires (as I am sure all ought) to avoid this Error, must in all his Enquiries allow himself time, and diligently consider the Matter with himself, before he proceeds to pass his Judgment upon it. The *second* Fault is, That a great many Men bestow abundance of Study, and a world of Pains, upon very difficult and obscure Subjects; and such as perhaps, when they are found out, are of but very little, or no Concernment. Would Men but be careful to shun these two Mistakes, whatsoever Study or Pains they might spend upon virtuous, worthy, or profitable Subjects, 'twould not without Reason be highly commended. Thus [b] *Caius Sulpicius* was heretofore prais'd for his Skill in Astronomy: [c] *Sext. Pompeius*, since my memory, for his in Geometry: Many have been famous in the Study of Logick, and more in that of the Civil Laws: the [d] more peculiar

[b] *C. Sulpicius Gallus*, Prætor of *Rome*, an *U. C.* 581, and the Year after, Tribune of a Legion under *P. Æmilius*, in the Great *Macedonian* War; where, by his Astronomy, he foretold to the *Roman* Soldiers an Eclipse of the Moon, so that they were not at all disheartned; whereas the Enemy, who knew nothing at all of such an Appearance before-hand, were extreamly terrify'd at it. Livy, *Book* 44. *ch.* 37. *Plutarch's Æmilius*. Cicero *often mentions him.*

[c] Uncle to *Pompey* the Great; several times mentioned by our Author, for his great Skill in Geometry, Philosophy, and the Civil Laws.

[d] The immediate end of all these Sciences indeed is Truth, not

liar Buſineſs, of all which parts of Learning, is the finding out of Truth. No Man however ſhould be ſo taken up in the Search of Truth, as thereby to neglect the more neceſſary Duties of the Active Life: For, after all is done, 'tis Action only that gives a true Value and Commendation to Virtue. Not that we are able to be always a doing without intermiſſion, but often retire from Buſineſs to Study; beſide that the Mind, [e] which is in perpetual motion and agitation, of it ſelf will ſupply us with Study and Thinking, whether we ſet our ſelves to it, or not. In a word, The general aim and deſign of our Thought, and application of Mind, [f] is either the attainment of ſuch things as are Honeſt, and tend to a virtuous and happy way of Life; or elſe the improvement of our Reaſon and Underſtanding in Wiſdom and Knowledge. And this may ſuffice for the firſt of our general Heads of Duty.

not but that they may any of 'em be applied to Action; as *Sulpicius*'s Aſtronomy, for example, was.

[e] What great Uſe might be made of this continual Activity of the Soul, if inſtead of ſpending it (as too many do) upon frivolous, uſeleſs and wicked Subjects, 'twere conſtantly employ'd upon ſome virtuous, uſeful or neceſſary Enquiries?

[f] This is no more than the ordinary *School-diviſion* of the Underſtanding into Practical and Speculative; The former conſiders things in order to Practice, as, whether Good or Bad, Honeſt or Diſhoneſt, tending to a happy or miſerable Life: The latter only in order to Knowledge, whether they are True, or not True, without any direct tendency to Practice at all. The former is only *Prudence*, and the latter *Knowledge*: By which it appears in what Sence he takes the word *Truth*, when he ſays, 'Tis the Object of this Virtue, *viz.* not only for *Truth*, as oppoſite to *Falſhood* in Speculation; but as comprehending under it that which is *truly* Good and Honeſt, as oppoſite to Vice and Diſhoneſty.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

The ſecond general Virtue, which conſiſts in maintaining of Human Society. Two Parts of it, Juſtice *and* Liberality. *The firſt Duty of Juſtice. All things at firſt common. The Original of Property. Men are born for the Good,* &c. *of one another: whence ariſes the ſecond Duty of Juſtice. Two ſorts of Injuſtice, the one of* Commiſſion; *the other of* Omiſſion. *The Cauſes of the firſt ſort of Injuſtice; Firſt,* Fear: *Secondly,* Deſire.

OF the other remaining three, [a] that which conſiſts in upholding Society, and keeping up mutual Love and good Nature amongſt Mankind, ſeems of the largeſt and moſt diffuſive Extent. It comprehends under it theſe two Parts: Firſt, *Juſtice*, which is much the moſt glorious and ſplendid of all Virtues, and alone entitles us to the Name and Appellation of *Good* Men. And, Secondly, *Beneficence*, which may alſo be call'd either Bounty or Liberality. Now the firſt thing that Juſtice requires of us is this, *That no one ſhould do any Hurt to another, unleſs he be neceſſarily driven upon it for his own Security:* [b] *and whatever belongs either to all in common, or to particular Perſons as their own Propriety, ſhould not be alter'd, but made uſe of accordingly.* Now no Man can ſay that he has any thing [c] *his*

[a] Which may be call'd *Juſtice* in a larger ſignification of that Word, as it takes in all the Duties Men owe to one another, which is the ſecond general Head he mention'd; and comprehends under it *Juſtice* ſtrictly ſo call'd, and *Liberality* or Kindneſs one to another; of which he begins to treat, *chap.* 14.

[b] The word *deinde* doth not denote a ſecond Duty of Juſtice, but only the ſecond Part of the firſt Duty, of, *Doing no Wrong.*

[c] *his own* by a Right of Nature; but either by an ancient immemorial Seizure, as those who first planted uninhabited Countries: Or, secondly, by Conquest, as those who have got things by the Right of the Sword; or else by some Law, Compact, Agreement, or Lot. 'Tis by some of these means, that the People inhabiting [d] *Arpinum* and *Tusculum* came to have those Lands, which are now call'd theirs; and [e] the same may be said as to private Mens Estates. However, since at present, *by some of these ways*, each particular Man has his personal Possessions, out of that which by Nature was common to all, 'tis but reason that each should hold what is now his own; which if any one endeavour to take away from him, [f] he

Wrong. The meaning is, That of things which are common, he should content himself with his reasonable Share: and those which are appropriate to particular Persons, he should suffer to remain in the State they are without disturbance. The word *suus* signifies here, as in many other places, the same thing with *proprius*.

[c] He supposes all things at first to have been common, like the Room in a Theatre, or other such place; and, as in these, he who first gets a Place has a Right to it, and can't be fairly turn'd out of it; so he imagins it to have been in old Time. Not that the Seizure of it self gives a Right, but the tacit Agreement amongst Mankind, That what any Man had first possess'd himself of, should be his own Property. *See* Grot. De Jure B. & P. *Book* 2. *ch.* 2.

[d] *Cicero* himself was born at *Arpinum*, a mean place in *Italy*; hence, by his Enemies in contempt, call'd *Arpinas*. He had a noble Country-house at *Tusculum*, another Town not far from *Rome*, whither he often retir'd, and where he wrote five Books of Philosophy, thence call'd his *Tusculan Questions*. He therefore uses the Examples of these two Places, because his Son was acquainted with 'em.

[e] *Descriptio*, signifies a Draught of any Land, or the like, in order to every Man's having his due Share: The meaning is, that private Men came to their Estates, by the like sort of Distribution or Allotment, as Towns and Cities did.

[f] *Quic-*

[f] he directly breaks in upon common Juſtice, and violates the Rights of Human Society. *But ſeeing* (as is excellently ſaid by *Plato*) *we are not Born for our ſelves alone; but that our native Country, our Friends and Relations, have a juſt Claim and Title to ſome part of us*; and ſeeing whatſoever is created on Earth, was meerly deſign'd (as the Stoicks will have it) for the Service of Men; and Men themſelves for the Service, Good and Aſſiſtance of one another: We [g] certainly in this ſhould be Followers of Nature, and ſecond her Intentions; and by producing all that lies within the reach of our Power for the general Intereſt, by mutually giving and receiving good Turns, by our Knowledge, Induſtry, Riches, or other means, ſhould endeavour to keep up that Love and Society, that ſhould be amongſt Men. Now the great Foundation of Juſtice is [h] *Faithfulneſs*, which conſiſts in being conſtantly firm to your Word, and a conſcientious performance of all Compacts and Bargains; whereupon for this once, let us venture to follow the Opinion of the Stoicks, thoſe mighty Admirers of Derivations, and believe that *Fides* [Faithfulneſs] is ſo

[f] *Quicquid jure poſſidetur* (ſays *Quintil.*) *injuria aufertur*; Whatever any Man is in the rightful Poſſeſſion of, can't be taken from him without Injuſtice: Since every one then has a Right to that, which is now his own, tho' 'twere originally common, no one without injuring him can diſpoſſeſs him of it again.

[g] He now comes to the ſecond Duty of Juſtice, which is, *To do all the Good we can*; as the firſt was, *To do no Wrong*.

[h] Juſtice is the rendring to every Man his due; which no one can do without being true to his Word, and conſcientiouſly performing all Promiſes, Oaths, Bargains, *&c.* For he that Promiſes, *&c.* to another, makes himſelf a Debtor of ſomething to him, which he may demand as a kind of Due. 'Tis the buſineſs of Faithfulneſs to ſee this pay'd; ſo that Juſtice is, as 'twere, built upon Faithfulneſs, as its Baſis and Foundation.

ſo call'd, (tho' perhaps it may ſeem a little too far fetcht) *quia fiat quod dictum eſt*, becauſe what was promis'd is perform'd. The [i] Vice that is oppoſite to Juſtice is Injuſtice, of which there are two ſorts; the *firſt* conſiſts in the actual doing an Injury to another; the *ſecond* in tamely looking on while he is Injur'd, and not helping and defending him, tho' we are able. For he that injuriouſly falls upon another, whether prompted by Rage or other violent Paſſion, does as 'twere leap at the throat of his Companion; and he that refuſes to help him when Injur'd, and to ward off the Wrong, if it lies in his power, is as plainly guilty of Baſeneſs and Injuſtice, as tho' he had deſerted his Father, his Friends, or his native Country. [k] Now that former Injuſtice, which conſiſts in the *wilful and actual Wronging another*, has oftentimes no other cauſe but *Fear*; when he, who deſignedly does a Man an Injury, is afraid leaſt himſelf ſhould be forc'd to undergo one, if he does not ſecure himſelf by doing it before-hand. But generally ſpeaking, the great ſource and fountain of all ſuch Injuſtice is [l] the ſatisfying ſome irregular and exorbitant Appetite; and in a more eſpecial manner, the deſire of Riches: *of which we ſhall therefore ſay ſomething in particular.*

[i] Having laid down the two great Duties of Juſtice, and the Foundation of it; he now proceeds to its oppoſite Vice, *Injuſtice*, (of which there are two ſorts) and the Cauſes of it.

[k] The Cauſes of the firſt ſort of Injuſtice, *viz. Of Commiſſion*: Firſt, *Fear*. Not but that 'tis lawful, if I *ſee* another taking up a Sword, and *plainly perceive* he's going to Stab me, to Stab him before-hand to prevent my own Death, if I can't poſſibly eſcape any other way. But this muſt be very certain and apparent; a bare fear or ſuſpicion that another deſigns me an Injury, not being a ſufficient Reaſon why I ſhould do him one.

[l] A ſecond Cauſe of this Injuſtice, *The ſatisfying ſome irregular Deſire*; as, *Firſt*, That of Money; of which in the next Chapter.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

The Desire of Riches, which is one Cause of Injustice, whence it proceeds. 'Tis allowable enough, so long as it does not draw Men to the Injuring of others. The Desire of Honours, &c. another Cause of Injustice. It usually is found in Men of the greatest Minds. There is a difference to be made between those Injuries, that are done hastily, and in a Passion, and those that proceed from premeditated Malice.

RIches then are most commonly desir'd, either to supply us with the Necessaries of Life, or furnish us with the Pleasures and Conveniences of it; or else, as it often is observ'd to happen in Persons of great and aspiring Minds, as a means of obtaining *an Interest* in the Publick, and *a Power* of Obliging and Gratifying one's Friends; to which purpose was that Saying of the late [a] *Marcus Crassus*, That whoever design'd to be a leading Man in the Commonwealth, ought never to think he had Estate enough, till he could maintain [b] an Army with its yearly Revenue. Others take pleasure in Splendor and

[a] A noble and wealthy, but very covetous *Roman*, twice Consul with *Pompey* the Great, whom *Vell. Paterc.* calls *Invictum par Consulum*. He was made Proconsul of *Apulia*, where he quell'd *Spartacus*, Ring-leader of the Slaves, and put an end to the Servile War. At last he, with *Pompey*, and *Cæsar*, divided the whole *Roman* Empire between 'em, and made the first Triumvirate. Here the East falling to his share, he made War upon the *Parthians*, out of a Desire of Money; but was conquer'd and slain by 'em, and had melted Gold poured down the Throat of his dead Body. His Life is writ by *Plutarch*.

[b] A *Roman* Army was four Legions, each consisting of six Thousand Foot, and three Hundred Horse; two of these Legions were given to each Consul every Year. The monthly Pay

and Magnificence; in a handſom, noble and plentiful way of Living; All which things have begot an inſatiable Greedineſs after Money, without which they can never be ſupported and maintain'd. Not but that a moderate Deſire of Riches, and bettering a Man's Eſtate, ſo long as it abſtains from oppreſſing of others, is allowable enough; but a very great care ought always to be taken, that we don't drawn to any Injuſtice by it. There's another [d] *Deſire* that makes Men as apt to be forgetful of Juſtice, as that after Riches, the Thirſt, I mean, of Empire, Glory, Honours, &c. For that Saying of [d] *Ennius*, *There's no inviolable Faith or Friendſhip in the Matter of a Kingdom*, tho' apply'd by him to that one caſe only, is yet full out as true in a great many others; for where-ever the Subject of Contention is ſuch, as that only one Party can meet with Succeſs, and the reſt muſt fall ſhort of what they deſire; things are uſually carry'd to ſo great a height, as that 'tis very difficult not to break in upon Faith and Friendſhip. This hath appear'd but too manifeſtly of late, in that raſh and moſt impudent Attempt of [e] *Caeſar*'s, who has broke thro' all thoſe Ties and Obligations, that either by Gods or Men could be laid upon him, for the compaſſing and getting

of an Army came to about 25000 Pounds: By which it appears what an Eſtate *Craſſus* deſir'd, to keep 'em a whole Year.

[c] A ſecond Deſire, that is very often the Cauſe of Injuſtice, is, That of Honour, Glory, &c.

[d] A famous ancient *Latin* Poet, born at *Rudiae*, a Town in *Calabria*, thence by our Author call'd *Rudinus homo*, in his Oration *pro Archia*. He was very familiar with *Africanus Major*, the Wiſe *Lælius*, *Cato Cenſorius*, &c. which laſt brought him firſt to *Rome*. His Works are loſt, except ſome Fragments preſerv'd by *Cicero*, and others.

[e] *Julius Caeſar*, who, ambitious of the Empire, rais'd a Civil War againſt the Senate and *Pompey* the Great; whom he conquer'd in the *Pharſalian* Field. *See an Account by himſelf in his Commentaries.*

[f] For

ting of that Empire to himſelf, which he vainly propos'd in his depray'd Imagination. But in this caſe, 'tis one very great unhappineſs, that the Thirſt after Honour, Empire, Power, &c. falls moſt upon Men of the greateſt Souls, and moſt exalted Natures; wherefore the greater care ought to be taken, that nothing of Offence be committed in this kind. Now it makes a great difference in all Acts of Injuſtice, whether they proceed from ſome violent Paſſion, (which is for the moſt part of ſhort continuance) or are done with Deſign and previous Deliberation: For thoſe that are the Effects of a ſudden guſt of Paſſion, ought not to be eſteem'd of ſo heinous a Nature, as thoſe that proceed from premeditated Malice. And this may ſuffice for the firſt ſort of Injuſtice, which conſiſts in *The actual doing of Wrong*; and the Cauſes of it.

d. For we ſhould increaſe our Care according to the greatneſs of our Danger; and where we are likely to be moſt violently Aſſaulted, there we ſhould place the ſtrongeſt Guard.

CHAP. IX.

Injustice of Omission, and the Causes of it. Those are guilty of it, who spend their whole Life in Study and Contemplation; as some Philosophers have done. Justice ought to proceed from Choice. Those who mind nothing but their own Business are guilty of this Injustice. Self-love hinders Men from seeing their Duty. An excellent Rule for the avoiding of all Injustice.

AS for the [a] second, which only consists *in seeing another Injur'd, and being wanting to our Duty, by not defending him*; the Causes of *that* are wont to be several. For some are afraid of offending others, or of bringing a trouble and charge upon themselves: Others are negligent, idle, or mean-spirited: And a third sort there is, who are so taken up with their own Concerns, that they have no time left to regard the Oppress'd, whom yet 'tis their Duty to save and protect. I am therefore of Opinion, that *Plato*'s Consequence will hardly hold good, where speaking about the Philosophers, he says, "They "are wholly taken up in the seeking out of Truth, "and perfectly neglect and make light of those "things, which the rest of the World are so ea- "ger after, and so contend about; and that *there-* "*fore* they are just. *This*, I say, *I am afraid is a bad Consequence*; for tho', 'tis true, [b] they keep the first sort of Justice, inasmuch as they *actually do* no Wrong;

[a] He comes now to the second sort of Injustice, that of Omission; the Causes of which are, first, Fear of giving Offence, of Charge, *&c.*

[b] In Chap. 21. he puts two Cases, wherein he thinks these Men may be excusable: 1. If their Genius lie very much toward Learning, *&c.* 2. If they are of weak Constitutions,

Wrong; yet they run perfectly counter to the other: for being engag'd in their Learning and Studies, they abandon their Friends to be injur'd by others, whom in Juſtice they ought to have protected and defended. So that 'tis believ'd, they'd hardly ever trouble 'emſelves ſo far, as at all to inter-meddle with the Buſineſs of the Publick, if it was not altogether, as it were, forc'd upon them. But 'twere a great deal better would they do it voluntarily; for an [c] Action, tho' Honeſt, is not therefore truly virtuous, unleſs it be done out of Choice, and with a Good-will. There are [d] others yet, who out of a Deſire of improving their own Eſtates, or elſe a moroſe and unſociable ſort of Temper, cry, *They meddle with Nobody's Buſineſs but their own*, that ſo they may ſeem to be Men of ſtrict Honeſty, and to Injure Nobody: and they do indeed avoid the one ſort of Injuſtice, but directly run themſelves into the other; for they deſert the common Good and Society of Mankind, while they beſtow neither Study, Pains, nor Money toward the Preſervation of it. Thus have I laid down the two ſorts of Injuſtice, and pointed out to you the Cauſes of each; and have alſo endeavour'd to explain the true Nature and Extent of Juſtice; from all which Account 'twill be eaſie to judge, unleſs we are extreamly fond of our own Eaſe, what thoſe ſeveral Duties are, which at *ſeveral* times are required of us. I ſay,

ons, ſo as to be unable to meddle with Publick Affairs; as *Scipio*'s Son was.

[c] The Moraliſts make a diſtinction between doing an *honeſt* Action, and doing it *honeſtly*, *honeſtum* and *honeſte agere*. He that pays another his due, does an *honeſt* Action; but he does not do *honeſtly*, if againſt his Will, and by compulſion of Laws.

[d] Another Cauſe of this ſort of Injuſtice, a moroſe unſociable Temper, *&c.*

ſay, *Unleſs we are fond of our own Eaſe*; for the truth on't is, 'tis a troubleſome thing to be concern'd in the Buſineſs of other People; however old [c] *Chremes* in *Terence* thinks, *That he ought to be concern'd for the Good of all Men.* But be that as it will, foraſmuch as the Succeſs of our own Affairs, whether Good or Ill, more nearly concerns us, and makes us more ſenſible, than that of another's; (which appears to us ſmall, as a thing at a great diſtance) therefore we paſs a quite different Judgment upon the one and the other. And, upon this account, 'tis a very good Rule that is given by ſome Men, *That we ſhould never venture upon any Action, of which we doubt whether 'tis Honeſt or Diſhoneſt.* For Honeſty quickly would ſhew it ſelf by its own native Brightneſs; and the Doubting about it is a plain Intimation, that at leaſt we ſuſpected ſome Injuſtice when we did it.

[c] *Terence's Heautontimorumenos*, Act. 1. Sc. 1. *Chremes* expoſtulating with *Menedemus* for working ſo very hard, the other asks him, What he has to do to meddle with another's Buſineſs: to which he anſwers, *Homo ſum, humani nihil à me alienum puto*; I am a Man, and accordingly ought to be concern'd in whatever relates to the Welfare of any Man: Which good-natur'd Sentence, S^t *Auſtin* tells us, was applauded by the whole Theatre. We are all Fellow-members, and (as was obſerv'd, Chap. 7.) born for the Service, Good, and Aſſiſtance of one another, it being the fundamental Principle of the Law of Nature, That every Man ſhould ſeek the Good and Welfare of the whole Society, and every Member of it, as well as his own private and particular Intereſt: *Omnis homo eſt omni homini proximus, nec ulla cogitanda eſt longinquitas generis, ubi eſt natura communis*, ſays the forecited Father.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Justice is alter'd upon an Alteration of Circumstances; and what was our Duty in one Case to do, in other Circumstances, 'tis our Duty to avoid. Promises are not to be stood to in several Cases, as, If they are Prejudicial; If made thro' Fear, &c. A close adhering to the words of a Law, or Bargain, is a means of being Unjust; Craft in such cases to be diligently avoided.

BUt here 'tis observable, [a] That the Limits of Justice are not so fixt, but that they may be alter'd upon an alteration of the Circumstances; so that what at one time appears to be the Duty of an honest and good Man, at another is alter'd and becomes the quite contrary: To deliver up a Trust, for example, or perform a Promise, and other things relating to Truth and Faithfulness, are Duties which Justice it self will allow us, in several Cases, to [b] neglect or omit: For respect must be had to those general Rules we before laid down, as the Ground and Foundation of all Justice, *First*, That no Injury be done to any other. And, *Secondly*, That

[a] Having given an account of the Nature of Justice, and Injustice, with the Causes of this; he proceeds to shew, How, in several Cases, that which is usually a part of Justice, upon an alteration of Circumstances, becomes the contrary. For as a thing may be pleasing to the Palate, or healthful to the Body in some Circumstances, which is not so absolutely; as a Cup of bad Water to one in extream Thirst: So may an Action, which generally speaking is vicious and unreasonable; as the breaking of one's Promise, or the like; in some certain Cases become honest, and agreeable to Right Reason.

[b] The Word *migrare* signifies transitively here, as in some other places of this Author: So *migrare communia jura* signifies *to transgress* or *violate* 'em.

That we make it our earneſt Endeavour to promote the Good and Intereſt of all Mankind: So that our Duty is not always the ſame, but various according to the variety of Circumſtances. There may be a Contract or Promiſe, for inſtance, the performance of which would bring very great Damage, either to the Perſon himſelf that made it, or the other Party whom he was made to. Thus, had *Neptune* not granted what he promis'd to *Theſeus*, *Theſeus* had not ſuffered the loſs of his Son *Hippolytus*. For (as the Story goes) *Neptune* having granted him any three Wiſhes, for the third, he once in a very great paſſion, deſired the Death of his own Son; by obtaining of which, he was afterwards brought into the greateſt Afflictions. Such Promiſes therefore are [a] not to be kept, as will but bring a Miſchief on him they were made to: no more are thoſe, which tend to the Damage of the Promiſer himſelf, more than to the Profit of him they were pro-

[a] By *ex tempora*, I ſuppoſe, he means thoſe *Caſes* or *Circumſtances*; for ſo he often uſes the Word in this Work. He had juſt been ſaying, That nothing muſt be done contrary to the two great Rules of Juſtice before given: And then he adds, *Ea cum tempora commutantur*, that is, When the Caſe is ſuch, as that the keeping one's Promiſe, or the like, would be acting contrary to one of thoſe Rules, (that is, would be a great Injury to him that made it, or him to whom it was made, as he explains himſelf afterwards;) then our Duty is alter'd, and we are bound not to keep it; becauſe, if we ſhould, 'twould be a Breach of the fundamental Rule of that Virtue. This is the firſt Caſe, wherein a Man is not oblig'd to be as good as his Promiſe.

[a] *See chap.* 25. *Book* 3.

[b] Becauſe the keeping of 'em would be an Offence againſt the firſt Rule of Juſtice, Not to do any Wrong: and it may be ſuppos'd the Perſon, to whom they were made, had he ſeen ſuch a Miſchief enſuing, would not have demanded it. *See chap.* 24, 25. *Book* 3.

[c] Becauſe 'tis preſum'd the Perſon, who made ſuch a Promiſe, had he thought of ſuch a Damage likely to come of it, would

promis'd to. Again, [g] even Juſtice it ſelf requires us to perform a greater before a leſſer Duty: You promiſe, for example, a Friend of yours, to aſſiſt him in a Cauſe that he has depending, but your Son grows dangerouſly ſick in the mean time; here 'twould be no [h] breach of Duty in you, if you ſhould not make good what you promis'd to your Friend; and he himſelf rather would be much to blame, ſhould he complain of being diſappointed by you. Further, [i] 'tis plain to any one's Sence, that ſuch ſort of Promiſes can never be binding, as are made by People over-aw'd by Fear, or over-reach'd by Deceit; moſt of which are void by the [k] Prætor's Edicts, and ſome of 'em even by the Laws themſelves. But another great Spring from which Injuries ariſe, is ſome Quirk or Cavil, and an over-ſubtle and malicious Interpretation of the Laws; from whence that Saying, *Summum jus ſumma Injuria, The height of Juſtice is the height of Roguery,*

would not have made it. We promiſe as Men, who aren't infallible, and can't provide againſt every thing that may happen; wherefore we are ſuppos'd not to promiſe any further, than what we now know; and ſhould any extraordinary thing happen in the mean time, 'tis to be taken as a thing, which we tacitly excepted. But here we muſt proceed very warily and cautiouſly: this will hardly hold good in the caſe of a Promiſſory Oath, where God himſelf is call'd to witneſs. *See* Grot. de Jure B. & P. Puffendorf, *&c. upon this whole Subject.*

[g] Another Caſe wherein a Man is diſpenc'd from keeping his Promiſe, is, when ſome greater Duty requires his Attendance in the mean time.

[h] Becauſe to take care of a Son's Life, is a greater Duty, than to aſſiſt a Friend; and therefore ought to take place before it.

[i] Another Caſe wherein a Man is not oblig'd to perform his Promiſe, is, when he was forc'd to make it thro' Fear, or drawn to it by ſome Deceit. *See the forecited Authors.*

[k] The Laws being deliver'd only in general Terms, and not being able to deſcend to all particular Caſes, 'twas in the

guery, is now become a daily and common Proverb among us. There are frequent Examples of this to be met with in our Publick Tranſactions; as that of Him, for Example, who concluding a Truce with the Enemy for thirty Days, made continual Incurſions into their Territory by Night; becauſe, forſooth, the Truce was not made for ſo many Nights, but only ſo many Days. Juſt ſuch a crafty and pittiful Trick (if the Story be true) was that notable Cunning of *Quintus Fabius Labeo*'s; (or whoever the Man was, for I have it only by hear-ſay) who being by the Senate appointed Arbitrator, in a Difference between thoſe of [1] *Nola* and *Naples* about their Bounds; when he came to the place that was appointed for the Treaty, took aſide the Commiſſioners of either Party, and exhorted 'em privately, Not to be too eager and greedy in their Demands, but rather to take up and content 'emſelves with leſs, than pretend to any more than what was honeſtly their Due. Both Parties did ſo according to his deſire, ſo that a good quantity of Ground was left between them: this he e'en goes and adjudges to the *Romans*, leaving that to each Party, which they 'emſelves had demanded. And is not this now to Deceive and Cheat, rather than to Judge? In all caſes therefore ſuch ſubtle kind of Tricks ſhould be diligently avoided.

the power of the Prætor, or Judge, to ſupply that Defect by his Edicts and Authority.

[1] Two Cities in *Italy*, about fourteen Miles diſtant from one another.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

Juſtice to be kept towards all ſorts of Men. Bounds to be obſerv'd in Puniſhing thoſe that have Injur'd us. Laws of War to be ſtrictly obſerv'd. Two ſorts of Diſputing, by Reaſon *and* by the Sword: *The latter is allowable, when we can't obtain what's our Right by the former. What ought to be the End of making War. How it ſhould be carry'd on. The Strictneſs of the old* Romans *in obſerving the Laws of War. A Story of the Elder* Cato *to that purpoſe.*

THere are certain [a] Duties or Offices alſo, to be ſtrictly obſerv'd, even towards thoſe that have injur'd us; for we ought not to go beyond ſuch and ſuch Bounds, in exacting Revenge and Puniſhment of another: in which particular it may perhaps be enough, to make him that has wrong'd us repent of the Wrong done; ſo that he himſelf may abſtain from the like, and others take warning from his Example, for the future. There are certain peculiar Laws of [b] War alſo, which are of all things moſt ſtrictly to be obſerv'd in the Commonwealth: For there being two ſorts of Diſputing in the World, the one by Reaſon, and the other by open Force; and the former of theſe being that which is

[a] After having diſcours'd of the Nature of Juſtice, *&c.* he proceeds to ſhew, That we ought to practice it towards all ſorts of People; as, *Firſt*, Even towards thoſe who have wrong'd us.

[b] In the ſecond place we ought to ſhew Juſtice to our Enemies: *Firſt*, By not entring upon a War, but upon very juſt and good Grounds. *Secondly*, By carrying it on fairly, and being ready to accept of a reaſonable Peace. *Thirdly*, By ſhewing Mercy to the Conquer'd, after we have gotten the Victory. The Words therefore, *Inter arma ſilent leges*, muſt be

is agreeable to the Nature of Man, and the latter to that of Brutes; when we can't obtain what is our Right by the one, we muſte'en of neceſſity have recourſe to the other. 'Tis allowable therefore to undertake Wars, but it muſt always be with deſign of obtaining a ſecure Peace. And when we have gotten the better of our Enemies, we ſhould reſt content with the Victory alone, and ſhew our ſelves merciful and kind to 'em afterwards; unleſs they are ſuch as have been very Cruel, and committed inhuman Barbarities in the War. Thus our Forefathers took into their City the [c] *Æquians*, *Volſcians*, *Sabines*, and others, whom they had ſubdu'd; whereas [d] *Carthage* and *Numantia* they entirely deſtroy'd. I could wiſh I might not add [e] *Corinth* too; but I believe they had ſomething in their Eye when they did it, and that more eſpecially the Situation of the Place; which being ſo very convenient as it was, they were afraid leaſt it might be, at one time or other, an Encouragement to a Revolt. In my Opinion 'tis always our Duty, to do what we can for a fair and ſafe Peace: in which thing if People would have [f] hearkned to me, we

be taken in a very reſtrain'd Sence, ſo as to mean the Civil and Judiciary Laws, not thoſe of Nature, and Juſtice towards Enemies. *See* Grot. Prolegom. ad Lib. de Jure B. & P.

[c] Several little Nations in *Italy*, all conquer'd by the *Romans*.

[d] The former a City in *Africk*, the latter in *Spain*; both taken by *Scipio Africanus* the Younger.

[e] A famous and rich City in *Achaia*, plac'd exactly in that Neck of Land, which ſeparates *Peloponneſus*, or the *Morea*, from the reſt of *Greece*. Hither St *Paul* writ two of his Epiſtles. 'Twas taken by *Mummius*, the *Roman* Conſul, and ras'd to the Ground, becauſe of ſome Affront the *Corinthians* had given to the *Roman* Ambaſſadors.

[f] In the Civil War between *Cæſar* and *Pompey*, *Cicero* always labour'd for a Peace and Agreement between the Parties; but to no purpoſe.

[f] The

we might at this time have seen the Republick, tho', 'tis true, I can't say in a flourishing Condition; yet certainly not, as at present we perceive it, entirely subverted and fall'n into Ruins. And as we are bound to be merciful to those we have actually conquer'd; so should those also be receiv'd into Favour, who have laid down their Arms, and thrown 'emselves wholly upon the General's Mercy; and *that* even tho' the Breach be made in their City Walls. Our good Fore-fathers were most strictly just as to this particular; the Custom of those Times making him the Patron of a conquer'd City or People, who first receiv'd 'em into the Faith and Allegiance of the People of *Rome*. In short, The whole Right, and all the Duties of War are most religiously set down in the [a] Fecial Laws; out of which it is manifest, that never any War can be justly undertaken, unless Satisfaction have been first demanded, and Proclamation of it made publickly before-hand. *Poppilius* was Commander in one of the Provinces, and *Cato*'s Son a young Soldier under him; and *Poppilius* thinking fit to disband one of his Legions, it happen'd to be the same in which the young Man was, who therefore was dismiss'd among the rest of the Soldiers: But having a mind to see more of the War, he notwithstanding this, continu'd still in the Army. Hereupon old *Cato* writes a Letter to *Poppilius*, and therein desires him, *That if he suffer'd his Son*

to

[a] The *Fetiales* were a sort of Priests or Heralds among the *Romans*, establish'd by *Numa*, whose Business it was to determin all Cases about the Lawfulness of War; about Leagues, Ambassadors, *&c.* They were sent to demand Satisfaction of the People that had offended; they denounc'd or proclaim'd Wars; and, in short, nothing of that nature could be done without their Advice. *Cicero* gives us an account of their Duties in his *De Leg.* 2. 9. *Fœderum, pacis, belli, indutiarum judices Fetiales sunto*, &c.

[b] An

to remain in the Army, he would give him his Military Oath again; forasmuch the former being void by his Disbanding, he could not any longer fight lawfully with an Enemy. So religiously careful they were in those Days, of doing nothing that's contrary to the Laws of War. There is extant still an Epistle of *Cato* the Father's to his Son, in which he tells him, *That he had heard of his being Disbanded by the Consul, when he was a Soldier in* Macedonia, *in the War with* [i] Perseus: *and therefore he advises him not by any means to intermeddle in a Battle; because*, he says, *'tis unlawful for one, that is no longer a Soldier, to engage with the Enemy.*

[h] An Oath that was given to the Soldiers, when they went out to War, (call'd *Sacramentum*) by which they were oblig'd to be faithful to their General, *&c. See the Form of it in* Livy.

[i] The last King of *Macedonia*, beaten and led in triumph by *Paulus Æmilius*, the *Roman* Consul, about the Year of *Rome* 586. *See* Plutarch's *Life of* Æmilius.

CHAP. XII.

The Civility of the old Romans *towards their Enemies, in giving 'em the mildest Names. Some Wars are only for Empire, others for Safety: Difference of Conduct to be observ'd in each. A noble and generous Saying of King* Pyrrhus.

AND here I can't but observe moreover, That he who is properly call'd *Perduellis*, [*a stubborn Enemy*] had by our Ancestors the name of *Hostis* giv'n him; the gentleness of the Word somewhat lessening the foulness and odium of the Thing; for *Hostis* [*an Enemy*] among them signify'd the same thing, that *Peregrinus* [*a Stranger*] does now a-

amongſt us; as appears from the [a] Laws of the XII Tables, and therein ſuch ſort of Expreſſions as theſe, [b] *Status dies cum hoſte*; and, *Adverſus hoſtem æterna auctoritas.* What greater Courteſie could be ſhewn than this, to call even an Enemy by only the ſofteſt and moſt obliging Names? Tho' the Word is now alter'd, I confeſs, from that mild to an harſher Sence, Cuſtom having chang'd it from what it firſt properly ſignified, *a Stranger*, to denote ſuch a one as *bears Arms againſt us.* We have told you [c] already what previous Cauſes and Conditions there ſhould be, before any War can be lawful and juſt; the ſame are requir'd even in thoſe Wars alſo, which are undertaken meerly for Glory and Empire: But then all Conteſts of this latter ſort, ſhould be carried on with leſs Heat and Animoſities; for as in the Differences that happen among Citizens, we make a diſtinction between a violent Enemy, and a generous Rival; (in one caſe nothing but a Title of Honour, in the other our Lives and Reputations being concern'd) ſo did our Anceſtors do in their Wars. That which they waged with the

[a] The Body of the ancient *Roman* Laws, which were gather'd from the wiſeſt Laws of all the *Grecians*, by the *Decemviri* created for that purpoſe, about the Year of *Rome* 301. See the Hiſtory of 'em in *Livy*, Book 3. chap. 33, 34. where he calls 'em the *fons omnis publici, privatiq; Juris*; and our Author in his firſt Book *de Orat.* prefers 'em for Wiſdom before whole Libraries of Philoſophers.

[b] Theſe are the Words of two Laws, taken out of the XII Tables; *See* Charondas de Leg. XII Tab. The Meaning of the *firſt*, is, That whoever has got any Buſineſs at Law with a Stranger, ſhall appoint a Day for the Deciſion of it beforehand, that ſo he may have time to make his Appearance. Of the *ſecond*, Tho' a Stranger had poſſeſs'd a Man's Eſtate never ſo long, he ſhould have no Title to it by way of Preſcription; but the rightful Owner, after never ſo many Years, ſhould have Authority and Power to demand it of him again.

[c] In the foregoing Chapter.

[d] A

the [d] *Cimbers* and [e] *Celtibers*, was manag'd as with hateful and implacable Enemies; the Queſtion then being, not whether of the two ſhould remain a Conquerour, but whether ſhould remain a People at all: Whereas thoſe with the *Latins*, *Carthaginians*, [f] *Pyrrhus*, &c. were only Quarrels about Honour and Dominion. The *Carthaginians* were perfidious and treacherous; *Hannibal* their great Commander Cruel; but all the reſt more Faithful and Merciful. That Speech of *Pyrrhus* is indeed very extraordinary upon reſtoring the Captives, when he ſays,

[g] *I neither Gold of you nor Price demand:*
Nor will I chaffer, *but* fight *out the War:*
Let Steel, *not* Gold *to each their Fate decide.*
Whether to you, *or* me *Dame Fortune will*
The Victʼry grant; or what the Chance of War,
Shall Courage try. And this I add withal,
That freely I their Liberties reſtore
To theſe brave Men, whoſe Lives the War has ſparʼd.
Freely I give; do you as freely take,
Iʼth' name of th' mighty Gods.

A truly Royal and Princely Saying, and worthy of the glorious Family of the [h] *Æacidæ*.

[d] A barbarous and ſavage Nothern People, who made an Inroad into *Italy*, and put the *Roman* State into a very great Fear; but at laſt were routed by *Marius* and *Catulus*. *See* Plut. *Life of* Marius.

[e] A valiant and hardy People, who from that part of *Gaul* which was callʼd *Celtick*, near the River *Ligeris*, went into *Spain*, and there ſettled upon the River *Iberus*; whence callʼd *Celtiberi*. *Numantia* was their capital City.

[f] A King of *Epirus*, who made War upon the *Romans*, and routed 'em ſeveral times, for the ſake of the *Tarentines*, who callʼd him to their Aſſiſtance. His Life is writ by *Plut.*

[g] This is quoted out of the Poet *Ennius*.

[h] The Deſcendants of *Æacus*, one of the Judges of the Dead; whom the Poets make Son of *Jupiter*, and Father of *Peleus*, who was Father of *Achilles*; from whom this *Pyrrhus* of *Epirus* was deriv'd.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Particular Perſons bound in Juſtice to keep the Promiſes made to an Enemy. The Example of Regulus. *The Story of ten who did the contrary: How puniſh'd by the* Romans; *particularly one, who thought to have eſcap'd by a Quirk. A noble Inſtance of the* Roman *Juſtice to King* Pyrrhus. *Juſtice to be kept towards the meaneſt Slaves. Two Ways whereby Injuries are done,* Fraud *and* Force. Fraud *the more odious. To be a Rogue under the Mask of Honeſty, the greateſt of Villanies.*

'TIs alſo the Duty of [a] particular Perſons, if at any time, forc'd by the neceſſity of their Circumſtances, they have made any Promiſe or Oath to an Enemy; afterwards to ſee that they perform it faithfully. Thus [b] *Regulus* was taken in the firſt *Punick* War by the *Carthaginians*, and ſent by them to *Rome*, about an Exchange of Priſoners, upon ſolemn Oath given that he would return to 'em again: as ſoon then as he was come to *Rome*, he firſt adviſ'd the Senate againſt making ſuch a Change, and when he had done it (tho' beg'd on to ſtay by his Friends and Relations) rather return'd to a certain Puniſhment, than his Oath ſhould be broken, tho' made to an Enemy. But *Hannibal*, in the ſecond *Carthaginian* War, after our fatal Defeat at [c] *Cannæ*, ſent ten to *Rome* under the ſame Obligation

[a] Thus far in general of publick Juſtice to an Enemy: He now proceeds to ſay, That Juſtice obliges particular Perſons too, if at any time they have made any Promiſes to their Enemies, afterwards to perform 'em faithfully.

[b] *See Book* 3. *ch.* 27.

[c] A little Village in *Apulia*, where the *Romans*, under the Conduct of *Paulus* and *Varro*, were Overthrown by *Hannibal*, the *Carthaginian* General.

[d] *See*

tion of returning again, unleſs by their Intereſt they could prevail with the Senate to redeem their Priſoners; who were all by the Cenſors depriv'd of their Priviledges as Free-men, and ty'd to pay ſuch and ſuch Duties to the Publick as long as they liv'd, for not being true to their Oaths and Obligations. There was one of 'em thought by a Trick to have eluded the force of his Oath, but was nevertheleſs puniſh'd for all that: His Shift was this; *Hannibal* had let 'em depart his Camp upon the Condition afore-mention'd; when therefore they had gotten a little way out of it, what does he do but come back to it again, under colour of having forgot to take ſomething (I know not what) with him: And then away he goes out again, diſcharg'd (as he thought) from his Obligation of Returning. And ſo, 'tis very true, he was in Word, but not in Reality; for in all ſuch Oaths we aren't to attend to the meer Form of Words, but the true Deſign and Intention of 'em. But the greateſt Example of Juſtice to an Enemy, was ſhewn by our Anceſtors towards King *Pyrrhus*: [d] There came a Deſerter out of *Pyrrhus's* Camp, and offer'd the Senate to diſpatch him with Poyſon; which they and *Fabricius* were ſo far from accepting of, that they gave him up again as a Traitor to his Maſter. Thus we may ſee, that they would not allow of any unjuſt way of Dealing, tho' for the Death of a powerful and invading Adverſary: And ſo much for the Duties required in War. There is one part of [e] Juſtice remaining behind, and which ought by no means to be forgotten by us; I mean that towards

[d] *See Ch. 4. and 22. of Book 3.*

[e] He has ſhewen there are Rules of Juſtice to be obſerv'd, towards thoſe that have injur'd us, and our very Enemies: Here he proceeds to a third ſort of People they are to be obſerv'd towards, *viz.* Slaves.

wards the loweſt and meaneſt ſort of People: And theſe are more eſpecially thoſe we call our Slaves; in relation to whom, 'tis a very good Rule that is given by ſome Men, That we ſhould uſe 'em no otherwiſe than we do our Day-labourers, *Make 'em firſt do their Work, and then pay 'em honeſtly what they have earn'd.* In fine, To cloſe up this Diſcourſe of Juſtice, There are two Ways or Methods, whereby one Man may Injure or Oppreſs another; the one is *Fraud* and Subtlety, the other open *Force* and Violence; the former of which is held the part of a Fox, and the latter of a Lyon: Both of 'em certainly very unworthy of a reaſonable Creature; tho' Fraud, I think, is the more odious of the two. But of all Injuſtice, theirs is certainly of the deepeſt Dye, who make it their Buſineſs to appear honeſt Men, even whilſt they are practiſing the greateſt of Villanies.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Liberality, the ſecond part of general Juſtice. Three Cautions to be obſerv'd concerning it. 'Tis not Liberality, to beſtow upon one, what is wrongfully taken from another; nor what ought to have rather been given to our Relations; nor to give out of Vainglory. Bounty ſhould be proportion'd to the Merit of the Receiver, which is of ſeveral ſorts.

WE have now gone thro' with the Subject of Juſtice, it [a] remains in the next place (to go on according to our Method propos'd) that we ſay ſomething likewiſe of Bounty and Liberality, than which there

[a] In Chap. 7. he divided Juſtice, taken in its largeſt Extent, into *Juſtice* ſtrictly ſo call'd, and *Liberality*: Having now finiſh'd

there is nothing more nearly ally'd to the Nature of Man. But then we muſt obſerve theſe following Cautions: *Firſt*, That we take care in all Acts of Bounty, that they ben't [b] prejudicial to thoſe we would oblige by 'em, nor to any other Body. *Secondly*, That we don't in our Bounty and Liberality go beyond our Eſtates. And, *Thirdly*, That we duely proportion our Kindneſs, according to every Man's Merit and Deſerts. [c] And firſt of the former, which is grounded upon the great and fundamental Principle of all Juſtice, to which this Duty in all its particular Inſtances ſhould be referr'd. For he who pretending to do one a Kindneſs, does that which is really a Prejudice to him, is indeed ſo far from being Kind and Obliging, as that he ought to be counted a moſt pernicious Flatterer: and to do any manner of Injury to one, that you may ſhew your Generoſity and Bounty to another, is juſt one and the ſame ſort of Roguery and Injuſtice, as to Enrich your ſelf by the Spoils of your Neighbour. Yet this is the Fault of a great many People, and eſpecially thoſe who are deſirous of Glory, to take away from ſome that which juſtly belongs to 'em, that ſo they may have to beſtow upon others; and they're apt to think 'emſelves extreamly

niſh'd his Diſcourſe upon the former of theſe, he proceeds to the latter in this Chapter, about which he firſt lays down three Cautions.

[b] As thoſe who lend or give Money to young Spendthrifts, to help 'em forward and encourage 'em in their ill Courſes, or the like; which is really a very great Injury to 'em.

[c] Having laid down his three Cautions, he proceeds in order to ſay ſomething upon each of 'em. I take the *Id enim* therefore to referr to his firſt Caution, *That our Bounty ben't really a Prejudice to any one*; for *to do no Wrong* he laid down before, [*chap. 7. and 10.*] as the firſt fundamental Principle of Juſtice. His Caution was, *that our Bounty ſhould not be Hurtful*, and here he gives his Reaſon for it, *Id enim*, &c. *i. e.* For not to Hurt or Injure any body is the firſt and fundamental

ly bountiful, if they Enrich their Adherents by any manner of means. But this is ſo far from being a Duty of Liberality, that nothing in the World can be more contrary to it. It ought to be therefore our firſt care in Giving, That what we beſtow be a real Advantage and Kindneſs to our Friend, and no ways an Injury to any third Perſon. That Action therefore of [d] *Cæſar* and *Sylla*'s, in taking away Eſtates from the rightful Proprietors, and giving 'em to others who had nothing to do with 'em, ought by no means to be accounted Liberal; for nothing can ever be truly ſuch, that is not at the ſame time Juſt and Honeſt. A [e] *ſecond* Caution to be obſerv'd was this, *That our Bounty ben't ſuffer'd to exceed our Abilities*; for they who give more than their Eſtates will allow of, are, in the firſt place, [f] injurious to their own Relations, by ſpending that Wealth upon other People, which ſhould rather have been given, or left to them. Beſide that this over-great Bounty in Giving, is uſually accompany'd with an anſwerable Deſire and Greedineſs of Getting; which often proceeds even to down-right Oppreſſion, that ſo Men may have wherewithal to ſupply this extravagant Humor. One may alſo obſerve in a great many People, that they take a ſort of Pride in being counted Magnificent, and give very plentifully, not from any generous Principle in their Natures, but only to appear Great in the Eye of the World; ſo

tal Rule of Juſtice, which Juſtice ought to be the Meaſure of Bounty; nothing being Liberal (as he afterwards obſerves) but what is agreeable to the Rules of Juſtice.

[d] The firſt after he had conquer'd *Pompey* the Great; and the ſecond after he had conquer'd *Marius* in their Civil Wars.

[e] Here he comes to his ſecond Rule to be obſerv'd in Giving.

[f] For 'tis our Duty in the firſt place to provide for our Relations, and thoſe who more immediately depend upon us. *See the latter end of Chap.* 17.

[g] The

ſo that all their Bounty is reſolv'd into nothing but meer Outſide and Pretence, and is nearer of kin to Vanity and Folly, than 'tis to either Liberality or Honeſty. [s] The *third* Caution was, *That our Bounty ſhould be proportion'd to the Merits of the Receiver:* In judging of which, we are firſt to conſider the Man's Honeſty or *Manners*; ſecondly, the *Good-will* he bears towards us; thirdly, the *nearneſs of Relation*, or Society that is between us; and, laſtly, the *Benefits* we have formerly receiv'd from him. 'Tis deſirable that all theſe Inducements might concur in the ſame Perſon; but when they do not, we ſhould beſtow our Kindneſs more eſpecially on him, in whom we find the moſt, and weighrieſt of 'em.

[s] The third Caution to be obſerv'd in Giving, *The Merits*, &c. Theſe are to be judg'd of from four Heads, which he treats of in order.

CHAP.

CHAP. XV.

Honesty, the first sort of Merit. We aren't to expect we shall find perfectly good Men. Modesty, Temperance, &c. more especially to be regarded. How we should judge of Men's Good-will towards us. Gratitude a most necessary Duty: We should imitate fruitful Fields, by returning more than we have receiv'd. How to judge of the Value of any Kindness: Those to be least esteem'd that are done rashly and inconsiderately. We should do most for those that stand in greatest need, if they are otherwise deserving.

[a] NOw seeing we don't live amongst such as, are perfectly and fully Wise, but such as are thought to have done very well, if they are but, as 'twere, the rough Draughts of Virtue; we ought to consider, I think, in the first place, That no one should wholly be neglected in this case, in whom there appears any shadow or resemblance of real Honesty; but that those Men ought to be principally regarded, who excel in the quiet and more peaceable Virtues of Modesty, Temperance, and especially this [b] Justice, of which I have now been discoursing a great while. [c] For most times Greatness of Spirit and Courage, unless it be in those who are *perfectly* Wise and Virtuous, is something too hot and apt to boil over; the others are the Virtues, which seem more peculiarly to constitute a Good Man.

[a] The first thing we are to judge a Man's Merits by, is his *Honesty* or *good Manners*; in which particular we aren't to stay, till we find *perfectly Good*, or Wise Men.

[b] From Chap. 7. He takes Justice here, as in several other places, in the larger Sence, as it contains Liberality, Gratitude, *&c.*

[c] This he gives as a Reason of what he just now said, That Modesty, *&c.* should be most regarded.

Man. And ſo much for the firſt ſort of Merit to be conſider'd, *viz.* The Manners or Honeſty of the Perſon we would be Kind to. The [d] *ſecond* was, *The Good-will which he bears towards us*; as to which it ſhould always be our principal care, to do moſt for him, by whom we are moſt belov'd: Now in judging of the Good-will that any one bears us, we are not to conſider (like Boys and Children) any ſudden flaſhes and heats of Paſſion, but rather a conſtant and well-ſetled Affection. But if a Man, [e] *in the next place*, has done us any real Service, ſo that our part is to make a Requital, and not firſt to lay an Obligation upon him, 'tis then our Duty to take ſome greater care; for of all the Virtues, there's none we are more neceſſarily oblig'd to, than *Gratitude*. If then, according to [f] *Heſiod*'s Rule, even that which was nothing but barely lent us, is, if poſſible, to be return'd back with Intereſt again; what abundant Returns ſhould we make to thoſe, by whom we have been freely and generouſly Oblig'd? What leſs can we do than be like fruitful Fields, which produce, beyond compariſon more than was thrown into 'em? And if we do Services even to thoſe Men, from whom we hope afterwards to receive any Favours; ought we not much more to do the ſame to thoſe, from whoſe forward Kindneſs we have already receiv'd 'em? For the Virtue of Liberality

[d] Here he proceeds to the ſecond of his four Grounds of Merit, *The Good-will*, &c.

[e] This is the fourth thing to be conſider'd in judging of a Man's Merits, *The Benefits*, &c. He diſcourſes of this in the third place, becauſe (I ſuppoſe) the next will take up ſo much room, that if this had come after it, 'twould have look'd too far diſtant from the other two foregoing.

[f] An ancient *Greek* Poet, born at *Aſcra*, a Town in *Beotia*, thence call'd *Aſcræus Senex*. Some think he was older than *Homer*, tho' *Paterculus* makes him a Hundred and twenty Years younger. His Works are ſtill extant.

[g] Every

lity containing under it these two Parts; in the *first* place, The doing a Kindness to any one; and, *secondly*, The requiting it when done to us; whether we'll perform the former or not, is altogether left to our own Choice; but every Good [g] Man's oblig'd to the latter, when e're he can do it [h] without Injustice. But then we're to make a distinction between Benefits, and are *there* bound to make the most ample Returns, *where* the Obligations we have receiv'd are the greatest. And to judge of the Merits of any Kindness, we are chiefly to consider in what manner it was done; as whether freely, considerately and from a Principle of Good-nature. For several People do many things Rashly, and with a blind sort of Impulse; throwing away their Favours upon all without distinction; being hurried about, as it were with a Tempest, by every mad and frolicksome Humour, and every sudden or impetuous Passion. A Benefit therefore, when receiv'd from such a one, is not to be esteem'd of an equal Value, with those that proceed from a setled Judgment and due Consideration. But our principal Duty both in doing of Kindnesses and making Requitals, is, To do most for those that stand in greatest need of it, supposing all Circumstances else to be equal: the contrary to which appears plainly in the Practice and Actions of the most part of Men; for, People choose to bestow their Favours, upon those from whom they expect to receive the most Benefits, tho' the Persons perhaps don't at all stand in need of 'em.

[g] Every Good Man's oblig'd to be *Charitable* too, according to his Abilities, as well as *Grateful*: but with this difference, That he can choose whether he'll *bestow* his Kindnesses upon this, or that, or t'other Person; but he's bound to *return* 'em to those very Men, by whom he was oblig'd.

[h] Otherwise not: nothing being Liberal in this sence of the Word, as it comprehends Gratitude, that is not Just.

CHAP. XVI.

We ſhould be moſt ready to give to thoſe, who are moſt nearly ally'd to us. The firſt ſort of Alliance is that between all Men in general. The Bond of it, and Duties reſulting from it. We're bound to do for any Man what will be a Kindneſs to him, and no Prejudice to our ſelves; but with this Caution, That we don't thereby make our ſelves unable to aſſiſt thoſe, who are more nearly ally'd to us.

THE [a] fourth Inducement remaining to be ſpoke to, is, *The nearneſs of Relation*, or Society that is amongſt Men; for the maintenance of which, we can't do better, than to give moſt to thoſe, that ſtand neareſt related to us. But that we may conſider, with greater diſtinctneſs, the natural Principles of Human Society, we ſhall here trace it down from the Fountain head. The firſt thing then to be taken notice of is this, [b] *That there is ſuch a thing as a Fellowſhip or Society between all Men in general*: The Bond or Cement that holds this together, is Reaſon and Diſcourſe, which by Teaching, Learning, Communicating one with another, *&c.* eaſily make Men agree together, and unite 'em all in one natural ſort of Conjunction and Community. Nor does

[a] He now proceeds to the fourth, but third plac'd [*See ch.* 14.] Ground of a Man's Meriting of us, *The Nearneſs*, &c. I have added ſome Words to the beginning of the Chapter, to make the Connexion with that foregoing appear the better.

[b] The firſt and moſt comprehenſive Society, is that, which is between all Men, conſider'd barely as they are Men: By which we are oblig'd to all thoſe things, which we call Acts of meer Humanity; ſuch as doing good to another, when 'twill be no prejudice to our ſelves, which by the Moraliſts are call'd, *Res innoxiæ utilitatis*, of which he gives ſeveral Inſtances in this Chapter.

[c] Rea-

does any thing ſet us at a greater diſtance from the Nature of Beaſts: for we *oftentimes* talk of the Courage of *them*, ſuch as Lyons and Horſes; but *never* a word of their Equity, Juſtice or Goodneſs; And why is this, but [c] becauſe they are deſtitute of Reaſon and Diſcourſe? This is then the largeſt and moſt comprehenſive of all Societies, being made up of Men conſider'd barely as ſuch, and ſo taking in even the whole Race and Kind of 'em one with another: the [d] Duties of which are, To let every one have a ſhare in thoſe things, which by Nature were produc'd for the common Advantage and Benefit of all; To let what's already determin'd by Laws, and civil Conſtitutions, remain as it is, without breaking in upon any Man's Right; as to which things however we ſhould remember a Rule, which is now among the *Greeks* become an uſual Proverb, *All things in common amongſt Friends.* But perhaps you may ask, what kind of things we ſuppoſe them to be, which ought to be common to all Mankind: *Ennius* has given us one Inſtance of 'em, which may eaſily be apply'd to a great many others:

He

[c] Reaſon and Diſcourſe are the Bonds of Society: where they are wanting therefore, there can be no Society, and by conſequence no Juſtice, Equity, *&c.* which are the Virtues that conſiſt in preſerving Society.

[d] The Duties incumbent on us by virtue of this Society are, *Firſt*, To let every one have a ſhare in thoſe things, which by Nature are common; and what theſe are, he tells us immediately. *Secondly*, Not to break in upon another's Property. *Thirdly*, In thoſe things which are made our own, and become a Property, to be communicative, *&c.* What he means by *E quibus ipſis*, &c. I confeſs I don't very well underſtand, neither do any of the Commentators tell me; but I take the meaning of it to be, as I have tranſlated it: ſo that *quibus* ſhould relate to *quæ deſcripta ſunt legibus*, the things that are every one's own by Laws: Concerning which his firſt Rule was, *That we ſhould not break in upon another's*

He who directs the wandring Traveller,
Doth, as 'twere, light another's Torch by his own;
Which gives him ne're the leſs of Light, for that
It gave another.

By this one Caſe he ſufficiently teaches us, That whatever Kindneſs can be done for another, without any Damage or Loſs to our ſelves, 'tis our Duty to do it, tho' to never ſo much a Stranger. From hence have ariſen thoſe general Maxims and Principles of Humanity, *Not to deny one a little Running-water*; or, *The lighting his Fire by ours, if he has occaſion: To give the beſt Counſel we are able to one who is in Doubt or Diſtreſs*; which are things that do Good to the Perſon that receives them, and are no Loſs or Trouble to him that confers them. Such things therefore, being by *Nature common*, ſhould accordingly be kept open for the free uſe of all Men: And of thoſe which are *our own* we ſhould always be giving ſomething, that may contribute to the Benefit and Welfare of the whole. [e] But becauſe the Revenues of Particulars are ſmall, and there are infinite numbers of thoſe that Want, therefore is [f] this univerſal Bounty to be kept within the Limits

nother's Right; and then as to all other caſes about 'em, he only puts us in mind of the *Greek* Proverb; the meaning of which is, *That we ſhould all count our ſelves Friends to one another, and practice accordingly.*

[e] He puts in a neceſſary Caution about Giving, and letting our Things be in common; which he would have us carry no further than *Ennius*'s Rule preſcribes; that is, We ſhould not be ſo Communicative and Open-hearted to all in general, as to impoveriſh our ſelves, and put it out of our Power to aſſiſt thoſe, who are more nearly ally'd to us. We muſt light indeed another's Candle by ours, but not ſo as to loſe our own Light by it. Here we muſt proceed by the Meaſures of Prudence and Charity.

[f] Viz. *That* of always Giving ſomething out of what is *our own*, for the general Benefit.

mits preſcrib'd by *Ennius*, *It gives him ne'r the leſs of Light*; that ſo we may have it within our Power, to be Liberal to thoſe that are more nearly ally'd to us.

CHAP. XVII.

Several other Degrees of Relation, leſs extenſive than that mention'd in the former Chapter. That of Friendſhip the moſt cloſely knit. The Ground and Foundation of true Friendſhip. The Relation ariſing from doing Kindneſſes to one another. The Love a Man has for his Native Country ſwallows up all other Loves whatever. Which of the ſeveral Relatives we ought to prefer, in our Liberality and doing Kindneſſes. A Deſcription of Friendſhip; and of all Friendſhips, which is moſt pleaſant.

[a] BUt there are ſeveral Degrees of Society and Fellowſhip amongſt Mankind; for to take now our leave of that general and univerſal one already mention'd, there's a nearer among thoſe who are all of the ſame Country, Nation or Language; than which, nothing more knits and unites Men to one another. There is a cloſer yet among thoſe, who are all of the ſame City; for a great many things are in common to Fellow-citizens, ſuch as Markets, Temples, Walks, Ways, Laws, Privileges, Courts of Juſtice, Freedom of Votes, beſides common Meetings and Familiarities, and abundance of Buſineſs and Entercourſe with

[a] He now proceeds to reckon up the ſeveral Degrees of Nearneſs or Relation among Men; that ſo we may know to whom we are oblig'd to be moſt Liberal, upon this laſt account of Merit, *viz. Nearneſs of Relation.*

with one another. But there's a ſtricter Bond of Alliance ſtill, between thoſe who belong to the ſame Family, as taking into it but a very ſmall part of that vaſt and immenſe one of all Mankind. For there being by Nature implanted in all things a certain Deſire of Begetting their Like, the cloſeſt and neareſt of all Societies is between Man and Wife; then follows that between *them* and their Children, and afterwards *that* of the whole Family, who inhabit together, and have all things in common; which is, as it were, the firſt beginning of a City, and Ground or Seed-plot of a whole Commonwealth. Next to this comes the Bond of Relation between Brothers; as alſo between firſt and ſecond Coſins; who growing too numerous to live in the ſame Houſe, are ſent out to others, as it were into new Colonies. Next after this follow Marriages and Alliances, and ſo a new Stock of Relations that way; from whence comes a new Propagation and Off-ſpring, which ſerves to give riſe, as was ſaid, to Commonwealths. Now that nearneſs of Blood, and the natural Love which ariſes from it, can't but endear Men to one another, is paſt all doubt; 'tis a very great matter to have the ſame [b] Relicks and Monuments of our Anceſtors; to make uſe of the ſame [c] religious Ceremonies, and be laid after death in the ſame place of Burial: But of all the Societies and Unions amongſt Men, there is none more excellent or more cloſely knit, than when ſuch as are Men of

[b] The Images, *&c.* of their Anceſtors, which were kept for the Honour of all the Family, into how many Branches ſoever divided.

[c] Private Sacrifices or Ceremonies belonging to ſuch or ſuch Families in particular, which the Publick in general was no ways concern'd in: *Cui præter cognatos & affines nemo interponebatur*, ſays *Valer. Max.* Book 2. ch. 1. And *Livy* ſpeaks of a *Statum Genti Fabiæ Sacrificium*, a ſolemn Sacrifice belonging to the *Fabian* Family, *Book 5. ch. 46.*

[d] Eve-

of real Virtue and Honeſty, from a certain agreement and likeneſs of their Manners, contract a Familiarity and Friendſhip one with another. For Virtue and Goodneſs (as we often obſerve) of neceſſity moves us where-ever we ſee it; and makes us all have a Love and Reſpect for that Perſon, in whom we diſcover it. And as every Virtue thus wins upon our Hearts, and even forces us to Love thoſe we take to poſſeſs it; ſo more eſpecially do Juſtice and Beneficence. But when [d] ſeveral Perſons are all like one another in Honeſty and good Manners, then no Society can ever be more loving, or more cloſely united. For where there are many of the ſame Humour, and ſame Inclinations; every one ſees, in ſome meaſure, his own ſelf, and is accordingly delighted, in the Perſon of another; and that's brought about, which *Pythagoras* thought the Perfection of all Friendſhip, *That a great many Severals are made into One.* There's another remarkable Fellowſhip or Community, ariſing from an Entercourſe of doing and receiving Benefits; which while 'tis kept up by a mutual Gratitude and Kindneſs of all the Parties, can't but occaſion a firm and very laſting Agreement between 'em. But when we have gone over all the Relations that are in the World, and thro'ly conſider'd the Nature of each, we ſhall find that there's no one of greater Obligation, no one that's dearer and nearer to us, than that which we all

[d] Every Man has a Kindneſs for himſelf, and is in ſome meaſure pleas'd with his own Qualities and Way of Living; when therefore he ſees another with the ſame Qualities, and that follows after the ſame Way of Life, he preſently conceives him as it were another *ſelf*, and is accordingly pleas'd with *him* too; which ſeems to be the Reaſon why *Like* (as we ſay) *loves to join with Like.* When ſeveral therefore have the ſame Virtues and Perfections in 'em, every one is pleas'd with all the reſt, as with himſelf, and they all become (as it were) one and the ſame Perſon, which is what *Pythago-*

all of us bear to the Publick. We have a tender Concern and Regard for our Parents, for our Children, our Kindred and Acquaintance; but the Love which we have for our Native Country ſwallows up all other Loves whatever; for which there is no honeſt Man but would Die, if by his Death he could do it any neceſſary Service. How deteſtable [e] then muſt the Wickedneſs and Barbarity of thoſe People be, who have mangled and rent this their Native Country by all manner of Villanies; and [f] have made it their Buſineſs (nay, and [g] ſtill do ſo) to bring it to Ruine and utter Deſolation? [h] Now if there ſhould happen any Conteſt or Competition between theſe Relations, which of 'em ſhould have the greateſt ſhare of our Duty; we ſhould pay the firſt Regard to our [i] Country and Parents, from whom we have receiv'd the moſt endearing Obligations; the next to our Children and Family, who all have their Eyes upon us alone, and have no Body elſe they can depend upon; next in order to theſe come our Kindred and Relations, whoſe Fortune is generally the ſame with our own. To each of theſe therefore, whom I have juſt now mention'd, we moſt of all owe what is neceſſary for their

rare thought the Perfection of Friendſhip. *See* Ariſtot. Eth. Nichom. *Book* 8. *ch.* 4. *from which this ſeems to have been taken.*

[e] For the greater Obligation they had to their Country, the greater their Wickedneſs was in Deſtroying it.

[f] He means *Julius Cæſar.*

[g] *Marck Anthony* and his Adherents.

[h] Having thus laid down the ſeveral Relations, that we have in the World, he proceeds to ſhew how we ſhould carry our ſelves in 'em; by giving the Preference to our Country, *&c.*

[i] Before even our Parents; for the Welfare of theſe is contain'd in, and depends upon *that* of our Country; which ſhould it be ruin'd, our Parents and every thing elſe muſt of courſe follow after it.

[k] *Solo-*

their ſubſiſtence: But then, as for Living and Eating together, for mutual Adviſing, Diſcourſe, Exhortation, Comforting, and ſometimes (if occaſion ſerves) [k] Rebuking, Friendſhip is the propereſt Soil for them; and of all kinds of Friendſhip, there is none ſo pleaſant, as that which is cemented by a Likeneſs of Manners.

[k] *Solomon* therefore incomparably well, *Prov.* 27. *v.* 6. calls Rebukes, *The Wounds of a Friend*; which he ſays *are faithful*; while *the Kiſſes of an Enemy are full of deceit.*

CHAP. XVIII.

In Liberality the Neceſſity of the Perſon is eſpecially to be conſider'd. Some Kindneſſes due to ſome Relatives more than to others. Rules ſignifie but little of themſelves, unleſs they are confirm'd by Practice and Exerciſe. Greatneſs of Soul, the third general Virtue, moſt glorious and ſplendid of 'em all. Is moſt of all prais'd, and its contrary diſprais'd among Men.

[a] BUt in all theſe Duties of Beneficence and Liberality, one principal thing to be taken notice of is, What Neceſſity the Perſon we would be Kind to lies under, and what he is able or not able to do, without our Aſſiſtance: So that in ſome caſes, the preſent Poſture and Circumſtances of a Man's Condition, ought more to prevail with us, than the Degrees of Relation. Again, There are certain particular Offices, which are more peculiarly owing to ſome

[a] He has ſhewn toward whom and how we ought chiefly to exerciſe our Liberality; but becauſe particular Circumſtances may make ſome alteration, he gives us a Rule or two for our Direction about them.

[b] Be-

ſome one ſort of Relatives, than they are to another: In the Buſineſs (for Example) of getting in his Corn, 'tis our Duty rather to aſſiſt a [b] next Neighbour, than either a Brother or familiar Friend: but if the Buſineſs be a Caſe at Law, then a Kinſman or Friend muſt rather be defended, than only a next Neighbour. Theſe things therefore, and ſuch like Circumſtances, ſhould be well conſider'd, in the Practice and Exerciſe of every Virtue; and our Minds ſhould be brought to a kind of Acquaintance and Familiarity with them; that ſo we may be quick at the Accounts of our Duty, and able by caſting up all things together, to ſee at laſt what the Remainder is, and know what we owe to the ſeveral ſorts and conditions of Men. For as a General, Orator or Phyſician, however well skill'd in the Rules of his Art, can never be perfect without the aſſiſtance of Practice and Experience; juſt ſo it is in the Caſe now before us: Many have laid down the Rules and Precepts of *Virtue* and Good-living; (as I my ſelf am doing at this very time) but there's moreover requir'd to a due degree of Height and Perfection in *it*, that one accuſtom himſelf to the Exerciſe of 'em. And thus have I ſhewn how Virtue and Honeſty (from which all our Duty does immediately flow) are deduc'd from thoſe things, which concern the Society and Good of Mankind; which was the ſecond General I propos'd to diſcourſe of.

[c] It is to be obſerv'd, that whereas there were laid down four general Heads, from which all Virtue

[b] Becauſe *getting in of Corn* is a thing that more peculiarly ſeems to be a part of Neighbourhood; and has nothing to do with Friendſhip and Kindred, *&c.*

[c] Having finiſh'd his Diſcourſe about Juſtice, the *ſecond*; he goes on to Fortitude, Magnanimity, or Greatneſs of Soul; the *third* of his general Heads of Virtue; Of which he obſerves

tue and Honeſty is deriv'd; whatever proceeds from a brave and exalted Mind, that's rais'd above Fortune, and all the little Chances and Accidents of the World, is uſually made moſt account of amongſt Men. Hence in Reproaches we find there's nothing more common, than ſuch things as theſe:

For ſhame! young Men, and yet have Womens Hearts!
While this brave Woman plays the Man ——

Or ſomething like this,

[*Blood!*
Dear[d] Salmacis *give Spoils, that coſt no Sweat or*

Whereas on the contrary in Praiſes or Panegyricks, thoſe things that are done with a bravery of Mind, and have ſomething of extraordinary Courage in 'em, (I know not how) we commend in a nobler and loftier Strain, than we do any thing elſe. Hence[e] *Marathon*, *Salamis*, *Platæa*, &c. are ſo common a Field for all the Rhetoricians: Hence our[f] *Cocles*; hence the *Decii*, the *Scipio's*, *Marcellus*, and a great many others; and eſpecially the People of *Rome* it ſelf is particularly famous for Greatneſs of Courage. But the Value that is ſet upon Military Glory appears from this, that almoſt all Statues are done in the Habit and Garb of a Soldier.

ſerves in the firſt place, That 'tis more glorious and ſplendid in the account of the World, than any of the reſt.

[d] *Salmacis* was the Name of a Nymph, preſiding over a Stream, which was ſaid to ſoften and effeminate thoſe, that waſh'd in it. [*See the fourth Book of* Ovid's Metamorph.] Theſe Words are ſpoken by way of Reproach to ſome Coward, and mean no more, Than that he's for no Spoils but only thoſe of Women, that coſt no Wounds, *&c.*

[e] Places where the *Grecians*, with a great deal of Courage, conquer'd mighty Armies of the *Perſians*. *See* Corn. Nepos's Miltiades. Plutarch's Themiſtocles *and* Ariſtides.

[f] The Names of ſeveral extraordinary *Romans*, who by their Courage contributed much to the Raiſing of that Empire: and therefore were very much applauded by Poſterity.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIX.

Courage is not truely a Virtue, unleſs it be accompany'd with Juſtice, Truth, &c. *An excellent Definition of it giv'n by the* Stoicks. *An admirable Saying of* Plato *to the ſame purpoſe. Men of great Souls are apt to be Ungovernable and Ambitious; which prompts 'em to Injuſtice. A Man of a truly noble Spirit never Injures another, but Protects from Injuries; ſcorns Applauſe, and the Voice of the ignorant Multitude.*

BUt that ſort of [a] Courage which is ſeen in the Dangers and Fatigues of War, unleſs a Man be govern'd by the Rules of Juſtice, and fight for the Safety and Good of the Publick, and not for particular Ends of his own, is altogether blamable; and ſo far from being a part of true Virtue, that 'tis indeed a piece of the moſt barbarous Inhumanity. Fortitude therefore is very well defin'd by the Stoick Philoſophers, when they call it, [b] *A Virtue contending for Juſtice and Honeſty.* No Man therefore by Baſeneſs and Treachery has ever got the Name and Reputation of true Courage; for nothing can ever be Virtuous or Credible, that is not Juſt. To which purpoſe, that of *Plato* was admirably well ſaid, "As that ſort of Knowledge, "which is not directed by the Rules of Juſtice, "ought

[a] Fighting ſtoutly, and undergoing Dangers, is not enough to give a Man the Name and Reputation of Valour, unleſs he do it in a good Cauſe, by fair means, *&c.*

[b] 'Tis not true Courage therefore to be bold in Sinning; nor is a ſign of a faint-hearted Spirit, to be afraid of committing what indeed is a Fault: There are ſome things (as *Ariſtotle* well obſerves) which a Man of true Courage ought to fear, and 'tis a ſhame for him not ſo do it. 'Twere well if

" ought rather to have the Name of *Design* and " *Subtilty*, than *Wisdom* and *Prudence*; just so that " bold and adventurous Mind, which is hurried by " the Stream of its own Passions, and not for the " Good and Advantage of the Publick, should ra- " ther have the Name of *Fool-hardy* and *Daring*, " than *Valiant* and *Couragious*. The first thing therefore I'd have in a truely couragious Man, is, [c] That he be a Follower of Goodness and fair Dealing, of Truth and Sincerity; which are principal and constituent parts of Justice. But here 'tis one very unhappy thing, that most times these great and exalted Minds are naturally ungovernable and desirous of Rule: So that what *Plato* observ'd of the *Spartans*, *That all their Customs had no other Aim, but to get the Superiority*, may fitly enough be apply'd to these Persons: for the more any Man has of this Greatness of Soul, the more eager he is of being a Sharer in the Government, or rather of obtaining it wholly to himself: And 'tis no easie matter to be fair and equitable in all one's Actions, (which is the proper and peculiar Office of Justice) while one is endeavouring to make himself uppermost. From hence it comes to pass, that they'll never be conquer'd in any Debates, or over-rul'd by the Laws and Constitutions

if this could be consider'd by some Men, who think it a brave and heroick piece of Greatness, to live in open Defiance of the Laws, and let the World see they arn't afraid of the Gallows: who defie Heaven out of a meer Bravado, and affront the Almighty, that they mayn't seem such Cowards as to be afraid of Hell. The truth on't is, there's hardly any thing occasions more Evil in the World, than Men's having false Notions of this Virtue; and would they but take this Definition along with 'em, they would not talk so much of being Couragious in Wickedness, nor call others, Men of low, mean and pitiful Souls for being afraid of Sinning.

[c] These Words must be taken in a limited Sence, not as tho' Cunning and Stratagem were unlawful, but only as exclusive of Perfidiousness and Treachery.

ſtitutions of the Publick; but make it their buſineſs by Factions and Bribery to get a ſtrong Party and Intereſt in the Republick; and rather chooſe to be Uppermoſt by Force and Injuſtice, than Equal to others by fair and upright Dealing. But the difficulty of it can only ſerve to make it more Honourable, [d] *but never its contrary more Excuſable*: For no ſort of Caſe or Circumſtance whatever, can excuſe any Man for being guilty of Injuſtice. Thoſe are therefore your truly brave and couragious Men, not who Rob, Plunder and Injure others, but thoſe who Secure and Protect 'em from Injuries. But that Greatneſs of Mind, which is *truly* ſuch, and under the direction of Wiſdom and Prudence, makes that Honour and Credit, which we naturally deſire, not conſiſt in the outward imaginary Applauſe, but in the real intrinſick Goodneſs of its Actions; and is not ſo eager of *appearing* to be greater and better than others, as of *really being ſo*. For he that is ſo mean as to depend upon the giddy and ignorant Multitude, ought never to be accounted of a truly great and exalted Spirit: Beſides that, there's nothing ſo eaſily draws Men to Acts of Injuſtice, as a Loftineſs of Mind, when joyn'd with this fooliſh Deſire of Applauſe. [e] This is indeed a very

[d] I have added theſe Words to my Author, becauſe the Sence ſeems plainly to require 'em, or ſomething like 'em. He had juſt been ſaying, That Men of great Souls are naturally apt to run into Injuſtice, for the raiſing of their Fortunes; and that 'tis very difficult for 'em not to do ſo: But fearing leſt this ſhould be urg'd as an Excuſe for 'em, he takes care to prevent it by ſaying, That the Difficulty of it enhances the Credit; and then adds, *Nullum eſt enim, &c.* which words ſeem to give a Reaſon why the Difficulty of adhering to Juſtice in this caſe, will by no means ſerve to excuſe Injuſtice: *For*, ſays he, *no ſort of Caſe*, &c.

[e] That is, He that has gotten this Loftineſs of Mind, is in very great danger of being deſirous of Applauſe, (very few being otherwiſe) and by conſequence, of falling into Injuſtice:

very dangerous Place, and requires our greateſt Concern and Watchfulneſs; becauſe you ſhall hardly find any Man, that, when he has gone thro' Labours and Difficulties, does not expect this Honour and Applauſe, as a kind of Reward for his Courage and Atchievements.

ſtice: and therefore he ought to be the more careful as to this particular.

Chap. xx.

Wherein true Greatneſs of Soul conſiſts. An excellent Deſcription of it. 'Tis an Enemy to Covetouſneſs, to the Deſire of Applauſe, and of Power. Produces a calm and unpaſſionate Mind. The Deſire of this Calm and Tranquility of Mind, has made ſome Men retire, and ſeparate 'emſelves from publick Buſineſs. In what a perfect Freedom conſiſts.

NOw all true Courage and Greatneſs of Mind [a] is more eſpecially ſeen in theſe two things: The *firſt* is a generous Contempt or Diſregard of all [b] outward Goods, proceeding from an Opinion, That 'tis unworthy of a Man *to admire*, or wiſh for, or en-

[a] Having ſhewn in the former Chapter what the Requiſites of true Courage are, *viz.* Juſtice, Truth, *&c.* that 'tis oppoſite to Ambition, Vain-glory and Ungovernableneſs, *&c.* he goes on now to ſhew wherein it conſiſts, and what thoſe things are, which 'tis concern'd about.

[b] Such are Riches, Honours, Commands, *&c.* which 'tis the part of the greateſt Soul not to be a Slave to. We call a Soul either *great* or *little*, according to the things which we find it affected with; there being always a proportion between the Faculties and the Object. Thus Children that have gotten but little Souls, are concern'd about little and trivial Objects; which afterward, as their Faculties enlarge, they

endeavour after any thing, unleſs it be that which is Honeſt and Becoming; *to* make himſelf ſubject to any one's Will; *to* be a Slave to his own irregular Paſſions; or any ways depend upon the Capricio's of Fortune. When he has gotten ſuch a Temper of Mind as I have now been deſcribing, then the *ſecond* thing is, That he [c] perform ſuch Actions as are glorious and profitable, but withal very full both of Labour and Difficulty; and extreamly dangerous to his Life it ſelf, as well as to thoſe things that are requiſite for its Preſervation. Now [d] all the *Luſtre* and *Dignity* of theſe two parts, nay and I add all their *Uſefulneſs* too, is lodg'd only in the latter; but the Ground-work, as 'twere, and Foundation of all true Greatneſs, is laid in the former. For in that are contain'd thoſe generous Principles which exalt Mens Minds, and raiſe 'em to a Contempt of all worldly things. But that former it ſelf is made up of two parts, The *firſt* is an Opinion that no-

they come to leave off and deſpiſe by degrees. He therefore is a Man of true Fortitude and Greatneſs of Soul, who is concern'd about none but the greateſt Objects, *viz.* Virtue and Vice, Happineſs and Miſery: who is above all leſſer Concerns in the World, ſuch as Pleaſure or Pain, Riches or Poverty, *&c.* and never ſuffers himſelf ſo much to regard 'em, as either to be puft up at the one, or dejected at the other. Hence he is never diſquieted either with *fears* of Evil, *hopes* of Good, or any other Paſſion; but however the World goes, can always keep an even Temper of Soul. From hence reſult Uniformity and Conſiſtency or Regularity in his Life, *&c.*

[c] This is not neceſſary to all Fortitude; for if it were, then thoſe Men who live a Life of Retirement, could never be ſaid to have that Virtue: which yet he affirms afterwards.

[d] 'Tis the doing of great and profitable Actions, that makes a Man glorious and ſplendid and uſeful to his Country: but 'tis that firm Temper and Reſolution of Mind, which is the cauſe that makes him venture to do ſuch Actions; which he therefore calls the *cauſa & ratio efficiens magnæ vires*, which has ſomething more in it than *Ground-work and Foundation.*

[e] Since

nothing is truely and really Good, but only what is Honeſt: The *ſecond* a Freedom from all ſort of Paſſion or Diſturbance of Mind. For what can more diſcover a Man of a brave and heroick Spirit, than to make no account in the World of thoſe things, which ſeem ſo glorious and dazling to the generality of Mankind; but wholly to deſpiſe 'em, not from any vain and fantaſtick Humour, but from ſolid and firm Principles of Reaſon and Judgment? Or what can more ſhew a robuſt Mind and unſhaken Conſtancy, than to bear thoſe heavy and numerous Calamities, which are incident to Mankind in this Life, with ſuch a firm Temper and Fixedneſs of Soul, as never to offend againſt Nature and Right Reaſon, or do any thing that's unworthy the Dignity and Character of a Wiſe Man? Now 'twould not at all be conſiſtent or agreeable, that he who bore up ſo couragiouſly againſt *Fear*, ſhould be afterwards unable to reſiſt *Deſire*; or that he who could never be conquer'd by *Pain*, ſhould ſuffer himſelf to be captivated by *Pleaſure*. Theſe things therefore ſhould well be conſider'd, and of all [e] Defires, that of *Money* ſhould be avoided; for nothing's a greater Sign of a narrow, mean and ſordid Spirit, than to dote upon Riches; nor is any thing on the contrary more Creditable and Magnificent, than to contemn Wealth, if you have it not; and if you have it, to lay it out freely in Acts of Bounty and Liberality. The Deſire of Glory (as I before obſerv'd) ought alſo to be

[e] Since Fortitude in great meaſure conſiſts in a freedom from the Paſſions, of which *Deſire* is one; from hence it follows, that whoever is taken with an over-great *Deſire* of any thing, offends againſt this Virtue. For this reaſon he adviſes here againſt the Deſire of *Money*, *Honour*, &c. as Vices oppoſite to Greatneſs of Soul. He brought 'em in before Chap. 8. as Cauſes of Poſitive Injuſtice.

[f] For

be avoided: for it [f] robs a Man wholly of his Freedom and Liberty, which generous Spirits ought of all things in the World to maintain and defend. Neither ought Places of Power to be ſought after; but at ſome times rather to be refus'd when offer'd, at others, be laid down if they can conveniently. We ſhould free our ſelves, in ſhort, from all vehement Paſſions and Diſorders of Mind, not only thoſe of *Deſire* and *Fear*, but alſo of *Sorrow*, of *Joy* and *Anger*; that ſo the State of the Mind may be calm and undiſturb'd, which will make the whole Life become graceful and [g] uniform. Now there both *are* and *have been* many, who to gain this Repoſe of which I am ſpeaking, [h] have betaken 'emſelves to a Life of Retirement, and wholly withdrawn from all Buſineſs of the Publick. Among theſe the nobleſt and moſt eminent of the Philoſophers;

[f] For who are greater Slaves than thoſe who ſtand for Places? Or what Servant more depends upon the Beck of his Maſter, than the ambitious Man upon the Humour and Good-will of the Multitude?

[g] By *Conſtantia* here, as in moſt other places, he does not mean that, which we commonly call *Conſtancy*; but that which the Poets call *Conſiſtency* in a Character, *i. e.* an Uniformity or Agreement between all the Parts of it, ſo that one doth not thwart and contradict another: which can never proceed from any thing elſe, but a perpetual Subjection of the Paſſions and Appetites to the Commands of Reaſon. For the Paſſions are irregular and inconſiſtent with one another; ſometimes up and ſometimes down; ſometimes hurrying a Man this way, other times that. *See Note* 2. *on Chap.* 29.

[h] 'Twas before obſerv'd, That this Virtue conſiſts chiefly in Freedom from the Diſorders of Mind, *&c.* This leads him to diſcourſe of the ſeveral Ways Men have taken for the obtaining this Repoſe; which are two, 1*ſt*, A retir'd and private Way of Living. 2*dly*, A Greatneſs of Power and Authority. The former is either of *Philoſophers* or *private Gentlemen*; and this laſt is either of *War* or *Peace*. So that according to our Author's Sence, we may make four ſorts of Fortitude, or rather four ways of Life in which this Virtue appears. The firſt we may call *Contemplative* or Monaſtick,

phers; and ſome Men of rigid and ſevere Lives, who miſliking the Manners of the People or Governours, have gone and withdrawn 'emſelves into the Country, pleas'd with the Management of their private Fortunes. Theſe Men propos'd the ſame End to themſelves that Kings and Princes do, *viz.* The Living ſo as to Want for nothing, to be under the Power and Controul of none, but to enjoy a full and perfect Freedom; which conſiſts in living ſo, as one's [1] ſelf beſt *pleaſes.*

naſtick, which conſiſts in Contemplation, and a bare Conqueſt of the Paſſions. The ſecond *Ruſtick*, in managing one's private Eſtate well. The third *Civil*, in wiſely and prudently Governing the State. And the fourth *Martial*, in Fighting bravely and well-carrying on the Buſineſs of War. He gives Rules about each of 'em in the following Diſcourſe.

[1] Theſe words muſt be taken in a limited Sence; not as tho' by *Pleaſes* were meant what our Paſſions or Fancy may ſuggeſt, but what our Nature or Reaſon commands. We ought to be Govern'd and Rul'd by *this*, and not by our Luſts and ſenſual Appeties; true Freedom conſiſting, not in our being exempt from Law, but in our being a Law to our own ſelves; as a great Author ſpeaks.

CHAP. XXI.

Thoſe who live a Publick and a Private Life aim both at Freedom. Their Lives compar'd: the former more uſeful, the latter more ſafe. In what Caſes a Man may be excus'd from ſerving the Publick. Thoſe ought to ſerve it who are qualify'd for the Service. Greatneſs of Soul more neceſſary for thoſe in a publick, than retir'd Life. Two or three Rules to be obſer'd before a Man enters upon Buſineſs.

THis then being the common Deſign and End of 'em both, thoſe who're ambitious of Power and Authority, think to obtain it by enlarging their For-

Fortunes and Intereſts in the World; but theſe whom I have mention'd as Men of Repoſe, by contenting themſelves with their own Condition, tho' but humble and mean. In which they are neither of 'em wholly in the wrong; but the Life of the latter, I mean the retir'd, is both eaſier and ſafer, and begets leſs of Trouble and Diſturbance to others; whereas that of the former, who give 'emſelves up to Affairs of State, and the Management of great and important Concerns, is more adapted to the Benefit and Good of Mankind, and the getting of Credit and Reputation in the World. [a] Thoſe People therefore are perhaps excuſable, who being of Parts and Capacities for Learning, give 'emſelves wholly to the Study of it, and never at all meddle with Publick Buſineſs: and ſo are thoſe alſo, who being diſabled by Sickneſs and Infirmities, or on any other good and allowable Account, have ſeparated 'emſelves from the Adminiſtration of Affairs, leaving the Power and Reputation of it in the hands of others. But as for thoſe People, who have none of theſe Reaſons, and pretend to deſpiſe thoſe Commands and Honours, which moſt Men admire; I am ſo far from thinking it a Virtue in 'em, that I rather eſteem it a very great Fault: Thus far, 'tis true, one can hardly condemn them, in that they deſpiſe, and make little account of Glory and Applauſe; but their true Reaſon ſeems to be rather this, That they don't care to ſuffer the Labour and Fatigue of 'em, and are afraid of encountring with Rubs and Repulſes, as things that are

[a] Having ſaid there are two kinds of Life, *viz. Publick* and *Private*, wherein Men endeavour to arrive at this Virtue, and compar'd 'em one with another; he ſhews that all are oblig'd to the former, as more uſeful to Mankind; except in ſome caſes mention'd.

[b] This

are attended with ſome Shame and Diſhonour. [b] For you ſhall often find there's a great many Men, who are very inconſiſtent with 'emſelves in things of a contrary Nature: as for *Pleaſure*, they deſpiſe it with all the Severity of a Stoick; but yet are ſo effeminate, as not to be able to bear the leaſt *Trouble*; are mighty Contemners of *Fame* and *Applauſe*; but extreamly concern'd at any thing of *Diſgrace*: [c] which are things that don't very well agree together. Thoſe People then, whom Nature has endow'd with Abilities for that purpoſe, [d] ſhould forthwith endeavour to procure 'emſelves Places, and manage the Buſineſs of the Commonwealth: Otherwiſe how ſhould the City be well govern'd, or the Greatneſs of their Endowments be made known to the World? [e] But that Greatneſs of Soul, and Contempt of all Human things, (which we have often mention'd) together with that Calmneſs and Serenity of Mind, is requiſite in thoſe of a publick Station, as much, if not more than 'tis in Philoſophers, if

[b] This he adds as a Reaſon of the Words immediately foregoing: He had juſt been ſaying, That retir'd Men did well in deſpiſing and neglecting Places of Honour; but that withal they were afraid of Shame and Diſgrace, which a Man of a great Soul ought not to be. This might ſeem odd, That one who deſpis'd Honour, ſhould yet be afraid of a little Diſgrace; to confirm it therefore, he preſently adds, *For you ſhall*, &c.

[c] *Viz.* For a Man to deſpiſe Pleaſure, and yet not be able to bear Pain; or to contemn Applauſe, and yet be afraid of being a little Ill-ſpoken of.

[d] Gentlemen therefore, and others, who have Parts and Abilities for that purpoſe, ſhould not think they are born for themſelves alone, but to ſerve their Country, Friends, *&c. See chap. 7.*

[e] Having ſaid that all, who are qualify'd for it, ſhould ſerve their Country, and endeavour after the publick ſort of Fortitude; he lays down ſome Rules in common for all thoſe, who take upon 'em any publick Truſt, whether *Civil* or *Military*; ſuch as are, To be free from Paſſion, to ſee that what they undertake be Honeſt, *&c.* Our

if ever they hope to be free from Anxieties, and arrive at any Steadineſs or Uniformity in their Lives. Now theſe things are eaſier to Philoſophers, than to them; foraſmuch as their Lives, being led in private, require for their ſupport a leſs number of things, and have fewer within the power and reach of Fortune: and if any ill Accident ſhould befal 'em, 'tis impoſſible their Sufferings can be very conſiderable. Thoſe Men therefore that are in Publick Stations, [f] having things of more weight and importance to be taken care of, muſt in reaſon be ſuppos'd to lye much more open to the Aſſaults of the Paſſions, than thoſe who ſpend their Days in Privacy and Retirement. Upon which account they ſhould take the more care, to fortifie themſelves with this Greatneſs of Spirit, and to free their Minds from the grievous Torments and Diſturbances of 'em. But he who takes upon him a Publick Truſt, ſhould not only look that the Buſineſs be Honeſt, but that he himſelf be qualified for the Management of it. In conſidering of which there's a double Extream to be carefully avoided, That he neither Deſpair thro' a mean Cowheartedneſs; nor yet be over Confident thro' Eagerneſs of Deſire. And laſtly, in whatever he ſets about, let all things be diligently and carefully put in order, before he goes on to the execution of it.

[f] Our Paſſions are apt to riſe in proportion to their Objects: Philoſophers therefore, and thoſe who live quiet and retir'd Lives, having very little Buſineſs or Concern in the World, can have nothing ſo great, as very mightily to move either their Hopes or their Fears, *&c.* But your Men of Buſineſs, being concern'd in the Affairs of a Kingdom or State, muſt needs be more liable to the Inſults of theſe Paſſions.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXII.

'Tis no leſs great and commendable to Manage Affairs of Peace, than of War. Several Examples to prove this. Arms uſeleſs abroad, without Civil Prudence at home. Cicero's *eminent Services to the Republick: A Saying of* Pompey *the Great's to him upon that Subject.*

BUt ſeeing moſt People are apt to imagin, that 'tis greater and more glorious to Manage Affairs of War, than Peace; [a] I ſhall endeavour to leſſen this general Opinion. For the Greatneſs of that Glory, which is given to Warriors, has made many People, for no other reaſon, deſirous of Quarrels; eſpecially Men of the greateſt Parts and moſt aſpiring Minds; particularly if they are qualify'd for a Soldier's Life, and their Diſpoſition carry 'em to the Profeſſion of Arms. But if we would make a juſt Eſtimate of the caſe, we ſhould find both greater and more glorious Actions done by Wiſdom at home, than by Arms abroad. For what tho' [b] *Themiſtocles* be deſervedly Commended, and his Name more Illuſtrious than that of [c] *Solon*? And

[a] Before he lays down any particular Rules about the ſeveral ſorts of Fortitude, he compares the *Civil* and *Military* together, and gives the Preference to the former.

[b] A famous *Athenian* General, by whoſe Prudence and Conduct eſpecially, the *Greeks* conquer'd *Xerxes* in that great Battle at the Iſland *Salamis*. *See his Life in* Plut. *and* Corn. Nep.

[c] An eminent Philoſopher and Lawgiver of the *Athenians*, one of the ſeven Wiſe Men of *Greece*, who is ſuppos'd by ſome to have firſt inſtituted their great Council of *Areopagus*. His Life is written by *Plut.* *Ariſtotle* indeed, and ſome others, tell us, That he did not firſt ſet on foot, but only confirm'd the Council of *Areopagus*, whereas he aboliſh'd moſt other things in the former Conſtitution. For which

And tho' *Salamis* be brought for the proof of a Victory, which is far to be prefer'd to the Wiſdom of *Solon*, in conſtituting and ſetling the Senate of *Areopagus?* Yet in truth ought *this* to be judg'd no leſs great and extraodinary than *that:* for *Themiſtocles*'s Victory was only a Kindneſs to the Commonwealth once; but *Solon*'s Counſel will be ſo for ever: Seeing 'tis by *this* that the Laws of the *Athenians*, and Conſtitutions of their Anceſtors are kept up and maintain'd. Beſide, *Themiſtocles* can name nothing in the World, wherein he aſſiſted the *Areopagus:* but *Solon* on his part may truly ſay, That he, by his Wiſdom, was aſſiſting to *Themiſtocles*; for the War was carried on by the Directions of that Senate, which he by his Prudence at firſt appointed. The ſame may be ſaid of [d] *Pauſanias* and *Lyſander*; for tho' by their Valour they are thought to have enlarg'd the Dominion of the *Spartans*, yet 'tis by no means at all to be compar'd with the Laws and Diſcipline of the wiſe [e] *Lycurgus*: beſide that to nothing but theſe Laws, and this Diſcipline, they ow'd all the Courage and Obedience of their Armies. I, for my own part, was always of Opinion, That [f] *Marcus Scaurus*, when I was a Boy, was by no

reaſon *Langius* will have *Cicero* mean by the Word *inſtituit* here, no more than *ſtabilivit* or *confirmavit*, confirm'd or eſtabliſh'd.

[d] Two famous *Spartan* Generals, who got ſeveral Victories over the *Athenians* and *Perſians*, and made *Lacedæmon* the Empreſs of all *Greece*. *See their Lives in* Corn. Nep.

[e] A Noble and moſt Wiſe Lawgiver of the *Spartans*, who, as long as they liv'd up to his Diſcipline, were one of the braveſt Nations in the World. *His Life is at large in* Plut.

[f] An excellent *Roman*, Coſ. about the Year of *Rome* 632, and afterwards Cenſor, about the time that *Cicero* was Born. He was Father of that *Scaurus*, whoſe magnificent Æ dileſhip he mentions afterwards. He was of great Credit and Authority in the Senate-houſe, and is commonly call'd, *Princeps Senatus*, commended by all for his Gravity, Abſtinence, *&c.*

[g] One

no means inferior to [g] *Caius Marius*; nor [h] *Quintus Catulus*, since I meddled with the Republick, to [i] *Cneus Pompeius*; for Armies can signifie but little abroad, unless there be Counsel and wise Management at home. Neither was the Rasing and Destroying of *Numantia*, by that incomparable Person, and brave Commander the Second *Africanus*, a greater and more signal piece of Service to the Republick, than the Murther of *Tiberius Gracchus* by [k] *Nasica*, tho' a meer private Citizen at the same time. 'Tis true, this Action had something of the Soldier in it, as being done by Force and down-right Violence, and so does not wholly come under the Notion of Civil Concerns: however, I have brought it as an Instance of these, because 'twas effected by this Civil sort of Prudence, and without the Assistance of a Military Power. I can't but therefore still extreamly approve of that Saying of mine, which I'm told some malicious and envious Fellows most mightily carp at,

Let

[g] One who tho' of mean Parentage, yet by his Valour and Courage rais'd himself to be seven times made Cos. of *Rome*. *His Life is in* Plut.

[h] There were two of that Name, Father and Son, very particularly Famous, and often mention'd by our Author, for their Learning, Wisdom, Eloquence, *&c.* See his *De Oratore*, *Brutus*, &c. The Father was Cos. with *Marius*, *An. U. C.* 651; and the Year after being Proconsul, shar'd with him in the Victory over the *Cimbri*. At last he was kill'd by his cruel Orders in the Year 666; *Cicero* being but twenty Years old: So that he must here mean the Son, who was Heir to his Father's Virtues, Cos. with *Lepidus*, *An.* 675. Our Author in his *Brutus*, ranks him *in præsidiis reip.* among those who by their Wisdom supported the State.

[i] *Pompey* the Great, who held the Civil War against *Cæsar*, and was beaten by him. All the Historians are full of him.

[k] *P. Scipio Nasica*, Grandson of him, who by the Senate was judg'd to be the honestest Man in *Rome*; who while *Gracchus* was perswading his pernicious Laws, and the Consul slack in

Let warlike Arms give place to th' peaceful Gown,
And to the Statesman's Praise the Victor yeild his Crown.

For not to say any thing of other People, when I my own self sat at the Helm of the Government, did not *Arms* then give place to the *Gown*? [1] Never was the State in more imminent Danger, and yet never were things better and more happily quieted. Thus by my Prudence and careful Management, the most impudent and audacious of all the Citizens let, as 'twere, their Arms fall out of their Hands. What Action then was there ever perform'd in War like this? Or where's the Triumph that can be compar'd to it? For I think I may venture a little to boast before you, Son *Mark*, whose Happiness it is to succeed in the Glory, and whose Duty to imitate the Excellence of my Actions: This I am sure of, even *Pompey* himself (a Man the most famous for Martial Atchievements) did me that Justice in the hearing of several, as to say, "That "his returning home with his third Triumph, had "been to but little or no purpose, unless my En- "deavours and Services to the Republick had pre- "serv'd the City for him to Triumph in. I conclude therefore, from what has been observ'd, That *that*

endeavouring to suppress him, rose up in the Senate, and bid all those who were for the Good of the Republick follow him: which several doing, they went and kill'd *Gracchus* presently.

[1] By the Conspiracy of *L. Catiline*, a Noble and Valiant, but Wicked and Debauch'd *Roman*, who, together with some others that were like himself, form'd most pernicious Designs against the Empire; which were defeated and brought to nought by the Vigilance and excellent Conduct of *Cicero* then Consul. For which extraordinary Service, he was by common Vote styl'd, *Father of his Country*, an Honour which he's frequently boasting of in his Writings. *See the whole History at large in* Sallust.

that ſort of Courage which is ſeen in the Management of Civil Affairs, is no leſs deſerving than *that* which conſiſts in the Buſineſs of Fighting; and the former requires more Pains and Application to be perfect in it, than the latter doth.

CHAP. XXIII.

The Body ought to be ſo far taken Care of, as that it may be able to bear Fatigues. But 'tis the Mind that truly makes Great Men. War ſhould be undertaken only for the ſake of Peace. The Difference between a Great Soul and a Great Underſtanding; and the Duties of each. Fighting one of the leaſt parts of Courage.

NOw 'tis certain *that* Virtue, which conſiſts in Greatneſs and Elevation of Soul, and makes up the Subject of our preſent Enquiry, is obtain'd by the Strength of the Mind, not the Body. However the Body ought not to be neglected; but by Exerciſe brought to ſuch a Frame and Condition, as that it may obey the Preſcriptions of the Mind, in performing that Buſineſs and bearing thoſe Fatigues, which are requir'd of it. But ſtill the Nature of the Virtue we are ſeeking for, conſiſts in due care and application of Mind; in which particular, the Publick receives as much Benefit from Gownſmen, who manage and take care of its Civil Concerns; as it doth from Soldiers, who are Generals of its Armies. For they by their Prudence have often either hindred the breaking out of Wars, or elſe have occaſion'd their ſpeedy Concluſion; and ſometimes too have been the cauſe of their being Undertaken: as the third with *Carthage* was entred into upon the

Advice of [a] *Cato*, whoſe Credit and Authority prevail'd in that Caſe, even after he was dead. Wiſdom therefore, and Skill in determining Civil Affairs, is more to be deſir'd than Courage in Fighting: But then we muſt always be careful in this Caſe, that our Deſign be not the avoiding of War, but the being more uſeful and ſerviceable to the Publick. [b] And as for War, it ſhould never be undertaken with any other Aim, but only that of obtaining an honourable Peace. 'Tis the part of a brave and unſhaken Spirit, not to be diſturb'd under any Misfortune, or ſuffer it ſelf in diſorder and tumult to be thrown off the Saddle (as we uſually ſpeak;) but always to keep ſuch a Preſence of Mind, as to be able to conſult upon every Occaſion, and be hurry'd on to nothing, but what is agreeable to Reaſon and Diſcretion. And as this is the part of an exalted Spirit, ſo is what follows of an elevated Underſtanding; to diſcover Effects even while they are yet in the Wombs of their Cauſes, and conſider before-hand whatever may happen on either ſide, and accordingly what's to be done when it *does* happen; that ſo he may never be taken unawares, and brought to that lamentable ſhift of crying out, *I never once thought of it.* Theſe are the Duties, as of a truly Courageous and Lofty, ſo of a Wiſe and Judicious Mind; but raſhly to run and lay about one in Battel, and come to Wounds and down-

[a] The Elder *Cato*, who was Sirnam'd *Cenſorius*, from his Severity when Cenſor. He was always perſuading the *Romans* to Deſtroy *Carthage*, which they did under the Conduct of the Younger *Scipio*; but not till two or three Years after his Death.

[b] Having determin'd the Queſtion, Whether *Civil* or *Military* Conduct be better; he now proceeds to give ſome Directions about the latter; That we ſhould never undertake War but for the ſake of Peace: Not be caſt down at Misfortunes, *&c.* to the end of the next Chapter.

down-right Blows with an Enemy, is but a ſavage and brutiſh kind of Buſineſs: However, Neceſſity ſo requiring, a Man ſhould Fight, and chooſe rather to part with his Life than his Liberty, or be guilty of any baſe or diſhonourable Action.

CHAP. XXIV.

The Duty of a truly Couragious Man, after he has conquer'd his Enemies. Cool and Deliberate Counſels to be prefer'd before Heat and Boldneſs. Nothing more fooliſh, than to expoſe one's ſelf to unneceſſary Dangers. 'Tis a Duty rather to expoſe one's ſelf, than the Publick Affairs. They are to blame, who rather venture the loſs of their Armies, than their own Reputation. The Folly of Callicratidas *and* Cleombrotus *in this. The Wiſdom of* Fabius Maximus *in doing the contrary. Men ſhould ſpeak what they think for the Good of the Publick, without regarding what Offence it may give to others.*

IN the Buſineſs of [a] Razing and Plundring Cities, there ought to be taken a very eſpecial Care, that nothing of Raſhneſs or Cruelty be ſhewn; and all true Greatneſs of Spirit obliges us, having firſt conſider'd things calmly and maturely, to Pardon the Multitude, and Puniſh thoſe only that were principally Faulty; and in every State and Condition of Fortune, to obſerve the juſt *Medium* of Virtue and Honeſty. For as we've already obſerv'd of

[a] Having ſhewn in the *former* Chapter what ſhould be the Motive *of*, and how a Couragious Man ſhould carry himſelf *in* War: In *this* he lays down ſome Rules for his Carriage after he has gotten the Victory, *viz.* To ſhew nothing of Paſſion, Cruelty, *&c.*

of ſome, that they count it more noble to manage Affairs of War, than of Peace; ſo you ſhall find there are a great many others, who imagine, that hot and adventurous Undertakings have ſomething that's greater and more glorious in 'em, than wiſely cool and deliberate Counſels. Now as no Man ought, by too warily avoiding of Dangers and Labours, to get himſelf the name of a Faint-heart and Coward; ſo, on the other hand, Care ſhould be taken, that we thruſt not our ſelves into Hazards and Difficulties, where there's no manner of occaſion for it; than which there is no greater Folly upon Earth. 'Tis a Duty therefore, in Attempts of any Danger, to imitate the Practice of skilful Phyſicians, who always to light and inconſiderable Diſeaſes, apply none but eaſie and gentle Remedies; but in deſperate Caſes are forc'd to have recourſe to deſperate Cures. 'Tis a madneſs therefore, while all things are calm and in a peaceful State, to deſire a Storm; but to keep off the Miſchiefs of it when it does happen, is the part of a Wiſe and a Prudent Man; and ſo much the more, if the Good to be obtain'd by getting well rid of it, out-balance the Evils you may be brought into by the Attempt. [b] The Danger of ſome Actions only relates to the Perſon that undertakes 'em, but *that* of others to the whole Republick: And again, A Man's Life is endanger'd in ſome, in others his Reputation and the Goodwill of his Citizens. 'Tis our Duty then, [c] *in the for-*

[b] He has done with thoſe Rules, which concern a Man's Carriage in Wars and Dangers; but becauſe there are ſeveral ſorts of Dangers, he proceeds to ſhew, which a Man ſhould rather chuſe. When *Fabius*, for inſtance, was *Roman* General; ſhould he Fight with *Hannibal*, *the whole Republick*; ſhould he not, *his own Reputation* was in danger. 'Twas then his Duty rather to hazard the *latter*, than the *former*.

[c] *Viz.* When the Danger on one hand concerns the State, on the other only the Perſon himſelf.

[d] *Viz.*

former Caſe, more willingly to expoſe and endanger our ſelves, than the whole State; and [d] *in the latter*, to fight for our Glory and Reputation, more readily than any other Conveniencies whatever. Yet the [e] contrary to this appears plainly in the Practice of a great many Men, who are willing to ſpend their Eſtates and Lives for the good of their Country; but won't bear the leaſt Diminution of their Honour, tho' the preſent Occaſions of the Republick require it. Thus *Callicratidas*, Admiral of *Sparta*, in the *Peloponneſian* War, after he had done many ſignal Services, at laſt was the occaſion of Ruining all; for when he was adviſ'd to Retreat with his Navy from [f] *Arginuſſæ*, and not venture giving the *Athenians* Battel, he utterly refus'd it; and told his Adviſers, *That* if this whole Navy ſhould chance to be loſt, the *Lacedæmonians* could rig out another; but that he for his part could never fly, without an irreparable loſs of his Honour. And here the *Lacedæmonians* had tho' a great, yet a tolerable Blow; but that [g] other was Mortal, and put a full period to the *Spartan* Greatneſs,

[d] *Viz.* When on either ſide the General only is endanger'd, in his Life, Reputation, *&c.*

[e] That is, They'll rather venture the Intereſt of the Republick, than their own Honour; as *Callicratidas* and *Cleombrotus* did; which is contrary to the Rule he has juſt now laid down.

[f] Two or three little Iſlands adjoyning to the leſſer *Aſia*, between that and the Iſle *Lesbos*; where the *Athenians*, under the Conduct of *Thraſibulus*, gave a mighty Overthrow to the *Lacedæmonians*, who were led by *Callicratidas*; himſelf being ſlain in the Action. *See Book* 15. *of* Diod. Sicul. who ſays, 'Twas the greateſt Battel that ever was fought between *Grecians*.

[g] At *Leuctra*, a Town in *Bœotia*, where the *Spartan* Army, under the Conduct of King *Cleombrotus*, and *Archidamus*, was entirely routed by the famous *Theban* General *Epaminondas*; *Cleombrotus* himſelf being kill'd in the Battel.

neſs, when their Leader *Cleombrotus*, only for fear of being ſomewhat Ill-ſpoken of, unadviſedly ventur'd to fight *Epaminondas*. How much better did [h] *Fabius Maximus* do? Concerning whom *Ennius* has theſe Words:

One Man our State has ſav'd by wiſe Delays:
For he regarded not the fooliſh Prate
Of idle People; but the City's Good.
Therefore his growing Fame now flouriſhes
More, when his Deeds are paſt.

[i] The ſame kind of Fault ſhould alſo be avoided in Civil Adminiſtrations; for a great many Men are afraid to ſpeak out what they really think, tho' perhaps 'tis for the beſt, for fear it ſhould give any Offence to others.

[h] *Fabius* being made General againſt *Hannibal*, would not come to a Battel with him, but endeavour'd to weary him out by Delays; for which he was call'd *Cunctator*, the Delayer. At firſt he was abus'd and call'd Coward for this; but afterwards 'twas found by Experience to be the beſt Courſe; and then no one was ſo much commended as he. *See his Life in* Plutarch.

[i] By this Step he paſſes from the Rules relating to *Military* Fortitude, to thoſe which relate to *Civil*; of which he gives ſeveral: as, *Firſt* here, To ſpeak one's Mind freely, *&c. Secondly*, in the next Chapter, To obſerve *Plato*'s two Rules, *&c.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XXV.

Two Rules of Plato's *to be obſerv'd by thoſe who Govern the State. The Good of the Govern'd ought to be their ſole Aim. An excellent Deſcription of a good Miniſter of State. Ambition very deſtructive in a Government. A good Saying of* Plato's *to that purpoſe. Men ſhould carry themſelves civilly towards thoſe, who are of an oppoſite Party in the State; and not count 'em their Enemies. The Example of* Scipio *and* Metellus. *Anger towards an Adverſary no part of Courage. Affability, &c. requiſite in a Stateſman. Severity and Chaſtiſements ſometimes neceſſary; and Rules to be obſerv'd about 'em. Nothing can be well done, that's done in a Paſſion. Rulers ſhould be like the Laws themſelves.*

THoſe who deſign to be Partakers in the Government ſhould be ſure to remember theſe two Precepts of *Plato*: *Firſt*, To make the Safety and Intereſt of their Citizens, the great Aim and Deſign of all their Thoughts and Endeavours; without ever conſidering their own perſonal Advantage. And, *Secondly*, ſo to take care of the whole collective Body of the Republick, as not to ſerve the Intereſt of any one Party, to the Prejudice or Neglecting of all the reſt. For the Government of a State is much like the Office of a Guardian or Truſtee; which ſhould always be manag'd for the good of the Pupil, and not of the Perſons to whom he is entruſted. And thoſe Men, who, whilſt they take care of one, neglect or diſregard another part of the Citizens, do but occaſion Sedition and Diſcord, the moſt deſtructive things in the World to a State: From whence it comes to paſs, that, while ſome take part with the Popular Faction, and others make their Court to every Great One, there's but very few

few left, who are concern'd for the Benefit and Good of the whole. From this Root have ſprung many grievous Diſſentions amongſt the *Athenians*; and not only Tumults, but even deadly Civil Wars in our own Republick: things which a worthy and truly brave Citizen, and one who deſerves to hold the Reins of the Govenment, will ſhun and deteſt; and will give himſelf ſo to the Service of the Publick, as to aim at no Riches or Power for himſelf; and will ſo take care of the whole Community, as not to paſs over any one part of it: Such a one will ſcorn, by the mean Arts of Calumny and a falſe Accuſation, to bring others into Hatred and Diſrepute with the People; but will always adhere to what is Juſt and Honeſt, and ne'r be drawn from it, whatever Offence may be taken by others; nay, will rather part with his Life it ſelf, than do any thing that is contrary to the Virtues I have mention'd. Eager Ambition, and contending for Honours, is, of all things, moſt ruinous and deſtructive to a State; concerning which, *Plato* has ſaid admirably well, "That for Men "to contend and fall out with one another, about "which ſhould be Chief in the Management of the "State, is juſt as if the Ship's Crew ſhould go to-"ther by the ears, about who ſhould be Maſter or "Pilot of the Veſſel. And the ſame Philoſopher has given us this for a Rule, "That only thoſe Men "ſhould be reckon'd as Enemies, who have taken "up Arms in oppoſition to the Republick; not "thoſe who would govern it after their own "Schemes. [a] Such was the Diſſention between

[b] *P.*

[a] The Quarels between Citizens are of two ſorts, 1. *Civil*, when each deſires the Good of the Publick, but take ſeveral ways of arriving at it; ſuch was this here mention'd. The other *Hoſtile*, when one endeavours to Ruine, the other to Uphold the State; ſuch was that between *Cicero* and *Catiline*.

[b] *P.*

[b] *P. Africanus* and *Q. Metellus*, without any great Bitterneſs or Animoſities between 'em. Some People think it the part of a brave and heroick Spirit, to ſhew heat of Anger and Paſſion againſt an Adverſary; but what they ſay is by no means to be regarded: for it's certain on the other hand, nothing's more laudable, nothing more worthy of a great and brave Perſon, than Clemency, Meekneſs and Gentleneſs of Spirit. In Cities that are Free, and where all Men in common enjoy the ſame Privileges, Courteſie and Affability, and that which they call *altitudo animi*, a calm and undiſturbed Temper of Mind, are peculiarly requiſite: For to fret upon every unſeaſonable Viſit, or at every impertinent and troubleſom Petitioner, makes a Man ſowre and moroſe in his Humour; which as it brings no kind of Good to himſelf, ſo it gets him the Hatred and Ill-will of others. But tho' Meekneſs and Clemency be laudable Virtues, yet no further, than as they leave room for a juſt Severity, whenever the Occaſions of the Publick require it; without which a City can never be well govern'd. Now [c] every Reproof and Chaſtiſement, *in the firſt place*, ſhould be always free from contumelious Language, and not inflicted for the ſake of the Perſon chaſtizing or reproving another, but the good and advantage of the whole Republick. Diligent care ſhould be taken, *in the next place*, that the Penal-

[b] *P. Africanus* the Younger, and that *Metellus* who was ſirnam'd *Macedonicus*, from his Conqueſt of *Macedonia*. They always rivall'd and oppos'd one another in the Affairs of the Publick, but never ſo, as to become inveterate Enemies.

[c] He had been ſaying, a Governour ſhould be Meek and Courteous, but not ſo as to exclude Severity, when occaſion requires it: This naturally brought him to diſcourſe, How Criminals ſhould be puniſh'd; which he does by laying down ſeveral Rules; as, *Firſt, That no ill Language be given 'em*, &c.

[a] The

Penalty be proportion'd to the nature of the Crime, and that ſome don't paſs without ever being queſtion'd, while others are puniſh'd for the ſame Miſdemeanours. But of all things, Anger ſhould be excluded in Puniſhing; for whoever comes to this Work in a Paſſion, will never obſerve that due Mediocrity, which equally abſtains from too much and too little, ſo ſtrictly requir'd by the [d] Peripatetick Schools: And they have very good reaſon indeed to require it; but then I can't but wonder they ſhould commend Anger, and ſay, Nature has giv'n it us to good Ends and Purpoſes: For *that* in truth ought in no caſe to be allow'd of; and 'twere heartily to be wiſh'd that the Governours of a State, would, in this particular, be like the Laws themſelves, which puniſh Offenders according to Juſtice, without being any ways guided by Paſſion.

[d] The *Peripateticks* hold, That the Paſſions, *viz.* Anger, *&c.* are in 'emſelves neither Good nor Bad, but accordingly as they are made either good, or ill Uſe of; and that they are given us by Nature for very good Ends and Purpoſes, if we don't let 'em get the upper-hand of our Reaſon, but reduce 'em to a certain Mediocrity and Temperament. But the *Stoicks*, whom *Cicero* follows in this Book, ſaid the Paſſions were abſolutely in themſelves evil, call'd 'em Diſeaſes and Infirmities of the Mind; and commanded their Wiſe Man, not to moderate, but wholly to root out all Anger, Joy, Compaſſion, *&c.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVI.

Greatneſs of Soul commands an even Temper, free from Haughtineſs in Proſperity, and Dejectedneſs in Adverſity. Phillip *greater than* Alexander, *in bearing his good Fortune with an even Mind. The Higher Men are, the more care they ſhould take of being Humble and Moderate. An admirable Saying of* Scipio *to this purpoſe. In Proſperity we ſhould eſpecially conſult our Friends; and have a care of Flatterers. Greatneſs of Soul ſeen often among the Philoſophers, and thoſe who in private manage their own Eſtates. How an Eſtate ſhould be got, improv'd and us'd.*

ANother great Duty of [a] Fortitude is, not to be Haughty, Diſdainful and Arrogant when Fortune favours us, and all things go forward according to our Wiſhes: for it ſhews as much Meanneſs and Poorneſs of Spirit, to be tranſported with *good*, as it does with *ill* Fortune: whereas, on the other hand, nothing's more brave, than an Evenneſs of Temper in every Condition, and (as is reported of *Socrates* and *Lælius*) a conſtant retaining the ſame Air in one's Countenance, without ever ſeeming puff'd up or dejected. I find that [b] *Philip*, the King of *Macedonia*, was inferiour to his Son in the outward Glory and Splen-

[a] The Rules which follow, equally concern the *Civil* and *Military* ſort of Fortitude, Not to be puft up at the good Succeſs of our Affairs, or dejected at the ill, *&c.*

[b] The ſecond of that Name, Son of *Amintas*, whom he ſucceeded in the Throne. A Cunning, Valiant and Ambitious Prince. He conquer'd the *Thebans*, *Athenians*, and other neighbouring Nations; till at laſt he was made Generaliſſimo of all the *Grecian* Forces. He laid the Foundation of that Empire, which *Alexander* the Great, his Son, brought to its Hight. *See 'em compar'd together in* Juſtin, *Book* 9. *ch.* 8.

[c] As

Splendor of his *Atchievements*, but very far above him in good Nature and Condeſcenſion; therefore the Father kept always the Character of a Great Perſon, whereas the Son often was [c] guilty of baſe and diſhonourable Actions. 'Tis a good Rule therefore, I think, which is given by ſome Men, *That the higher our Station in the World is, the more care we ſhould take of our Lives and Actions, that they be kept within the compaſs of Lowlineſs and Humility.* *Panætius* tells us 'twas an uſual Saying with his Schollar and familiar Friend *Africanus*, "That "Men who give the Reins to their vitious Appetites, "and are high and preſuming upon the Greatneſs "of their Fortunes, ſhould be dealt with like Hor- "ſes, when grown fierce and unruly by frequent "Engagements: for as *theſe* are deliver'd to Brea- "kers to tame and be made fit for riding; ſo *thoſe* "ſhould be brought within the barriers and limits "of Reaſon and Philoſophy, to teach 'em the Un- "certainty of all Human Things, and the great "Volubility and Changeableneſs of Fortune. We ſhould alſo in Proſperity more eſpecially make uſe of the Counſel of our Friends, and pay more Reſpect and Deference to their Advices, than we were wont to do. At the ſame time alſo we ſhould take a great care, that we don't give over-much ear to Flatterers, nor ſuffer our ſelves to be wheedled and impos'd upon by their deceitful Words. For there's nothing wherein we're more apt to be miſtaken, than in this particular; every one having ſuch a fond Conceit and Opinion of himſelf, as to think he deſerves thoſe Applauſes which they give him. Hence ſpring innumerable Errors in our Lives; whilſt Men, puff'd up with a vain Imagination, and mi-

[c] As in the Murther of his Friend *Clitus*, *Calliſthenes*, &c. *See* Q. Curtius.

[d] Ha-

miſtaken Notions of their own great Merit, are expos'd to the Railery of all the World beſides. And ſo much may ſuffice upon this Head. From what has been ſaid we may eaſily gather, That thoſe who are over Affairs of the Publick, do the greateſt Actions, and ſuch as expreſs the moſt Bravery of Mind; their Buſineſs affording 'em more Opportunities, and there being more Men who are concern'd in *this*, than in any *other* Method of Living whatever. [d] But after all, we can't but acknowledge there *are*, and *have been* a great many noble Spirits, even in a Life of Retirement and Privacy; who being ſequeſtred from the Buſineſs of the World, have given up 'emſelves to Enquiries after Truth, and the great Concernment of the Practice of Virtue: Or elſe leading a Life in the middle, as it were, between the Stateſman and Philoſopher, have been delighted with the Management of their own private Fortunes; not ſcraping up Money by all manner of ways, or hoarding it ſo as to make no Body the better for it; but parting with it freely for the ſake of their Friends, or to ſerve the Republick, when occaſion required it. Now this private Eſtate I would have, in the *firſt place*, to be *honeſtly* come by, not by any baſe, ſcandalous or invidious way of Gaining: *then* let it be diſtributed to the Uſes and Neceſſities of as many as is poſſible, provided they are worthy and deſerving People; and let it be encreas'd by ſuch ordinary Methods of Saving and good Husbandry, as are agreeable to the Dictates of Reaſon and Prudence: and *laſtly*, let none of it be ſpent in Debauchery and luxurious

[d] Having done with the *publick*, he comes now to the *private* Fortitude. Of this he omits the former Branch, *viz.* The *Contemplative*, having diſcours'd of it already in Chap. 6. Of the latter, which relates to *private* Gentlemen, managing their own Eſtates, he gives a few Precepts; as, *Firſt*, That their Eſtate be well gotten, *&c.*

urious Living, but in Acts of Munificence and Liberality towards others. Whoever obſerves theſe Meaſures laid down (let his way of Life be either publick or private) may perform all the Duties of Magnanimity, Conſtancy and Greatneſs of Soul, as well as of Sincerity, Fidelity, and doing Good to Mankind.

CHAP. XXVII.

The Virtues contain'd under the fourth Head of Honeſty. Whatever is Honeſt, and nothing elſe but that, is becoming a Man; Honeſty and Decency being really the ſame thing, and diſtinguiſh'd only by an Act of the Mind. Two ſorts of Decorum, and what the Nature of each of 'em is.

WE are now in the next place to ſpeak of the fourth, and only remaining part of Virtue or Honeſty, under which are comprehended Baſhfulneſs, Temperance, Modeſty, Government of the Paſſions, and the obſerving a juſt Order as to time and place in our Words and Actions; from all which ariſes [a] a certain engaging kind of Beauty and Gracefulneſs, which ſerves to ſet off and adorn our Lives. Under this Head is contain'd that Becomingneſs [*Decorum*, as we call it in Latin] which among the *Greeks* has the name of πρέπον; which is

[a] By theſe Words I would expreſs our Author's *quaſi ornatus quidam vitæ*, by which 'tis likely he might mean the ſame, which the *Greeks* did by their Κοσμιότης or ἐυκοσμία, which *Ariſtotle* comprehends under the Virtue of Temperance. 'Tis that which gives a Luſtre and Ornament to Virtue, like the poliſhing of a Diamond, which makes it more pleaſing and valuable than when rugged, tho' then it exceeded all other Stones. Thus we ſee ſome have a way to ſet

is in its Nature so closely united and riveted to Honesty, that there's no way left of pulling 'em asunder: for whatever is *Becoming* is likewise *Honest*, and whatever is *Honest* is likewise *Becoming*. The Difference between 'em is so very small, that we may better conceive what it is, than explain it; for [b] whatever Becomingness there is in any Action, it immediately arises from the Honesty of it. From hence it appears, that Becomingness does not peculiarly belong to this one part of Honesty, whereof we are now undertaking to Discourse; but shews it self also in each of the three former. [c] To Reason, for instance, and Discourse according to the Rules of *Prudence*; to go about nothing but after due

set off and recommend their Virtue; while others by their too great Severity and Rigidness, for want of this *ornatus*, which he here mentions, render both it and themselves Distastful.

[b] That is, Honesty is as it 'twere the Foundation of Decorum, which 'tis built upon; it being impossible for any thing to *become*, unless it be first Honest. I could wish however our Author had endeavour'd to explain the Difference he understood between 'em, and not contented himself with saying in general, That it might better be conceiv'd than in Words express'd. The Nature of *Honesty* seems to consist in the Conformity of our Actions to the Judgment of *Right Reason*, as the Rule or Measure which a reasonable Creature ought to walk by: But that of *Decorum*, in our Actions being answerable to the Dignity and Excellence of Human Nature, as a Character which we ought to live up to in the World. Now nothing can be so, that is not first suppos'd conformable to the Dictates of Reason: and whatever is conformable to the Judgment of Reason, must of consequence be worthy of a Man. For what can be worthy of a reasonable Creature, but to live according to that Reason which God has giv'n him? From hence it follows, that *Decorum* does as 'twere result from *Honestum*, as Light does from the Sun; or (to give our Author's own Explication of it) as Beauty and good Colour in the Face, doth from a good Constitution of Body.

[c] He shews in particular, how Decorum is seen in the three former Virtues, *Prudence*, *Justice*, *Fortitude*.

due Conſideration; and on every occaſion to be quick at eſpying and defending the Truth, are things that are *Becoming*: whereas to be deceiv'd, to be in an Errour or Miſtake, and to be impos'd upon, are very *Unbecoming*, as well as to be mad or beſide one's ſelf. So again, all Actions of *Juſtice* are *Becoming*, but thoſe of Injuſtice are both Scandalous and Unbecoming. The ſame may be ſaid as to the Actions of *Fortitude*; whatever is done with a manful Courage and bravery of Mind, as 'tis *worthy* of, ſo it *becomes* a Man; but whatever on the other hand ſhews any Cowardice or Meanneſs of Spirit, is as contrary to Becomingneſs, as it is to true Virtue. I conclude therefore, That the Decency whereof I am now diſcourſing, appertaineth to each of the four parts of Honeſty; and ſo appertaineth, as not to ſtand in need of any mighty reach of Underſtanding to perceive it; but is eaſily diſcoverable at the firſt view: for there's ſomething of Becoming contain'd in the very Notion and Idea of all Virtue, from which 'tis diſtinguiſh'd by the Mind alone, and not by the Nature of the thing it ſelf. Juſt as the Beauty and good Colour of the Countenance, can never be ſeparate from the Health of the Body; ſo this Becomingneſs, of which we are ſpeaking, in it ſelf is all one, and, as it were, incorporate with Virtue and Honeſty; but may be diſtinguiſh'd from it by Thought and Imagination. Now there are *two kinds* or ſorts of it; the one [a] *Univerſal*, which belongs to the Nature of *Honeſty in general*; the other *particular* and contain'd under this, which belongs to the *ſeveral parts of it*. The *former* is us'd to be thus defin'd, *Decorum* or *Be-*

[a] This is that we have ſpoken of in the Note above, which is the immediate Off-ſpring of, and neceſſarily reſults from the Nature of Honeſty in general.

[b] That

Becoming is that, which is congruous or agreeable to [e] *that excellent part of the Nature of Man, by which he is distinguish'd from the rest of the Creation.* As for the latter, which is contain'd under this, 'tis most commonly made to consist in *that, which is so agreeable to the Nature of Man, as* [f] *withal to shew something of Temper and Moderation, with a certain sweet Air of Gentility and good* Manners.

[e] That is, His Reason; it being impossible for any thing to become a Man, but that which is agreeable to the Rules of Right Reason: and whatever is reasonable doth at the same time become him, in this first and largest acceptation of the Word.

[f] There are two things then, which constitute and make up the Nature of this Decorum: 1*st*, An Agreeableness to the Nature of Man; and so far 'tis the same with the former universal one: But then it adds to it, 2*dly*, A *Moderatio*, &c. something that's gentile, handsom and engaging, which may serve to recommend it in the Eye of the World. *See Note* 1. *on this Chapter.*

CHAP. XXVIII.

Poetical Decorum what it is, and how differing from that we here speak of. Nature has given us a Character of Reason, &c. *which we ought to live up to. Nature teaches us to have a Respect for other Men. Proportion, Regularity,* &c. *please, where-ever they are found. We ought to be concern'd about other People's Opinion of us. How the Duties of Justice, and those of Modesty, Decency,* &c. *differ. We should live agreeably to Nature, which will always lead us right. Decency relates both to the Actions of the Body and Mind. The Nature or Mind of Man consists of Sence and Reason. The former of these ought to obey the latter.*

THat this is so, will more plainly appear, if we consider that *Decorum* or Convenience of Manners, which

which the Poets aim at in all their Writings; concerning which were it anywise necessary to my present Purpose, I might largely discourse. Suffice it at present for me only to observe, That the Poets are then said to keep this Decorum, when each of their Persons is brought in saying and doing those things, which are suitable to the Character he bears in the World: Should [a] *Æacus*, for Example, or *Minos* say

[b] *E'en let 'em hate me, whilst they dread me too:*

Or,

[c] *The Child's entomb'd in its own Parent's Bowels.*

'twould be an Offence against the Rules of *Decency*; because they pass in the World for Men of Justice and Honesty: But let the same be said by a cruel *Atreus*, and the whole Theatre shall clap and applaud it; because 'tis a Saying very agreeable to his Character. [d] Now the Poet can judge what is becoming and convenient for every Person, according to the Character he himself has fix'd on him; but Nature has fix'd one on every one of us, by giving us that Nobleness and Excellence of Being, whereby we are set above all other Creatures. The

[a] Two of the Sons of *Jupiter*, suppos'd to have been very Just and Good Men; therefore, after their Deaths, made two of the Judges of Hell.

[b] A Verse out of *Ennius*, often quoted by our Author.

[c] A Verse which the Poet *Accius* puts into the Mouth of *Atreus*, who had kill'd the Children of his Brother *Thyestes*, and serv'd 'em up to him at a Banquet. *See* Seneca's *Tragedy* of Thyestes.

[d] There's a difference between the Poetical and Moral Decorum: The *Poet* himself can give such or such a Character, (a vicious one if he pleases) and his Decorum consists in the Person's speaking and doing what's agreeable to such a Character.

The Poets then, there being ſo great a variety of Characters, can ſee what's becoming and convenient for all, even the moſt Vitious: but we have got only one Character to live up to, I mean that which is aſſign'd us by Nature herſelf; a *Character* of Temperance and Modeſty, of Conſtancy and Moderation. And the ſame Nature having alſo taught us, That we ought to be careful of our Carriage and Demeanour towards the reſt of Men; from hence it appears of how large an Extent that Becomingneſs is, which belongs to the Nature of [e] *Honeſty in general*; and alſo that other, which is ſeen in the Exerciſe of the [f] *ſeveral kinds of it*. For, as the Beauty and Comlineſs of the Body draws the Eyes to it by the fit Compoſure of all its Members, and pleaſes us only upon this account, becauſe all its Parts correſpond with a kind of Proportion and Harmony: So this Decorum, which gives a ſort of Luſtre and Grace to our Lives, engages the Approbation and Eſteem of all we live with, by that juſt and due Order, Conſiſtency, and Regularity, which it keeps and maintains in our Words and Actions. [g] We ought to have therefore a certain Reſpect and Reverence for all Men, and deſire to be approv'd not only by the beſt, but by all the

racter. But *Nature* (*i. e.* the God of Nature) has given one to every of us, by making us reaſonable underſtanding Creatures. As therefore a poetical Perſon muſt ſpeak and do what's ſuitable to his Character; ſo are we bound in all our Thoughts, Words and Actions, to follow the Dictates of Underſtanding and Right Reaſon; in which conſiſts the Nature of univerſal Decorum.

[e] Which conſiſts in living up to that Character of Temperance, *&c.* which Nature has given us.

[f] Which conſiſts in being careful of our Carriage and Demeanour towards the reſt of Men, which the ſame Nature has taught us to be; in giving no Offence to any one, *&c.*

[g] Men ought to frame and compoſe their Actions, not according to their own *private* Will and Fancy, but according to

the World: For not to care a farthing what 'tis People think of One, is a ſign not only of Pride and Conceitedneſs, but indeed of having perfectly abandon'd all Modeſty. [h] But here we muſt obſerve, there's a great deal of difference between that which Juſtice, and that which this Modeſty, Reſpect or Reverence demands, in relation to other People: 'Tis the Duty of Juſtice, not to injure or wrong any Man; of Reſpect or Reverence, not to do any thing that may offend or diſpleaſe him; wherein more eſpecially the Nature of that Decorum we are ſpeaking of conſiſts. Theſe things then being thus explain'd, I ſuppoſe it may clearly enough appear, what that is which we mean by *Becoming*. As for the Duties preſcrib'd by it, the firſt thing to which it conducts us is, To demean our ſelves ſuitably and agreeably to our Nature, and do nothing that may any ways ſtain or deface it: for whilſt we take *this* for our Guide and Conductreſs, [i] 'tis impoſſible we ſhould ever go out of the way; but by her ſhall be led thorough all the Paths of Wiſdom, Truth and Underſtanding; of Juſtice and Beneficence toward the Society of Mankind; and of true Magnanimity and Great-

to the Preſcriptions and Manners of thoſe, with whom they converſe; ſo far as is innocent and not contrary to Virtue; to be eaſie and compliant in Things indifferent, and by a civil, gentile and affable Deportment, endeavour to oblige and win the Affections of all Men. And he that will follow his own Humour, without caring whether he pleaſes or diſpleaſes Men, where he might innocently do it, is deſervedly cenſur'd for a proud, arrogant and unmannerly Fellow.

[h] Modeſty, or the ſecond ſort of Decorum, conſiſting (as is ſaid) in our due Carriage towards other Men; and Juſtice alſo in another manner doing the ſame: he here ſhews wherein they differ, and what the diſtinct Duties of each.

[i] For Virtue it ſelf conſiſts in acting agreeably to the Dictates of Nature, *i. e.* Reaſon: in following her therefore we ſhall but go in the Way of Virtue, and conſequently can never be in the wrong.

[k] Since

Greatneſs of Soul. But the Nature of Decency is more peculiarly ſeen in the fourth part of Honeſty, concerning which we are now diſcourſing; and relates not only to the Motions of the Body, but more eſpecially to thoſe of the Mind alſo; each of which are approv'd and becoming, when they are ſuch as are ſuitable to Nature. [k] Now the whole of the Nature or Mind of Man, is made up of only theſe two Parts: The *firſt* conſiſts in the ſenſitive Appetite, which by the *Greeks* is call'd ὁρμὴ, by the blind and extravagant Impulſe of which, he is hurried and tranſported from one thing to another. The *ſecond* in Reaſon, which ſhews and inſtructs him in the way of his Duty, telling him what he ſhould *do*, and what *not do*: From whence it follows, That 'tis Reaſon which ought to be the governing Faculty; and the Appetite ſubject to the Commands of it.

[k] Since Decorum conſiſts in acting ſuitably to Nature, and we muſt firſt know what Nature is, before we can tell what's ſuitable to it; therefore he here tells us wherein it conſiſts.

CHAP. XXIX.

Our Actions ſhould neither be Raſh nor Careleſs, &c. How the Senſitive Part ſhould be ſubject to the Reaſonable. Paſſion diſorders the Body, as well as Mind. Watchfulneſs and Conſideration neceſſary for the ſubduing of the Paſſions. Men were not deſign'd by Nature for Jeſting, &c. but ſerious Studies. Several ſorts of Jeſts and Diverſions. Meaſures to be obſerv'd about 'em.

EVery Action therefore ſhould be free, as from Precipitancy and Raſhneſs on the one hand, ſo

from all Careleſneſs and Negligence on the other; nor ſhould any thing be done, for which we can't give a ſufficient *Reaſon*, which is almoſt the very Definition of Duty. In order to this [a] the Paſſions muſt be brought under the power of Reaſon, ſo as neither thro' Haſtineſs to run before its Orders, nor thro' Coldneſs and Heavineſs to diſregard 'em when given; but all their Motions muſt be ſo quieted and ſo reſtrain'd, as to bring no Uneaſineſs or Diſturbance to the Mind. And from this calm and peaceable State of the Soul ariſes that Conſtancy and Moderation we have mention'd: For when once the Paſſions grow unruly and extravagant, and refuſe to be guided in their Deſires and Averſions by the Rules of Prudence, [b] they'll run without queſtion beyond all Bounds and Meaſure; for they abandon and caſt off their Allegiance to *Reaſon*, which they ought to obey by the Conſtitution of Nature. By this means are all things turn'd topſie-turvy, and not the *Mind* only, but even the *Body* alſo, put very much into Diſorder and Confuſion. Do but mark thoſe, who'r enflam'd with a vehement *Anger* or *Deſire*; who'r tranſported with *Fear*, or an over-great *Joy*; and you'll ſee an alteration

[a] Since God has endow'd us with the Faculty of Reaſon, to ſhew and inſtruct us in the Way of our Duty, What can be more either Sinful or Unbecoming, than to ſtifle the Sparks of it by Negligence and Heavineſs? Or what more unnatural, than to make what ſhould be our Guide and Directreſs, become a Captive and Slave to our irregular Paſſions? For God has given us that Divine Faculty to no purpoſe, if afterwards we refuſe to be Guided and Conducted by it. The great and fundamental Duty therefore in this place, is, To do nothing but according to the Directions of Reaſon, to aſſert her Soveraignty, and never ſuffer her to be captivated by any vicious Principle or inordinate Luſt.

[b] For nothing is ſo wild and ungovernable as the Paſſions, when they've over-power'd and got the maſtery of Reaſon. And how then can there be any Regularity, Temper or Decency

ration in their Countenances, Voices, Geſtures, and all their Actions; which ſufficiently gives us to underſtand (that we may return again to the Duty now before us) how neceſſary 'tis to reſtrain and give check to the Movements of the Appetite, and to be always Watchful and ſtanding upon our Guard, that ſo we may neither be Careleſs and Inconſiderate, nor do any thing Raſhly and at all Adventures. [c] For Mankind were never deſign'd by Nature, meerly to ſport and idle away their Time; but to follow after grave and ſerious Studies, and Buſineſs of greater importance than Play is. Not but that Jeſting and Diverſion are allowable, provided we uſe 'em but only as Sleep, and other ſuch neceſſary Refreſhments of Nature, *viz.* after the diſcharge of our ſerious and more important Duties. And even then we muſt ſee, that our Jeſting be neither exceſſive nor immodeſt, but ſuch as is handſom and becoming a Gentleman. For as Boys are allow'd, not all kinds of Sports, but only ſuch as have nothing that is vicious or ill in them; ſo in this Jeſting we ſhould allow our ſelves nothing, but only what is agreeable to Honeſty and Good-manners. We may therefore obſerve, that Jeſting or Merriment is of two ſorts, the *one* clowniſh, abuſive, ſcandalous and ob-

ency in that Life, which is under the Government of ſuch blind, inconſiſtent Maſters? *Diſtrahuntur in contrarias partes impotentium cupiditates,* (ſays our Author in another place) *cum huic obſecutus ſis, illi eſt repugnandum.*

[c] Since Reaſon (as was ſhewn) is the governing Part of Man, and he's bound to act according to its Precepts; certainly it muſt follow, That to ſpend his time in Idleneſs and Sloth, in fooliſh Playing and impertinent Jeſting, is contrary to his Duty, as being unworthy of that excellent Nature, which God has beſtow'd on him. This brings him to diſcourſe, How far theſe things are allowable. As *firſt*, as to the *Meaſure* of Jeſting, it muſt not be exceſſive: As to the *Matter*, it muſt not be immodeſt, or abuſive, *&c.*

obſcene; the *other* handſom, gentile, ingenious and truly pleaſant. Of this kind are ſeveral Inſtances to be met with, as in our [a] *Plautus*, and the *Old* [c] *Greek* Comedians; ſo in the Writings of the Socratick Philoſophers; to which we may add the ingenious Sayings of ſeveral Men, ſuch as are collected by the Senior *Cato*, and uſually go by the Name of *Apothegms*. There is no great difficulty then to diſtinguiſh between a gentile and a clowniſh Jeſt; the *one*, if brought in at a ſeaſonable time, and when a Man's Mind's diſengaged from Buſineſs, is becoming for a Gentleman; the *other*, for no Man at all indeed, when baſe and unhandſom things are dreſs'd up in filthy and obſcene Expreſſions. [f] Our Plays and Recreations muſt alſo be kept within their due Bounds; and care ſhould be taken that we don't run out into great Exceſſes, and ſuffer the Pleaſure, which we take in them, to carry us into any thing that's Baſe or Unbecoming. Hunting, and the Exerciſes of the [g] *Campus Martius*,

[a] A famous *Latin* Comedian, very well known by his Plays, which are ſtill extant. See his Character in the Preface to three of 'em, which are turn'd into *Engliſh*; and the Commentators on *Horace de Art. Poet. v.* 270.

[c] *Old* in oppoſition to the *New*. There were in all three ſorts of Comedy among the *Athenians*: The firſt in the ſtricteſt ſence *Old*, the Authors of which took true Stories for their Subjects, and expos'd Men publickly by Name, tho' they had otherwiſe a great deal of handſom Wit: This being forbid, the *middle* Comedy ſucceeded, wherein they ſtill took true Subjects, and expos'd Men as formerly, but under borrow'd Names: (theſe are both of 'em often, and I ſuppoſe here, comprehended under the name *Old*.) This was follow'd by the *New*, wherein they only us'd feign'd Subjects, and forbore to abuſe. *See* Horace *Sat.* 4. *Book* 1. *and* Art. Poet. *verſ.* 281. *and the Commentators upon him.*

[f] Having done with *Jeſting*, he now proceeds to Plays and other Recreations; concerning which almoſt the ſame Rules are to be obſerv'd: They muſt not be exceſſive, unhandſom, *&c.*

[g] A Field juſt without *Rome*, where the Youth us'd to perform all their Sports and Exerciſes.

tius, ſupply us with Examples enough of creditable and manly Recreations.

CHAP. XXX.

The Excellence of Man's Nature above that of Brutes, neceſſary to be conſider'd. Wherein it conſiſts. Some are really Beaſts under the ſhape of Men. Senſual Pleaſures, Effeminacy, &c. unbecoming Man's Nature. Beſide Reaſon, which is the common Nature of all Men, each Man has his particular Nature or Genius. The difference of Mens particular Natures or Diſpoſitions, ſhewn by a large number of Examples.

BUt in all Enquiries concerning what becomes us, 'tis of very great moment to be [a] conſtantly reflecting, *How much Man's Nature excels that of Beaſts and inferior Animals.* Theſe have no taſt or reliſh for any thing, but the Pleaſures of the Body, towards which they are carry'd with a great deal of Eagerneſs: whereas nothing's more agreeable and nouriſhing, as it were, to the Mind of Man, than Learning and Contemplation. Hence he is always a-ſeeking or contriving of ſomething that's new, and is greatly delighted with ſeeing and hearing, for the increaſe of his Knowledge. And if there is any one too much addicted to ſenſual Pleaſures, unleſs he's transform'd into a meer Brute; (for ſome ſuch there are, who are Men in Name, and

[a] To the end that we may perceive the Nobleneſs and Excellency of the one above the other, and make it our Buſineſs to live accordingly. This will ſhew us (as he goes on to obſerve) how mean and unworthy an Employment it is, for a Man to wallow in Luſt and Senſuality; how inconſiſtent

and not in Reality) but if, I ſay, any one is too much addicted, and ſuffers himſelf to be conquer'd by Pleaſure; yet, for very ſhame, he will hide and conceal his Propenſions towards it, as much as is poſſible. And what is this now but [b] a plain Indication, That ſenſual Pleaſures are unbecoming the Dignity of a reaſonable Creature, and ought to be deſpis'd and rejected by it? And whoever ſets any Value upon them, ſhould be ſure to take care, that he keep within the Limits of Reaſon and Moderation? From hence it follows, that we ſhould not have any reſpect to Pleaſure, but only to the preſervation of our Health and Strength, in our Victuals, Cloaths, and other Conveniencies belonging to the Body. And does not the Conſideration of the ſame Dignity and Excellence of our Natures, plainly inform us, how baſe and unworthy a thing it is, to diſſolve in Luxury, Softneſs, and Effeminacy? And how brave and becoming it is, on the other hand, for a Man to lead a Life of Frugality and Temperance, of Strictneſs and Sobriety? [c] And here we muſt obſerve, that Nature has given us, as it were, a *double* Part to be acted in the World: The *firſt* is extended to all Men in common, foraſmuch as we are all Partakers of Reaſon, and that Prerogative

ent with his reaſonable Nature; and how much more agreeable to Goats and Swine.

[b] For what elſe ſhould be the reaſon, why Men are aſham'd to diſcover their Deſires and Inclinations for bodily Pleaſures, but only a ſort of natural Conſciouſneſs, that they are not anſwerable to the Dignity of their Nature?

[c] Having ſhewn what the true Notion of Decorum is, and hinted at the Duties of it, as 'tis drawn from the Nature of Man *in general*; he now proceeds to a ſecond ſort of it, taken from each one's *particular Nature*. We ſhould not only live ſo, as is Conſonant to our general Character, *Right Reaſon*; but every one ſhould endeavour to follow what's agreeable to his particular Inclinations, provided there's nothing in 'em vicious or unreaſonable. For nothing can ever be

tive of our Nature, whereby we are exalted above other Animals; 'tis this that conducts us in the finding out our Duty, and from it all Honesty and Becomingness arises: The *second* is appropriate to each in particular; for as there's a great deal of difference in Bodies, (some being nimble, and proper for Running, others more lusty, and fitter for Wrestling; some of a noble and majestick Air, others of a sweet and engaging kind of Beauty;) so there's no less, or rather a far greater Variety in Humours. Thus [d] *Lucius Crassus* and [e] *Lucius Philippus* were Men of a great deal of Wit and Pleasantry: [f] *Caius*, the Son of *Lucius Cæsar* of more than they, and a great deal more studied. Whereas the young [g] *Drusus* and [h] *Scaurus* at the same time, were

be handsom or becoming, that's contrary to the tendency of a Man's own Genius; for whatever is strain'd and forc'd (as all such things are) must consequently be undecent. Here therefore he begins to discourse of Mens various Dispositions, *&c.* some are naturally Witty and Merry, others Grave and Serious, or the like: And 'tis impossible *one* of these should ever sustain the Character of the *other*, but he must come off very aukwardly and unhandsomly.

[d] A famous *Roman* Orator, one of the Interlocutors in our Author *De Oratore*, where may be seen enough of his Character; particularly, an admirable Account of his Death, *chap.* 1. *Book.* 3.

[e] *L. Marcius Philippus* a great Orator, and Cos. of *Rome*, *An. Urb.* 662. Our Author calls him *magno virum ingenio*, Book 2. chap. 17. and mentions him in several places of his Works.

[f] Brother to the Elder *Catulus*, whom we spoke of *ch.* 22. He is often mention'd by our Author for his Wit; particularly very much in his *De Oratore*, and *ch.* 37. of this Book.

[g] *M. Livius Drusus*, an excellent young *Roman* Gentleman, Tribune when *Philip* was Cos. *See his Character and Death in* Patercul. *Book* 2. *ch.* 13, 14.

[h] There were several Noble *Romans* of that Name; one *M. Aurelius Scaurus* was Cos. and slain by the Cimbri, when they broke into *Italy*. 'Tis likely he means here *M. Æmilius Scaurus*, whom he mention'd *ch.* 22.

were Men of extraordinary Gravity and Severity. [j] *Lælius* had abundance of Mirth and Gaity; his Familiar [k] *Scipio* much more Ambition, and greater Austerity and Strictness of Living. Amongst the *Greeks*, *Socrates* is said to have been one, that was of a very easie and facetious Humour; that always loved to be Merry and Jesting, and was a mighty Artist at hiding his Meaning under witty Ironies and drolling Expressions (which sort of Men are by the *Grecians* call'd [l] εἴρωνες;) whereas [m] *Pericles* and *Pythagoras* got 'emselves Credit, by being of exactly the contrary Temper. *Hannibal* among the *Carthaginian* Generals, and amongst our own *Fabius*, was Crafty and Subtle; one that knew how to disguise his Intentions and keep his Counsel; that could make shew of one thing, whilst he was really designing another; of exquisite Skill for contriving of Stratagems, and preventing those laid by the Enemy against himself. In this kind, the *Grecians* give *Jason* [n] the *Pheræan*, and *Themistocles* the Preference before any others; and there's one thing of *Solon*'s which shews he had his share of this Cunning and Subtilty, [o] when he feigned himself Di-

[j] He was firnam'd the *Wise*, whom he makes speak in his Book *de Amicitia*.

[k] The Younger *Africanus*.

[l] 'Tis plain, from what he has been saying, that this Word is taken here in a good Sence. Not for those roguish Dissemblers call'd by that Name, and describ'd by *Theophrastus* in his Characters.

[m] The *former* a famous *Athenian* General and Statesman; of whom see *Plut.* and *Thucid.* The latter an eminent Philosopher of the Isle *Samos*, Founder of the *Pythagorick* Sect.

[n] So call'd from *Pheræ*, a Town in *Thessaly*, where he Reign'd. He was one of the greatest Captains of his Age, and chosen General of all the *Greeks* to make War upon the *Persians*. He was Father-in-law of that *Alexander Pheræus*, whom he mentions *ch.* 7. *Book* 2.

[o] The *Athenians* and *Megarans* had been at Wars a great while for the Isle *Salamis*. At last the former grew weary of

Distracted to save his own Life, and withal to do a good piece of Service to the Publick. There are others to be found of just an oppoſite Humour, who think it unlawful to do any thing by Stratagem and under-hand Dealing, but are all for Simplicity and Plainneſs in their Actions; Lovers of open and undiſguis'd Truth, but Haters of any thing that looks like a Trick. There are ſome that will undergo any thing in the World, fawn and crouch to any manner of Perſon, if they can but obtain their own Ends and Deſigns by it; as *Marcus Craſſus* we know did to *Sylla*. Of which ſort of crafty and complying kind of People, *Lyſander* the *Lacedemonian* is ſaid to have been Chief: whereas *Callicratidas*, who was Admiral of the Navy next after *Lyſander*, was quite the contrary. *Again*, There's as great a variety in Men's Ways of Diſcourſe as in their Humours and Complexions; ſome, who are able to ſpeak very nobly, can yet ſuit their Language to the Humours and Capacities of the ignorant Vulgar; as I remember *Catulus*, Father and Son, as alſo *Mutius Mancia* could do; and I have heard old People relate the ſame of *Scipio Naſica*: But his Father, on the contrary, he who, by ſlaying *Tiberius Gracchus*, put a full end to his ruinous Attempts, had none of that affable, familiar way of ſpeaking. No more had [p] *Xenocrates*, the moſt rigid

of it, and made a Law, That whoever propos'd fighting for it any more, ſhould loſe his Life. *Solon* once, finding the Place might be recover'd, but fearing to ſpeak becauſe of the Law, feign'd himſelf Mad, that under that Diſguiſe he might ſpeak what he would: and coming into the Aſſembly in a ſtrange Garb, *&c.* he repeated ſome odd Verſes about *Salamis*; and by degrees brought it about, that the *Athenians* reſolv'd to try again for the Iſle, and recover'd it.

[p] An eminent Philoſopher, Born at *Chalcedon*, Scholar of *Plato*, and Founder of the *Academick* Sect. He is frequently mention'd by our Author.

rigid and severe of all the Philosophers; and for that very reason was Noted and Eminent. *In short*, There's almost an infinite number of these different Natures and Characters in Men, not one of which is q in it self to be condemn'd.

? But only if it be apply'd to ill Ends and Purposes.

CHAP. XXXI.

Every one should follow his own Genius, so far as 'tis innocent. Uniformity or Consistency most becoming a Man, which can't be kept if we run counter to our own Natures. The great force of this Difference in Mens Natures. Custom of the Actors on the Stage. Several other Rules relating to the same.

THE more easily then to arrive at that Decorum, of which we are speaking, let every one stick to his own *peculiar* Character and Humour, provided it has nothing that's Vicious in it. I say *provided it has nothing that's Vicious in it*; for we should always take a particular care to do nothing that is contrary to that [a] *universal Character*, which Nature has imprinted on every one of us: but, saving the Reverence we owe to *that*, then to live according to our own particular one; so as to follow after that kind of Study, and apply our selves to that course of Life, which is most suitable and agreeable to our own Inclinations, tho' others perhaps may be more useful and important: For 'tis in vain to struggle against the Bias of your Nature; or at first to set upon that sort of Business, which you can never arrive at any perfection in. From what has been

[a] *Viz.* Reason. *See Note on chap.* 29.

b He

been ſaid it more fully appears, what that is which we call [b] *Becoming*; ſince nothing can be ſuch, that is done (as we ſay) in deſpite of Nature, *i. e.* contrary to the bent and tendency of a Man's Genius. Now it's certain if any thing in the World is Becoming, 'tis a conſtant Uniformity in our whole Lives, and particular Actions; [c] which 'tis utterly impoſſible we ſhould ever maintain, ſo long as we run counter to our own Inclinations, and fooliſhly follow after thoſe of other People: for as we ſhould uſe our own Native Language, which all are ſuppos'd to underſtand beſt, and not *lard* our Talk (as a great many do) with Expreſſions out of *Greek*, who are therefore deſervedly laugh'd at by others: So we ſhould keep to one conſtant Tenour, and regular Conduct in our Lives and Actions; ſo that nothing may be in them, which is not well ſuited and of a piece with the reſt. And this difference in the Characters or Natures of Men is of ſo great moment, as that in conſequence of it, one Man may be oblig'd to make away with himſelf; whilſt another, tho' like him as to all other Circumſtances, may be oblig'd to the contrary. [d] *Cato*, for inſtance, and thoſe [e] who in *Africk* ſurrendred 'emſelves to *Cæſar*, were all of 'em under the ſame Condition; and yet

[b] He means that which reſults from one's living up to his particular Character; not that general one, of which we have ſpoken before.

[c] Becauſe 'tis impoſſible wholly to conquer our Nature and Inclinations; ſo that tho' we ſhould, by Cuſtom to the contrary, make ſhift to keep 'em under for ſome time, yet they'll certainly break out again, and ſo ſpoil that Uniformity which is requir'd in our Lives.

[d] He that was ſirnam'd *Uticenſis*, becauſe he choſe rather to kill himſelf at *Utica*, than yeild to the Power of *Julius Cæſar*. He was Great Grandſon to *Cenſorius*. *See his Life in* Plutarch.

[e] *Viz. Lucius Cæſar, Conſidius*, &c. *See* Comment. de Bell. Afric. *ch.* 11.

[f] This

yet any of the reſt might perhaps have been blam'd for't, had they murder'd themſelves ſo as *Cato* did; becauſe they were Men of leſs ſtrictneſs in their Lives, and leſs ſeverity in their Manners. But *Cato* was a Perſon, whom Nature had endow'd with incredible Firmneſs and Strength of Soul, which he had augmented by perpetual Conſtancy, and unalterably adhering to his once undertaken Deſigns and Reſolutions: [f] It became his Character therefore to Die, rather than to ſee the Face of the Tyrant. How many things did *Ulyſſes* undergo in his tedious Wandrings, when he was forc'd to be at the Pleaſure of Women, (if [g] *Circe* and [h] *Calypſo* may be call'd Women) and by fawning Words, and fair complaiſant Speeches, wheedle himſelf into the Favour of all he met with? How did he bear the contemptuous Uſage of his Servants and Maids, even in his own Palace, that at laſt he might arrive [i] at

[f] This might be true enough, if to kill himſelf were a lawful Action, and had nothing in it that's contrary to the Univerſal Nature, of which he ſpake at the beginning of this Chapter. *Cicero* here ſuppoſes it lawful (tho' in other Places he talks againſt it) as following in this Work eſpecially the *Stoicks*, who held that Life and Death were things *indifferent* in themſelves, and that in ſeveral caſes a Wiſe Man *might*, nay and *ought too*, to make away with himſelf. Hence we hear 'em ſo often talking, of a Door's being always open to Liberty, whatever Misfortunes ſhould befal 'em, *&c.* *See* Lipſ. *Stoick Philoſ. Book* 3. *ch.* 22.

[g] A notable Sorcereſs, that by her Enchantments turn'd *Ulyſſes*'s Men into Swine, Goats, *&c.* but at laſt reſtor'd 'em to their former Shape upon his Entreaties. *See* Homer's *Odyſſeis.*

[h] A Nymph that Reign'd in the Iſle *Ogygia*, whither *Ulyſſes* was driven in his long Wandring, *&c.* She kept him there ſeven Years.

[i] *Viz.* To kill thoſe who courted his Wife in his abſence. This he could not have done had he diſcover'd himſelf; therefore he came in a Beggar's Habit, and was contemptuouſly us'd by his own Servants.

[k] One

at his wish'd-for End? Whereas [k] *Ajax*, according to the Character we have of him, would rather have died you a thousand Deaths, than ever have submitted to such mean Compliances. These Observations should teach us all, to look carefully every one into himself, and consider well what is his peculiar Genius, and endeavour to make the best use of it he is able; and not to be foolishly trying Experiments, to see how he can succeed in what's another Body's Talent: For 'tis certain that nothing becomes a Man so well, as that which is best suited to his own Inclinations. Every one therefore should inform himself thorowly which way his Humour and Genius lies; and be severe in examining what he's well fitted, or not fitted for; otherwise the Players may seem to be wiser than we are; for they, when they pitch upon what they'll Act, don't always choose those Parts that are best, but those that are best suited to their Humours and Abilities. They that have the ablest Voices, for instance, [l] *Epigoni* or [m] *Medus*; they that have most Action, [n] *Menalippa* or [o] *Clytemnestra*; *Rupilius*, whom I remember,

[k] One of *Homer*'s chief Heroes in the *Trojan* Wars; of a haughty and proud Spirit, that scorn'd to yield and give way to any one; and disdain'd to submit himself to any thing low or mean.

[l] A Tragedy of *Euripides*, or, as some think, *Sophocles*, so call'd because it treats of the second *Theban* War, which was manag'd by the Children of those who dy'd in the first: The Word in *Greek* signifying *Descendants* or Children. 'Twas translated into *Latin* by *Accius*.

[m] The Son of *Medea*, the famous Sorceress, who when his Mother had fled away upon the Clouds, went all about the World to seek her; which is the Subject of this Tragedy. 'Twas written by *Pacuvius* a *Latin* Poet, Nephew to *Ennius*.

[n] Sister of *Antiope*, Queen of the *Amazons*, taken Prisoner by *Hercules*, but ransom'd by *Antiope* with his Armour and Belt: Upon which *Accius* made this Tragedy.

[o] Wife of *Agamemnon*, notorious for her living with *Ægisthus*

member, always had [p] *Antiopa*, and [q] *Æſop* very rarely *Ajax*. And ſhall Actors obſerve this in chooſing their Parts, and Wiſe Men not do it in chooſing their Buſineſs and way of Living in the World? We ſhould therefore apply our ſelves eſpecially to that, which we find moſt agreeable to the Bent of our Natures; but if we ſhould chance to be driven upon any thing, which is not ſo proper for our Parts and Talents; we ſhould make it our Buſineſs, by Care and Application, if not to go thro' with it, the moſt perfectly that is poſſible, yet at leaſt with as few Faults as ever we are able. And let us rather labour to avoid thoſe Vices, which we are naturally inclin'd to, than try to arrive at thoſe Excellencies and Perfections, which we were never made for.

thus while her Good Man was at the *Trojan* War; and for Murthering him by his help as ſoon as he came home. This was one of *Accius*'s Tragedies.

[p] Wife of *Lycus*, King of *Thebes*, whom *Jupiter* fell in Love with, and begat on her *Amphion* and *Zethus*.

[q] A famous Actor at *Rome*, of whom *Cicero* is ſaid to have learnt Pronunciation. He was grave and ſedate in his Action, and ſo unfit to repreſent the Violence and Tranſports of *Ajax*.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXII.

Duties ariſing from Men's ſeveral Stations, and Profeſſions in the World. They whoſe Fathers have been Famous, imitate their Virtues, or add to 'em. The Choice of a Profeſſion very difficult. Prodicus's *Story of* Hercules. *What uſually determines Men in their Choice of a Way of Life.*

BUt beſide thoſe two Parts, which I have already mention'd, [a] there are ſtill two others remaining behind: The *one* is allotted us by Time and Chance: The *other* we our ſelves chooſe voluntarily to our ſelves. To the firſt appertain one's being a King, a General, or a Magiſtrate; coming of a great Family; having Riches and Power, together with the Contraries of all theſe: which are all of 'em things that depend upon Fortune, and alter according to the difference of Times. As for the *ſecond*, 'tis altogether left to our own Choice, what ſort of Calling we have a Mind to be of: accordingly ſome chuſe to ſtudy Philoſophy, others the Civil Law, and a third ſort Eloquence: and of the Virtues themſelves, ſome are deſirous of being Eminent in one kind, and ſome in another.

[b] Now

[a] Having done with that Decorum, which conſiſts in acting *according* to Univerſal Nature, or Reaſon; and the ſecond, *according* to our own particular one: He comes now to a third, which ariſes from Acting agreeably to our *Place*, or *Station* in the World. Now this Station we may have two ways, either from *Fortune*, or our own *Choice*. To be a Prince, for inſtance, a General, or the like, are things of Fortune: but to be a Lawyer, a Philoſopher, or Tradeſman, of Choice. It always becomes us, whatever Character we bear in the World, whether of Prince or Peaſant, Soldier or Gownſman, to do thoſe things which are ſuitable to ſuch a Character.

[b] The

[b] Now thoſe Men, whoſe Fathers or Anceſtors have been eminent in any one kind, for the moſt part endeavour to excel in the ſame: as [c] *Quintus* the Son of *Publius Mucius* did in the Civil Law; [d] *Africanus* the Son of *Paullus* in Martial Atchievements. And ſome, not content with the Glory of their Anceſtors, have added ſomething elſe of their own to it: as that *Africanus*, whom I juſt now mention'd; who beſide his great Fame for Military Exploits, made himſelf noted for his Learning and Eloquence. The ſame did [e] *Timotheus* the Son of *Conon*, who was equal to his Father in the Glory of War, and obtain'd that of Learning and Ingenuity beſides. But it happens ſometimes, that, omitting to tread in the Steps of their Fathers, ſome take new Methods and Deſigns of their own; which, generally ſpeaking, is the caſe with thoſe, who are born of mean Parents, and propoſe to Riſe, and make their Fortunes in the World. Each of theſe things ſhould be thro'ly conſider'd and revolv'd in our Minds, when e'er we deliberate about what will *become* us. The firſt thing then to be determin'd is, what ſort of Men we deſign to be, and what courſe of Living to take to in the World; which

[b] The Decorum he's going to ſpeak of conſiſting in doing that which is agreeable to one's Station and Way of Life in the World; this brings him to diſcourſe of the Methods People take in chuſing their Ways of Life; as ſome endeavour to follow their Fathers, *&c.*

[c] *Q. Mutius Scævola*, who was Augur, and Son-in-law to the Wiſe *Lælius*, whom he mentions at the beginning of his Book *de Amicitia*, to whom his Father recommended him for the Study of the Civil Law: He was Cos. with *L. Metellus*, *An. U. C.* 636. There was another of this Name at the ſame time, who was *Pontifex maximus*.

[d] *Scipio Africanus Minor*, who was Son of *Paullus Æmilius*, but adopted by *P. Scipio*, the Son of *Africanus Major*.

[e] Two famous *Athenian* Generals. *See the Lives of 'em both in* Corn. Nep.

[f] *Pro-*

which is a caſe of all others the moſt hazardous and difficult. For *when* People are young, and conſequently moſt fooliſh, they generally pitch upon that way of Life, which *then* beſt pleaſes their unexperienc'd Fancies; ſo that they are fix'd and engag'd in a certain Courſe, before they have the Judgment to diſcern what is beſt. [f] *Prodicus* indeed (as I find it in *Xenophon*) tells us this Story concerning *Hercules*; "That when he was a Youth, (which "is the proper Seaſon allotted by Nature for chu-"ſing a Way of Life) he withdrew himſelf into a "ſolitary Place, and there having found out a cou-"ple of Ways, the one of *Pleaſure*, and the other "of *Virtue*, he ſat muſing and conſider'd a while "with himſelf, which of theſe two he had beſt to "follow: Such a thing as this might happen to *Hercules*, a Son of *Jupiter*; but 'tis not for us to expect the ſame, who each of us take whom we pleaſe for our Patterns, and ſuffer ourſelves to be drawn any whither, according as they lead us. We have moſt of us Principles inſtill'd by our Parents, and follow their Cuſtoms and Manners of Living: others are guided by popular Opinion, and like that *beſt*, which takes with the *moſt*. However there are ſome, whether it be out of mere good Fortune, or an happy Temper and Diſpoſition of Soul; or laſtly, by the Care and Inſtuctions of their Parents, that purſue right Methods and Ways of Living.

[f] *Prodicus* was a Sophiſt in the Iſland of *Cos*, one of *Euripides*'s Maſters; who in a Book of his *concerning* Hercules, brings in this Story, as *Socrates* tells it in *Xenophon*'s Memorab. *Book* 2. *ch.* 1. therefore he calls him here *Herculem Prodicium*.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Few so happy, as to consider thro'ly what Way of Life they should choose. The principal thing to be regarded in Choosing, is one's own Genius: Next to that one's Fortune in the World. After a Man has chose, he should stick to his Choice, without great Reasons to the contrary. How a Change should be made. Two Cautions to be observ'd about Imitating our Ancestors. Those Men whose Nature is not capable of some, should take the more care that they have other Virtues. The best Inheritance a Father can leave his Son, is the Fame of his Virtues. 'Tis a mighty Shame for a Son to be unworthy of the Fame of his Ancestors.

BUt those of all are the most difficult to be found, who having sufficient natural Parts, or sufficient Improvements of Learning and Education, or both these together, have withal had due time to consider with themselves, what's the best Course of Life they can follow in the World. [a] Now in this Deliberation, the principal thing which we ought to regard, is each Man's peculiar Nature and Genius. For since the Decorum of each particular Action, as before was observ'd, is taken from the Disposition of the Person that does it; sure that Disposition should be carefully consulted, before we determine upon our whole Way of Living; [b] 'tis otherwise impossible we should keep a due Tenour and Consistency in our Lives, and not sometimes faulter in the Per-

[a] Two things which ought to be carefully consider'd by us in Choosing our Calling: *First*, Our natural Disposition and Capacity for it. *Secondly*, Our Fortune and outward Circumstances in the World.

[b] *See Note on ch.* 31.

[c] After

Performance of our Duty. But tho' Nature in this caſe has much the greater ſway, yet Fortune comes in for a ſhare next after her: both of 'em therefore ſhould be duly conſulted in making choice of a Calling, but more eſpecially Nature: For Fortune's unconſtant and often changing, but Nature is firm, and will always abide by us; ſo that for the *former* to oppoſe this *latter*, is like a mortal Power's contending with an immortal. [c] That Man then, who has choſe a Way of Living that's ſuitable to his [d] Nature, (provided *that* Nature be no ways vitious) ſhould make it his next care never to alter it; for nothing's leſs becoming than a Humour of Changing. But if upon tryal he ſhould find that he was miſtaken in the choice of his Method, (as 'tis poſſible ſuch a thing ſometime may happen) there's no way left but to unravel again what is already done. If the Times themſelves favour the making ſuch a Change, it may be the more eaſily and conveniently done; but if not, it muſt be brought about gradually and inſenſibly: according to that Rule which is given by Wiſe Men, When e'er you deſign to break off any Friendſhip or diſpleaſing Acquaintance, you ſhould looſen the Knot by little and little, and not try to cut it aſunder all at once. And when by this means we have chang'd our courſe of Life, great care ſhould be taken that we may ſeem to have done it upon very good Reaſons. But having before recommended the Imitation of our Fathers and Anceſtors, I muſt here interpoſe an Exception or two: In the firſt place then, we ſhould take great care, not to follow 'em in any thing

[c] After the Rules about chooſing a Calling, he proceeds to ſhew, what a Man ſhould do after he has choſen: *Should not be eager to change*, &c.

[d] His particular Nature or Genius.

thing that is vitious or blamable. Nor, secondly, should we attempt it, when we find our Constitution wont carry us thro' with it: Thus, for instance, the Son of the former *Africanus*, (who adopted this *latter* being Son to *Paullus*) by reason of the weakness and indisposition of his Body, could not so well tread in the steps of his Father, as his Father had done in those of his [c] Grandfather. But then if a Man be in such a condition, as that he's unable to plead at the Bar, to harangue the People, or conduct an Army; [f] he should take the more care that he do those things, which *are* in his Power; such are the Duties of Justice and Fidelity, of Modesty, Temperance and Liberality; the performance of which may serve to make amends for his want of the others. Now the noblest Inheritance that can be left by a Father to his Son, and far exceeding *that* of Houses and Lands, is the Fame of his Virtues and glorious Actions: and for a Son to live so as is unworthy of the Name and Reputation of his Ancestors, is the basest and most abominable thing in the World.

[c] *P. Cornelius Scipio*, a famous and valiant *Roman*, who, together with his Brother, bravely defended *Spain*, while *Hannibal* was in *Italy*, routing the *Carthaginians* in several Battles. At last they were both Slain, and young *Scipio*, who was afterward first sirnam'd *Africanus*, succeeded 'em.

[f] Those who, for any of the fore-mentioned Reasons, relinquish the Publick, must not think 'emselves immediately excus'd from serving it in their proportion, and in the way they are able. The most solitary Life should do some Good, and Retirement should not minister to Luxury or Idleness, but to Virtue and Sobriety. Those that can't shew their Valour, Eloquence or Policy for the Publick, may however their Modesty, Liberality, Fidelity, *&c.* in Retirement.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXIV.

The reſpective Duties belonging to each Age. Old Men ſhould have an Eye upon Youth. Vice is doubly Evil in Old Men, becauſe of the ill Example given to the Young. The Duties of Magiſtrates, private Citizens, and Strangers. Nothing more becoming in all ſorts of People, than Conſiſtency and Regularity.

AND ſince each Age has its reſpective Duties belonging to it, and the ſame things become not both Young and Old, [a] I muſt add ſomething alſo upon this Diſtinction: 'Tis required then of the younger ſort of People, that they pay due Reverence to thoſe that are Old, and chooſe out the beſt and moſt approved among 'em, by whoſe Counſel and Direction they may ſteer their Lives. For indeed the Unskilfulneſs and Ignorance of Youth, does ſtand in ſome need of the Prudence of Old Age, to be its Guide and Director. This Age eſpecially ſhould be kept from all looſe and effeminate Living, and be enur'd to Labour, and enduring Hardſhips both of Body and Mind: that ſo they may be able to bear with the Toils and Fatigues of Buſineſs, whether in Peace or War. And if they do at any time ſlacken their Minds, and give 'emſelves up to their Pleaſures and Refreſhments, great care ſhould be taken that they exceed not the Limits of Temperance and Modeſty: And in order to this, 'twould be very convenient, if ſome aged People would keep a conſtant Eye upon their Sports and Recreations. [b] As for old Men,

[a] Another ſort of Decorum conſiſts in Acting agreeably to one's Age; in Youth's doing what is proper for Youth, *&c.*

[b] So much for the Duties of Youth; he proceeds now to thoſe of Old Men.

Theſe

Men, 'tis their Duty to leſſen the Labours of the Body, and employ more frequently thoſe of the Mind; and make it their Buſineſs, by prudent and wiſe Counſels, to do what Good they can to the younger ſort of People, to their Friends and Dependants, and more eſpecially to the Republick. And Old Men of all things ſhould eſpecially be careful not to languiſh out their Days in unprofitable Idleneſs. Luxury and Riot is unbecoming in all, but is perfectly ſcandalous and intolerable in Old Age: but ſhould Luſt and Wantonneſs come into the bargain, thoſe who are guilty of it are doubly faulty; For, firſt, they bring a Shame and Diſgrace upon themſelves, and withal make the young Men more ſhameleſly Wicked. Beſide theſe Duties already mention'd, it mayn't be amiſs to ſay ſomething of thoſe, which peculiarly belong either to [c] Magiſtrates, private Citizens, or Strangers. Firſt then a Magiſtrate ought to conſider, *that* he does in his Perſon repreſent the whole City, and accordingly is bound to maintain the Credit and Dignity of it: *that* he's to preſerve the Laws, and ſee that all People have their due Rights; remembring that theſe things are committed to his Truſt, which he is bound to render up faithfully and honeſtly. The Duty of thoſe in a private Capacity, to live as the reſt of their Citizens do; neither debaſing themſelves below their juſt Height, nor endeavouring to raiſe 'emſelves up above it; and to follow thoſe things which are honeſt and peaceable in the Commonwealth: theſe are they, whom we uſually call and account Good Citizens. And *laſtly*, for Strangers and Sojourners in a place, 'tis their Duty to

[c] Theſe he brings in, as it were, by the *Bye* here: they might, I think, have been put under the third ſort of Decorum, *Living* according to one's Station and Character in the World. *See ch.* 32.

follow their own Buſineſs, and not intermeddle with any Body's elſe; not to take upon 'em in what no way concerns 'em, or be curious in prying into the Secrets of a State, which they have nothing to do with. By obſerving theſe Rules we may, generally ſpeaking, be ſure to find our Duty; whenever 'tis enquir'd what's ſuitable and becoming for ſuch a *Perſon*, ſuch a *Time*, or ſuch an *Age*: I ſhall only add, that in all our Deſigns and all our Undertakings, nothing's more becoming than Conſtancy and Regularity.

CHAP. XXXV.

Decorum ſhews it ſelf outwardly in three things. Rules of Modeſty, taken from Nature in the Frame of our Bodies. Obſcene Talk diſcovers ill Inclinations. The falſe Reaſoning of the Cynicks, *and ſome* Stoicks *upon this Subject. Rules of exterior Decency in our Carriage, Poſtures,* &c. *The great Care the old* Romans *took of Modeſty.*

BUt ſeeing this Decorum, of which we are ſpeaking, is ſeen more eſpecially, and diſcovers it ſelf, in our [a] Actions, our Words, and our Carriage and exterior Ornaments of the Body; and conſiſts in one of theſe three things, [b] in a certain kind of natural Beauty and Comlineſs; in Pertinence and

[a] Having diſcours'd of the ſeveral ſorts of Decorum, he proceeds to ſpeak of the ſeveral things, in which it appears: They are, 1. Our *Actions*. 2. Our *Words*. And 3. Our *bodily Carriage, Dreſs*, &c. He diſcourſes therefore of each of theſe.

[b] What *Formoſitas*, *Ordo* and *Ornatus* mean, in which he makes Decorum to conſiſt, is more difficult to underſtand, than 'tis to expreſs; and Commentators can't agree about it.

and Well-timing our Words and Actions; and ſuch other kind of Ornaments and outward Embelliſhments, as are proper for the Buſineſs one is going about; (things which 'tis no eaſie matter to expreſs, but I hope I am underſtood, and that is ſufficient;) and ſeeing that [c] Care which we ought to take, of making our ſelves agreeable to thoſe we converſe with, conſiſts in a due Regulation of [d] theſe; I ſhall proceed to diſcourſe of 'em each in particular. [e] In the firſt place then it may be worth our obſerving, how much Care and Concern has been ſhewn by Nature, in ordering the Frame and Conſtitution of our Bodies: Thoſe Parts, which were handſom and agreeable to the ſight, ſhe has plac'd in view; but thoſe which could *not* be ſo handſomly ſhewn, and were only given to ſerve certain Ends and Neceſſities of Nature, theſe ſhe has been careful to conceal and cover. A Sence of Shame and Modeſty in Men has ſeconded this her Diligence in framing their Bodies; for all, that aren't wholly bereav'd of their Reaſon, keep thoſe Parts hidden, which *ſhe* has conceal'd; and are always as ſecret as they can in thoſe Actions, which natural Neceſſity forces 'em upon: Neither do they call by their proper, and broad Names, the Parts that are given to ſerve ſuch Neceſſity, nor the Uſes of 'em; and Modeſty forbids us to mention thoſe things,

it. Not to trouble the Reader with their ſeveral Opinions; by *Formoſitas* (I ſuppoſe) may be underſtood the natural Beauty of the Body, and natural Clearneſs of the Voice; and by *Ornatus* the acquir'd or adventitious; of which 'twill appear he diſcourſes in the four next Chapters: By *Ordo*, a due timing our Words and Actions; of which chap. 40.

[c] *See Note on chap.* 28.

[d] *Viz.* Our Words, Actions, and Carriage of Body.

[e] He begins with the laſt of thoſe three things, in which Decorum ſhews it ſelf, *viz.* Bodily Carriage, Dreſs, *&c.* of which in this and the next Chapter.

[f] Pro-

things, which may be done very honestly, provided it be in secret. Therefore the plain and open [f] *Talking* of those things, as well as the plain and open *Acting* of 'em, discovers immodest and wanton Inclinations. The [g] *Cynicks* therefore are wholly to be rejected, and some of the *Stoicks* little better than *Cynicks*; who laugh at, and blame us for calling those things by their proper Names, which are really dishonest and scandalous in themselves; while we count it a shame to speak plainly of those, in the doing of which there's no manner of Dishonesty. To *Rob*, for Example, to *Cheat* and *Whore*, are Actions in themselves the most shameful and scandalous, and yet it is not counted immodest to name 'em; whereas to *make one's self a Father of Children*, is an Action that is honest and creditable in it self, and yet, forsooth, must not be plainly mention'd, for fear of its giving Offence to chast Ears. This, and much more to the same purpose, they commonly urge against Modesty and Bashfulness: But let us follow where Nature has shew'd us the way, and whatever may offend either the Eyes or Ears, *that* let us shun in our Carriage and Conversation. In all our Postures and Gestures of Body, such as stand-

[f] *Prodit mores plerumq; oratio,* (says *Quintil.*) *& animi secreta detegit; nec sine causa Graeci prodiderunt, Ut vivat quemq; ita etiam dicere.* Unwholsom Waters argue the Fountain, from whence they proceed, to be unwholsom too: and when People can delight in such fulsom, lascivious, unbeseeming Talk, 'tis a certain sign their Inclinations are vitious, and their Hearts tend very much to Lewdness and Debauchery; since from the abundance of *these* (as the Scripture assures us) the Mouth speaketh.

[g] An ill-natur'd Sect of Philosophers, Followers of *Antisthenes*, that lov'd to Talk and Act in opposition to the rest of the World; and to be Snarling and Biting at every Body and and every thing; whence they had their Name, the word in Greek signifying *Dogged* or *Currish*. These People holding, that nothing is *commendable* but only Virtue, nor any thing

ſtanding, walking, ſitting and [h] leaning; nay, in our very Countenance, in the caſt of our Eyes, and motions of our Hands, we ſhould be careful to keep and obſerve what's Becoming: in which there's a double Extream to be avoided, *that* of too much Niceneſs and Effeminacy on the one hand, and *that* of meer Clowniſhneſs and want of Breeding on the other. Nor let any one imagin, That theſe things do well in an Actor or Orator; but that we are left free to obſerve, or not obſerve them. The Actors indeed have had always ſo much regard for Modeſty, as that, time out of mind, it has been their Cuſtom, never to appear upon the Stage in publick, without ſomething on to conceal thoſe Parts, which ought to be kept ſecret; for fear leaſt their Cloaths being open'd by any Accident, ſomething might be ſeen, which Modeſty bids 'em hide. And our common Cuſtom forbids the Son, when grown toward Man's Eſtate, to Bathe with his Father; and likewiſe the Son-in-law with his Father-in-law. We ſhould therefore take care to be ſtrict Obſervers of theſe Rules of Modeſty, eſpecially being ſuch as even Nature herſelf has directed us to.

blamable but only Vice; and ſome of the rigider *Stoicks* with them, caſt off all Modeſty and ſuch kind of things: Not being aſham'd of doing any thing in publik, tho' never ſo Unbecoming, nor ſpeaking of it openly, provided 'twere an Action that was not Diſhoneſt or Vitious in it ſelf. But our Author here adviſes us, with very good Reaſon, to diſregard what they ſay; and rather chooſe Nature for our Guide and Directreſs, than any of their vain and frivolous Reaſonings. For, *Eſt aliquid quod non oportet, etiam ſi licet*, as he tells us in another place; ſome things there are lawful enough in themſelves, which yet Modeſty and Civility oblige us to abſtain from.

[h] *Accubitio* ſignifies the Poſture they us'd in Eating, *viz.* Leaning on one ſide upon a Couch, which they call'd *Lectus*, ſet round about their Tables.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXVI.

Two ſorts of Beauty, one proper for Men, t'other for Women. Men ſhould avoid Niceneſs, &c. Nothing affected can Become. Rules about Cloaths, Walking, and outward Ornaments. Outward Carriage diſcovers the inward Diſpoſitions of the Mind. More Care ſhould be taken to keep Decency in the Motions of the Soul. How this may be done. Two ſorts of Motions in the Soul, the ſenſitive Appetite and Reaſon. How each ſhou'd be manag'd.

BUt ſince there are two ſorts of Beauty in the World, to the *one* of which belongs Prettineſs or Neatneſs, to the *other* Comlineſs and Majeſty; the former of theſe ſhould be left to the Women, and the latter only be thought proper for the Men. From hence it follows, that *theſe* ſhould avoid all unmanlike Ornaments and Niceneſs in their Habits, and the ſame in the Motions and Geſtures of their Bodies. For all People hate the [a] affected Motions and Carriage of thoſe, who would be taken for Maſters of a gentile Air; and your Actors on the Stage have a great many fooliſh impertinent Geſtures, which are very diſpleaſing and offenſive to the Spectators: and in each of theſe kinds what is ſimple and unaffected, is always beſt lik'd of and approv'd by the World. If you would have a true Comlineſs, you muſt endeavour to keep a good Co-

[a] *Palæſtrici motus.* The *Palæſtra* was a kind of Dancing-ſchool, and Place of Exerciſe, where People were taught to move gracefully and agreeably: whence the Word is often oppos'd to *clowniſh Carriage*, and, *motus habens Palæſtram aliquam*, is a gentile becoming Motion in our Author *de Perfect. Orat.* But ſometimes, it ſeems, People learn't to be affected and foppiſh in the *Palæſtra*, as they do now in ordinary Dancing-ſchools among us.

Colour in your Face, and the way to do that, is to uſe frequent Exerciſe. Nor do we forbid Men the uſe of all Ornaments and Graces to recommend 'em, but only of thoſe that are too exquiſite and affected: ſo far they are allowable, as they are neceſſary to keep a Man from being thought a Clown, and from ſhewing a Diſreſpect for the Perſons he has to do with. And the ſame Rule may ſerve very well for our Cloaths; in which to be moderate, as in moſt other caſes, is certainly the beſt way. We ſhould alſo avoid an effeminate ſoftneſs and ſlowneſs in our Gate, like thoſe that are marching along in Proceſſion; and no leſs an over-great haſtineſs and ſpeed, which only begets a deep panting and breathing, diſtorts the Face, and perfectly changes the whole Air of the Countenance, which diſcovers a lightneſs and inconſtancy of Humour. Now if the Motions of the Body deſerve all this Pains and Concern about 'em; how much Care ſhould we take [b] to keep thoſe of the Mind, within the Limits preſcrib'd 'em by Nature and Right Reaſon? which ne'r can be done any other way, than by keeping the Soul in ſuch an even Temper, as not to be concern'd or dejected at any thing; and by a conſtant care and application of Thought, ſo as to nothing but what is Honeſt and Becoming. Now the Motions of the Soul are of two ſorts, ſome of 'em proceeding from the Reaſonable or Thinking, others from the Senſitive and Paſſionate part: The former is buſied in nothing but ſearching and finding

[b] If this ben't done, the Motions of the Body, however gentile and graceful they may be, will but make our Folly the more remarkable; and ſuch ſort of Men are well enough compar'd by one, to an ill Piece of Painting, ſet off and adorn'd with a beautiful Frame. Thoſe People therefore, who ſpend ſo much time in adorning their Outſides, would do well to conſider, that they do but make 'emſelves the more ridiculous, unleſs they take care to make their Inſides anſwerable.

ing out of Truth; by the latter we are push'd and driven forward to Action 'Tis our Duty therefore to employ our Thoughts about laudable Objects; and so to reduce and over-rule the Passions, as that they may ebb and flow in obedience to Reason.

Chap. XXXVII.

Decorum shews it self in Speaking. Two sorts of Speech. There might Rules be given about our ordinary Discourse. Two things requir'd in the Voice and Pronunciation. How each of 'em may be gotten. Several Examples of good Speakers. Rules about the Manner, Subjects and Measure of our common Talk.

ANother [a] great Instance in which this Becomingness shews it self, is our Speech and Discourse. But whereas of this there are two sorts, the *one* proper only for Argument and Contention, the *other* for common and ordinary Talk; we should make use of *that*, when we plead at the Bar, or speak in the Senate and Publick Assemblies; of *this* when we meet and discourse with our Friends; when we walk in any of the publick Places; or are sitting at Table, and over a Glass of Wine. There are Teachers of Rhetorick who give Rules about the *former*; but there are no Rules to be given about the *latter*. Not but that I think there might some be invented; but the Business is, there's no body to be found that would study 'em, if they were; other-

[a] He proceeds now to the second of those three things, in which Decorum shews it self, *viz.* Our Speech, which he divides into two sorts, *&c.*

otherwiſe Maſters would never be wanting, if there were but Learners that would ſtudy, and employ 'em. Hence we are almoſt over-run with Rhetoricians; tho' no ſmall part of the Rules which they give, *viz.* thoſe that concern either the Words or the Sence, may be very well applied to our ordinary Diſcourſe. 'Tis the [b] Voice is that, whereby we can Talk, and convey our inward Thoughts from one another; in which there are two things chiefly required: Firſt, That it be *Clear*. And, Secondly, *Harmonious*. Each of theſe muſt be the Gift of Nature, and is not attainable any other way; but where they are naturally, Practice and Exerciſe will encreaſe the one, and Imitation of thoſe, who ſpeak ſweetly and agreeably, better the other. This was the principal thing in the [c] *Catuli*, which made 'em be counted Men of Judgment and Learning: tho' they had ſome Skill in the matter 'tis true; and ſo had ſome others as well as they; but this one thing recommended 'em ſo much that they were eſteemed the moſt perfect Maſters of the *Roman* Language. The ſound of their Voices was pleaſing and harmonious; they neither ſlurr'd over things negligently in their Pronunciation, nor yet were too exact in expreſſing every Letter: the former of which would have made their Speech obſcure, and the latter affected. They never ſpoke ſo as to ſtrain their Voices, but equally avoided the double Extream, that of Faintneſs and Sicklineſs (as it were) on the one hand, and of too much Loudneſs and Elevation on the other. *Craſſus*'s Diſcourſe was full out as witty, and not near ſo barren as that of the *Ca-*

[b] The firſt thing to be conſider'd in Speech is the Voice, as to the natural Tone or Accent of it; which he deſires ſhould be clear and harmonious; and ſhews the great Uſefulneſs of its being ſo by Examples.

[c] *See Note on on ch.* 22.

[a] Ha-

Catuli; yet these had as great a Reputation as he, upon the score of good Speaking. *Cæsar*, who was Brother to the Elder *Catulus*, was far more facetious and witty than any of 'em; so that in Court, when before the Judges, he'd do more by his easie, familiar way of Talking, than others could do by all the Powers of their Eloquence. Each of these things should be diligently taken care of, if we desire to Act decently on all Occasions. Our [c] common Discourse then I'd have to be such, as that wherein the Followers of *Socrates* excel; easie and good-natur'd, without any stubbornness or stiffness in Opinion: Let it be season'd with mirth and pleasantness; and not be too tedious, pert, and assuming, as tho' it had a Right to the Attention of the Hearers, and no body else had any thing to do with it: but think it reasonable, as in all other cases, so in this of Discourse, to let every Man fairly take his own turn. But especially in the first place it ought to be consider'd, what is the Nature of the Subject we are discoursing upon: if it be *serious*, we should handle it with seriousness; but if it be *merry*, with gaiety and briskness. But the most important thing to be taken care of, is, That our Talk don't discover any Viciousness in our Manners; which is apt to appear by nothing so much, as by falling too foul upon those that are absent, either by turning 'em into Ridicule, or misrepresenting 'em by malicious, reproachful Language. Now the Subject of Discourse in common Con-

[c] Having done with what concerns the manner of Pronunciation, and Regulation of the Voice; and advis'd against Affectation, Loudness, *&c.* in Speaking: He now proceeds to give some Rules about our Discourse, as that it should be Easie, not Tedious, *&c.* which relate, some of 'em to the *Manner*, others to the *Matter*, and others to the *Measure* that should be observ'd in Talking; and all deserve to be carefully consider'd.

Converſation is uſually one of theſe three things; either our own private Domeſtick Concerns; or thoſe that relate to the Commonwealth in general; or laſtly, ſome matter of Study and Learning; therefore when our Talk begins to ramble from theſe, we ſhould always be careful to fetch it back to 'em again. But whatever Subjects preſent 'emſelves (for we aren't all pleas'd with the ſame things, nor with any thing equally at all times;) but whatever Subject, I ſay, we are upon, we ſhould conſider how far our Diſcourſe may be entertaining, and as we could find a time when to begin, ſo we ſhould learn when to make an end.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

Diſcourſe ſhould be free both from Paſſion, and Heavineſs; and ſhew a Reſpect for thoſe we converſe with. Chiding and Correction ſometimes neceſſary: Rules to be obſerv'd in it. In Quarrels with Adverſaries we ſhould avoid flying out into Paſſion. To talk Great of one's ſelf very Unbecoming.

'TIs a general Rule for the Conduct of our Lives, That we make it our Buſineſs to be free from Paſſion; that is, from all violent Motions of the Soul, which reject and caſt off their Allegiance to Reaſon. This ſhould be apply'd to the Matter now before us, and all our Diſcourſe ſhould be Calm and Unpaſſionate, without any Tranſports of Anger or Deſire; as alſo on the other hand, without Deadneſs, and Heavineſs, or any ſuch Vice: And in every Company we ſhould carefully endeavour, to ſhew a ſort of Kindneſs and Reſpect for thoſe Perſons, with whom we converſe. It ſometimes

times comes to paſs, that [a] *Chiding* is neceſſary; in which we may be allow'd a little to raiſe our Voices, and to uſe more Sharpneſs and Authority in our Expreſſions: However we muſt be careful that we do not diſcover any Paſſion; but let it rather be ſeen that we come to ſuch Corrections, as Phyſitians do to cutting and ſcarifying Wounds, but ſeldom, and with a great deal of Regret and Unwillingneſs. And indeed we ſhould never come to 'em at all, unleſs it be neceſſary, and when no other Methods will do any good. And even then, when we're forc'd to't, we muſt be ſure (as was ſaid) to avoid all Anger; for whatſoever is guided by its Influence and Directions, can never be done with any Prudence or Moderation. Our Rebukes ſhould be generally mild and gentle; but nevertheleſs ſuch, as may carry ſome Weight and Authority along with 'em; obſerving a Mean betwixt too great Eaſineſs, and breaking out into angry and contumelious Language. And whatſoever Sharpneſs we may expreſs in our Reproofs, we ſhould let the Perſon ſo corrected know, that we do it altogether for his Good, and not for any Ends or Self-deſigns. [b] In the Quarrels we have even with our greateſt Adverſaries, whatever dirty Language may be thrown at us, 'tis the beſt way to keep our Minds calm and ſedate, and never let Anger break in upon them: For whatever is ſpoken or done in a Paſſion, can neither be conſiſtent with the Rules of Gra-

[a] He has done with thoſe Rules, which concern the Government of our *Diſcourſe in general*: He now proceeds to ſome *particular* Species of it. The firſt of theſe is *Chiding* or *Correction*, about which he gives us ſeveral good Directions; as, That it ſhould not be done Paſſionately, *&c.*

[b] Another *particular ſort of Diſcourſe*, is that which falls out in Quarrels betwixt Oppoſers; in which 'tis our Duty to be calm and ſedate, *&c.*

Gravity, nor be approv'd of by thoſe who are preſent in the Company. Laſtly, [c] 'Tis a very unbecoming thing for a Man to Talk great of himſelf in Diſcourſe, and eſpecially when that which he ſays is falſe: which is but to imitate *Braggadocchio* in the Comedy, and make himſelf the Laughing-ſtock and Jeſt of the Hearers.

[c] A third particular kind of Diſcourſe, is, Talking Great of one's ſelf, which is always very ridiculous and unbecoming.

CHAP. XXXIX.

What ſort of Houſe is fitting for a Perſon of Honour. What ſhould be the End of Building. The Examples of Octavius *and* Scaurus. *A great Houſe brings a Reproach on its Maſter, if his Worth be not anſwerable to it; and if he don't keep up the Laws of Hoſpitality. Meaſures to be obſerv'd in Building. Three Rules to be obſerv'd for the keeping a Decorum in our Actions.*

AND ſince [a] we take in (or deſire at leaſt to take in) all the ſeveral Branches of Duty, we muſt not forget to add a word or two, about what ſort of Houſe is becoming a Gentleman, or a Perſon of Honour. Now the main End of Building is Lodging, and the neceſſary Uſes of an Houſe, and therefore the Draught, or Contrivance of it, ſhould be ſuited

[a] Another thing, wherein Decency ſhews it ſelf pretty much, is *Building*, which he therefore brings in here as 'twere by the *bye*; in which he would have a Mediocrity obſerv'd. 'Tis very becoming for a Perſon of Quality, to have ſuch a Houſe as is ſuitable to his Quality; neither too little, ſo as not to have room for the Reception of Strangers; nor yet too extravagantly great and magnificent.

A

ſuited accordingly. But we ſhould not ſo much regard bare Neceſſities, as not to have an eye to Convenience and Magnificence. [b] *Cneius Octavius*, the firſt of that Family that was ever Conſul, built himſelf a noble and magnificent Houſe upon the *Palatin* Hill, which is ſaid to have gain'd him a great deal of Reputation; inſomuch that the People coming uſually to ſee it, the very Houſe was ſuppos'd to have gone a great way toward advancing its Owner (tho' a kind of [c] an Upſtart) to the Dignity of Conſul. This ſome time after was pull'd down by [d] *Scaurus*, that ſo he might make his own ſomewhat the bigger by it: But whereas [e] *Octavius*, by Building *his* Houſe, had made himſelf Conſul; this Man, on the contrary, by enlarging of *his*, (tho' the Son of a great and moſt eminent Citizen) not only cauſ'd himſelf to be put by that Office, but [f] was moreover brought into Shame and Diſhonour, and at laſt utterly Ruin'd. 'Tis well if a Man can enhance that Credit and Reputation he has got, by the Splendor of his Houſe; but he muſt not depend upon his Houſe alone for it: For the Maſter ought to bring Honour to his fine Seat, and not the fine Seat bring Honour to its Maſter. But as, in all other caſes, a Man ſhould not have Reſpect to himſelf alone, but to other People alſo; ſo 'tis in this of a Noble Man's

[b] A famous and great Man, (as our Author in another place calls him) Prætor and Admiral of the *Roman* Navy, in the *Macedonian* War with *Perſeus*, when he triumph'd for a Sea-Victory. Afterwards he was Coſ. about the Year of *Rome*, 588.

[c] Not but that the Family was very ancient in *Rome*, even from the times of *Numa Pompilius*; but none of 'em had ever been any way noted, till this *Octavius*.

[d] *See Note on ch.* 16. *Book* 2.

[e] Whom we ſpoke of chap. 22.

[f] He was convicted of undue Ways of ſqueezing Money out of the Allies, and at laſt forc'd to go away into Baniſhment.

[g] He

Man's Houſe, which ought to be made very large and capacious, becauſe he muſt keep up the Laws of Hoſpitality, and entertain multitudes of all ſorts of Perſons in it. For a fine and large Houſe that gives Entertainment to no body, ſerves but to reproach and upbraid its Owner; and eſpecially if 'twere us'd to be frequently viſited under its former Maſter: for 'tis an odious thing to have Paſſengers cry, as they go along,

Ah! good old Houſe, alas thy preſent Lord
Iſn't like thy former one!

which may [g] juſtly be ſaid of but too too many in our own Days. Care ſhould be taken, eſpecially when a Man Builds himſelf, that he ben't too extravagant in his Magnificence and Expences: which is a very ill thing tho' it had no other harm in it, but only *that one* of giving a bad Example: For moſt Men are apt, more than in any thing elſe, to imitate the Great Ones as to this Particular. Where, for Example, ſhall we find the Man, that Rivals the famous [h] *Lucullus* in his Virtues? Whereas how many have done it in the Statelineſs and Magnificence of his Country-houſes? But there certainly ought to be *ſome Bounds* fix'd and preſcrib'd to theſe things, and *thoſe* to be according to the Rules of Moderation: But the Meaſure whereby we are to judge of their being Moderate, is their Subſerviency to the Ornaments and Conveniencies of Life: And ſo much may ſuffice upon this Head.

As

[g] He reflects upon ſome of *Caeſar*'s Party, who poſſeſs'd the Houſes of *Pompey*'s Friends; and particularly *Mark Anthony*, who was got into that, which had formerly been *Pompey*'s own.

[h] *Lucius Lucullus*, a noble and very wealthy *Roman*, famous for his Learning, Eloquence, and eſpecially Valour;

as

As for our [1] *Actions*, the way to maintain this Decorum in *them*, is constantly to observe these three following Precepts: First, *That we keep all our Passions and Appetites under the Government and Direction of Reason*, than which there is nothing of greater Efficacy toward the constant Preservation of our Duty. Secondly, *That we consider the Quality and Moment of the thing, which we go about*; that so we may proportion our Endeavours accordingly, and take neither more nor less Pains about it, than it really deserves. And lastly, *That in all those exterior Circumstances, which are only design'd for a gentile Show and Grace of the Action*, we should keep within the Measures of Prudence and Moderation. Now the best Measure we can observe is this, To keep our Eyes fix'd on those Rules of Decorum I've before laid down, and never to transgress 'em. But of these three Rules the first is the most important, *That the Sensitive Part be kept obedient to the Reasonable.*

as well as Extravagance in Building, *&c. See his Life in* Plutarch.

[1] Having spoken of our *Carriage of Body* and *Discourse*; he now proceeds to the third thing, in which Decorum shews it self, *viz.* Our *Actions*; concerning which he gives us three Rules.

CHAP. XL.

Order to be obſerv'd in our Words and Actions. Wherein it conſiſts. The Duties ariſing from it. An excellent Saying of Pericles *to that purpoſe. Of how great moment the due Timing a thing is. We ſhou'd be particularly careful to avoid little Indecencies. Harmony and Agreement more neceſſary in our Lives, than our Muſick.*

IT remains in the next place that we ſhould ſpeak of [a] that *Order*, which is to be obſerv'd in our Words and Actions; and of the proper Seaſons and Opportunities of 'em. And here will fall under our Conſideration, that which by the *Greeks* is call'd, εὐταξία; by which I don't mean that [b] εὐταξία, which by us is moſt commonly render'd *Moderation*, and ſignifies the *keeping within due Bounds*: but that which contains in the Notion of it, *The Preſervation of Order*. We ſhall crave leave, however, to call even this latter by the Name of *Moderation*, which is thus defin'd by the *Stoick* Philoſophers, *Moderation is the Knowledge of putting whatever we ſay, or do, in its proper place.* From whence it appears, That *Order* and the *Well-placing* of things are but different Words to expreſs the ſame Notion, For *Order* is defin'd by the ſame Sect of Men, to be *the ranging of things in their fitting and proper places.* Now

[a] He comes now to the third of thoſe things, in which he told us [Chap. 35.] Decorum conſiſts, *viz. Order*, or the due Timing our Words and Actions.

[b] The Word εὐταξία ſignifies two things, either the *keeping within due Bounds*, and ſo 'tis oppos'd to Extravagance, or living above one's Rank, Abilities, *&c.* or *a due Timing our Words*, &c. and ſo 'tis oppos'd to Impertinence, Unſeaſonableneſs, or the like. 'Tis taken by our Author here in this laſt Sence.

[a] A

Now the place of an Action they tells us is, *The Seaſon of Time for doing it*; and by the *Seaſon of Time* they mean nothing elſe, than that which the *Greeks* call εὐκαιρία, and which we expreſs by the word *Occaſio*: So that, in ſhort, by *Moderation* here (in the Sence of the Word which I have juſt now given) we mean no more than *the Knowledge of Well-timing whatever we do.* Prudence may be deſin'd the ſame way too, about which we have ſpoken at the entrance of this Work: but now we're diſcourſing of Temperance, Moderation, and ſuch like Virtues. What the Duties of Prudence are, is ſufficiently explain'd in its proper place; what thoſe of Modeſty and ſuch other Virtues, as ſerve to recommend us to thoſe we converſe with, and make up the Subject of our preſent Enquiry, remains now to be conſider'd. *In the firſt place then,* We ought to obſerve a due Regularity and *Order* in our Actions, as that the ſeveral parts of our whole Lives, like thoſe of a regular and coherent Diſcourſe, may agree and be ſuitable one with another. For what is more Unſeemly, and contrary to good Manners, than when we're engag'd about ſerious Buſineſs, to bring in ſome pleaſant and merry Diſcourſe, that's proper for a Feaſt or over a Glaſs of Wine? 'Twas a very good Anſwer to the preſent Purpoſe, which *Pericles* once gave to [c] *Sophocles* the Tragedian: They were both of 'em Prætors of *Athens* together, and meeting one Day about ſome Buſineſs of their Office, it happen'd a beautiful Boy paſs'd by; whom *Sophocles* eſpying, *Heavens!* ſaid he, Pericles, *What a delicate Youth is there!* To which

[c] A famous Tragedian of *Athens*, whoſe Works are ſtill extant, and counted the moſt perfect in their kind. His being a Poet did not hinder him from being a good Soldier and a wiſe Stateſman. He liv'd about the beginning of the *Peloponneſian* War.

[d] The

which he reply'd, *A Magiſtrate*, Sophocles, *ſhould* [a] *keep a ſtrict Guard, not over his Hands only, but his Eyes too.* Now had *Sophocles* happen'd to ſay the ſame Words, at a time when they were chooſing of Wreſtlers or Racers, ſuch a Rebuke had been wholly undeſerved: So much may the Merit, or Demerit of an Action, depend upon the Circumſtances of Time and Place. Suppoſe, for Example, a Man had ſome conſiderable Cauſe upon his Hands, or Buſineſs that requir'd attentive Thinking: Could any one blame him for being very thoughtful as he walk'd or rid? But ſhould he ſhew himſelf ſo at a Feaſt among Company, it would be counted a great piece of Rudeneſs and Ill-breeding, and this for not obſerving the Difference of Seaſons. Now as for thoſe things, which notoriouſly offend againſt the Rules of Good Manners, ſuch as for a Man to Sing openly in the Streets, or any other groſs and apparent Abſurdity, theſe are ſo eaſie to be obſerv'd by all, that we need give no Rules or Directions about 'em; but we ought more eſpecially to employ our Care, in avoiding thoſe little unheeded Indecencies, which are hardly underſtood by the generality of Mankind. And as the leaſt fault or diſagreement in the Notes, is immediately perceiv'd by a skilful Muſician; ſo we ſhould take all imaginable Care, that there be no Diſagreement in our Lives and Actions: and that ſo much the more, as the Harmony in our Lives is of much greater Conſequence, than that in our Muſick.

[a] The Word *Abſtinentes* refers to both *Manus* and *Oculi*: in the former Caſe it ſignifies *Uncorrupted*, or free from Bribery and receiving Gifts; in the latter *Chaſt*, or free from all wanton and laſcivious Looks. A Magiſtrate ought to have both.

CHAP.

CHAP. XLI.

Decency to be kept even in the leaſt things, as the moving of the Eyes, &c. We ſhould obſerve what's unhandſom in others, and correct it in our ſelves. We ſhould ask the Advice of experienc'd Perſons. Cautions in taking this Advice. We ſhould follow Cuſtom and Civil Conſtitutions. Some things allowable in ſome great Men, which aren't ſo in others. Nothing immodeſt is Becoming. Some particular Duties to be obſerv'd by all good Men.

AS therefore the delicate Ear of the Artiſt can quickly diſcover the leaſt fault in his Muſick; ſo would we take as much care in detecting and cenſuring our Vices, we might from the leaſt and moſt trivial Matters, make ſeveral Obſervations that would be much to our advantage. From the moving of our Eyes, for Example; from our way of ſmoothing or wrinkling our Brows; from the merry or ſorrowful Air of our Countenances; from our Laughter, freedom or reſervedneſs in Diſcourſe; from the raiſing or falling the Tone of our Voices, and a great many other ſuch little kind of Circumſtances, we might eaſily judge what is Handſom and Becoming us, and what is repugnant to the Rules of our Duty, and to that which our Nature or Character requires. Now in this Particular 'tis a very good way, To obſerve firſt in others how each of theſe ſuits, that ſo we may avoid and correct in *our ſelves*, whatever we ſee bad and misbecoming in *them*. For, I know not how, we can ſooner ſpy Faults out in other People, than we can in our ſelves; upon which account there's no better way to correct any Learner, than for the Maſter to mimick his Faults before him; that ſo he, perceiving their Deformity in another, may the ſooner be brought to

to amend 'em in himſelf. Another good way is, Whenever we are in doubt and ſuſpence about a Duty, to go to ſome learned or experienc'd Perſon, and ask his Advice upon the Matter in queſtion, before we reſolve and determin with our ſelves: Becauſe, generally ſpeaking, when left to themſelves, Men are apt to be guided too much by their own Inclinations and Natures. And in asking this Advice we ſhould diligently obſerve, [a] not only what every one tells us in Words, but what his real inward Opinion is, and what Reaſons and Grounds he may have for ſuch Opinions. For *as* your Statuaries, Painters and Poets, uſe to ſet their Works out to be publickly view'd; that ſo they may be able to correct ſuch Faults, as are generally found by Spectators in 'em: and *as* they conſider with themſelves and their Friends, what Overſights or Miſtakes they have been guilty of in 'em; *ſo* ſhould we make uſe of other People's Judgments as well as our own, and do or not do, correct or alter a great many things upon their Advice. As for thoſe things that are ſettled by Cuſtom and Civil Conſtitutions, I ſhall give no Directions at all concerning 'em; for they are ſufficient Directions of themſelves: I ſhall only obſerve, That 'tis a great Miſtake in any one to think, becauſe ſuch Men as [b] *Ariſtippus*, and *Socrates*, have ventur'd to ſay, or do a great many things, which are contrary to Rule and receiv'd Cuſtom, that therefore he may be allow'd the ſame: For theſe are

[a] For Ill-will, private Intereſt, and a thouſand the like things, may make People give us Advice, which they don't think beſt: or blind 'em and make 'em think that beſt, which really is not ſo.

[b] Several eminent Philoſophers have been of that Name. One Schollar of *Socrates*, and Founder of the *Cyrenaick* Sect: another his Grandſon. 'Tis uncertain which he means here.

are Persons of extraordinary Merits, and almost more than Human Perfections; and on that account might demand some Privileges, which aren't to be granted to the rest of the World. But as for the Practice and manner of the *Cynicks*, 'tis wholly to be discarded; for 'tis a plain Offence against the Rules of Modesty, without which nothing can be Virtuous and Becoming. 'Tis our Duty to pay a Respect and Deference, as to all those that are Virtuous and Couragious, who design for the Good and Advantage of the Republick, and serve or have serv'd her in any of her Interests; so to those also, who bear any Office or Command in the State. We should pay in like manner a peculiar Regard and Reverence to old Age: never resist any publick Magistrate: make a Distinction between Citizens and Strangers; and of Strangers 'emselves, between those in a private and publick Capacity. In fine, Not to mention any more Particulars, we ought in all cases both to keep *our selves*, and endeavour to uphold and maintain among *others*, that common Correspondence and universal Society, that's among all Mankind.

CHAP.

CHAP. XLII.

Of the ſeveral ſorts of Trade which are Creditable, and which not. All thoſe that adminiſter to Vice and Debauchery, ſcandalous. Lying in Tradeſmen abominable. How far Merchandiſe is Creditable. Husbandry particularly commended.

AS for [a] Trades and the Ways of getting Money, which of 'em are creditable, and which otherwiſe, I have only theſe very few things to obſerve: *Firſt*, All thoſe are unworthy Ways of Gaining, which procure one a general Hatred and Ill-will; as that of the *Uſurers* and *Tax-gatherers*, for Inſtance. *Secondly*, Thoſe Arts are mean and ungentile, in which a Man is paid for his *Work* not his *Skill*; for the very receiving a Reward for one's Labour, is like taking of Earneſt to bind himſelf a Slave. Nor are they to be eſteem'd as better than mean and ordinary People, that buy things up by the lump of Merchants, to ſell 'em out again by little and little; for what they gain is but a very poor Buſineſs, unleſs they are guilty of abominable Lying; than which there is nothing in the World more ſcandalous. Again, All Handicrafts-Men have but a mean ſort of Calling, and 'tis impoſſible that a Work-houſe ſhould have any thing that's gentile in it. *Further yet*, All thoſe Trades are pitiful and low, that Purvey and Cater for the ſatisfying Mens Pleaſures; [b] Fiſhmongers, Butchers, Cooks,

[a] The laſt thing he mentions, wherein Decorum ſhews it ſelf, is Trades and Callings; which he divides into Gentile and Ungentile, and ſhews which are the one and which the other.

[b] Theſe Trades don't ſo much cater for Pleaſures, as ſerve the Neceſſities of Life: but I ſuppoſe he brings 'em in here, be-

Cooks, Poulterers, &c. as *Terence* reckons 'em up; to which we may add, if you pleaſe, Perfumers, Dancing-maſters, and thoſe who ſupply us with Dice or Cards. But Arts that have ſomething of Knowledge and Skill in 'em, or thoſe that are uſeful and neceſſary for the Publick; ſuch as Phyſick, for Inſtance, or Architecture, or the Inſtruction and Education of Youth in Good-manners, theſe are very creditable and commendable in thoſe, whoſe Rank and Condition is ſuited for ſuch Employments. As for Merchandiſe, 'tis ſordid and mean, when the Trade that is driven is little and inconſiderable: but when it takes in a great quantity of Buſineſs, and bringing home Goods from every Country, ſells 'em out again without Lying or Deceiving, we can hardly ſay but that 'tis creditable enough: Nay, 'tis moſt certainly very commendable, when thoſe who're concern'd in it only deſign (after they are *ſated*, or rather *contented*, with what they have gain'd) to betake themſelves wholly from the *Haven* to the *Country*, as before they have done from the *Sea* to the *Haven*, and there enjoy quietly their private Poſſeſſions. But among all the Methods of Enriching one's ſelf, there's no one better; no one more profitable, pleaſant and agreeable; no one more worthy of a Man and a Gentleman, than *that* of Manuring and Tilling the Ground: concerning which I have ſpoken at large in my *Cato Major*, from whence you may borrow what's neceſſary to be ſaid upon this Subject.

becauſe of the great abuſe of 'em among the *Romans*, where indeed their chief Buſineſs was to ſerve Mens Luxury. *Cetarius* is a Seller of Salt-fiſh, as *Piſcator* is of freſh.

CHAP.

CHAP. XLIII.

The comparing of two Parts of Honesty one with another. The Duties of Prudence or finding out Truth, and those of Justice or maintaining Human Society compar'd; and the Preference given to the latter.

AND thus [a] have I finish'd what I had to say upon the first Question, and, I think, sufficiently made it appear, how the particular Instances of Duty are to be drawn from the several Heads of Honesty. But it often comes to pass, that those very things 'emselves which are Honest, *Rival* as it were, and come into Competition with one another, so as to make it be another Question, *Of two that are Honest, which is the most so?* which is a Point not mention'd at all by *Panætius*. For the whole of Virtue receiving its Rise from those four Fountains: First, *Prudence*, or the Knowledge of Truth. Secondly, *Justice*, or or doing Good to the Community and Society of Mankind. Thirdly, *Fortitude*, or Greatness of Soul. And, Lastly, *Temperance*, or *Moderation*; it can't but happen, that several of these must be compar'd together, before we can be able to satisfie our selves, which 'tis our Duty to prefer before which. *First then,* [b] If the

[a] He has now done with his four Heads of Honesty, Prudence, Justice, Fortitude and Temperance; and shewn the Nature, and laid down some Rules concerning each of 'em; by comparing any of our Actions with which, we may discover whether they are Honest or Dishonest, agreeable or not agreeable to the Rules of Virtue; which was the *first* general Head of Deliberation he propos'd to speak to. [*See chap.* 3.] The *second* was, Of two, which are both Honest, which is to be preferr'd? which he now proceeds to.

[b] Of the Duties of Prudence and Justice, which are both apparently good and honest, the latter he proves should take place

the Duties of *Juſtice*, or preſerving the Community, and thoſe of *Prudence*, or the Knowledge of Truth, ſhould come into Competition one with another; the former, I think, ſhould take place of the latter, as being more Conſonant to the Dictates of Nature, which may eaſily be prov'd by this following Argument: Suppoſe a Wiſe Man to be in ſuch a place, as afforded him all the Conveniencies of Life, and all the Opportunities of Leiſure in abundance, ſo that he might Study and Contemplate every thing, that was any ways worthy his Knowledge or Contemplation; *yet* were he wholly depriv'd of all Company, and had no body ever come near him to be ſeen, he'd quickly be tired and grow weary of his Life. Again, The Principal of all the Virtues is that ſort of Wiſdom which the *Greeks* call σοφία; (for as for *that* which they call φρόνησις, and we *Prudentia*, 'tis a thing of a perfectly different Nature, as being no more than *The Skill of diſcerning what 'tis that we ought, or ought not, to do:*) but that ſort of Wiſdom which I ſaid was the Principal, is, [c] *The Knowledge of things both Divine and Human*; and ſo comprehends the *Society* and *Relation* of Men with the Gods, and with one another. If then this, as moſt certainly 'tis, be the greateſt Virtue; it follows that the Duties, which flow from Society, muſt as certainly be the greateſt: For the deepeſt Knowledge and Contemplation of Nature, is but a very lame and imperfect Buſineſs, unleſs it proceed and tend forward to Action: Now the Occaſions wherein it can ſhew it ſelf beſt, conſiſt in maintaining the Intereſts

place of the former: *i. e.* Study and Contemplation, which are Actions of Prudence, ought to be laid aſide, if occaſion ſo require, for the ſake of doing Good to Mankind, which is a part of Juſtice.

[c] *See Note 2. on chap. 2. Book 2.*

[a] Ha-

terests of Men, and of consequence belong to the Society of Mankind: from whence it follows, That the Maintaining of *this* should in reason take place before Learning and Knowledge. [a] Nor is this any more, than what all good Men shew they judge to be true, by their Actions and Practices: For who's there so wholly addicted to Contemplation and the Study of Nature, as that, if his Country should fall into Danger, while he was in one of his nobleſt Researches, he would immediately throw all aside, and run to its Relief with all possible speed; nay, tho' he thought he might number the Stars, or take the just Dimensions of the whole World? And the same would he do in case of any Danger to a Friend or a Parent. From all which things it undeniably appears, That the Duties of *Knowledge* and Searching for Truth, are oblig'd to give way to the Duties of *Justice*, which consist in upholding *Society* among Men; than which there is nothing we should be more concern'd for.

[a] Having prov'd his Assertion by Reasons, he proceeds to shew, That 'tis what the wisest Men in the World have always thought.

CHAP.

CHAP. XLIV.

Even those, whose Business is the Search after Truth, are serviceable to the Society of Mankind, and how. Speaking well preferable to the highest Speculations, and why. Man by Nature a sociable Creature. Knowledge of little Use, unless it tend to Action, and do some Good to the World. Necessity not the Reason of Men's joyning into Societies.

NAy those very Men, who have spent their whole Lives in Philosophy and Learning, have yet always endeavour'd, as much as they could, to be serviceable to the Interest and Good of Mankind. For many brave Men, and very useful Members of their several States, have in great part been made such by their Institutions. Thus [a] *Epaminondas*, the famous *Theban*, was indebted for his Education to [b] *Lysis*, the *Pythagorean*: [c] *Dion* of *Siracuse*, for *his* to *Plato*; and the same may be said of a great many others; Even I my self, whatever Service I have done the Republick (if at least it may be said I have done it any Service) must wholly ascribe it to that

[a] Whom he mention'd *chap.* 24. one of the greatest Men of all Antiquity, for his Integrity, Learning, and especially Valour. He beat the *Lacedæmonians* several times, and made *Thebes*, as long as he liv'd, the chief City of *Greece*; which before and after him was inconsiderable. Corn. Nep. *has written his Life.*

[b] He liv'd about the Year of *Rome* 366. born at *Tarentum*, in *Italy*, from whence he fled to *Thebes*, and was entertain'd by *Epaminondas*'s Father, where he dy'd. There is still extant an Epistle of his to *Hipparchus* the *Pythagorean*; and some take him to be the Author of the *Golden Verses*, that go under the Name of *Pythagoras*.

[c] He liv'd in the Time of, and was near of kin to, both the *Dionysius*'s of *Siracuse*, the last of which he expell'd. *See* Plut. *and* Corn. Nep.

that Learning, and those Instructions I receiv'd from my Masters. Neither is their Teaching, and Instructing others, determin'd to the time of their living here; but they continue to do it even after they are dead, by the learned Discourses which they leave behind them: For there's no one Point they have left unhandled, relating either to the Laws, Customs, or Discipline of the Commonwealth: So that they seem to have sacrific'd their leisure and opportunities of Study, to the Benefit of those who are engag'd in Business. And thus we see how those Men themselves, whose Lives have been spent in the pursuit of Wisdom, have nevertheless endeavour'd by their Learning and Prudence, to be some way profitable to the Community of Mankind. And for this one Reason, perswasive Speaking, if joyn'd with Prudence, is a greater Accomplishment than the acutest Thinking, if destitute of Eloquence: for *Thinking* is terminated in it self alone, but Speaking reaches out to the Benefit of those, with whom we are joyn'd in the same Society. Now as Bees don't *therefore* unite themselves together, that so they may the better prepare their Combs; but *therefore* prepare their Combs, because they do by Nature unite themselves together: So Men, and much more, being Creatures that naturally love Society; in consequence of that, seek how they may find Methods of living happily in it. From hence it follows, That the Knowledge of things, unless 'tis accompany'd with that sort of Virtue, which consists in defending and preserving of Men, *i. e.* in the Maintenance of Human Society, is but a barren and fruitless Accomplishment; and even *Greatness of Soul*, without a regard to this Society and Conjunction, is very little better than Savageness and Barbarity. Thus we may see, that the getting of Knowledge is a Duty of much less Concern

cern and Moment, than the preſerving this Society and Union amongſt Men. 'Tis a very falſe Notion that hath been advanc'd by ſome People, *That* Neceſſity alone was the Motive to this Society, which we have ſo often mention'd; and *that* Men would never have aſſociated together, but that they weren't able, in a ſolitary Life, to furniſh themſelves with the Neceſſaries of Nature; and *that* every great and exalted Genius, would Providence ſupply him with Food and the other Conveniencies of Life, would withdraw from all Buſineſs and Entercourſe with Men, and give himſelf wholly to Study and Contemplation. This is not ſo; for he would avoid Solitude, endeavour to find a Companion in his Studies, and always be deſirous of Teaching and Learning, of Hearing and Speaking. From all which things 'tis abundantly evident, That the Duties belonging to Human Society, ſhould in reaſon take place before thoſe which relate to *inactive* Knowledge.

CHAP. XLV.

The Duties of Maintaining Society not always preferable to thoſe of Temperance, Modeſty, &c. What Duties of Juſtice ought to take place of Others.

PErhaps it may be ask'd, [a] Whether the Duties of this Society, which is thus agreeable to the Dictates and Principles of Nature, ought always to be prefer'd before the Duties of Temperance, Decency and Moderation? Indeed I think not: For ſome

[a] Having determin'd the former Queſtion in favour of Juſtice, he now propoſes a ſecond, Whether the Duties of Juſtice

ſome things there are ſo highly ſcandalous and abominably wicked, that a wiſe Man would hardly be guilty of 'em, ſuppoſing he could bring Safety to his Country by it. [a] *Poſidonius* has heap'd up a great many Inſtances of things of this nature; ſome of which are ſo very filthy, and intolerably obſcene, that 'tis a ſhame ev'n ſo much as to repeat 'em after him. Theſe then muſt never be done for one's Country; nor will one's Country ever deſire that they ſhould; for the beſt on't is, 'tis impoſſible ſuch a Conjuncture ſhould happen, as that it ſhould be profitable for any Republick, to have wiſe Men be guilty of ſuch abominable Actions. We may lay down this then for a certain Concluſion, That when ſeveral Duties come into competition, thoſe ſhould take place before any others, which relate to the Maintenance of Human Society. For wiſe and conſiderate *Acting* is the End of all *Knowledge* and prudent Thinking; and [c] by conſequence *that* is more valuable than *this*. And ſo much may ſuffice upon this Subject; for, I think, I have ſufficiently clear'd the way, ſo that hereafter there will be no difficulty, to know which Duties are to be preferr'd before which. But thoſe very Duties which relate to Society, are of different Rates and Degrees among themſelves; but 'tis no hard matter to ſee in what Order they ought

ſtice ought always to be preferr'd before thoſe of Temperance? He thinks not, and gives his Reaſons.

[b] An eminent Stoick, Schollar of *Panætius*; he was born at *Apamea*, a Town in *Syria*, but liv'd at *Rhodes*, where *Panætius* had been before him. [*See chap.* 2. *Book* 3.] He was one of *Cicero*'s Maſters, who ſome where calls him, *Vel omnium Stoicorum maximum*. *Pompey* the Great, in his return from the *Aſian* Wars, went to *Rhodes* on purpoſe to hear him. His Works are loſt.

[c] According to the Maxim of the Philoſophers, *The End is always more valuable than that, which is only done for the ſake of the End.*

ought to be perform'd: as in the *first* place, Thoſe to the Immortal Gods. *Secondly*, To our Native Country. *Thirdly*, To our Parents; and ſo on to all others in their reſpective places. What has been ſaid in a few Words on this laſt Head, I hope, is ſufficient to make it appear, that 'tis uſual for Men not only to doubt, *Whether ſuch and ſuch an Action be Honeſt or Diſhoneſt*; but alſo, *Of two, that are both of 'em Honeſt, which is the moſt ſo.* This is one of thoſe two Heads, which I at firſt obſerv'd were omitted by *Panætius*: Let us now paſs on to the remaining part of our propos'd Diviſion.

The End of the First Book.

TULLY'S OFFICES.

The Second Book.

CHAP. I.

What will be the Subject of this Second Book. He applies himself to the Study of Philosophy, as his greatest Consolation in the midst of the Publick Calamities of his Country.

WHat those Duties are, Son *Mark*, which *Honesty* and *Virtue* require of us, and how they arise from their several Fountains, is, I think, plain enough from the former Book. I am now in the next place to speak of those others, which wholly regard the Convenience of Life, and are requisite for the Getting and Enjoyment of those things, which serve for our comfortable Subsistence here; such as Interest, Riches, &c. And here I told you, the common Heads of Deliberation were, *What is Profitable, and what Unprofitable?* And, *Of several Profitables, which is more, and which most of all such?* * Concerning which I shall begin to speak, after I have premis'd but a Word or two, in

* Having propos'd the Subject, about which he is to treat in this Book, he defers discoursing of it, till he has answer'd two Objections made against him, for this sort of Writing.

b The

in Vindication of my ſelf, and my preſent Undertaking. For tho' my Books have excited ſeveral both to the Reading, and even Writing of Philoſophy; [b] yet I am now-and-then apt to be afraid, leaſt ſome, who are otherwiſe very Good Men, ſhould hate and deſpiſe the very Name of that Study; and wonder at me, for beſtowing ſuch Portions of my Time and Pains, in ſo very fruitleſs and inſignificant a manner. To whom I anſwer, [c] That ſo long as the Republick was govern'd by thoſe, to whoſe Care and Management ſhe had intruſted her ſelf, I was ever diligent and employ'd all my Thoughts, for her Good and Preſervation. But *when* [d] one Man had ſeiz'd of her wholly to himſelf, and there was no place left for my Counſel or Authority: and *when* I had loſt thoſe extraordinary Perſons, who had been my Companions in labouring for her Intereſt: I reſolv'd not to ſink into Anguiſh and Deſpair, which had wholly overwhelm'd me, if I had not reſiſted 'em; nor to follow ſuch Pleaſures or idle Ways of Living, as were improper and unbecoming a Man of Learning. I could heartily wiſh, had it ſo pleas'd the Gods, that the Republick had continu'd in its ancient Con-

[b] The firſt Objection againſt him is, That he ſpent too much Time, and took too much Pains, in ſuch a fruitleſs Study, as that of Philoſophy. For the *Romans* being a rough and ambitious People, minded nothing before thoſe Times, but the Arts of War, and encreaſing the Glory of their Empire. As for Philoſophy, *&c.* 'twas counted fit for none almoſt but *Pedants*, and (as they us'd to call 'em) the trifling, inſignificant *Grecians*. *Tu regere imperio populos*, &c. was their Maxim.

[c] He excuſes himſelf for ſpending his Time in this idle manner, by ſhewing what he had formerly done for the ſake of the Commonwealth, and how deſirous he is of doing the ſame again, if the Times would permit him.

[d] *Julius Cæſar*, who having conquer'd *Pompey* the Great, got the whole Power of *Rome* into his Hands.

Condition, and never fall'n into the Hands of e thoſe Men, who aren't ſo much for Changing, as Overturning every thing! I ſhould then, as I did in its flouriſhing Circumſtances, ſpend my Time rather in Buſineſs, than Writing; and what I did write, would not be things of this Moral Nature, but my Publick Orations, as I have often done. But when the poor State, which had taken up all my Care and Thoughts, and for which I had labour'd with all my Power, was utterly ruin'd and ſunk into Nothing, there was quickly no room left for ſuch Orations, either at the Bar, or in the Senate-houſe: And my active Mind, which had always been employ'd in that kind of Studies, now not being able to lye wholly idle; I thought I could not find out a better way to get rid of thoſe Troubles which oppreſs'd my Mind, than by returning again to the Studies of Philoſophy. I had ſpent a good part of my time in theſe, whilſt I was young, for the improvement of my Reaſon: But when I came once to be a Candidate for Places, and devoted my ſelf to the Service of the Publick; I had little time left for Philoſophical Enquiries; only ſo much, as could be ſpar'd from the Buſineſs of my Friends and the State; which was wholly taken up in nothing but Reading, without any Leiſure at all for Writing.

e Not only *Cæſar*, but *Mark Anthony* and his Adherents; who, after the Murder of *Cæſar*, endeavour'd to get the ſole Power to himſelf. *See his Life in* Plut.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Some Advantage to be drawn out of Evils. The Commendation and Definitions of Wiſdom and Philoſophy. 'Tis the only way of obtaining Virtue and Happineſs. The Opinion of the Academicks, *and why they Diſpute againſt every thing.*

HOwever then we have this Advantage, in the midſt of all our Miſeries and Calamities, that by them we are brought to the Writing of thoſe things, [a] which were not ſufficiently known amongſt us, tho' nothing in the World more deſerves our Knowledge. For what is there, O ye Gods! more deſirable than Wiſdom? What more excellent and lovely in it ſelf? What more uſeful and becoming for a Man? Or what more worthy of his reaſonable Nature? Now thoſe who are buſied in the purſuit of this, are call'd Philoſophers; and the Word *Philoſophy* ſignifies no more, if you'd take it literally, than *a certain Deſire and Love for Wiſdom*: And Wiſdom's defin'd by the old Philoſophers, *The Knowledge of things both* [b] *Divine and Humane, together with the Cauſes upon which they depend*: the Study of which whoſoever finds fault with, I confeſs I can't perceive what 'tis he would commend. For what Study is there, that brings ſo much Quiet and Satisfaction

[a] The *Romans* receiv'd their Philoſophy from the *Greeks*, and did not begin to cultivate it to any purpoſe, till *Cicero*'s time.

[b] By *Divine* things they meant *God*, and his Nature; together with the World and Bodies in it, which are the Work of *God*. By things *Human* the Nature of Man, both as to his Body and Soul, together with the good or ill Uſe he may make of either; *viz.* Virtue and Vice: As alſo the Relation he ſtands in toward God, and other Men, with the ſeveral Duties reſulting from it. *See* Lipſ. Stoic. Philoſ. *Book* 2. §. 7.

tisfaction to the Mind, (if these are the things which we long after) as theirs who are always a-searching out something, which may contribute to the Welfare and Happiness of their Lives? Or if it be Virtue and Constancy that we desire, either 'tis *this* is the Method of obtaining 'em, or else there is not any to be found in the World. To say there's *no* Art of those weighrier Concerns, when none of the most trivial Matters is without Art, becomes only those who Talk without Thinking, and Deceive themselves in their most important Business: But if there *is* an Art of attaining Virtue, in what other way we do hope to find it, if this be forsaken, of which I am now speaking. But these things use to be more fully handled, when we excite and perswade Men to cultivate Philosophy: which I have endeavour'd to do in another [c] Work. My Design at present was only to shew, why I particularly chose this Study, being thrust from all Business and Concern in the Government. [d] There are others, and those Men of no small Learning, who object against me, and ask, *If I am not inconsistent with my self, who affirm that nothing at all can be known, and yet have discours'd upon several Subjects, and at this very time am laying down Rules and Directions about Duty:* I could wish these Persons had understood our Opinions a little more throughly;

[c] for

[c] His Book entitled *Hortensius*; because in it he brought in *Hortensius* condemning, whilst he himself commended Philosophy. 'Tis now all lost except some few Fragments.

[d] He proceeds to the second Exception made against him, which is this; *Cicero* being (as before was observ'd) of the Academick Sect, who deny there is any such thing as Certainty, *How* (say they) *can you pretend to give Rules of Duty, when 'tis a settled Maxim of your Sects*, That nothing can be known? *Is not this to contradict your own Principle?* Or will you say, *That you don't know the Truth of your own Rules?*

[e] He

[e] for we are not of *those*, whose Minds are perpetually wandring in Uncertainties, and have nothing whereby to determin their Assents; (for what sort of Mind must a Man needs have, or rather what Life must he needs lead, [f] when he's utterly debar'd from all liberty of Disputing, and observing any regular Conduct in his Actions?) nor yet of *those others*, who call some things *certain* and others *uncertain*: but rejecting both these, *we* say some things are *probable* and others *improbable*. Is there any thing then that should hinder me, from approving of that, which I think most probable; and laying aside that, which I think the contrary? Or where's the Inconsistency, if leaving that arrogant Pretence of *Demonstrating*, I am neither too rash, nor presumptuous in my Opinions, which of all things in the World are the farthest from Wisdom? Now this is the reason why we *Academicks* Dispute against every thing, because what is probable could not appear, without comparing the Arguments upon either side of the Question. But these things are clear'd, I think, accurately enough, in my Books entitled *Academical Questions*. But you, my Son, are

[e] He answers, That he is not one of those, who doubt of every thing, *viz.* the *Scepticks* or *Aporeticks*, Followers of *Pyrrho*, who held, *That all things were equally probable, and nothing could have so much said for it, but that as much might be said against it*, and accordingly doubted of every thing in the World. But *Cicero*'s of a middle Opinion between these and the *Dogmaticks* (*who hold some things to be certain and others uncertain*) and maintains that *some things are extreamly probable* (tho' not absolutely *certain*) *and others highly improbable*; which is the Opinion of the *Academicks*, as distinguish'd from pure *Scepticks*. Tho' therefore he won't say his Rules are *certain*, yet he thinks 'em so very probable, as that no wise Man can deny his Assent to 'em.

[f] Which was the Case of the *Scepticks*; For what Disputing can there be with them, who won't allow one thing more probable than another; when all Dispute must suppose that

are already engag'd in the Study of [g] a moſt noble and ancient Philoſophy; and have gotten *Cratippus* for your Maſter and Inſtructor, who is hardly inferior to its moſt glorious Founders: However, I would have you acquainted with [h] our Doctrins, which are very little different from thoſe of your own Sect. But it's high time now to return to our Purpoſe.

that ſome things are probable and true, and from them make out the Matter in queſtion? Or what regular Conduct can he obſerve in his Life, who doubts whether he ſees, hears, or feels any thing, or not? Therefore *Quintil.* with very good Reaſon, excludes *Pyrrho* from medling with Eloquence, *Cui judices eſſe* (ſays he) *apud quos verba faciat, &c. non liquebit:* For he muſt doubt (if he Act according to his Principles) whether there be any Judge for him to ſpeak to, any Criminal to defend, *&c.*

[g] The *Peripatetick*, of which Sect *Cratippus*, his Son's Maſter, was.

[h] The *Academick.*

[i] *See Book* 1. *chap.* 1.

CHAP. III.

The Knowledge of Honeſty is of greateſt Moment. Profit and Honeſty really the ſame, and diſtinguiſht only by an Act of the Mind. The cuſtomary Opinion to the contrary very pernicious. The Diviſion of things that are profitable, and hurtful to Men. The Good we receive from inanimate Beings owing to Man's Induſtry.

THere being then, as [a] was before obſerv'd, five general Heads of Deliberating and Conſulting for the finding out our Duty; two of which relate to

[a] *In Book* 1. *at the end of chap.* 3.

[b] Be-

to what is Honeſt and Becoming; two to the Uſes and Conveniencies of Life, ſuch as Plenty, Power, Riches, &c. and the fifth to the teaching us how we ought to Chooſe, if any of the former ſhould ſeem to contradict and run counter to one another: we have gone thro' with that, wherein *Honeſty* is the Queſtion; with which I deſire you'd be more eſpecially acquainted. The Point which now comes under Conſideration, is what uſually goes by the name of *Profitable*; [b] concerning which, Cuſtom is mightily in the wrong, and by little and little has brought it to ſuch a paſs, as to make a Diſtinction between Profit and Honeſty; and ſettle it as a conſtant and receiv'd Maxim, *That a thing may be Honeſt without being Profitable; and again may be Profitable without being Honeſt*: the moſt pernicious Errour, and moſt deſtructive of all Goodneſs, that ever could have crept into the Minds of Men. The greateſt however, and moſt eminent Philoſophers, have been always ſo ſtrict and ſevere in their Writings, as to make the three Natures of *Juſtice*, *Profit*, and *Honeſty*, be blended and interwoven together in Reality, and diſtinguiſhable only by an Act of the Mind. For whatever is *Juſt*, ſay they, the ſame is alſo *Profitable*; and whatever is *Honeſt*, the ſame is alſo *Juſt*; from whence it follows, That whatever is *Honeſt*, the ſame muſt be alſo *Profitable*. Did People but conſider this Matter as they ought, they would not, as now they commonly do, admire a crafty and ſubtle ſort of Fellows, and eſteem that Wiſ-

[b] Being to Diſcourſe in this Book about *Profit*, the firſt thing he takes care of is, to ſettle the true Notion of Profit, and root out of Mens Minds a pernicious Errour, which they have got concerning it. He aſſerts therefore, and proves by the Authority of the greateſt Philoſophers, That nothing can be Profitable, which is not Honeſt. *See Book* 1. *chap.* 3. *Note* [f].

[a] Ha-

Wiſdom, which in truth is Roguery. This Errour therefore ſhould wholly be rooted out of the Minds of Men, and all ſhould be taught, That if ever they hope to obtain their Ends, they ſhould not ſet about it by the ways of Knavery and underhand Dealings, but by Juſtice and Integrity in their Deſigns and Actions. [c] Now all things that tend to the Good and Preſervation of the Life of Man, are either *Inanimate*, ſuch as Gold, Silver, the Productions of the Earth, and other ſuch like; or *Animals*, which have natural Powers, Inclinations and Appetites. Of theſe ſome are *unreaſonable* and others *reaſonable*: The *unreaſonable* are Horſes, Oxen, and other ſorts of Cattel; to which we may add Bees, which produce and make ſomething, that contributes to the Convenience of the Life of Men: the *reaſonable* are Gods and Men. The means for procuring the Favour of the Gods, is to live a religious and holy Life: Next to the Gods, there's nothing ſo capable of contributing to the Happineſs and Welfare of Men, as Men themſelves. The ſame Diſtribution may ſerve for thoſe things, which tend to the Hurt and Inconvenience of Men. But becauſe 'tis believ'd, That [d] to hurt is incompatible with the Divine Nature, the Gods for that reaſon are excepted here, ſo that Men are ſuppos'd, of all things in Nature, to do both the moſt [e] Service

[c] Having ſhewn, That nothing can be Profitable which is not Honeſt; he now enumerates the ſeveral ſorts of things, which may be profitable for us; ſo that, when we know what is Beſt, and what is Worſt for us, we may endeavour to obtain the one, and avoid the other.

[d] Becauſe the Gods being by Nature good and kind, if they ſhould harm Men, they would act contrary to their own Natures. *See* Lipſ. Phiſiolog. Stoic. *Book* 1. *chap.* 10.

[e] The words, *Et prodeſſe*, not being found in ſeveral Manuſcripts, have been excluded the late Editions; but (I think) without ſufficient Reaſon: For this is not a Concluſion from

vice and Diſſervice to one another. For *Firſt*, [f] Thoſe things which are call'd Inanimate, are moſt of 'em owing to the Induſtry of Men; which we neither could *get*, if it weren't for their Labour and Art in procuring 'em; nor afterwards *uſe* without their Aſſiſtance. For where ſhould we have ſuch a Science as Phyſick; as Navigation or Agriculture? How ſhould we gather and preſerve our Corn, and the reſt of our Fruits, if it were not for Men? And then how ſhould thoſe Commodities, which we want, be imported; or thoſe, with which we abound, be exported, if there were not Men to do each of theſe Works? In like manner, how could Stones be fetch'd out of the Quarries for our neceſſary Uſes? How could Iron, Braſs, Gold and Silver, be dug and drawn out from the Bowels of the Earth, did not Men ſet their Hands to work for theſe Purpoſes?

from the laſt Words only, but the whole Sence foregoing; *viz. That Men do moſt Good, except only the Gods; and moſt Harm of all, the Gods not doing any*: From whence it follows, *That Men do the moſt Good, and moſt Harm, taken both together, of any thing, to one another.* Beſide the words following begin to reckon up the ſeveral *Goods*, which Men do to one another; which being brought in with an *enim*, *for*, ought to be a Proof of what immediately forgoes, *viz. That Men do the greateſt Service as well as Diſſervice*, &c.

[f] Being to ſhew, *That Men do the moſt Good to one another*; he begins with inanimate things, and ſhews that the Service we receive from them is owing to Men.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Other Conveniencies from inanimate Beings, and unreasonable Animals, receiv'd by Mens Industry. The Advantages arising from Mens joyning in Society.

SO Houſes, which ſerve to defend us from the extremities of Heat and Cold, could neither at firſt have been made by Mankind; nor afterwards, if by Earth-quake, Tempeſt, or length of Days, they had fall'n to decay, have been repair'd or rebuilt; had not Men, joyn'd together in one common Society, learnt to beg Help and Aſſiſtance of one another. To this Induſtry of Men we are alſo indebted for Conveyances of Water, for making new Channels and Arms to Rivers, and for turning the Streams after ſuch a manner, as thereby to water and fatten our Grounds; for throwing up Banks to defend us from the Waves, and making of new Harbors in convenient Places. From all which Inſtances, and a great many others that might eaſily be produc'd, 'tis abundantly manifeſt, That the Fruits and Advantages reap'd from thoſe things, which are call'd *Inanimate*, are entirely owing to Mens Labour and Induſtry. *Secondly*, [a] Thoſe we receive from *unreaſonable* Animals, how very little and inconſiderable would they be, if they were not augmented by the ſame Peoples Induſtry? For who was it but Men that firſt diſcover'd the Uſes, to which Beaſts in their ſeveral kinds might be ſerviceable? And how at this time could we feed or break them? How could we keep 'em, and get the

[a] Having ſhewn, *That the Advantage they reap from inanimate Beings is owing to Men*; he proceeds to ſhew the ſame of unreaſonable Animals.

[b] Se-

the moſt Profit and Advantage by 'em, without the Endeavours and Aſſiſtance of the ſame Men? 'Tis *they* that deſtroy us thoſe Creatures which are hurtful, and procure for us thoſe which may be ſerviceable to us. Why need I mention a [b] multitude of Arts, which are abſolutely neceſſary to our Well-being here? For what Help or Succour could thoſe that are ſick, or what Pleaſure thoſe that are healthy find? How could Mankind be ſupply'd with Victuals, and other Conveniencies or Comforts of Life; if it weren't for that number of Callings in the World, which are wholly deſign'd to provide 'em of ſuch things? By which Men are brought to live better and more handſomly, and are rais'd to a condition ſo far above that of unreaſonable Animals. Again, Cities could neither have been built nor frequented, without a Community and Society of Men: From hence have ariſen all Laws and Cuſtoms; the Bounds of Equity and Juſtice have been ſettled; and a certain and regular Method laid down for the Conduct of Mens Lives. This has brought Modeſty into requeſt, and fill'd off the natural Roughneſs of Mens Tempers; has contributed to the greater Security of their Lives, and eſtabliſh'd ſuch a Commerce and Correſpondence among 'em, as by mutual giving and receiving of Benefits, by bartering and changing one Commodity for another, one Convenience for another, ſupplies 'em to the full with whatever they ſtand in need of.

[b] Several other things, ſuch as *Arts* and uſeful Inventions, Civil Society, *&c.* whereby Men are ſerviceable and do good to one another.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Nothing extraordinary either in War, or Peace, can be done without the help of Men. Nothing the Cauſe of ſo much Evil to Men, as they themſelves are to one another. What is the Office of Virtue. The whole Buſineſs of it conſiſts in three things.

WE dwell much longer, than we needed to do, upon this Subject: For who does not *ſee*, which *Panætius* has ſpent many Pages to *make out*, that neither a General in War, nor a Stateſman in Peace, could ever perform any glorious Exploit, or do any notable Service to the Publick, without the concurrence of other Mens Endeavours? To confirm this Aſſertion, he brings [b] *Themiſtocles*, *Pericles*, *Ageſilaus* and *Alexander*; and tells us, that no one of all theſe, without the aſſiſtance of others to ſupport 'em, could ever have atchiev'd ſuch glorious Actions. What he tells us is undoubtedly true, and ſuch a number of Witneſſes altogether ſuperfluous. [b] And as *Men* thus receive moſt extraordinary Benefits, from agreeing and conſpiring to lend mutual Aſſiſtance; ſo we ſhall find, upon changing the Scene, that there are no Misfortunes or Calamities ſo great, as thoſe which they bring upon one another. [c] *Dicæarchus*, a learned and eloquent *Peripatetick*, has written a whole Book con-

[a] Several of the greateſt Generals and Stateſmen amongſt the Ancients.

[b] Having thus made it appear, *That Men do, plurimum proſeſſe, do the greateſt Good to one another*; [See Not. 4. on ch. 3.] he is now going to ſhew, *That they do the greateſt Miſchief too.*

[c] Born at *Meſſene*, a City in *Sicily*, Schollar of *Ariſtotle*. He was alſo an eminent Orator, and Geometrician. He left ſeveral Works behind him, which are all loſt.

[a] He

concerning the Deſtruction of Men; where firſt *having* reckon'd up all other Cauſes of it, ſuch as Inundations, Peſtilences, and Famines, and even ſudden Incurſions of furious wild Beaſts, (by which he aſſures us ſome whole Nations have been devour'd;) and then placing on the other ſide Wars, Seditions, and ſuch-like Misfortunes, which Men were the Occaſions of; he endeavours to ſhew at the foot of the Account, that a great many more have been deſtroy'd by *theſe*, than by all other Accidents or Calamities whatever. This then being indiſputably true, That the *Goods* Men enjoy, and the *Evils* they ſuffer, proceed for the moſt part from Men themſelves; I ſay 'tis the principal Office of Virtue, to procure the Good-liking and Favour of Men, and ſo to engage their Endeavours and Affections, as to make 'em ſtill ready to do us any Kindneſs. 'Tis the Buſineſs therefore of laborious Callings, to ſupply us with all the Conveniencies of Life, which may be had from the Uſe of inanimate Beings, and unreaſonable Animals: But to gain the Affections of *Men* on our ſide, and beget in *them* always a readineſs and deſire to advance our Intereſt, is a Work that requires the Wiſdom and Virtue of the greateſt Men. [d] For the whole Work and Exerciſe of Virtue in general, conſiſts in ſome one of theſe three things: The *firſt* is a Knowledge, in all we undertake, of what is agreeable to Truth and Sincerity; what's becoming and ſuitable to every one's Character; what will be the Conſequence of ſuch or ſuch

[d] He proves what he juſt now ſaid, *That it requires Wiſdom*, &c. For, *ſays he*, the whole Work and Exerciſe of Virtue conſiſts in one of theſe three things: 1. The Improvement of our Reaſon and Underſtanding; which is the Work of Prudence, and the intellectual Virtues. 2. To govern and reſtrain the Paſſions, and keep the ſenſual Appetite in ſubjection to Reaſon; which Temperance and the Moral Vir-

ſuch Actions; what are the Materials out of which things are made, and what the Cauſes that firſt brought 'em into Being. The *ſecond*, A reſtraining the violent Motions and Paſſions of the Soul, which by the *Grecians* are termed πάθη; and bringing the irregular Inclinations of the Appetite, which by the ſame are call'd ὁρμαὶ, under the Power and Government of Reaſon. The *third* is a Skilfulneſs of Addreſs in our Carriage, and a winning Demeanour toward the reſt of Men, with whom we are joyn'd in one common Society; that ſo by their help we may be ſupply'd in abundance, with all thoſe things which our Natures ſtand in need of; and by the ſame may be enabled, ſhould any Injury be offer'd us, to keep our ſelves ſecure from the Violences of it; and not only ſo, but to revenge our ſelves alſo upon the guilty Perſon, and inflict ſuch Puniſhments, as are according to the Rules of Humanity and Juſtice.

Virtues do. 3. To gain the Affections of Men, ſo as to make 'em promote our Intereſt; which any of the former may help to do. Thus Wiſdom or Knowledge, for Inſtance, perfect the Underſtanding, and are proper to beget in Men Confidence or Reliance on us. [*See chap.* 9.] So Juſtice, and Greatneſs of Soul, moderate the Paſſions and Inclinations; and alſo make Men love, reſpect, and honour us. *See chap.* 9, 10, 11, &c.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

How far the Power of Fortune over Men reaches. The ſeveral Reaſons why Men favour any one; or ſubmit to his Authority.

WHat [a] Means ſhould be us'd for the gaining, and ſecuring Men firm to our Intereſts, we ſhall mention immediately; but we have one Obſervation to make before-hand. [b] There's no one but knows that the Power of Fortune is very great, both as to the *good*, and *ill* Succeſs of our Actions: for when ſhe favours us, we quickly arrive at our deſired Haven; but when ſhe turns againſt us, we as quickly are Shipwreckt and run A-ground. Now of thoſe Events which depend upon Fortune, there are ſome which come to paſs but extraordinary ſeldom; ſuch as Storms, Tempeſts, Shipwrecks, Ruins, Fires, *&c.* which proceed from *inanimate Beings*; and from *brutiſh Animals* kicks, bites, puſhes, *&c.* all which, as I ſaid, do but rarely happen: But the *Overthrows of Armies*, as of [c] three but a while

[a] Men doing us the moſt Good and moſt Evil, (as is ſhewn) it follows that thoſe are the profitableſt Actions, which engage Men to be of our ſide, and to do all the Good they can, and keep from us all the Evil: What theſe are he proceeds now to ſhew; only obſerving one thing by the way.

[b] It might have been objected, That the good or ill Succeſs of our Actions depends upon Fortune, and not Men's Aſſiſtance; which therefore why ſhould we endeavour to procure? To obviate this he obſerves, That the moſt and greateſt of what we call fortuitous Accidents, could never have fall'n out without Men's Aſſiſtance, notwithſtanding that uſually they are ſaid to come from Fortune: Such are Victories, Overthrows, *&c.*

[c] That of *Pompey* the Great in the *Pharſalian* Field; his eldeſt Son's at *Munda* in *Spain*; and *Juba* and *Scipio*'s in *Africk*; all defeated by *Cæſar*. *See his Commentaries.*

[a] *Viz.*

while ago, and a great many others at several times; *the Deaths of Commanders*, as lately of [d] a great and extraordinary Person; *the Hatred and Violence of the enrag'd Multitude*, and, as a Consequence of that, the Banishments, Flights and utter Undoings of well-deserving Citizens: as also on the other hand *prosperous Successes*, such as Honours, Commands, Victories, &c. tho' they are all truly fortuitous things, yet they can't succeed either the one way or t'other, without the Assistance and Endeavours of Men. This being noted, we are now to discourse of those Ways and Methods, whereby Men are drawn and enclin'd to be for us, and to endeavour all they can for our Interest and Advantage: Upon which if we seem to dwell longer than we should do, I desire the Usefulness of the Subject may be consider'd, and then we may possibly be thought too short. [e] Whatsoever then is contributed by Men, toward any one's advancement in Riches, Honours, Power, &c. is always done upon some of these Motives: *First*, *That* of Kindness, Benevolence, or Good-will; when for some reasons they *love* any Person. *Secondly*, Honour or Admiration; when they *respect* any one for his Virtues, and think he deserves to be highly promoted. *Thirdly*, Confidence, Trust, or Reliance; when they think they may safely *confide* in a Man, as one that will certainly take care of their Affairs. *Fourthly*, Fear, when they stand in any *Aw* of his Power and

[d] *Viz.* *Pompey* the Great, who after his Defeat at *Pharsalia*, flying into *Ægypt*, was there treacherously Murder'd: *Princeps* Romani *nominis*, *imperio arbitrioq*; Ægyptii *municipii*, *jugulatus est*. See *Vell. Paterc.* Book 2. chap. 58.

[e] He lays down six things, or Principles of Action in Men, which make one Man endeavour to be Profitable to another, as, Love, Honour, &c. and shews which of 'em are convenient, and which not; and by what Virtues we may gain each of 'em.

[f] He

and Authority. *Fifthly*, Hope, when they expect to get ſomething from him; as when Princes or popular Men promiſe great Donations. And, *laſt of all*, Hire, when they are drawn to't by Money or Preſents; which is much the moſt pitiful and ſordid Way, as for thoſe on the one hand that are taken by it, ſo likewiſe for thoſe that endeavour to make uſe of it: For 'tis never well when People ſhall attempt to get that by Money, which ought to be the Reward of Virtue and Merit. However ſeeing ſometimes one muſt have recourſe to this Method as a Refuge, I ſhall give ſome Rules for our Direction in the Uſe of it; but firſt ſpeak of thoſe, that are more nearly related to Virtue and Honeſty. [f] In much the ſame manner, and for ſeveral ſuch Reaſons, Men ſubmit to the Power and Authority of another: Either becauſe they have a *Kindneſs* for him; or have formerly receiv'd ſome Obligations from him; or *reſpect* him for his Worth; or *hope* they ſhall get ſomething by it; or *fear* they ſhall be forc'd to it, if they don't do it voluntarily; or are drawn by fair *Promiſes* and large Donations; or, laſtly, (as we ſee it too often practis'd in our own Republick) are downright *hired* to it.

[f] He brings in this, becauſe he deſigns to Diſcourſe not only about *private* Perſons, How *they* ſhould get others to be ſerviceable to 'em; but of *Governours* alſo of a State or Commonwealth, How *they* ſhould do to make their Subjects and Allies be firm to their Intereſts.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

A Governour ſhould endeavour to make himſelf lov'd, and not fear'd. The Fates of ſeveral, who have taken the contrary Method.

NOw of all [a] thoſe Methods, which tend to the advancement and maintenance of our Intereſt, there is none more proper and convenient than *Love*, and none more improper and inconvenient than *Fear*. For, as 'tis very well obſerv'd by *Ennius*, *Whom Men fear, they alſo hate; and whom they hate, they wiſh out of the World.* But that no force of Power or Greatneſs whatever, can bear up long againſt a Stream of publick Hate, if it were not ſufficiently known before, was of late made appear by an Inſtance of our own. And not the Murther of that [b] Tyrant only, who by force of Arms oppreſs'd the City, which now moſt [c] obeys him, when taken out of the World; but the like untimely Ends of moſt other Tyrants, who have generally been attended by the ſame ill Fate, is a manifeſt Token that the Hatred of People is able to ruin the moſt abſolute Authority: For Obedience proceeding from *Fear* can't poſſibly be laſting; whereas that which is the Effect of *Love*, will be faithful for ever. 'Tis well enough in thoſe, who by open Force

[a] He begins with the firſt Ground of Mens being ſerviceable and obedient to us, *Love*; to which he adds its Oppoſite, *Fear*; and comparing 'em one with another, rejects the latter as a very unſafe and inconvenient one, and magnifies the former.

[b] *Jul. Cæſar*, who was aſſaſſinated in the Senate-houſe. *See* Sueton. *and* Plut.

[c] By adhering to *Mark Anthony*, and others, who pretended to be Revengers of his Death; endeavouring to fire the Houſes, *&c.* of the Conſpirators, *&c.* See the fore-cited Authors.

[d] A

force have reduc'd any Nation, and accordingly Rule it with an high Hand, if they *do* ſometimes uſe Rigour and Severity, like Maſters towards their Slaves, when there's no other way of holding 'em in Subjection: But for thoſe who are Magiſtrates in a *free* City, to endeavour to make themſelves fear'd by the People, is one of the maddeſt, and moſt deſperate Attempts upon the face of the Earth. For tho' a Man ſhould by his Power and Greatneſs oppreſs the Laws, and over-awe Liberty by Terrour and Threatnings, yet ſtill they will find time to recover again, firſt by the private Reſentments of the Citizens, and afterwards by their chooſing in ſecret Conſults, ſome worthier Perſon to free 'em from the Oppreſſour. And Liberty, after ſhe has been chain'd up a while, is always more Curſt, and bites deeper, than ſhe would otherwiſe have done if ſhe had never been reſtrain'd. Let us therefore embrace and adhere to that Method, which is of the moſt univerſal Influence, and ſerves not only to ſecure us what we have, but moreover to enlarge our Power and Authority: That is in ſhort, Let us rather endeavour to be *Lov'd* than *Fear'd*; which is certainly the beſt way to make us ſucceſsful as well in our private, as our publick Buſineſs. For thoſe who deſire to have others be afraid of 'em, muſt needs be afraid of thoſe others in their turns: What, for Inſtance, ſhall we imagin of [d] the Elder *Dionyſius*? With what eternal Fears and Apprehenſions muſt he needs be rack'd, when [e] daring

[d] A Tyrant of *Syracuſe*, Son of one *Hermocrates*. He ſeiz'd upon the Government at twenty five Years old, about the Year of *Rome* 447. [See our Author's Tuſc. Queſt.] His Son of the ſame Name ſucceeded him in his Tyranny; but was expell'd for it by *Dion*. *See* Plut. *Life of* Dion.

[e] His Barber one day happening to ſay, *That his Life was in his Hands*, he caus'd him to be murder'd, and made his

ring not to venture his Throat to any Razor, he was forc'd even to ſinge off his Beard with Coals? Or what of [f] *Alexander*, who was ſirnam'd the *Pheræan*? In what Torment, think we, muſt he perpetually live? When (as 'tis uſually reported of him) he dar'd not ſo much as to riſe from Table, and go to his own Wife *Thebe*'s Chamber, one whom he lov'd with an entire Affection, without a *Barbarian*, and him (as 'tis ſaid) too a [g] branded *Thracian*, to lead the way with his naked Sword? And would always diſpatch ſome of his Guards before him, to ſearch all the Cloaths and Coffers of the Women, for fear leaſt any Weapon might be conceal'd within 'em. O miſerable and unhappy Man! who could think a *Barbarian*, one that carried the Marks of his Condition in his Forehead, would be faithfuller to him than his own Wife. Neither, it ſeems, was he miſtaken in it; for he was afterwards Murther'd [h] by her Procurement, upon ſuſpicion of having to do with ſome other Woman. Nor indeed can any Authority, how abſolute ſoever, ſubſiſt very long when 'tis thus

Daughters ſhave him for ſome time. But afterwards ſuſpecting even *them* too, he us'd ſinging, as the ſafeſt way he could think of.

[f] See *chap.* 30. *Book* 1. He by his ſavage Cruelties and Injuſtice, made all the World hate him. The *Theſſalians* beg'd Aid of the *Thebans* againſt him, who ſent their General *Pelopidas* ſeveral times; whom he by Treachery got into his Power, and kept Priſoner a good while.

[g] The *Thracians* were counted ſome of the ſavageſt *Barbarians*, and ordinarily made uſe of by Tyrants in thoſe times, as the fitteſt Executioners of their bloody Deſigns. To be mark'd on the Forehead was a token of Honor amongſt them, as it was of Diſgrace and Slavery amongſt others. But *Cic.* here ſeems to ſpeak of this Man, as a Slave or Villain: 'tis probable therefore he might be a *Thracian* Slave, and mark'd as ſuch, after he came into *Greece*.

[h] She perſuading her three Brothers to it, who accordingly ſlew him in his Bed. *See* Plut. *Life of* Pelopidas.

thus generally fear'd: [i] *Phalaris* himſelf, who is particularly remarkable for his barbarous Cruelties, may ſerve for a Witneſs to this Truth; who was not deſtroy'd by domeſtick Treacheries, like that *Alexander*, whom I juſt now mention'd; nor yet by ſome *few* Men conſpiring his Death, like our late Tyrant; but by a general Inſurrection of all the *Agrigentines* falling upon him at once. Again, Did not the *Macedonians* revolt from [k] *Demetrius*, and all with one conſent march over to *Pyrrhus*? And when the *Lacedæmonians* grew Inſolent and Tyrannical, did not their Allies upon a ſuddain forſake 'em, and ſhew 'emſelves idle and unconcern'd Spectators of their Ruin at [l] *Leuctra*, without ever ſtirring one Foot to their Aſſiſtance?

[i] A noted Tyrant of *Agrigentum* in *Sicily*, Son of *Laodamas*, Born at *Aſtypalea*, but expell'd his own Country. He is remarkable for his Cruelty, particularly for a brazen Bull, in which he us'd to torture thoſe, whom he had a mind to get rid of. He is ſaid however to have lov'd Learning and learned Men. There is ſtill extant a Book of Epiſtles under his Name.

[k] Sirnam'd *Poliorcetes*, a King of *Macedonia*, Son of *Antigonus*, one of *Alexander* the Great's Captains. By his Pride and Inſolence he made the *Macedonians* deſert him, and go over to *Pyrrhus*. *See his Life in* Plutarch.

[l] A Town in *Beotia*, where the *Lacedæmonians* were entirely routed by the *Thebans*, under the Conduct of their brave Leader *Epaminondas*. *See chap.* 24. *Book* 1.

CHAP. VIII.

The just and gentle Government of the old Romans: *When chang'd, and the fatal Conſequences of that Change.* Cæſar *and* Sylla's *unjuſt Cruelties. One Cauſe of Civil Wars is Mens hoping to raiſe 'emſelves by them. All have occaſion for ſome Friends, tho' not for general Love.*

I Much rather chooſe, upon ſuch a Subject, to bring Inſtances from Forreign, than our own Nation. However, I can't but obſerve thus much, That ſo long as our Empire ſupported it ſelf, not by Ways of Injuſtice and Violence, but rather by Actions of Kindneſs and Gentleneſs; Wars were undertaken to Protect its Allies or Defend its Honour, and accordingly their Iſſues were attended with Mercy, or at leaſt no more Rigour than was abſolutely neceſſary. The Senate then was a kind of Port or Refuge, for Princes and Nations to have recouſe to in their need; and our Officers and Commanders made it their greateſt Glory, to Defend their Provinces, and Aſſiſt their Allies, with Juſtice and Fidelity. This City therefore was not then the [a] *Empreſs*, ſo properly as the *Protectreſs* of all the World. This Conduct and Method of managing the State, began by little and little to *wear off* be-

[a] *Patrocinium verius quam imperium.* 'Twas the Duty of a Patron to Protect and Defend, not to Rule over his Clients: and one was never the leſs free, becauſe he was under the Patronage of another, but only the more ſafe, as being protected by him. In like manner one Nation might be under, and (as 'twere) the Client of another, and yet be a Free Nation for all that. Whence there's a difference in *Roman* Authors, betwixt *in fide eſſe*, and *in ditione eſſe pop. Roman.* The latter denoting a loſs of Liberty; the former only ſome ſort of Inferiority and Homage.

[b] *Luc.*

before, but utterly *vaniſh'd* immediately after the Victory of [b] *Sylla*; for People began to think nothing could be unjuſt to their Confederates and Allies, when once they had ſeen ſo great Cruelties exercis'd even upon their very Citizens. This Man therefore was in a juſt Cauſe, but which was follow'd by a cruel and moſt unjuſt Victory: he having had the Boldneſs and Impudence to ſay, when in full Market he was ſelling the Goods of ſome honeſt and wealthy Men, and whom he himſelf knew to be *Roman* Citizens, *That he was going to make ſale of his own Booty.* But there has come [c] *one* after him, whoſe Cauſe was impious, and his Victory yet more ſcandalous and inhuman: who did not ſtop at ſelling of private Mens Eſtates, but involv'd all our Countries and Provinces together in one common Calamity. Hence we have ſeen, after Havock and Devaſtation made in other Countries, as it were by way of Prælude to the Loſs of our own Empire, the City [d] *Marſeilles* drawn along in Triumph; and that very place, without whoſe Aſſiſtance our former Generals never brought Triumph from beyond the *Alpes*, has now found one that could have ſo much Impudence, as to Triumph over its own Deſtruction. I might bring a great many other Examples, of moſt impious Treatment that hath been ſhewn towards our Allies; but this ſingle Inſtance is abundantly ſufficient, being one of the baſeſt that was ever com-

[b] *Luc. Sylla* the Dictator. He took up Arms againſt *Marius*, and defended the Cauſe of the Nobility againſt the Commons, in a bloody Civil War: but after his Victory was inhumanly Cruel. *See his Life at large in* Plut.

[c] He means *Julius Cæſar*.

[d] A City in *France*, which had always taken part with the *Romans*, in all their Wars on that ſide. But declaring for *Pompey* in the Civil War, 'twas ſack'd by *Cæſar*; who carry'd along a Figure of it (as was their uſual Cuſtom) with him in Triumph.

committed before the face of the Sun. The truth on't is we have deſerv'd theſe Misfortunes; for if *others* had not 'ſcap'd without Puniſhment for their Wickedneſs, *this Man* could never have arriv'd at that Inſolence; who tho' he has left but few Heirs of his Eſtate, I am afraid will have a great many wicked ones of his Ambition. For as long as ſome diſſolute and profligate Fellows remember that [e] former inhuman Auction, and are in hopes one day of ſeeing the ſame again, they'll always be for propagating Civil Diſſentions. Thus *Publius Sylla*, who was ſo buſie in *that* mention'd, when his Kinſman was Dictator, was never contented till he had manag'd [f] a worſe and more inhuman Auction ſix and thirty Years after: and [g] another, who was *Scribe* in that former Dictatorſhip, in this latter was advanc'd to be *Treaſurer* of the City. By all which 'tis eaſie enough to perceive, that we are never to hope we ſhall be free from Civil Wars, when People expect to make their Fortunes by 'em. We have therefore only the Walls of our City remaining entire, and even *they*, as 'twere, expecting to feel the Effects of their abominable Wickedneſs; but as for the Republick 'tis abſolutely ſunk into Ruins and Nothing. And all theſe Misfortunes have fall'n upon us (that I may return to the Subject which occaſion'd this Digreſſion) by our chooſing to Govern rather by *Fear* than *Love*. What then ought particular Perſons to expect, when Tyranny and Oppreſſion could bring all theſe Evils upon the whole *Roman* Empire? [h] This then being ſo

[e] When *Lucius Sylla* ſold the Goods of the *Roman* Citizens, whom he had Out-law'd, and caus'd to be Slain.

[f] When *Cæſar* ſold the Goods of thoſe, who had been of *Pompey*'s Party.

[g] One *Cornelius*, mention'd by *Saluſt* in *Lepidus* the Conſul's Speech againſt *Sylla*.

[h] Having ſhewn how convenient *Love*, and how inconvenient

ſo manifeſtly plain, That *Love's* a moſt powerful Motive to Obedience, but *Fear* a moſt weak and dangerous one; it follows in the next place that we ſhould diſcourſe of thoſe Means, whereby ſuch a *Love*, joyn'd with *Honour* and *Confidence*, may moſt eaſily be gotten. [i] Now this is what all Men don't equally ſtand in need of; but each ſhould conſider his own way of living, and accordingly judge what's convenienteſt for him; whether to be *belov'd* by the generality of Men, or only by ſome few and ſelect Perſons. This however we may lay down for certain, as a firſt and moſt neceſſary Rule in this caſe, to procure at leaſt *ſome* faithful and ſincere Friends, who may have a true Kindneſs and Eſteem for us. [k] As far as this reaches, there's very little difference between even the greateſt and meaneſt of People, and all ſorts of 'em are almoſt equally concern'd to endeavour after it. As for Honour, Glory, and the general Good-will of *all* the Citizens, theſe indeed are things, which aren't alike uſeful and neceſſary for all. However for thoſe that have been

nient *Fear* is, for the advancement of our Intereſt; it remains that he ſhould ſhew how the former may be obtain'd. To it he joyns *Honour* and *Confidence*; the ſecond and third Means mention'd Chap. 6. which three together make up true and perfect *Glory*. *See the next Chapter.*

[i] Before he enquires how this *Love* is to be gotten, he divides it (if I may ſo ſay) into *Love of Friendſhip*, which conſiſts in having ſome few good Friends; and this he ſays all, whether great or mean, are almoſt equally concern'd to get; and *general Love*, which conſiſts in the Kindneſs and general Good-will of all the Citizens; and this is neceſſary but to ſome few. Of the former he has ſpoken in his *Lælius* or *of Friendſhip*; and therefore paſſes it by here. The latter he gives ſome Rules about here, as making up, together with *Confidence* and *Admiration*, true and perfect Glory.

[k] That is, Tho' all don't ſtand in need of the general Love and Good-will of the Citizens, yet particular and private Friends are as uſeful to the Meaneſt, as to the Great and more Powerful.

been able to get 'em, they are very good Helps, as for moſt other Purpoſes, ſo for the obtaining of faithful Friends: But of Friendſhip I have treated in another Work, which is entitled *Lelius*.

CHAP. IX.

What the Ingredients of true Glory are. By what Means the Love of the People may be obtain'd. How Men may be brought to place a Confidence in us. Juſtice more powerful than Cunning to this End.

LEt us now proceed to diſcourſe of *Glory*; tho' *that* too is a Subject, upon which I have [a] two Books already extant; however I ſhall touch upon it here in ſhort, becauſe 'tis a thing of ſuch Weight and Moment toward the ſucceſsful Management of the moſt important Affairs. True and perfect Glory then is always made up of theſe three Ingredients: *Firſt*, The Love and Good-will of the Multitude. *Secondly*, Their Truſting and Reliance upon a Man. And, *Laſtly*, Their Valuing and Admiring him ſo, as to think him a Perſon that really deſerves Honour. The Means of getting theſe three from the Multitude, (to give one ſhort and eaſie Rule) are very much the ſame as from particular Perſons. However there's another peculiar Way of approaching the People, and gaining Admittance into the Hearts and Affections of all Men in general. [b] Of thoſe three then, which I juſt

[a] They are both loſt. He mentions them two or three times in his Epiſtles to *Atticus*.

[b] He Diſcourſes in order of the Ways how to obtain theſe three, and firſt *Love*: the Means of gaining which are Liberality, a generous Diſpoſition, *&c.*

[c] Se-

juſt now mention'd, let us firſt ſee the Ways of obtaining *Love*. Now the Love of the People is mov'd by nothing ſo much, as by Bounty and doing Kindneſſes: Next they are pleas'd with an hearty Deſire and Inclination toward it, tho' a Man have not wherewithal to exerciſe it. Thirdly, The very Name and Reputation of having Beneficence and Liberality, Juſtice and Fidelity, with the reſt of thoſe Virtues, which give a kind of Smoothneſs and Agreeableneſs to our Converſation, is of very great Efficacy in getting us the Favour and Love of the Multitude: and the reaſon of it is, becauſe Honeſty and *Decorum* delight us of themſelves, and by their own native Beauties and Excellencies move, and engage the Hearts of all Men: which ſeeing they appear with more Luſtre in the Virtues, which I juſt now mention'd; it follows that by Nature we muſt Love thoſe People, in whom we ſuppoſe ſuch Virtues to reſide. And theſe are the principal Cauſes of Men's Loving us: there might, I confeſs, be ſome others given, but not of equal Weight and Importance with theſe. [c] We are to ſpeak in the next place of their *Truſting* or *Confiding* in us; for the compaſſing of which, 'tis neceſſary we ſhould be ſuppos'd to have two Qualifications, *viz. Prudence* and *Juſtice*. [d] For we truſt thoſe Men, whom we believe, *to* underſtand Matters better than we do; *to be* wiſe enough to ſee things before they are arriv'd, and in the Management of 'em, if any Danger ſhould happen, *to be* ready at finding out Ways and Expedients, to diſentangle 'emſelves from the Perplexities of it: in which Men

[c] Secondly, How Men are brought to *confide* and *truſt* in us, which is the ſecond part of true Glory. The two great Means are *Juſtice*, and *Prudence*, or Knowledge of Buſineſs: of theſe Juſtice is the chief.

[d] How *Prudence* makes Men confide in us.

Men imagin that all true and profitable Wiſdom conſiſts. [e] But when a Man is found really *Juſt* and *Faithful*, that is *Good*, we place ſo much Truſt and Confidence in ſuch a one, as not to entertain any the leaſt ſuſpicion of Deceit or Injury. To ſuch a Man therefore we think we may wiſely, and with a ſecure Confidence, entruſt our Safeties, our Children and our Fortunes. Juſtice therefore, of theſe two Virtues, has much the more ſtrong and effectual Tendency, to procure this Credit and Confidence from the People. For *that*, even without Wiſdom, can go a great way toward the obtaining of this End; whereas Wiſdom, without *that*, is unable to do any thing: For the more Shrew'd and Cunning any Perſon is, the more he's Suſpected and Hated by the World, if he ben't counted Honeſt and Upright withal. Juſtice therefore, in conjunction with Wiſdom, can make a Man be truſted as far as he pleaſes: Juſtice without the other can do a great deal; but the other without *that* is of no Force at all.

[e] How *Juſtice* makes Men confide in us.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Why he talks of Wiſdom and Juſtice as ſeparate from one another, tho' really there's a mutual Connexion between 'em. What will make Men admire any one. The difference between Deſpiſing *and* having an Ill Opinion *of a Man.*

[a] SOme Men perhaps will be ready to admire, ſince 'tis ſo generally agreed on by Philoſophers, and has been ſo often aſſerted by me my ſelf, That whoever has *one* muſt have *all* the Virtues; why I ſhould ſpeak of 'em ſeparately now, as tho' it were poſſible for a Man to have Prudence, without having Juſtice at the ſame time. I anſwer, That the Way of Expreſſion is highly different, according to the difference of the Subjects we are treating of; whether they are ſuch as require a Niceneſs and Subtilty in handling, or be ſuited to the Capacities of ordinary People. I do but ſpeak here with the Vulgar therefore, when I call one Man *Couragious*, another *Juſt*, and a third *Prudent*; for in treating upon a Subject which concerns the People, we muſt make uſe of common and ordinary Expreſſions; which is what has been done by *Panetius* himſelf ——. But to return to our Purpoſe: [b] Of the three Ingredients, which we ſaid were requir'd

[a] In the former Chapter he mention'd *Prudence* and *Juſtice* as ſeparate from one another, whereupon 'tis objected, That he talks Unphiloſophically; all the Philoſophers (and himſelf too) having maintain'd, that the Virtues are all connected and link'd together, and can't be ſeparated from one another. This Objection, with his Anſwer to it, occaſions this ſhort Digreſſion. *See Note* [c] *on chap.* 5. *Book* 1.

[b] He has ſhewn how the two firſt Ingredients of true Glory, *viz.* the *Love* and *Confidence* of the Multitude, are to be obtain'd: here he proceeds to the third, *Their Admiring*, &c.

[c] The

quir'd to the making up of Glory; the third was this, That Men ſhould Admire and Value us ſo, as to think we are Perſons that really deſerve Honour. [c] Now generally ſpeaking they are apt to *Admire* whatever they ſee Great, and beyond their Apprehenſions; and likewiſe in particulars, if they diſcover any Excellency, which they never expected. They Admire thoſe therefore, and extol 'em ev'n to the Skies, in whom (as they think) they have found any rare and extraodinary Qualities: But as for thoſe others, who have neither Virtue, Spirit, nor Courage in them, theſe Men they wholly deſpiſe and ſet light by. For they can't be ſaid to *deſpiſe* all thoſe, of whom they entertain but *an Ill Opinion*. They're *far from thinking well* of your roguiſh backbiting, cozening ſort of Fellows, who are never unprepar'd for the doing Man an Injury: but by no means [d] *deſpiſe* 'em for all that; their Contempt (as was ſaid) lighting only upon thoſe, who neither do Good to themſelves, nor others (as we commonly ſpeak;) that is, who ſpend all their Lives in meer Idleneſs and Sloth, without ever minding or taking care of any thing. [e] Thoſe, who are eſteem'd to excel in Virtue, more eſpecially draw Men to Wonder and Admiration; who keep themſelves free, as from all other things that are Baſe and Unbecoming, ſo more eſpecially from thoſe ſorts of Vices, which the reſt of Mankind can't ſo eaſily ſtand againſt. *Pleaſures*, for inſtance, are very alluring and charming Miſtreſſes, which are apt to enſnare the better part of the

[c] The Extraordinarineſs of any thing, the firſt Cauſe of Mens Admiration.

[d] But rather are afraid of 'em, leſt they ſhould do 'em ſome Injury, or other.

[e] A more particular Cauſe of Admiration, is extraordinary Virtue: eſpecially reſiſting *Pleaſure* and *Pain*, which moſt Men are apt to be conquer'd by: which is Courage or Greatneſs of Soul.

the Soul, and entice it aſide from the Paths of Virtue; and *Pain* on the contrary racks and torments us, ſo that the dread of it carries moſt Men beyond the Bounds of Reaſon. Thus again, when *Life* and *Death*, *Riches* and *Poverty*, are the things in queſtion, there are very few Men but are wholly tranſported with *deſire* of the one, and *abhorrence* of the other. When a Man therefore has got ſuch a great and exalted Soul, as that he can look upon all theſe with Indifference; and cloſely purſues and adheres to Honeſty, in whatever Shape ſhe preſents her ſelf; then 'tis that Virtue appears with ſuch a Brightneſs, as that all the whole World muſt admire her Beauties.

CHAP. XI.

Juſtice, and a Contempt of Riches, are eſpecially Cauſes of Mens Admiration. Juſtice alone procures all the three things, which make up Glory; and how. 'Tis a neceſſary Virtue for all ſorts of People. Even Robbers and Pyrates can't ſubſiſt without it. Some Examples to this Purpoſe.

SUch a Conſtitution of Soul therefore, as can make a Man deſpiſe all [a] theſe Goods or Evils, begets him a mighty Eſteem and Admiration: But eſpecially *Juſtice* (which ſingle Virtue ſerves to give Men the Name and Denomination of *Good*) ſeems much the moſt admirable to the generality of People. And not without Reaſon; it being [b] impoſſible

[a] Thoſe mention'd in the laſt Chapter, Pleaſure and Pain, Riches and Poverty, *&c.*

[b] For 'tis but clapping a Piſtol, or the like, to ſuch a Man's Breaſt, and he'll betray his Friend or Country, break his Word,

poſſible for any one to be Juſt, who is afraid at the approaches of Death, of Pain, of Baniſhment or Poverty; or prefers [c] thoſe things, which are contrary to theſe, before the great Duties of Juſtice and Honeſty. And more particularly yet, Men admire thoſe, whom they find unconcern'd as to the matter of *Money*; and count them try'd, as it were like Gold in the Fire, who have been able to withſtand the Temptations of it. Juſtice therefore of it ſelf is ſufficient to procure thoſe three things that are requiſite to Glory: In the *firſt* place, The Love and Good-will of the People; becauſe of the [d] Kindneſſes it ſhews to very many. *Secondly*, Their Confidence. And *Thirdly*, Their Admiration, both for the ſame Reaſon, *viz.* Becauſe it neglects and deſpiſes thoſe things, which the reſt of Men purſue with ſuch Eagerneſs and Paſſion. [e] Now, in my Opinion, not only the being in a publick Station, but every Method of Living whatever, requires the Helps and Aſſiſtances of Men; as for other Deſigns, ſo particularly for this, that we may have ſome familiar Friends to converſe with; which 'tis no eaſie matter for a Man to obtain, without at leaſt the Shew and Reputation of Honeſty. From hence it follows, That 'tis neceſſary even for thoſe Men themſelves, who have withdrawn

Word, or any thing in the World, rather than looſe his belov'd Life; and conſequently can't be reſolutely Juſt.

[c] *Viz.* Life, Pleaſure, Riches, *&c.*

[d] He takes Juſtice in the larger Sence here, ſo as to comprehend Bounty and Liberality. *See Note* [a] *on chap.* 7. *Book* 1.

[e] Having ſhewn how neceſſary Juſtice is, for thoſe who live in the Eye of the World, and endeavour to get true and perfect Glory; he's now going to ſhew, That 'tis neceſſary *alſo* for all ſorts of Men, *viz.* Thoſe of Privacy and Retirement; thoſe of Trade and Commerce in the World; nay for even Thieves and Pirates.

[f] A

drawn from the World, and choſen the Quiet and Retirements of the Country, to be reputed at leaſt Men of Honeſty and Integrity: and that ſo much the more, becauſe otherwiſe they'll certainly be counted Diſhoneſt; and then, having nothing of Guard or Defence, they muſt needs be expos'd to perpetual Injuries. The ſame Juſtice alſo is neceſſary for thoſe (if ever they hope to ſucceed in their Buſineſs) who Buy, Sell, Letr, Hire, and are concern'd in the Commerce and Affairs of the World: Nay 'tis a thing of ſuch powerful Moment and univerſal Influence, as that thoſe who live only upon Villanies and Wickedneſs, can never ſubſiſt without ſomething of Juſtice: For ſhould any Thief ſteal from another that belong'd to the ſame Confederacy, he'd immediately be expell'd, as unfit to be a Member even of a Society of Robbers; and ſhould the Leader himſelf not diſtribute their Booty, according to the Meaſures of Juſtice and Honeſty, he'd either be murther'd or deſerted by his Company: Nay 'tis ſaid that your Robbers have ſome certain Statutes, which they are all of 'em bound to obſerve amongſt themſelves. [f] *Theopompus* tells us of a certain Rogue, one [g] *Bardylis* an *Illyrian*, that got a great Power by the fame of his Juſtice in dividing the Prey: and [h] *Viriatus* the *Luſitanian*, got a much greater, to whom even ſome of our Armies and

[f] A famous *Greek* Hiſtorian, born in the Iſle *Chios*, and Schollar of *Iſocrates*, who us'd to ſay, That he was forc'd to uſe a Spurr to *Ephorus*, and a Bridle to *Theopompus*. He is highly commended by ſeveral of the Ancients. *Corn. Nepos* accuſes him of Ill-nature in his Characters of Men. He left ſeveral Works, which are loſt.

[g] He was afterwards conquer'd by *Phillip*, Son of *Amyntas*, King of *Macedonia*. *Pyrrhus* the famous King of *Epirus* Married his Daughter.

[h] A Man of very great Cunning and Valour; he was firſt a Huntſman, afterwards a General of a formidable Army. *See* Florus, Paterc. *&c.*

and [i] Generals were forc'd to yield; till at last he was conquer'd by that [k] *Caius Lælius*, who was sirnam'd the *Wise*, in the time of his Prætorship; who brought down his Courage and Fierceness so low, as to render the War easie for those that came after him. If Justice then be of so great Efficacy, as that it can raise and support even Pirates; of what mighty Force must we suppose it to be, in the midst of Laws, and in a well-constituted Republick?

[i] C. *Plautius* and *M. Vitellius*, or (as others say) *Claudius Unimanus*, the Prætors. At last *Servilius Cæpio* got him treacherously murther'd.

[k] The same, whom he brings in speaking in his Book *De Amicitia*.

CHAP. XII.

What made Men at first choose Kings, and make Laws. The justest Men usually made Kings; and why. How to make use of the Glory he hath been discoursing of. An excellent Rule of Socrates's. *Glory must be founded upon solid Virtue. Whatever is Counterfeit will sometime be discover'd.*

[a] 'TWas for the sake of enjoying the Benefits of *this Justice* (the great Use of which we have now been discoursing of) that the *Medes* heretofore, as we are told by [b] *Herodotus*, and I am apt to imagin our own Ancestors too, chose always the honestest Per-

[a] He still goes on in his Commendation of Justice, and tells us, That Kings heretofore were chosen according to their Characters for Justice and Integrity.

[b] The first of any great note among the *Greek* Historians, very well known by his Works, which are still extant in nine Books; which for their Sweetness and Elegance are deservedly call'd by the names of the Nine Muses.

[c] His

Perſons for their Kings. For the poorer ſort of People, being oppreſs'd by the richer, had recourſe to ſome one of remakable Virtue, to ſave and protect 'em from Violence and Injuries: who conſtituting Meaſures of Equity and Juſtice, bound the greateſt to obſerve 'em as well as the meaneſt. And that which was the reaſon for their chooſing Kings, in like manner put them upon enacting Laws: For Men have always deſired to enjoy ſuch a Right, as all ſorts of 'em might have an equal Share in (for otherwiſe indeed 'twould be no *Right* at all) which when they *could* get by the Juſtice and Honeſty of ſome one Perſon, they were contented with him, and never look'd any further; but when they *could not*, they were put upon a neceſſity of inventing Laws, which could never be partial, but uſe the ſame Language to all Ranks and Conditions. 'Tis very plain therefore, that thoſe Men were uſually choſen to be Kings, who were counted by the People Men of Honeſty and Integrity: but if they were held Prudent and Wiſe withal, the People thought there was nothing they might not obtain by their Conduct and Management. By all means therefore let us conſtantly follow, and ſtick cloſe to Juſtice; as for its own ſake, (for otherwiſe indeed 'twill not be properly *Juſtice*) ſo for the increaſe of our Honour and Reputation. [c] Now as 'tis not ſufficient for a Man to get Riches, unleſs he has the Wiſdom to diſpoſe of 'em ſo, as

[c] He has ſhewn what theſe Virtues are, which make the People *Love*, &c. But as 'tis not enough for a Man to get Riches, unleſs he knows how to make uſe of 'em too: So, after we have gotten the Virtues he has mention'd, the next thing that comes to be conſider'd is, How we ſhould uſe 'em, ſo as to be remarkable in the World; and let People ſee, by our Practice and Exerciſe in ſome ſort of Life, that we are ſuch Perſons, as deſerve their *Love*, *Confidence* and *Admiration*. For theſe Virtues themſelves are only the Ground-work or Foun-

as thereby to furniſh out all his Expences; not only thoſe of his bare Neceſſities, but thoſe of his Bounty and Liberality too: So neither is it enough for a Man to get [d] Glory, unleſs he knows how to make Uſe of it with diſcretion: Tho' what *Socrates* ſays is very excellent to this purpoſe, *That the readieſt Way, and, as it were, ſhorteſt Cut, to arrive at* [e] *Glory, is* really to be, *what one deſires* to be accounted. Thoſe People therefore are highly miſtaken, who think of obtaining a ſolid Reputation, by vain Shews and hypocritical Pretences; by compos'd Countenances and ſtudied Forms of Words: for true Glory takes deep rooting, and grows and flouriſhes more and more; but *that* which is only in Shew and meer Outſide, quickly decays and withers like Flowers; nor can any thing be laſting that is only Counterfeit. I might bring a great many pregnant Examples for the proof of theſe Aſſertions; but, for brevity ſake, I ſhall content my ſelf with thoſe of but one ſingle Family. [f] *Tiberius Gracchus*, the Son of *Publius*, will always be Prais'd and had in Admiration, as long as there ſhall any Memori-

als

Foundations, as it were, of perfect Glory; and we know Foundations are laid in the Earth, and require ſomething elſe to be Built upon 'em, before they are taken notice of in the Eye of the World. Here he puts in, by way of Caution, a Saying of *Socrates*, That we make ſure in the firſt place, that we *really* are ſuch, *&c.*

[d] By *Glory* here he underſtands the Virtues of *Juſtice*, &c. which he has juſt been diſcourſing of, as the Foundations of true Glory.

[e] Outward Glory, not the Virtues themſelves.

[f] A Noble, Wiſe and Valiant *Roman*, who was twice Conſ. and as often triumph'd; and at laſt was made Cenſor, in which Office by his Wiſdom and Prudence he ſav'd the Republick. [*See* Cic. de Orat. 1. 9.] He marry'd *Cornelia*, the Daughter of the Elder *Africanus*, by whom he had the two *Gracchi*.

[g] *Tib.*

ls remain of the *Roman* Atchievements: But his [s] Sons, on the contrary, were not in their Lives-time approv'd of by good Men; and ſince their Deceaſe have been number'd among thoſe, who were juſtly Slain.

[s] *Tib.* and *Caius Gracchus*, two eloquent and ingenious young Men: but for attempting to make Laws pernicious to the State, about equally dividing Lands, *&c.* they were both Slain; the former by *Scipio Naſica*, and the latter by *Opimius* the Coſ. *See* Paterc. *Book* 2. *ch.* 2, 3, 6, 7. *and their Lives in* Plut.

CHAP. XIII.

What young Men ſhould do to make 'emſelves Known, and taken Notice of in the World. Courage in War the firſt thing that ſets off young Men. Another, Temperance, Sobriety, &c. Keeping often Company with Wiſe and Good Men another thing that very much Recommends them.

'Tis the Buſineſs therefore of thoſe, who deſire to get true Glory, ſtrictly to diſcharge all the Duties of Juſtice: what thoſe are we have ſhewn already in the former Book. I ſhall now proceed to lay down ſome Directions, [a] How a Man ſhould do to appear before the World what he is in himſelf; tho' that of *Socrates* is certainly the wiſeſt that can poſſibly be given, *To make ſure in the firſt place, that*

[a] His Deſign is to ſhew, What Methods a young Man, who is juſt coming into the World (ſuppoſing he has laid a Foundation of Virtue) had beſt enter upon, that he may make himſelf Known, and taken Notice of among his Citizens, that ſo his Virtues mayn't lye hid and conceal'd. In order to which he diſtinguiſhes young Men, into thoſe who are remarkable already upon their Anceſtors account, *&c.* and thoſe

that he really *be in himself, that which he desires to* appear *before the World.* For when a young Gentleman is just come into the Publick, and is already known and remarkable in it; either by the Fame of his Father's Actions (which I think, Son *Marcus*, may be your Case;) or by any other Means or Accident whatever; the Eyes of all are immediately upon him, and every one's enquiring after what he does, and how he steers his Life; and, as tho' he were set in the publick View, so none of his Actions, or so much as his Words can be long kept in secret. But those, who at the beginning and entrance of their Lives, by reason of their Meanness, are unknown to the World; as soon as ever they come up to years of Discretion, should set before their Eyes the most honourable Places, and bend all their Studies and honest Endeavours toward the obtaining of 'em: which they ought to do with so much the more boldness, because Men are so far from envying Youth, that they rather encourage and forward 'em in their Progress. The [b] first thing then, that sets a young Man off, and recommends him to the Publick, is Courage and Bravery in Martial Affairs; by which a great many amongst our Forefathers, who were scarce ever wholly disengag'd from Wars, very nobly distinguish'd and signaliz'd themselves. But you, my Son, have had the misfortune to light upon the times of a Civil War, wherein the [c] one Party was wicked and detestable, and the [d] other unfortunate and unsuccessful:

those who are unknown and obscure. They must both take to some honourable Way of Life, so as to signalize their Valour, Honesty, *&c.*

[b] Courage in the Wars, the first thing that makes a young Man become Remarkable.

[c] That of *Julius Cæsar.*

[d] That of *Pompey* the Great.

[e] Each

ful: In which however, when *Pompey* had giv'n you the Command of [e] one Wing, you got much Praiſe from that great Commander and all his Army, by your riding, darting and patiently abiding all the Fatigues of War. But as for this piece of your riſing Glory, *that*, and the whole Conſtitution of the Republick, are both of 'em fall'n to the ground together. But I never deſign'd ſo to model this Diſcourſe, as that it ſhould be proper for none but you; but as that it might be applicable to all Men in general: I ſhall go on therefore to the remaining part of it. As then in all things the Funct'ons of the Soul are more noble and excellent than thoſe of the Body; ſo the Effects of our Reaſon and Underſtanding are greater, and more powerful as to this Particular, than thoſe of meer Strength. [f] Now of theſe there is none that can more recommend and adorn a young Man, than Temperance and Sobriety, Duty and Reſpect to his natural Parents, Love and Good-nature towards his Friends and Relations. [g] Another good Way for young People to get Known, and have a good Reputation, is often to attend on ſome Great and Wiſe Men, who are thought to deſign for the Good of the Publick: For when they're obſerv'd to be frequently with ſuch, the People are preſently apt to imagin, that they'll be like thoſe Men, whom they chooſe for their Patterns Thus [h] *Pub. Rutilius*, when he

[e] Each Body of Foot conſiſting of two Legions, had two Troops of Horſe to ſupport it, one on the right and t'other on the left. *Cicero*'s Son commanded one of theſe, being call'd *Wings*.

[f] Of the Virtues that don't require Strength of Body, Temperance, *&c.* moſt recommend a young Man.

[g] A third thing that recommends young Men is, keeping frequent Company with thoſe that are Wiſe, and Lovers of their Country.

[h] *P. Rutilius Rufus*, a noble *Roman*, Coſ. together with *Cn.*

he was young, had the general Vogue of a very honeſt Man, and an able Lawyer, becauſe he frequented the Houſe of [i] *Mutius*. As for [k] *Craſſus*, whilſt he was very young, he was not beholden to any one elſe, but obtain'd of himſelf everlaſting Honour, by undertaking that [l] noble and glorious Accuſation: when at that term of Years, wherein others are commended if they begin but to Study and Exerciſe the Art; (as we have it recorded of the famous *Demoſthenes*) at that Age, I ſay, did *Craſſus* make it appear, that he could perform *that* laudably in the open Courts of Juſtice, which he might without diſparagement have been Studying at home.

Cn. Mallius. He was Schollar of *Panætius*, [*See Book* 3. *chap.* 3.] a great lover of Learning, and very well skill'd in Philoſophy and the Civil Laws. *Cicero* in his firſt Book *de Oratore* calls him, *Exemplum innocentiæ*: and *Vell. Paterc.* Book 2. chap. 13. *Virum non ſui tantum ſeculi, ſed omnis ævi optimum.* However he was accus'd by the Malice of ſome Men, and condemn'd of Extortion, and accordingly Baniſh'd. *Of which ſee the fore-cited places.*

[i] *P. Mutius Scævola*, a noble *Roman*, famous for his Knowledge of the Civil Laws, and withal an eloquent Speaker; therefore call'd by our Author, *Juriſperitorum diſertiſſimus.* He was Coſ. with *Calpurnius Piſo*, about the Year of *Rome* 620, when *Tib. Gracchus* rais'd his Sedition: and afterwards made *Pontifex maximus.*

[k] *Lucius Craſſus*, the famous Orator, whom he mention'd *Book* 1. *chap.* 30.

[l] Of *C. Carbo* a very eloquent Man, who had been Tribune and Conſul; whom *Craſſus*, at the Age of nineteen Years, (when others begin but to ſtudy Eloquence) publickly accus'd and got condemn'd, ſo that he poyſon'd himſelf.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIV.

Diſcourſe of two ſorts. Affability very powerful to obtain Mens Love, &c. But Eloquence much more. Several Occaſions of ſhewing a Man's Eloquence. To Defend more Laudable than to Accuſe; but the latter in ſome caſes Honourable enough. Several Examples of brave Accuſations. 'Tis lawful in ſome caſes to Defend the really Guilty; but never to Accuſe the Innocent. The Judges and Advocates Duties. Defending the Accus'd, eſpecially honourable, when 'tis againſt ſome powerful Oppreſſor.

BUT [a] of Speaking or Diſcourſe there are two ſorts; the one proper only for common Converſation, the other for Pleadings and Debates in the Publick. Of theſe two the latter, which is what we call Eloquence, is apparently moſt powerful towards the procurement of Glory; [b] but yet 'tis unexpreſſible of what Influence Courteſie and Affability are, in the buſineſs of obtaining Mens Love and Affections. There are extant Letters of [c] *Philip* to *Alexander*, [d] *Antipater* to *Caſſander*, and [e] *Antigonus* to *Philip*; in

[a] Having ended the laſt Chapter with *Craſſus*'s Accuſation of *Carbo*, and the Credit he got by it: this eaſily brings him to another thing, that recommends young Men, and makes 'em be taken notice of, *viz. Their Diſcourſe*. This he divides into two ſorts, and ſpeaks upon 'em ſeverally.

[b] Of the firſt ſort of Diſcourſe, *viz.* That of common Converſation; and its Power.

[c] Son of *Amyntas*, Father of *Alexander* the Great.

[d] A Soldier of *Philip*'s, left Governour of *Macedonia* by *Alexander*, when he invaded *Perſia*: At laſt he Poyſon'd *Alexander*, by his Son *Caſſander*'s means. *See* Quint. Curtius.

[e] A King of *Macedonia*, not Father, but only *firſt* Guardian, and *afterwards* Father-in-law to *Philip*, who was Son of *Demetrius*, King of *Macedonia* and *Epirus*.

[f] The

in which theſe moſt *Wiſe* and *Prudent* Princes (for *ſuch* we are told they really were) adviſe each his Son to ſpeak kindly to the *Multitude*, and try to win the Hearts of both *them*, and the Soldiers, by gentle Words and familiar Appellations. [f] But that other Diſcourſe, which is proper for Pleadings and Harangues in Publick, does oftentimes move and tranſport the whole Multitude: For when a Man ſpeaks to 'em plauſibly and fluently, they are preſently rapt in a ſtrange Admiration, and can't but conclude, as ſoon as ever they hear him, that he's wiſer and more knowing than the reſt of Men are. But if there be Modeſty joyn'd with the Power and Weight of his Eloquence, there's nothing in the World can more raiſe their Admiration; and eſpecially too, if he be a young Man that ſpeaks. Now the Subjects and Occaſions, that ſtand in need of Eloquence, are more than one; and ſeveral young Gentlemen, in our own Republick, have made 'emſelves eminent in ſeveral of 'em: ſome, for Example, by ſpeaking in the Senate-houſe, and others by pleading in the Courts of Juſtice. Of theſe Ways the latter is moſt fruitful of Admiration, the Duties of which are only two, *Defending* and *Accuſing*. 'Tis much more commendable to Defend than to Accuſe; however this *latter* has oftentimes brought Men a conſiderable Reputation. We mention'd the Example of *Craſſus* but juſt now, [g] *Marcus Antonius*, when he was a young Man, did the ſame

[f] The ſecond ſort of Diſcourſe, *viz.* Eloquence: of which he ſpeaks pretty largely, and gives ſome Rules about Accuſations, relating to their Lawfulneſs, Frequency, *&c.*

[g] Grandfather to *Mark Anthony* the *Triumvir*; whom he brings in ſpeaking in his *de Oratore*; a very eloquent Perſon, as appears from the great Praiſes he there gives him. He was Cos. and Cenſor, call'd by *V. Paterc. Princeps Civitatis & Eloquentiæ*. He was afterwards kill'd by the Command

ſame; and nothing got [h] *Sulpitius* ſo much Credit for his Eloquence, as his brave Accuſation of *Caius Norbanus*, a very ſeditious and troubleſome Citizen. This nevertheleſs muſt be done but ſeldom, or indeed never, unleſs it be undertaken on the behalf of the Republick, as 'twas by thoſe three whom I juſt now mention'd: Or ſecondly, upon the account of ſome Injury receiv'd, as by the two [i] *Luculluſes*; or elſe for the ſake of thoſe under our Protection, as was formerly done by [k] my ſelf for the *Sicilians*; and by [l] *Julius* for the *Sardians* againſt *Marcus Albutius*: in like manner [m] *Fuſius* made his Induſtry be taken notice of, by his accuſing of *Aquilius*. Once then or ſo, 'tis allowable enough; but by no means often. However, ſhould the Commonwealth call a Man to it, he may do it oftner upon her account; it being no Diſgrace to be often employ'd in taking Vengeance on her Enemies. Yet, even in this Caſe, 'tis ſtill the beſt way to be Moderate and Cautious: For he ſhews himſelf a Man of a very unnatural and mercileſs Temper (or rather indeed not a Man at all, but a Savage Monſter) who can endure to make it his Buſineſs and Employment, to bring

mand of *Martus* and *Cinna*. The Perſon, by whoſe Accuſation he gain'd this Credit, was *Cn. Papirius Carbo*.

[h] One of the Interlocutors in his *de Oratore*, and there commended for an excellent Speaker. He accus'd *Norbanus*, whom *Anthony* defended. [*See* de Orat. 2. 28.] He was Tribune of the People, and joyning with *Marius* againſt *Sylla*, was ſlain by *Sylla*'s Order. *Vell. Paterc.*

[i] *Lucius* and *Marcus*, who accus'd *Servilius* the Augur, becauſe he before had accus'd their Father.

[k] In his Orations againſt *Verres*.

[l] I have follow'd the Correction of *Langius*, *Manut.* &c. who would have it read *Pro* Sardis *in* or *Contra Albutium* Julius. *Vid.* Ed. Grævii.

[m] He mentions this Accuſation in his *Brutus*, where he ſays *Fuſius* got a great deal of Credit by it. *Anthony* the famous Orator defended *Aquilius*, and to move the Judges to

bring many People into danger of their Lives: Beſide that 'tis dangerous to the Perſon himſelf too; and not only ſo, but ev'n ſcandalous and ſhameful, to get himſelf the odious Name of *An Accuſer*: which of late was the Fortune [n] of *Marcus Brutus*, a Perſon that was ſprung of a noble Family, and Son of that *Brutus*, who was ſo particularly fam'd for his Skill in the Civil Laws. 'Tis another Rule of Duty more eſpecially to be taken notice of, and which can't be broken without manifeſt Villany, *Never to bring an innocent Perſon into Danger*. For ſince kind Nature has given us Eloquence, to ſerve for the Good and Preſervation of all Men; what can be more, either Wicked, or Inhuman, than to turn it to the Ruin and Deſtruction of the [o] beſt of 'em? 'Tis our Duty then, never to accuſe the Innocent: but we need not, on the other hand, make any Conſcience, of ſpeaking ſometimes in behalf of the Guilty, provided he ben't wholly Villanous and Abominable. For this is no more, than what the People deſires, than what Cuſtom authorizes, and the common Bowels of Humanity encline us to. 'Tis the Duty of a *Judge*, to endeavour after nothing but the real Truth; but an *Advocate* ſometimes may ſpeak up for that, which carries no more than an outward Appearance of it: Which, I think, I ſhould hardly have ventur'd to ſay, (eſpecially in Writing a Philoſophical Diſcourſe) but that I perceive 'twas the

Pity, pull'd open his Cloaths, and ſhew'd them his honourable Wounds in his Breaſt. *Aquilius* was Coſ. with *Marius*, *An. Urb. Cond.* 652. and accus'd of Bribery or Extortion. *Multis avaritiæ criminibus, teſtimoniiſq; convictus*, Cic. Orat. pro Flac.

[n] He mentions both Father and Son in his *de Oratore*, the one for an excellent Lawyer, who wrote ſeveral Books; and the Son for a looſe Debauchee. And in his *Brutus* he calls the Father an excellent Man, and very skilful of the Law; but the Son a Diſgrace to his Family, *&c.*

[o] *Viz.* Thoſe that are innocent.

[p] 'Tis

the Opinion of *Panætius*, a Perſon of as great and conſiderable Authority, as any among the *Stoicks*. But *Defending* is that, which brings the largeſt Returns both of Glory and Intereſt; eſpecially if one happen to be Aſſiſtant to thoſe, who ſeem Injur'd and Oppreſs'd by the Power of ſome Great One. This was my Fortune, as a great many times, ſo more eſpecially in my younger Days; when I ſtood in Defence of *Roſcius Amerinus*, againſt all the Greatneſs and Authority of *Sylla*: and you know the Oration, which I then ſpoke, is [p] at this time extant.

[p] 'Tis the ſecond of his Orations as now printed.

CHAP. XV.

Two ſorts of Liberality. Better to help Men by our Labour and Induſtry, than by our Money. Phillip's *Reproof to his Son* Alexander *to this purpoſe. The Inconveniencies of the ſecond ſort of Liberality. Meaſures to be obſerved in it.*

[q] HAving given this Account of the particular Duties, which young Men muſt do for the attainment of Glory; we are next to diſcourſe of Beneficence or Liberality. Of this there are two ſorts; the one of which conſiſts in obliging thoſe, who

[q] *Chap.* 6. he laid down ſix things, as Reaſons or Motives of Mens being profitable to us: Of theſe he rejected *Fear*, as a very dangerous and inconvenient one. *Good-will*, *Honour* or *Admiration*, and *Confidence*, all which three go to make up true Glory, he hath already diſcours'd of, and ſhewn by what Virtues they are to be obtain'd. There remain therefore only two more, *viz. Hope*, when Princes, *&c.* promiſe great Donations; and *Hire*, when Money is given.

who need it by our *Labour and Induſtry*; the other, by our *Money*. The latter of theſe two is much the more eaſie, eſpecially for thoſe who have plentiful Fortunes; but the former, on the other hand, more glorious and magnificent, and more ſuitable to the Character of a brave and exalted Soul. For tho' there's a Good-will, and generous Readineſs to oblige ſhewn in either; yet in the one Caſe we are beholden to the *Cheſt*, in the other to the *Virtues* and Abilities of the Perſon. Beſides, thoſe ſort of Kindneſſes, which are done by the Aſſiſtance of Money or the like, within a ſhort ſpace of time, draw their own Fountain dry; ſo that this Liberality doth, as 'twere, eat out its own Bowels, and the more you have formerly oblig'd in this kind, the fewer you'll be able to oblige for the future. But now, on the other hand, he whoſe Generoſity ſhews it ſelf in Labour, that is, in Virtue and being Active for another's good, the more Men he hath formerly ſhewn himſelf kind to, the more he'll have ready to aſſiſt him ever after: beſide that by the Cuſtom of doing good Offices, he gets a kind of Habit, and grows much more expert in the Art of Obliging. *Philip* the Father of *Alexander* the Great, reproves his Son ſharply in one of his Epiſtles, for endeavouring to purchaſe the Good-will of the *Macedonians*, by giving 'em Donations; *In* the name of Wonder, *ſays he*, what reaſon could you have, to hope that thoſe People would ever be faithful to you, whom you your ſelf had *Corrupted* with Money? 'What! do 'you deſign to be thought not the King, but only 'the *Steward* and *Purſe-bearer* of the *Macedonians*? That

Both theſe he comprehends here under *Beneficence* or *Liberality*, and ſhews *what* ſort of Donations are uſeful, and in *what* Meaſure, and in *what* particular Caſes, *&c.* And firſt he divides *Beneficence* into two ſorts, of which he prefers the former for ſeveral Reaſons.

The

That *Steward* and *Purſe-bearer* is admirably well ſaid; becauſe 'tis ſo ſcandalous a Buſineſs for a Prince; and that calling Donations a *Corrupting the People*, is better yet; for thoſe that receive 'em are perpetually the worſe for it, and only made readier to expect the ſame again. *Philip* writ this to his Son alone, but it may ſerve for a Direction to all Men in general. I think we may take it for granted therefore, that *that* ſort of Bounty, which conſiſts in doing Kindneſſes by our Labour and Induſtry, is more Virtuous and Creditable, can oblige more People, and has more ways of doing it, than that other has. Not but that *ſometimes* a Man ſhould *give*, nor is this ſort of Bounty to be wholly rejected; nay, one ought oftentimes to diſtribute ſome part of one's Money to thoſe, who are well-deſerving Perſons, and ſtand in need of ſuch Aſſiſtance: But ſtill it muſt be done with [b] great Prudence and Moderation. For ſome Men have ſquandered away whole Eſtates by inconſiderately Giving; which is certainly the fooliſheſt thing in the World; for ſo a Man diſables himſelf ever after, from doing of that, [c] which he takes moſt delight in. But the worſt thing is this, that Profuſeneſs in Giving is uſually accompany'd by unjuſt Ways of Getting: For when by this means Men have parted with what's their own, they are forc'd to lay hands upon that which is another's. And by this means they miſs what is their principal Deſign, *viz.* The obtaining Men's Love, by their Bounty and Generoſity; for they get more Hatred from thoſe whom they Injure, than Good-will from thoſe whom they hop'd to Oblige by it. We ought not therefore *ſo* to Lock up our Riches, *as* that e-

[b] The word *Diligentia* in this place properly ſignifies, the making a Choice and Diſtinction between Perſons.

[c] *Viz.* Shewing his Bounty and Generoſity in Giving; becauſe he has given away all already.

ven Liberality it self can't open 'em; nor *so* to keep 'em open, *as* if they were common to all Men in general: The best way is, always to observe a due Medium, and give more or less in proportion to our Estates. In fine, we'd do well to remember a Saying, which is now grown so common as to be a Proverb amongst us, *Bounty has got no Bottom:* For how indeed is it possible, there should ever be any end on't, when those, who are us'd to it, look to receive again; and others, from seeing them, are taught to expect the same?

CHAP. XVI.

Two sorts of Givers. How Liberality and Prodigality differ. What the chief Advantage of Riches. Publick Shews to the People very foolish. Several Examples of magnificent Ædiles among the Romans.

[a] OF those who give largely, there are two sorts, the one of which are *Prodigal*, and the other *Liberal*. The *Prodigal* are those who consume vast Sums in making publick Feasts, and distributing Portions of Meat to the People: or in providing Gladiators to Fight with one another; or with wild Beasts in the Theatres; or in making Preparation for other such Sports, and Recreations of the Multitude: things that are forgotten in a very short time, if

[a] Having given his Reasons, why the first sort of *Beneficence*, which consists in obliging Men by our *Labour* and *Industry*, is preferable to the second, which does it by *Money*; he begins in this Chap. to discourse of the latter, and divides those that use it (the *Largi* as he speaks) into two sorts, the one *Prodigal*, and the other *Liberal*, in the proper and strict Sence of that Word. He begins with the first, and discourses of it to Chap. 18. where he comes to the second, the Liberal.

[b] The

if ever at all thought on, after once they are over. But the *Liberal* are thoſe, who diſpoſe of their Money in Redeeming poor Priſoners; in helping their Friends and Acquaintance out of Debt; in aſſiſting 'em toward the Marrying their Daughters; or putting 'em into ſome Method of Making, or Encreaſing their Fortunes. I admire therefore, what ſhould come into [b] *Theophraſtus*'s Head, who in a Book of his, which he wrote *concerning Riches*, amongſt ſeveral noble and excellent things, has been guilty of one very greivous Abſurdity: for he runs out mightily in Commendation of Magnificence, and giving publick Shews or Donations to the People; and thinks the Supplying of ſuch Expences as theſe, the very principal Fruit and Advantage of Riches: But in my Opinion 'tis both a much greater, and more durable Advantage, to be furniſh'd with Money for theſe Acts of Bounty, of which I have juſt now been giving ſome Inſtances. But [c] *Ariſtotle*, with much more Reaſon and Judgment, reproves us for not being amaz'd at thoſe Sums, which are daily thrown away to Careſs the People: 'Should 'any one (ſays he) when a City's beſieg'd and re-'duc'd to great Streights, give a large Sum of Mo-'ney for a little Cup of Water; People would won-'der and admire at it ſtrangely, and hardly be per-'ſuaded to believe it at firſt: but afterwards poſſibly, 'upon farther Conſideration, would be ready to par-'don it, becauſe 'twas a Caſe of meer Exigence and 'Ne-

[b] The ſame that he mention'd *Book* 1. *ch.* 1. his Book here mention'd is now quite loſt, but 'tis quoted by *Diogenes Laertius*.

[c] Nothing of this here quoted is to be found in any of the Works of *Ariſtotle* now extant; which makes the learned *Moretus* think, that it ought to be read *Ariſto*, who was a *Stoick* Philoſopher, mention'd by *Seneca* in his 29th *Epiſt.* and who (as we learn from *Plutarch*) wrote a Book upon the Subject of Riches.

'Neceſſity: But yet *we can ſee*, without any thing 'of Admiration, thoſe vaſt Charges and infinite Ex-'pences, which Men put themſelves to for no Rea-'ſon in the World; neither for the Relief of any 'Want or Neceſſity, nor yet for the Encreaſe of their 'Glory and Dignity: And that Pleaſure of the Mul-'titude which is principally aim'd at, is of ſhort 'Continuance; and only tickles and ſooths up the 'Meaneſt of the People, who themſelves will for-'get the Satisfaction they receiv'd, as ſoon as ever 'the Shew and Recreation's at an end. He adds moreover with a great deal of Reaſon, 'That 'Children indeed and ſome trifling Women, toge-'ther with Slaves, and the more ſervile Part of thoſe 'who are free, might perhaps take a Pleaſure in 'ſuch fooliſh kind of Paſtimes: but that Men of 'true Prudence, and thoſe who judge of things 'by the Rules of Reaſon, can by no means either 'commend or approve of 'em. I know 'tis a Cu-ſtom in our Republick, and *has been* from the time of our good Fore-fathers, to expect and demand, even from the ſobereſt Citizens, ſomething that is ſplendid and magnificent in their [d] Ædileſhips. Hence [e] *Publius Craſſus*, who was ſirnam'd *The Wealthy*, and really was ſuch, in his Office of Ædile was very magnificent and noble in his Entertainments: and [f] *Lucius Craſſus*, a little while after, was

[d] An Office in *Rome*, which required their taking care of the publick Buildings, Temples, *&c.* as alſo the publick Games on any ſolemn Occaſion, Plays, and the like. 'Twas uſually counted the firſt Step toward *other* Offices; into which the People choſe Men, according to their good or ill Behaviour in *this*. Hence they uſually ſpar'd no Pains, Charges, *&c.* ſo as they could but pleaſe the Multitude.

[e] A noble *Roman*, ſirnam'd *Mucianus*, becauſe adopted into the Family of the *Craſſi*, from that of the *Mucii*. He was the firſt that gave the People a Fight of Elephants in his Ædile-ſhip. He was afterwards Coſ. and *Pontifex Maximus*.

[f] The famous Orator, mention'd before.

[g] The

was full-out as generous, tho' Collegue of [g] *Mucius* the moſt moderate Man living. Next after theſe came [h] *Caius Claudius*, the Son of *Appius*; and a great many others, *viz.* the [i] *Luculli*, [k] *Hortenſius* and [l] *Silanus*. But [m] *Publius Lentulus*, when I was Coſ. exceeded all others that ever went before him: who was afterwards follow'd and copy'd by [n] *Scaurus*. But of all theſe Shews, that have been given to pleaſe and entertain the People, thoſe of my Friend *Pompey* were the greateſt and moſt magnificent, [o] exhibited when he was the ſecond time Conſul. [p] In all which Caſes 'tis eaſie to ſee what is my Opinion.

[g] The *Augur*, who married the Daughter of the *Wiſe Lælius*: mention'd by our Author in the beginning of his *De Amicitia*.

[h] Sirnam'd *Pulcher*; he firſt had their Scenes in the Theatre painted, whereas before they were bare Boards.

[i] The two Brothers *Luc.* and *Mar.* who were both Ædiles together, and made the Scenes to turn round, and ſo often whereas before they were fixt and unalterable.

[k] The famouſeſt *Roman* Orator next to *Cicero*, and often his Opponent; Conſul ſix Years before him. See his Death excellently lamented at the beginning of our Author's *Brutus*.

[l] *D. Junius Silanus*, who was Conſul next after *Cicero*, with *L. Licinius Muræna*.

[m] Sirnam'd *Spinther*, Coſ. ſix Years after *Cicero*, whom he recall'd from his Baniſhment. To him is written the firſt Book of his Familiar Epiſtles. He was the firſt that wore a Purple Gown double dy'd, and made the *Vela* or Curtains in the Theatre of fine *Cypreſs* Linnen.

[n] He built a noble Theatre, with vaſt Pillars of fine Marble, and was ſo profuſe in his Ædileſhip, that *Pliny* ſays, he utterly ruin'd the *Roman* Moderation, and that *Sylla* did more Harm by encouraging his Prodigalities, than he did by all his Murders and Cruelties.

[o] He brought Lyons, Panthers, and Elephants in vaſt numbers to Fight before the People.

[p] See the latter end of the next Chap.

CHAP. XVII.

Expences to please the People allowable in some Cases; and what they are. Some Examples of laudable ones. Upon what one may best lay out his Money in this kind.

NO Man however should be so far moderate, as to draw upon himself the Suspicion of Avarice. [a] *Mamercus*, a Person of very great Riches, was put by the Consulship for no other Reason, but because he refus'd to be Ædile first. [b] If such things therefore are demanded by the People, and *allow'd* of, tho' perhaps not *desir'd*, by good Men, they must ev'n be perform'd; but so as to keep within the compass of your Estate, as I my self did. Nay, tho' they should not be demanded by the People, yet they might wisely enough be presented 'em, upon a Prospect of gaining some more considerable Advantage by it. Thus [c] *Orestes* of late got a great deal of Credit, by Giving the People a Dinner in the Streets, under the Notion of [d] Paying his Tenths to *Hercules*. Nor did any one ever find fault with *M. Seius*, for selling out Corn at

[a] A Name of the *Emilian* Family. *Mamercus Æmilius Lepidus* was Cos. with *D. Brutus*, *An. U. C.* 676. 'Tis uncertain whether he be meant here, or not.

[b] When, and how far such sorts of Giving are allowable.

[c] A Sirname of the *Aurelian* Family. This is *Cn. Aufidius Orestes*, so call'd because he was adopted by *Cn. Aufidius*, [*Cic. pro domo*, ch. 18.] He was afterwards Cos. with *Corn. Lentulus Scra*, *An. U. C.* 682.

[d] 'Twas a Custom among the *Romans*, upon any great Undertaking, to Vow the Tenth of their Income to some God, to make him prosper 'em in their Undertakings. *Orestes*, under Pretence of Paying this to *Hercules*, gave a great deal of Victuals to all the People in publick, that so he might gain their Favour.

[e] *Clodius*

at an eaſie Rate, in the time of a very great Dearth and Scarcity: for he got himſelf free from a great and inveterate Hatred of the People, by a Coſt, which (conſidering he was at that time Ædile) was neither diſhoneſt, nor yet extraordinary great: But of all my Friend *Milo* got the greateſt Honour, by purchaſing Gladiators for the Defence of the Publick, which was wholly included in my ſingle Safety, and thereby defeating the mad and pernicious Attempts of [e] *Clodius*. Such Charges therefore are not to be ſhun'd, when either they are *neceſſary* or *very advantagious*: but even when they are ſo, we muſt ſtill not exceed the due Limits of *Mediocrity*. *Luc. Philippus*, the Son of *Quintus*, an extraordinary ingenious and eminent Man, was wont, I confeſs, to be making his Brags, That he got all the Honours the Republick could give him, without ever ſpending one Farthing that way: [f] *Caius Curio* us'd to ſay the ſame: and even I my ſelf have ſome reaſon to boaſt upon this account: for conſidering the Greatneſs of the Honours I got, and that too by every one of the Votes, and the very firſt Years I was ca-

[e] *Clodius* was a vile and profligate Fellow, a great Enemy to *Cicero*, whom in his Tribuneſhip he got baniſht, [*See* Cicero's *Life in* Plut.] but *Milo*, being Tribune the Year following, endeavour'd to bring back *Cicero* again. *Clodius* violently oppos'd it; and getting together ſome of his own Gang, and a parcel of Gladiators, fell upon the People as they aſſembled about it, and ſlew ſeveral. *Milo*, on the other ſide, bought Gladiators to defend *Cicero*, and in him (as he ſays) the Republick it ſelf. This is that *Milo*, who afterwards kill'd this *Clodius*; for which being accus'd, he was defended by our Author in that incomparable Oration, which is ſtill extant.

[f] An excellent *Roman*, Coſ. with *Cn. Octavius*, the Year of *Rome* 677; a good Man, and a Lover of Virtue, as well as Learning. He was alſo a very good Orator, and is often mention'd by our Author. His Son was that *Curio*, who was Tribune of the People, and the grand Incendiary in the Civil War between *Cæſar* and *Pompey*.

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capable of 'em, (which is more then can be ſaid by any one of thoſe two whom I juſt now mention'd) the Charge of my Ædileſhip was very inconſiderable. But the beſt way of laying out Money in this kind, is to repair the City-walls, make Docks, Havens, Aquæducts and the like; things that may ſerve to the general Uſe, and Advantage of the Publick. For tho' things which are preſent, and given down upon the nail, are more acceptable for a Time; yet the Memory of theſe will be more laſting, and continu'd even down to Poſterity. I forbear to ſpeak much againſt Theatres, Portico's, new Temples and the like, out of Reſpect to my old Friend *Pompey*: but I find 'em not approv'd of by the famouſeſt Men; particularly not by *Panætius* himſelf, whom I have very much follow'd, but not quite tranſlated in this Work. Neither are they lik'd by *Demetrius Phalereus*, who blames *Pericles*, one of the greateſt Men amongſt all the *Grecians*, for ſquandring away ſuch [g] a vaſt Sum of Money, upon that noble Structure at the entrance of the *Acropolis*. But I have ſpoken ſufficiently upon all this Subject, in thoſe Books I have written [h] *concerning the Republick*. To conclude therefore, all ſuch Profuſions are *generally ſpeaking* (I think) to be blam'd; but yet at *ſometimes, and upon certain Occaſions*, may be rendred *neceſſary*: However even then they muſt be proportion'd to one's Eſtate, and kept within the Limits of Reaſon and Moderation.

[g] Above two thouſand Talents: This is that entrance to their ancient Tower call'd *Acropolis* and (becauſe under the Protection of *Pallas*) *Glaucopia*, ſo often mention'd by ancient Writers. It had five noble Doors, was cover'd with curious white Stone, and was five Years in building. See *Meurſ. Cecropia*.

[h] This Work was in ten Books: but 'tis now all loſt except ſome few Fragments, of which *Scipio*'s *Dream* is much the largeſt, as making a good part of the ſixth Book.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVIII.

Liberality to be varied according to the Variety of Circumſtances. The Merits of the Receiver eſpecially to be conſider'd. What Acts of Bounty we ſhould more particularly exerciſe. Meaſures to be obſerv'd in Receiving Money. 'Tis profitable ſometimes to part with one's Right. When a Man uſes an Eſtate as he ought. Hoſpitality deſervedly commended.

IN that [a] other ſort of Giving, which proceeds from *Liberality*, we ſhould not keep conſtantly to one certain Meaſure; but vary according to the Variety of Circumſtances in the Perſons that receive. His Caſe (for inſtance) who ſtruggles at preſent under ſome preſſing Neceſſity, is different from his, who is well enough to paſs, and only deſires to improve his Fortune. We ſhould lend our Aſſiſtance in the firſt place to thoſe, who are under the Burden and Weight of ſome Misfortune; unleſs they are ſuch as deſerve to be miſerable: We ſhould be ready however to forward thoſe likewiſe, who deſire only our Helping-hand, not ſo much to ſave 'em from being Unfortunate, as to raiſe 'em to ſome higher Degrees of Fortune. [b] But here we muſt be

[a] He has done with the *firſt* ſort of Giving largely, *viz. Prodigality*; which he thinks generally blamable, but in ſome Caſes excuſable. He comes now to the *Second*, *Liberality*, which is ſeen not only in *Giving*, but in *Receiving* too. He begins with *Giving*; concerning which his firſt Rule is, *That we ſhould conſider the Circumſtances of the Perſon we give to.*

[b] Secondly, In Giving *we ſhould conſider the Perſon's Deſerts*: For Kindneſſes beſtow'd upon thoſe, who don't deſerve, but will make ill uſe of 'em, are indeed no Kindneſſes. We ſhould make honeſt Men the Objects of our Bounty in this kind. [c] Ha-

be careful to acquaint our ſelves thro'ly with the Fitneſs of the Perſons: for that of *Ennius* is admirably well ſaid,

I take good Actions, when ill apply'd, to become ill ones.

Now that which is given to a truly honeſt and grateful Perſon, is paid us in the Acknowledgment he himſelf makes, and in the Good-will that's got by't from the reſt of the World. For nothing's more pleaſing to all Mankind, than Bounty beſtow'd without Raſhneſs and Precipitancy: and the generality of Men praiſe it ſo much the more, becauſe the Liberality of every great Man, is a common kind of Sanctuary for all that are Needy. We ſhould endeavour therefore, as far as we are able, to oblige many Men by ſuch Acts of Generoſity, as may not be forgotten as ſoon as ever they are over; but be remember'd by the Children and Poſterity of the Receivers, in ſuch manner as to lay a Neceſſity upon 'em of ſhewing their Gratitude: I ſay *Neceſſity*; for all People hate one, that takes no care of being grateful to his Benefactors, and count him that is ſuch Injurious to themſelves; becauſe he diſcourages Bounty and Liberality, and ſo is a common Enemy to all the poorer Sort. Beſides, this way of Giving, whereby Captives are ranſom'd, and the meaner Folk enrich'd, is uſeful and advantagious to the Publick it ſelf; and has frequently been practic'd by thoſe of our Order, as appears very fully from the Oration of *Craſſus*. That other way therefore of expending Money, which conſiſts in making Shews for the Entertainment of the Vulgar, ought (I think) by no means to be compar'd with this: The *one* comports well with the Character of a great, and a prudent Perſon; the *other* of ſuch as Cajole the People, and look out for

Plea-

Pleaſures to tickle the Fancies of the unſtable Multitude. [c] And as 'tis a Duty to be generous in Giving, ſo is it not to be too rigorous in Demanding; but in every Tranſaction of Buying, Selling, Letting and Hiring, to behave our ſelves towards our Neighbours and Chapmen, with all the Fairneſs and Courteſie imaginable; to let go ſomething of our ſtrict and juſt Rights, upon certain Occaſions; to avoid all Suits and Contentions at Law, as far as can reaſonably and fairly be expected; perhaps I might add, *And even ſomething farther*; for in ſeveral Caſes to deliver up one's Right, is not only generous, but [d] advantagious too. However a Man ſhould have a decent Regard to his Eſtate and Fortune; for 'tis not over-reputable to let *that* be ruin'd by his Eaſineſs and Neglect; and yet on the other hand ſhould carry himſelf ſo, as to avoid all Suſpition of a ſordid, mean or avaritious Temper. For 'tis then a Man uſes his Money as he ought to do, when he ſhews himſelf liberal, without ruining his Fortune. [e] *Theophraſtus* commends, and with very good Reaſon, another ſort of Bounty, which we call *Hoſpitality*: For there's nothing, in my mind, more handſom and becoming, than conſtantly to have the Houſes of Noble Men open, and ready to entertain all Strangers of Faſhion; and 'tis no ſmall Credit and Reputation to the Publick, that

[c] Having given ſome Rules for the liberal Man's direction in *Giving* or Spending; he proceeds in this place to do the ſame about *Receiving*; in which he would have him *not be too rigorous, but courteous, complying*, &c.

[d] 'Tis no ſmall part of Prudence, to know when to loſe; it hapning ſometimes, and upon ſome Occaſions, that 'tis the beſt way to act againſt one's preſent Intereſt, and by omitting a leſs Advantage, to gain a greater afterwards. *Pecuniam in loco negligere*, ſays *Terence*, *maximum interdum eſt lucrum*.

[e] One particular ſort of Bounty, which he thinks fit juſt to

that Strangers ne're fail to meet with that ſort of Bounty, and Liberality in our City. Beſide that there's nothing can be more uſeful for thoſe, who deſign by honeſt Means to get an Intereſt in the World, than to recommend themſelves to the Eſteem and Good-liking of foreign Nations, by the help of thoſe People whom they thus entertain. *Theophraſtus* tells us of [f] *Cimon* the *Athenian*, that he ſhew'd his Hoſpitality even to all his Brethren of the [g] *Lacian Tribe*; and not only made it his own conſtant Cuſtom, but alſo commanded his Bayliffs the ſame, to keep open Houſe for any one of the *Laciadæ*, that ſhould paſs that way.

to bring in here, is *Hoſpitality*. This he recommends as a thing handſom, and becoming in any City, and advantagious to get a Man Intereſt, and make him known among Strangers.

[f] The Son of *Miltiades*, a famous *Athenian* General, who beat their Enemies both at Sea and Land the ſame Day: He was particularly fam'd for his Bounty and Hoſpitality. See his Life in *Plut.* and *Corn. Nep.*

[g] There were one hundred ſeventy four diſtinct Tribes or Peoples in *Attica*, one of which was call'd the *Lacian*, and the Men who were of it, *Laciadæ*. *Cimon* was one of theſe, and kept conſtantly open Houſe for all thoſe of his Tribe. See *Meurſius de Pop. Attic.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XIX.

The Liberality which consists in doing good Offices for others: Two sorts of it. What sorts of Study afford most Opportunities of it. The Ruin of Civil Law and Eloquence. All Men may do Kindnesses of this Nature if they please. We should be careful of not Offending some, by Obliging others.

[a] I Come now to speak of that other sort of Bounty, which consists not in *Giving*, but in *Labouring* for another's Good; and extends it self as to the Republick in general, so to each Member of the City in particular. [b] The Civil Law principally gives us Opportunities of exercising this: For there's nothing more proper to get a Man Interest and Credit in the World, than the Managing the Law-suits of a great many Persons, the assisting 'em with his Advice, and doing for 'em all that he can by his Knowledge, and Skill in that Learning. And therefore I admire the Wisdom of our Ancestors, as for several Reasons, so particularly for this, that the Knowledge and Interpretation of their excellent Civil Law, was counted a matter of the highest Credit and Reputation among them. This the greatest Men have kept constantly among themselves, till this late sad Disorder and Confusion of every thing: But now the Glory of this sort of Learning, together with all Honours and Degrees of Dignity, is utterly ruin'd and fall'n to just Nothing. And to make

[a] He begins here with the second, and as he thinks [*See Chap.* 15.] much better sort of Beneficence, which consists in doing Kindnesses for others by our Labour and Industry. These Kindnesses may be either done to *particular Persons*, or to the *Republick in general*: and first of the former.

[b] The first thing that puts a Man in a Capacity of serving a great many People, is the Civil Laws; the Knowledge of which he highly commends.

[c] He

make the matter ſtill ſo much the worſe; all this has happen'd in the Days of [c] One, who, as he equall'd in Dignity all that have gone before him, ſo was he far above 'em in the Knowledge of the Laws. This Study then is approv'd of by moſt People, and puts it in one's power to aſſiſt a great many and oblige them by Kindneſſes. [d] There's another ſort of Knowledge near related to this, the Art, I mean, of Perſwaſive Speaking, which carries more Majeſty and Ornament along with it, and is more pleaſing and lik'd of, by the generality of Men. For what is there in the World more extraordinary than Eloquence, whether we conſider the Admiration of its Hearers, the Reliance of thoſe who ſtand in need of its Aſſiſtance, or the Goodwill procur'd by it from thoſe whom it defends? Our Anceſtors therefore held this among the chief of their Civil Profeſſions. Any one then muſt oblige a great many, and have a large number of Clients and Dependants, who is able to ſpeak well, and willing to take pains, and (as [e] 'twas the Cuſtom of our good Fore-fathers) is ready to undertake many Mens Cauſes, without ever expecting to be rewarded for his Trouble. And here I have a fair Opportunity offer'd me, to bemoan the great Downfal, that I mayn't ſay the utter Extinction of Eloquence; but that I am afraid I ſhall ſeem to complain for my own ſake only. However I can't but with ſome Concern take notice, what a great many excellent Orators we have loſt; how few there are ariſing, whom we can expect any thing from; and how much fewer who are able to perform and do any thing; and

[c] He means *Ser. Sulpitius*, one of the moſt eminent among the *Romans* for his Skill in the Civil Laws.

[d] A ſecond thing which enables Men to aſſiſt others this way, is Eloquence.

[e] There was even a Law among the *Romans*, entitul'd, *Cincia de donis & muneribus*, forbidding to take Money, *&c.* for Defending another's Cauſe.

[f] A

and for all that, how many, who are brim full of Impudence and vain Presumption. [f] Now it is not for all, nor indeed very many, to be either skilful Lawyers, or eloquent Pleaders: However there's no one, if he'd make it his Business, but may do friendly Offices to several People; either by begging some Kindnesses for 'em; or by recommending their Cases to the Judges and Officers; or by being Industrious in promoting their Interests; or lastly, by using his Endeavours with those, who either are able Lawyers, or eloquent Orators: which whoever shall do, will make a great many be beholden to him, and get himself a general Interest in the World. [g] There is one thing however I would advertise him of, (tho' I think 'tis so obvious, that I hardly need do it) which is to have a care of offending *some*, whilst he's endeavouring to be serviceable to *others*. For it often comes to pass, that such do a Diskindness, either to *those* whom they ought to have oblig'd; or to *those* who are able to make 'em suffer for it afterwards: Which shews Carelessness and Negligence, if done undesignedly; but if designedly, Rashness and Imprudence. And if it should happen that we are forc'd, tho' unwillingly, to disoblige any Person, we must endeavour to excuse it as well as we are able; by shewing the Necessity we lay under of doing so, and how 'twas utterly impossible for us to avoid it: and must be careful and industrious to repair the Injury, by making some reasonable Amends for it afterwards.

[f] A third Way of doing People Kindnesses is, if we aren't our selves able to manage their Causes, by recommending 'em to the Judges, to those that are skill'd in Law, *&c.*

[g] He puts in a Caution or two about these Rules, *viz.* That whilst we oblige one, we take care not to disoblige others, *&c.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XX.

Men are readier to aſſiſt one that's Wealthy and Great than one that is Poor and Honeſt. Reaſons why they ought to do the contrary. The Evil Effects of Mens Love of Riches. Never to do an Injury to one, for the ſake of Obliging another.

NOw [a] whenever we do a *Kindneſs* or Friendly *Office* to another, we uſually regard one of theſe two Things, *viz.* Either the *Honeſty*, or the *Greatneſs* of the Perſon. 'Tis eaſily ſaid, and every one's ready enough to profeſs, That in placing their Favours, they have much more Reſpect to the *Merits* of the Perſon, than to his Fortune in the World. This is very fairly and honeſtly ſpoken: but yet I'd be glad to be ſhewn that Man, who is more willing to Help one that's Honeſt and Poor, than to get the Favour of one that is Wealthy and Powerful. For who is not readieſt to be ſerviceable to thoſe, from whom he expects the moſt ſpeedy Requital? But People would do well to conſider more throughly the Natures of things: For tho' a poor Man, 'tis true, can't make a Requital, yet if he's honeſt, he will acknowledge the Obligation: And 'twas no unhandſom Saying, whoever was the Author of it, "That in Caſe of a *Debt*, the "Man who *acknowledges* it doth not thereby *pay* it; "and the Man who *pays* it does no longer *acknowledge*

[a] Having ſhewn what thoſe things are, which put us into a Capacity of Helping others, *viz.* Eloquence, Civil Law, *&c.* and lay'd down a Rule or two for our Direction in doing it; he proceeds to enquire, on whom we ought eſpecially to beſtow our Kindneſſes; where he puts the Queſtion, *Whether 'tis better to aſſiſt a Rich and Great, or a Poor and Honeſt Man?* and argues for the latter; becauſe a poor Man will be more grateful, *&c.*

He

"ledge it: But in Case of an *Obligation*, both he "who *returns* it still continues to *acknowledge* it, and "he who *acknowledges* it thereby sufficiently *returns* "it. But now those, on the contrary, who value themselves upon their Riches, Honours and flourishing Condition, will scorn to acknowledge they're oblig'd for any Kindness; nay, will think they vouchsafe you a signal Favour, even whilst you are doing 'em some considerable Service; and will always be jealous and suspicious over you, as tho' you demanded and expected something from 'em: But to have it ever said they were defended by you, or to be number'd among your Dependants or Clients, is as insupportable to 'em as even Death it self. Whereas your *mean Person*, when any one does him a friendly Office, considers 'twas done out of Respect to himself, and not out of Regard to his Fortune or Condition; and endeavours to shew himself sensible of the Obligation, not to him only who has done him the Kindness, but (as standing in need of some other Mens Assistance) to those others also, from whom he hopes for the like. And if he should chance to do another any Service, he does not endeavour to cry up and magnifie it, but rather to lessen it as much as he is able. Another thing worth the considering is this, That if you defend one that's wealthy and powerful, the Obligation remains in the Person himself, or perhaps just his Children; but if you protect one that's needy and forsaken, provided withal he be virtuous and modest, all the lower sort of People immediately that aren't wicked (which is no inconsiderable part of the Multitude) will look upon you as their Safe-guard and Protection. Upon all which Accounts I am wholly of Opinion, That a Kindness is better bestow'd upon *an honest*, than 'tis upon a *wealthy* and *fortunate* Person. We should endeavour, 'tis true,

to

to the utmoſt of our power, to be ſerviceable to all Men of whatſoever Condition: But if their ſhould happen a Competition between 'em, I am clearly for following *Themiſtocles*'s Advice, who being once ask'd, *How he'd Marry his Daughter, whether to one that was Poor, but Honeſt; or to one that was Rich, but of an ill Reputation?* made Anſwer, *I'd rather have a Man without an Eſtate, than have an Eſtate without a Man.* But the mighty Reſpect, which is paid to Riches, has wholly deprav'd and corrupted our Manners. And yet what does it ſignifie to any one of us, that ſuch or ſuch a Perſon has got a plentiful Fortune? Perhaps it may be uſeful to him that has it; tho' not *ſo* neither always: But allowing it to be ſo: Suppoſe he has got the World more at his Command; yet how (I'd fain know) is he ever the honeſter for it? [b] But and if a Man be Honeſt, as well as Wealthy, tho' I would not have him helpt for the ſake of his Riches, yet I would not have him hindred upon their account neither: But in every caſe have it fairly conſider'd, not how Wealthy and Great, but how Good and Deſerving a Perſon he is. [c] I ſhall conclude this Head with only one Rule more, which is, Never for the ſake of doing any one a Kindneſs, to venture upon that which is unjuſt in it ſelf, or injurious to a third Perſon. For no Credit or Eſteem can be ſolid and durable, unleſs built upon the Foundations of Juſtice and Honeſty; without which nothing can be virtuous or commendable.

[b] He gives this by way of Caution, tho' he would not have a Man aſſiſted for being Rich, he would not have his Riches be an hindrance to him neither, provided he be otherwiſe an honeſt and good Man.

[c] The laſt Rule to be obſerv'd in this ſort of Liberality.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXI.

Two ſorts of that Bounty, which relates to the Publick. Nothing to be done for the ſake of the Members in particular, which may any ways damage the Publick in general. The firſt Duty of the Governours of a State, to ſecure each Particular in the Poſſeſſion of his own. Levelling all Eſtates very deſtructive. Why Men firſt built Cities. Not to burden the People with Taxes, a ſecond Duty. A third, To furniſh the People with Neceſſaries. Covetouſneſs in a Governour pernicious to any State. The unhappy Effects of it in the Roman *Empire.*

[1]HAving thus diſcours'd of the one ſort of Kindneſſes, which are done to *particular Members* of the City; we are now in the next place to ſpeak of thoſe others, which are done to *them all*, and to the Commonwealth in general. Now theſe again are of two ſorts, The one more immediately relating to the Community; the other reaching down to each Member in particular; which latter, of the two is more grateful and acceptable. We ſhould ſhew our Beneficence, as far as we are able, in both theſe Ways; but eſpecially in this latter, which relates to each one of the particular Members: In

[1] *Chap.* 19. He divided that Beneficence, which conſiſts in doing Kindneſſes by our Labour, *&c.* into two Parts: He has done with the former, which reſpects *Particulars*, and comes now to the latter, which reſpects the State in *general*. This he again divides into two ſorts, *ſome* terminating in the State, conſider'd abſtractedly by it ſelf; *others* in all the particular Members of it. About the *latter* he immediately gives us one Direction, never to do any thing for the ſake of *Particulars*, which may any ways be prejudicial to the Whole in general. Under the former he comprehends the Duties of thoſe that are Governours, and principal Magiſtrates in the Republick: concerning which he diſcourſes very largely.

In which however one Caution muſt be obſerv'd, That nothing be done in behalf of Particulars, but that which is uſeful, or at leaſt not prejudicial, to the Commonwealth in general. [b] *C. Gracchus*, for Inſtance, made a large Diſtribution of Corn to the People; and the Effect of it was, that the Treaſury was exhauſted by it. [c] *Marcus Octavius* made one that was moderate, which was a Kindneſs to the Multitude, and no ways a Burthen or Grievance to the State; and accordingly both the Publick, and all the Members of the City receiv'd Benefit from it. [d] But the principal thing for a Governour to take care of, is, *That* each Individual be kept in the quiet Poſſeſſion of his own, and *That* private Men ben't [e] diſpoſſeſſed of their Lands, under a Pretence of taking Care of the Publick. For Nothing's more deſtructive to the Peace of any Kingdom, than to bring in a new Diſtribution of Eſtates, which was attempted by [f] *Philip*, in the Time of his Tribuneſhip: However he quickly gave over his Deſign, and did not perſiſt ſtubbornly in Defence of it, as ſoon as he found it was ſo vigorouſly oppos'd: But in his publick Speeches and Harangues to the People, among a great many things to obtain their Favour, he was heard to ſay one of very dangerous Conſequence, That the whole City had not Two Thouſand Men in it, that were Maſters of Eſtates: A very pernicious and

[b] *See ch.* 12. *of this Book.*

[c] He was Tribune of the People together with *Tib. Gracchus*, and reſiſted him very much, in his pernicious Attempts, and was therefore by him depriv'd of his Office. What Action of his our Author here means is uncertain.

[d] The firſt Duty of thoſe, who are Governours of a State, to keep every Man in the peaceful Poſſeſſion of what is his own.

[e] Which would have been done by the two *Gracchi*, by their equal Diſtribution of Lands.

[f] *Luc. Marcius Philippus*, *See ch.* 30. *Book* 3.

and deſperate Saying, directly tending to bring all things to a Level; which is the greateſt Misfortune that can befal any People. For to what end were Cities and Commonwealths eſtabliſh'd, but that every one might be ſafer and ſecurer, in the Enjoyment of his own? For tho' Men by Nature are ſociable Creatures, yet 'twas the Deſire of Preſerving what they had, that firſt put 'em upon building of Cities for a Refuge. [g] 'Tis a *Second* Duty of the Governours of a State, to ſee that the People ben't forc'd to pay Taxes; as they often were in our Fore-fathers time, partly becauſe they were always in War, and partly by reaſon of the Lowneſs of the Treaſury. This is an Inconvenience, which ought, as far as poſſible, to be provided againſt before-hand: But if *any State* ſhould be under ſuch Circumſtances, as that it muſt be forc'd to make uſe of this Expedient, (I ſay *any State*, becauſe I'm unwilling to ſuppoſe ſo unhappy a thing of *our own*; beſide that I ſpeak here of all of 'em in general) but if, I ſay, any State ſhould be brought to ſuch a Pinch, due Care muſt be taken to let the People know, That 'tis abſolutely neceſſary as Affairs now ſtand, and that otherwiſe they muſt needs be inevitably ruin'd. [h] Again, 'Tis yet further requir'd of thoſe Men, who Govern and Preſide in a Commonwealth, to ſee that it be furniſh'd with all the Conveniencies and Neceſſaries of Life. To tell what *theſe* are, and how to be provided, would be altogether needleſs in this place, ſince 'tis ſufficiently known already; I only thought fit juſt to touch upon it by the *Bye*. [i] But in all kinds of Buſineſs, and managing Affairs of

[g] A ſecond Duty of a good Governour, Not to burthen, *&c.*

[h] To provide Neceſſaries for the Support of the People, a third Duty of a Governour.

[i] A fourth Duty is, To be free from even any Suſpicion of Avarice.

of a publick Nature, there's nothing more neceſſary, than always to keep one's ſelf clear and untainted, ſo as not to lye under the leaſt *ſuſpicion of Avarice*. I could heartily wiſh, (ſaid [k] *Caius Pontius* the *Samnite*) that Fortune had reſerv'd me to thoſe Times, and that it had been my fate to be then born, whenever the *Romans* ſhall begin to take Bribes; I ſhould quickly have put an end to their flouriſhing Empire. Truly he muſt have waited a pretty many Ages; for that's a kind of Evil, which but lately has begun to infeſt this Republick. If *Pontius* therefore were ſo great a Man as he pretended to be, I am very well ſatisfy'd with his being born when he was; and not in thoſe times, which have lately happen'd. 'Tis not yet an Hundred and Ten Years ago, ſince [l] *Lucius Piſo* got a Law to be enacted againſt the Corruption of Magiſtrates, whereas there had never been any one before. But ſince that time there have been ſo [m] many Laws, and ſtill ev'ry new one more ſevere than the former; ſo many Perſons accus'd and condemn'd; ſuch [n] a War ſtirr'd up in the Bowels of *Italy*, by thoſe who were afraid of being brought to Puniſhment;

[k] He was the *Samnite* General, when the Peace was made with them at the Paſſage of *Caudium*, to the great Diſgrace and Shame of the *Romans*. *See* Livy, *Book 9. chap.* 1.

[l] *L. Calpurnius Piſo*, the firſt of thoſe who were ſirnam'd *Frugi*, Tribune of the People when *Cenſorinus* and *Manilius* were Conſuls, about *An. U. C.* 603, Author of the *Lex* Calpurnia *de pecuniis repetundis*.

[m] *Junia*, *Servilia*, *Acilia*, &c. *vide* Calv. de Leg.

[n] He means that which was call'd the *Social* War, of which he only brings one, and that a very remote Cauſe. *Livius Druſus*, Tribune of the People, amongſt ſeveral Laws about the Freedom of all *Italy*, propos'd that all thoſe, who were ſuſpected of Bribery, ſhould be made to anſwer for it. Hereupon the Senators, who were pretty Guilty, miſliking this one, oppos'd and hindred all his other Laws. This made the *Italian* Nations, who thought to have been made Free of *Rome*,

ment; such shameful Extortion and Pillaging our Allies, by those who have defied all Laws and Courts of Justice; that we're rather beholden to the Weakness of others, than our own Strength or Virtues, that we are not utterly ruin'd.

Rome, but by this Means were frustrated, rise up in Arms against the *Romans*, upon which ensued the *Social* or *Italian* War; of which see the Historians.

CHAP. XXII.

Examples of Contempt of Money among the ancient Romans. *The Danger, &c. of the opposite Vice. The Honour gotten by this Virtue. The Danger, Folly, &c. of the Project of Levelling Estates.*

P*Anætius* highly commends [a] *Africanus*, for his being uncorrupt as to the matter of Money. 'Tis a Virtue that very well deserv'd his Commendation: but I think there were others in that great Person, which deserv'd it much more: to be untainted with Money being not so properly a Virtue of that Man, as of those Times in general. [b] *Paulus Æmilius* had all the Wealth of *Macedonia* in his Power, which amounted to almost an infinite Value: so that he brought such a Sum into the Treasury, as that the single Booty of that one General superseded the Necessity of all Taxes for the future: and yet he brought nothing into his own House, but the eternal

[a] The second *Scipio* of that Name, who raz'd *Carthage* and *Numantia*; and was Scholar to *Panætius*.

[b] He conquer'd *Perseus* King of *Macedonia*, and led him in Triumph; thereby putting an End to the second *Macedonian* War, and that Empire together. *See his Life in* Plut.

nal Memory of his Name and Atchievements. [c] *Africanus* follow'd the Example of his Father, and return'd nothing richer from the Overthrow of *Carthage*. So *Mummius*, who was afterwards his Partner in the Cenſorſhip; did he make himſelf ever a farthing the Wealthier, by razing [d] one of the wealthieſt Cities in the World? No; he rather choſe to make *Italy* fine with the Spoils of his Enemies, than his own Houſe; tho' in my Opinion the Fineneſs of *Italy* reflects a bright Luſtre upon his own Houſe too. There is no Vice then (that I may return to the Subject, from which I have digreſs'd) more deteſtable than Avarice; more eſpecially in Great Men, and ſuch as bear Sway in the Government of a State. For 'tis not only *mean* for a Man to make a Prey and Advantage of the Commonwealth, but even impious and abominable. That Oracle therefore of the *Pythian Apollo*'s, *That nothing but Avarice ſhould be the Ruine of* Sparta, doth not ſeem deſign'd for the *Lacedæmonians* only, but for every wealthy and flouriſhing Nation. [e] And as Avarice is thus very deſtructive to a State; ſo to appear Upright and Regardleſs of Money, is the certaineſt Method thoſe in Power can make uſe of, for procuring the Love and Good-liking of the *People*. But thoſe, who, deſigning to curry *their* Favour, attempt new Laws about the Levelling Eſtates, ſo as to force the

[c] The ſame that was juſt now mention'd. He was Son of *Paulus*, but adopted by *Scipio*.

[d] *Corinth*, which was raz'd by *Mummius* the ſame Year that *Carthage* was by *Scipio*. *See* Paterc. *Book* 1. *chap.* 12. where the two Generals are very handſomly compar'd together.

[e] He has told us by *Precept*, and from the *Examples* of the greateſt Men, That Governours of a State ſhould be free from Covetouſneſs, and regardleſs of Money. Here he adds, That nothing ſo much recommends 'em to the Good-liking of the People as that Virtue: Which brings him to diſcourſe of a fooliſh

the right Owners from their lawful Poſſeſſions; or propoſe to make Creditors remit all the Debts, which in Juſtice are due to 'em; [f] plainly undermine the two principal Pillars and Supports of the Government: In the *firſt* place, Concord and Unity among the Citizens, which can never be kept up, whilſt ſome are depriv'd of what is juſtly their Due, and others diſcharg'd from the neceſſity of Payment. *Secondly*, Juſtice, which immediately muſt ſink into Ruins and Nothing, if Men can't be ſecur'd in the Poſſeſſion of what's their own: For *that* (as we before remark'd) is the chief End and Aim of Men's gathering into Societies, and building of Cities, that each one might freely enjoy what's his Right, without any danger or fear of being depriv'd on't. [g] Beſide this, the Authors of theſe pernicious Deſigns never get that Good-will, which they propoſe, from their Citizens: For, as for thoſe Men, who are *Loſers* by the Bargain, 'tis certain that they'll be their Enemies for it; and thoſe, who are *Gainers*, will beſure to pretend that they never deſir'd it: eſpecially in the Buſineſs of having Debts forgiven; *there* ev'ry one diſſembles how glad he is of it, for fear it ſhould be thought that he was not able to pay 'em. But thoſe Men, to whom ſuch Deſigns are prejudicial, will hardly forget 'em, but ſhew a perpetual Grudge and Reſentment. And tho' the number of thoſe, who are thus wickedly Befriended, be greater than of thoſe, who are injuriouſly

fooliſh Method, that ſome Men have taken to this purpoſe, *viz.* A Deſign of bringing all Eſtates to an Equality, and making all Creditors remit their Debts; which he ſhews to be unſafe, unreaſonable, *&c.*

[f] *Firſt*, He ſhews 'tis deſtructive to a State, by ruining Concord and Juſtice, which are the Supports of it.

[g] *Secondly*, 'Tis fooliſh; for it does not procure 'em that Good-liking of the People, which they thought to get by it.

jurioufly Rob'd; yet it doth not follow, that therefore they are more Powerful: for 'tis not the Number, but the Quality of the Perſons, that muſt carry it in this Caſe. [h] Beſides, what Reaſon or Equity is there, when Eſtates have been held for a great many Years, or perhaps Ages, that the rightful Owners ſhould be thruſt out from 'em, and others, that never had any, ſhould come and poſſeſs them?

[h] *Thirdly*, 'Tis very unjuſt and unreaſonable.

CHAP. XXIII.

Several Examples of the unhappy Effects of taking away Mens Eſtates, in order to bring things to a Level. The wiſe Conduct of Aratus *the* Sicyonian *in doing the contrary. What a Magiſtrate's Duty in ſuch Caſes is.*

FOr ſuch kind of partial, injurious Proceedings, [a] the *Spartans* once baniſh'd [b] *Lyſander*, one of their [c] Ephori; and put to Death [d] *Agis* their King

[a] Having ſhewn how pernicious, fooliſh, *&c.* theſe Deſigns are; he gives here ſome Examples of their unhappy *Effects*; and of the good *ones* of the contrary Practice.

[b] Not their famous General *Lyſander*, Son of *Ariſtarchus*, who beat the *Athenians*, &c. but another, Son of one *Orbis*, made Ephore by King *Agis*, and his Aſſiſtant in his Deſigns.

[c] The Word ſignifies *Inſpectors* or *Overſeers*: They were Officers among the *Spartans*, uſually five in number, much like the Tribunes in *Rome*, who reſtrain'd the Power and Greatneſs of their Kings; ſo that Appeals were allow'd from the Kings to them, as in *Rome* from the Conſuls to the Tribunes.

[d] The third King of *Sparta* of that Name, Son of *Eudamidas*, and ſixth in Deſcent from the famous *Ageſilaus*: who

King for the same Reason: an Action unheard of before in that City. This was succeeded by such grievous Contentions and Discords in the State, as that Tyranny and Oppression got the upper-hand amongst 'em; the Nobles were banish'd from their Native Country; and the best constituted Republick upon the face of the Earth was utterly dissolv'd, and brought into Confusion. Nor did this Mischief end with the *Spartans* only, but, like a Contagion, spreading it self farther, involv'd all *Greece* in the same Miseries and Calamities. Pray what was it ruin'd our own two *Gracchi*, Sons of the famous *Tiberius Gracchus*, and Grandsons of [e] *Africanus*, but only these Controversies about Levelling Estates? [f] *Aratus* the *Sicyonian* is deservedly commended as much on the other hand: He, when his County, for fifty Years together, had been greatly oppress'd and over-run by Tyrants, went secretly one Night from *Argos* to *Sicyon*, and made himself Master of the City by Surpize; and unexpectedly falling upon *Nicocles* the then Tyrant, he put him to flight. This being done, he recall'd six Hundred of the wealthiest Citizens, who had all been formerly banish'd by the Tyrants, and by this his arrival delivered the City from Slavery and Oppression. But he afterwards found 'twould be a great deal of trouble, to settle the Business of their Estates and Possessions; for he thought on the one hand 'twas very unreasonable, that those Men, whom he had restor'd, should

who for endeavouring to alter the then present State of things, and bring in some obsolete Laws of *Lycurgus*, about dividing Lands into equal Portions, *&c.* was murder'd by the contrary Faction. *See his Life and Death in* Plut.

[e] *The Elder*, whose Daughter *Cornelia* was married to *Sempronius Gracchus*, and had those two Sons by him.

[f] A noble Man of *Sicyon*, a City in *Peloponnesus*, Son of one *Clinias*: His Father being kill'd by the treachery of *Abantidas*, he was forc'd to fly to *Argos* at six Years old. Afterwards,

ſhould Want, whilſt others enjoy'd what in Equity was theirs: and yet it ſeem'd hard on t'other ſide, that Men ſhould be thruſt out of thoſe Poſſeſſions, which now they had held for theſe fifty Years: if more eſpecially 'twere withal conſider'd, That it could not but happen in ſo long a time, that they muſt have gone, a great part of 'em, from one to another, either by Inheritance, Purchaſe, Dowry, or the like; and therefore were poſſeſt by the *preſent Incumbents*, without *their* having injur'd the rightful Proprietors. Upon theſe Conſiderations he judg'd it neceſſary, both to bear with the *latter* in the Enjoyment of what they had, and yet to Satisfie the *former*, whom it juſtly belong'd to. And finding a large Sum of Money was requiſite, to ſettle this Buſineſs as it ought to be; he told 'em he had occaſions to go to [g] *Alexandria*, and order'd they ſhould not concern 'emſelves about it, till his return. He goes accordingly with all poſſible ſpeed to his old Friend [h] *Ptolomy*, who at that time was reigning in *Alexandria*, being ſecond King after the Founding of that City. Having told him his Deſign of ſettling Liberty in his Country, and the Reaſons that put him upon undertaking of that Voyage, he quickly obtain'd of that wealthy Prince, to ſupply him with a quantity of Money for his Aſſiſtance. With this he immediately returns to *Sicyon*, and chooſing out fifteen o'th' principal Citizens, to help him with their Counſel upon this occaſion; he heard both the

terwards, at about the Age of Twenty, he took the City again by Surprize, made *Nicocles* the then Tyrant fly, and ſettl'd Peace and Unity amongſt his Citizens. *His Life is written by* Plut.

[g] The capital City of *Ægypt*, and Seat of their Kings, built by *Alexander* the Great, in his return from viſiting the Temple of *Jupiter Hammon*.

[h] Sirnam'd *Philadelphus*, the Founder of the famous *Alexandrian* Library. He was Son of that *Ptolomy*, who was *Alex-*

the Cauſes of thoſe who poſſeſs'd what had belong'd to others, and of thoſe who had loſt what had been formerly their own. At laſt he ſo manag'd the whole Buſineſs, as that, the Eſtates being ſet at their true Values, [i] *ſome* were perſuaded to part with what they had, and take an Equivalent in Money for it: and [k] *others* to neglect the Recovery of their own, and reſt themſelves content with being pay'd its full Value. By this means the Controverſie was fairly determin'd, and all went Home ſatisfy'd without Grudging or Complaining. Here was a great and extraordinary Man now! Here was one, that deſerv'd to have been born in our Republick! This is the true way of Dealing with Citizens; and not (as hath been practis'd amongſt us [l] twice) to make ſale of their Goods in the publick Markets, and have them cry'd by the Voice of the Common Cryer. But this famous *Grecian* (as was the Duty of a wiſe and extraordinary Perſon) thought it became him to provide alike for all: And indeed every Magiſtrate, who proceeds upon Principles of Reaſon and Prudence, will always take care not to make any Difference between the Intereſts of his People; but will govern them all by the ſame Rule and Standard of Juſtice and Equity. Here's one Man ſhall dwell in what belongs to another: What *Reaſon* is there, I beſeech you, for this; that when I have bought, built, repair'd, and laid out a great deal of Money, another ſhould come and injoy all the Fruits of it, in ſpite of my Teeth? Is

Alexander the Great's Captain, and who got *Ægypt* to himſelf after the Death of that Prince.

[i] *Viz.* Of the preſent Incumbents, who poſſeſs'd thoſe Lands, which originally belong'd to others.

[k] *Viz.* Of thoſe who had been outed of their Lands by the Tyrants.

[l] Firſt under *Sylla* the Dictator, and afterwards under *Cæſar*.

Is not this plainly to take away from one that which juſtly belongs to him, and give to another what he has nothing of Right to? As for the Project of Forgiving Debts, I can ſee no Reaſon in the World for it, unleſs it be Reaſon, that another ſhould buy Land with my Money, and that he ſhould have the Land, but I never have my Money.

CHAP. XXIV.

Care ſhould be taken to prevent Peoples running too much into Debt. Faith *the Cement of Publick Society.* Cicero's *Conduct in his Conſulſhip about the matter of Debts. The Duties of a good Magiſtrate. How one's Health and Eſtate are to be taken care of.*

[a] CAre ought therefore to be taken before-hand (which 'tis eaſie to do by a great many ways) to keep People from running ſo much into Debt, as may bring any Damage or Inconvenience to the Publick: and not, *when they are in*, to make the Creditors loſe what's their own, and let the Debtors gain what in Juſtice is another's: For nothing ſo cements, and holds together in Union all the parts of a Society, as Faith or Credit; which can never be kept up, unleſs Men are under ſome force and neceſſity of honeſtly Paying what they owe to one another. This Deſign of having Debtors excus'd from Payment, [b] was never attempted with

[a] Since the Deſign of making Creditors Forgive all Debts, is ſo very pernicious, *&c.* 'tis one great Buſineſs of a good Governour, to prevent Peoples running too much into Debt; which may be done ſeveral Ways.

[b] In the Conſpiracy of *Catiline*. *See chap.* 22. *Book* 1.

He

with greater eagerneſs, than whilſt I was Conſul: Men of all Ranks and Degrees in the State, took up Arms and form'd Camps for the bringing it about; whoſe Endeavours I reſiſted with ſo much vigour, as that the Republick was quickly deliver'd from ſo pernicious an Evil. There never were known greater Debts in the City, nor ever more eaſily and faithfully paid: and pray what was the Reaſon of all this? Why becauſe when their Hopes of Defrauding were cut off, they found themſelves under a Neceſſity of Payment. 'Tis true there is [c] one, who has ſince been a Conquerer, (tho' then he was conquer'd by my Vigilance) that has [d] found out Means to effect theſe Deſigns, at a time when they'd bring *him* [e] no manner of Advantage; but ſuch an Inclination had that Man to Villany, that the bare Doing of it was a Pleaſure to him, without any other Invitation in the World. The Sum then of what has been ſaid is this, That ſuch as deſign for the good of the Republick, *muſt* be ſure to avoid *this* ſort of Liberality, which takes away from one what it gives to another; and *muſt* conſtantly make it their principal Care, to uphold each Member in his proper Rights, according to the Principles of Juſtice and Equity; ſo as neither to ſuffer the *poorer* ſort of People to be wrong'd or oppreſs'd, by reaſon of their Poverty; nor the *richer* to be hindred from keeping or demanding what's juſtly their own, by the Envy of the others: and in fine *muſt* apply their moſt earn-

[c] He means *Cæſar*, who being over head and ears in Debt, was ſuſpected in *Catiline*'s time, to favour *his* wicked Deſigns under-hand; and ſo may be ſaid to have been conquer'd by *Cicero*, when he ruin'd *Catiline*.

[d] He made the Creditors loſe not all, but only a fourth part of their Due.

[e] Becauſe he was then got free from Debt by other Ways; and ſo had no occaſion to make uſe of this, upon his own Account.

[f] He

earneſt Endeavours, whether in War or Peace, to encreaſe the Power, and enlarge the Bounds and Revenues of the Republick. Theſe are the Duties and Exerciſes of great Men: Theſe are the things which were practic'd by our Anceſtors; and whoever goes on to perform the ſame, will not only bring great Advantage to the Republick, but gain a mighty Intereſt and Reputation to himſelf. [f] In theſe Rules of Duty relating to things profitable, [g] *Antipater* the *Tyrian*, a *Stoick* Philoſopher, who lately dy'd at *Athens*, thinks that two things have been omitted by *Panætius*: *Firſt*, The care of getting or preſerving one's Health. And, *Secondly*, Of an Eſtate. I believe *that great Philoſopher* might omit 'em on purpoſe, becauſe they are ſo eaſie and obvious to every one: however 'tis certain they are

[f] He has now done with his firſt Head propos'd in this Book, *viz. Whether an Action be profitable or not?* In which, after having ſhewn, That *Men* are able to bring the moſt Profit to us, he gives ſome Directions about how we ſhould engage Men to be of our ſide, and ſo do us all the Service that lies in their Power. He ſhould now proceed to the ſecond Head propos'd to be the Subject of this Book; but becauſe *Antipater* thought the former not perfect, becauſe two material things were omitted in it, *viz.* The Care of our Health, and Eſtate; he therefore, before he leaves this Head, adds a word or two about each of theſe.

[g] There were two or three *Stoicks* of that Name; The one of *Tarſus*, call'd *Tarſenſis*, Scholar to *Diogenes Babylonius*, and Maſter of *Panætius*. He is mention'd *ch.* 12. of the next Book. *Another* about the ſame time (or as others think the ſame Man by another name) call'd *Sidonius*, a familiar Acquaintance of *L. Craſſus*, an Hiſtorian and Poet, famous for making Hexameter Verſes *extempore*, [*See* Cic. *and* Quintil.] of whom we have ſeveral Epigrams ſtill extant in the *Greek Anthologia*. He's ſaid to have had a Fever every Year on his Birth-day, of which at laſt he dy'd. The *third* a *Tyrian* here mention'd, an Acquaintance of *Cicero*'s, and particularly familiar with *Cato Uticenſis*, whom he inſtructed in Morality and Politicks.

How

are both of 'em profitable. [h] Now *Health* is preſerv'd *by* conſidering the peculiar Temper of one's Body, and obſerving what agrees or does *not* agree with it; *by* Temperance and Moderation in Meats and Drinks, and other things relating to the welfare of the Body; *by* forbearance and abſtinence as to the matter of Pleaſures; and laſtly, *by* the Skill of Phyſicians, and the like. [i] An *Eſtate* ſhould be *gotten* by nothing that's any ways Scandalous or Diſhoneſt; *preſerv'd* by Diligence and prudent Management; and laſtly, by the ſame means *better'd* and *augmented*. But this whole Subject is excellently handled by [k] *Xenophon* the *Socratick*, in his Book *of OEconomicks*; which I formerly tranſlated from the *Greek* into *Latin*, when much about as old as you are at preſent.

[h] How the Health of the Body is to be maintain'd.
[i] How an Eſtate ſhould be gotten, kept, *&c.*
[k] A famous *Athenian*, Son of one *Gryllus*, and Scholar of *Socrates*; a valiant and wiſe Captain, as well as an eminent Philoſopher and Hiſtorian. His Works are moſt of 'em extant to this day: the native Simplicity, Purity, and eſpecially Sweetneſs of which, have juſtly got him the name of the *Athenian Bee*. The Tranſlation *Cicero* here mentions is loſt, except ſome Fragments.

CHAP. XXV.

The Comparing of things Profitable one with another. An Anſwer of Cato's *upon this Head. Who are beſt able to teach how to get Eſtates.*

THE [a] fourth chief Head we propos'd to ſpeak of, was the *Comparing things Profitable one with ano-*

[a] He comes now to the ſecond Head to be treated on in this Book, *viz. Of two that are Profitable which is moſt ſo?* Which

another; which is oftentimes neceſſary, however neglected or forgotten by *Panætius*. For we uſe to compare either the Goods of the *Body* with thoſe of *Fortune*; or *theſe* back again with *thoſe* of the Body; or laſtly, thoſe both of *the one* and *the other* amongſt 'emſelves. *Firſt*, The Goods of the Body are compar'd with thoſe of Fortune, as, *'Tis more eligible, ſuppoſe, to be Healthy than Rich. Secondly*, Theſe back again with thoſe of the Body, as, *'Tis better to be Rich, than of a robuſt Conſtitution. Thirdly*, Thoſe of the Body with one another, as, *Health is preferable to Pleaſure*, or *Strength to Activity*. And *Laſtly*, Thoſe of Fortune with one another, as if *Glory ſhould be preferr'd before Riches*, or *an Eſtate in the City before another in the Country*. To this latter ſort of Comparing may be referr'd that Anſwer of the *Senior Cato*'s, who being once ask'd, What he conceiv'd moſt Profitable in the Management of an Eſtate? ſaid, *To Feed Cattle well*. And what the ſecond? *To Feed Cattle pretty well*. And what the third? *To Feed Cattle, tho' but ill*. And what the fourth? *To Till the Ground*. And then the Enquirer proceeding ſtill to ask, *Pray what do you think of letting Money out to Uſury? Pray what do I think*, replies *Cato, of killing a Man?* From what has been ſaid, and a great deal more, that might eaſily be added, 'tis ſufficiently manifeſt, That Profits are often compar'd with one another; and that we had Reaſon ſufficient on our ſide, in making *this* a fourth Head for the finding out our Duty. But as for the Buſineſs of getting an Eſtate, and placing out Money to the beſt Advantage, and I wiſh I might add of applying to the beſt Uſes, there are certain [b] honeſt Men who attend at the Ex-

Which he but juſt touches upon, and ſhews that 'twas requiſite to add this Head to the three of *Panætius*.

[b] So he calls by way of Deriſion the Bankers, Changers, &c.

Exchange, that can better inform you than any of the Philoſophers, that diſpute in the Schools. 'Tis worth while however to know theſe things, becauſe they relate to the Buſineſs of *Profit*, which has made up the Subject of all this Book. Let us now paſs on to what remains behind.

&c. who frequented the *Janus*, a Street in *Rome* of that name, very noted and eminent for ſuch ſort of People. The upper part of it was called *Janus Summus*, the middle *Janus Medius*, and the lower *Janus Imus*.

The End of the Second Book.

TUL-

TULLY's OFFICES.

The Third Book.

CHAP. I.

An excellent Saying of the Elder Scipio Africanus. Cicero *betakes himself to a Life of Leisure and Retirement, the Republick being quite ruin'd. The Difference between his Retirement, and* Africanus's. *Some Good to be drawn out of Evils.*

[a] *CAto*, Son *Mark*, who was near of the same Age with *Publius Scipio*, the first that had the Surname of [b] *Africanus* giv'n him, tells us 'twas an usual Saying of *his*, *That he never was less idle, than when he was idle; nor ever less alone, than when he was alone.* A noble and excellent Sentence indeed, and worthy of so great and so wise a Person; by which it appears, that in the midst of Leisure he could think of Business, and was us'd when alone to converse with his own Thoughts: so that he never was properly Idle, and needed no Company to entertain him in his Solitude. The two things there-

[a] Whom he spake of in the last Chapter of the former Book.

[b] Because he beat *Hannibal* and the *Carthaginians* in *Africa*. He was Grandfather of the Younger *Africanus*. The *Roman* Historians are full of his Praises.

[c] Those

therefore, which bring a kind of Dullneſs and Heavineſs upon others, ſerv'd but to ſharpen and invigorate his Mind, *viz.* Solitude and Leiſure. I wiſh I could truly ſay the ſame of my ſelf! But tho' I'm not able to arrive at that inimitable Temper of Soul, I deſire at leaſt to come as near it as is poſſible; and being excluded by open Violence, and [c] impious Arms, from having ought to do with Affairs of the Senate, or Buſineſs of the Bar, I wholly betake my ſelf to a Life of Retirement; and for that very reaſon have abandon'd the City, and am often alone, only going from one Seat to another in the Country. But alas! my Leiſure is not to be compar'd with that of *Africanus*, nor my Solitude with his Solitude! For he was employ'd, at that very time, in Places of the greateſt Reputation in the Publick; and his *Leiſure* was only a voluntary Retirement, to give himſelf Reſpite from Buſineſs for a ſeaſon; and his *Solitude* only a kind of Port or Haven, into which he withdrew himſelf from the Diſturbances of Company. Whereas my Leiſure proceeds not from any deſire of Reſpite, but from a want of Buſineſs to Employ my ſelf about; for what proper Work can I find to do, when there's no more [d] a Senate, nor any Courts of Juſtice remaining [e] entire, in which I might honourably ſhew my ſelf? Therefore, whereas 'twas my former Cuſtom to appear much in Publick, and in the Eye of my Citizens; I now on the contrary hide my ſelf from 'em, to avoid the very ſight of ſuch Packs of Villains, as are everywhere abroad; and as much as is poſſible confine my ſelf to Solitude. But ſince this is given us for a

[c] Thoſe of *Cæſar* firſt; but after his Death, of *Mark Anthony* and his Adherents.

[d] The two Places in which he before us'd to ſhew himſelf.

[e] Becauſe all things were acted by Violence and Force of Arms.

[f] By

a Rule by the Learned, *That when ſeveral Evils are threatning us at once, we ſhould not only chooſe to undergo the* leaſt, *but extract ſome Advantage out of* 'em *if 'tis poſſible:* I therefore, in the midſt of all theſe preſent Misfortunes, gain the ſmall Advantage of Quiet and Retirement, (tho' not ſuch a Quiet as *he* might have expected, whoſe Wiſdom had formerly [f] procur'd the Peace of the Publick) and endeavour not wholly to languiſh out that Solitude, which not Choice, but Neceſſity has laid upon me. Tho' *Africanus* indeed, I my ſelf muſt confeſs, has got much greater Glory by his Solitude and Retirement: For none of his Thoughts are committed to Writing, nor any Monuments remain of what he did in his Leiſure, and when he was alone; whereby we are given to underſtand, That he never was idle, nor ever properly alone; becauſe he was always employ'd in Meditation, and in ſearching out thoſe things, which by Thinking he became Maſter of. But I, who han't got ſuch a ſtrength of Genius, as to be content, when alone, with the company of my bare Thoughts, am forc'd to apply all my Studies and Endeavours to the drudgery of Writing: I have written more therefore within a very ſhort time, ſince the Ruin of the State, than I did for ſome Years, while 'twas in its flouriſhing Condition.

[f] By freeing it from *Catiline*'s Conſpiracy. *See chap.* 22. *Book* 1.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

The Subject of Duties the most useful part of all Philosophy. An Exhortation to his Son to be diligent in his Studies. The Subject of this Third Book. Panætius *neglected to treat of it, tho' he did at first design it. A Saying of* Rutilius Rufus.

NOw tho' all Philosophy (my dear *Cicero*) be a rich, as it were, and plentiful Soil, which has not any part of it waſt and uncultivate: yet there's no place that's more fruitful in it, or from which more Advantage accrues to the Husbandman, than that which is employ'd about *Offices* or *Duties*; from whence thoſe Precepts and Directions are drawn, which lead toward a ſteddy and virtuous Way of Living. Wherefore tho' I doubt not but that *Cratippus*, the greateſt Philoſopher of our Age, is daily inculcating theſe things to you, and you are receiving them with that Attention they deſerve; yet I have thought it not wholly unneceſſary, my ſelf to remind you of ſo important a Matter; and could wiſh that your Ears might continually ring, as it were, with ſuch Precepts, and not hear (as far as poſſible) any thing elſe. And as this is a Method which is uſeful for all Men, who deſign to lead virtuous and creditable Lives; ſo for no one living, perhaps, more than your ſelf. For conſider you're the Son of an induſtrious Father, one who has born the greateſt Honours in the Republick, and has gotten himſelf ſome Credit and Reputation in the World; People therefore will expect that you ſhould follow my Steps, and 'tis your part to ſee that you anſwer their Expectation. Beſide 'tis no ſmall thing you have taken upon you, by being at *Athens*, and under the Great *Cratippus*; whither ſince you are gone

gone as it were to a *Staple* and Mart of good Literature, 'twill be ſcandalous for you to return again empty, and bring a Reproach both upon the Place and your Maſter. Wherefore, dear Son, be Induſtrious and Diligent, and ſpare no manner of Pains and Labour (if I may call it a *Labour*, and not rather a *Pleaſure*, to Study and Learn) that you may make a good Uſe of theſe Advantages before you; and when all things are thus plentifully ſupply'd on my part, let it never be ſaid, That you your ſelf are wanting to your own greateſt Intereſt. But I ſhall ſay no more upon this at preſent, having heretofore written again and again to you, by way of Exhortation. Let us now proceed to the fifth and laſt Part of our propos'd Diviſion. [a] *Panætius* then, who without all controverſie has written moſt accurately upon the Subject of *Duties*, and whom in this Work, with a little Alteration, I have hitherto follow'd, lays down (as was ſaid) three general Heads, which Men uſe in Conſulting or Deliberating concerning their Duty: In the *firſt* 'tis queſtion'd, *Whether the Action they are going about be Honeſt or Diſhoneſt.* In the *ſecond*, *Whether it be Profitable or Unprofitable.* In the *third*, *How a good Man ought to determin the Caſe, if that which ſeems Honeſt ſhould come into competition with that which ſeems Profitable.* Of the two former Heads he has given us an account in his three firſt Books, and therein has promis'd to go on with the third of 'em; but has fail'd, it ſhould ſeem, of being ſo good as his Word. Which I wonder at the more upon this account,

[a] After this Diſcourſe and Advice to his Son, he comes now to his Subject, of comparing Profit and Honeſty. But *tells* us firſt, That *Panætius*, tho' he propos'd, yet did not diſcourſe upon this third Head: Shews he deſign'd to have done it, and is large in explaining the Sence 'tis to be taken in.

[b] One

count, because we are told by his Scholar *Possidonius*, That he liv'd thirty Years after those Books were publish'd. And I can't but admire at the same *Possidonius*, that having an occasion, in some of his Writings, to discourse upon this Argument, he should do no more than just touch upon it in short; especially seeing he himself has observ'd, That in all Philosophy there's no one Subject more necessary and important. Some indeed think, whom I cannot agree with, that *Panætius* did not *forget* this Part, but *omitted* it on purpose; and that in plain truth, it ought to be omitted, since Profit can never be *really* contrary to Honesty. Whether it *ought* to be omitted or not, may perhaps be a Question; but whether *Panætius* design'd it or no, and afterwards neglected it, I think can be none: For a Writer certainly, that proposes three Heads, and goes thro' with but two of 'em, must needs design to discourse upon the third; nay he tells us himself in the close of his third Book, That he'd afterwards proceed to this remaining Part. Beside we have the Authority of *Possidonius* to vouch it, who in one of his Letters has given us a Saying of *Rutilius Rufus*, who was Scholar to *Panætius* as well as himself; *That as never any Painter had been yet so bold, as to venture upon finishing that Piece of* Venus, *which* Apelles *left imperfect at the Island* Cos; *(the Beauty of the Face making all Men despair, ever to paint a Body that should be answerable to it) so the Excellency of that, which* Panætius *had writ upon this Subject, made others afraid of attempting to add that which he had omitted.*

[b] One of the famousest Painters that ever was, of the Island *Cos* in the *Ægæan* Sea, therefore by *Ovid* call'd *Artifex Cous*. He is often mention'd by *Greek* and *Latin* Writers, and particularly for an admirable Piece of *Venus* rising out of the Sea. He began a second, which is here mention'd, but did not live to finish it.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Whether Panætius *did well in making this third Head. Reaſons why he did not. The Danger of ſeparating Profit from Honeſty. What the* Stoicks *mean by* Living according to Nature. *Two ſorts of Virtue, the* Perfect *and* Ordinary. *The former belongs to the* Wiſe *only; the latter is common to all. The moſt perfect Virtue (as 'tis counted by the Multitude) is really imperfect.*

[a] THat *Panætius* therefore did think he was obliged to Diſcourſe upon this Part, is beyond all Queſtion: But whether he was miſtaken in his Judgment or not, when he laid down this Head, as the *third of deliberating for the finding out our Duty*, may perhaps be diſputed. [b] For whether according to the Opinion of the *Stoicks*, we take *Virtue* or *Honeſty* to be the *only Good*; or, according to that of *your Peripateticks*, acknowledge it ſo to be the *chiefeſt Good*, as that all things elſe are juſt nothing againſt it; 'tis certain, upon either of theſe Suppoſitions, That Profit can't be put in the Ballance againſt Honeſty. We are therefore told, That *Socrates* us'd even to *curſe* thoſe People, who disjoyn'd theſe things in Thought and Conception, which are one and the ſame in Nature and Reality. And [c] the *Stoicks* are ſo far of his Opinion, as conſtantly

[a] Having ſhewn from Reaſon, and the Authority of *Poſſidonius*, that *Panætius* deſign'd to have writ upon this Head; he now proceeds to enquire, *Whether he ought to have done it, or not?*

[b] The Reaſons why *Panætius* ſhould not have brought in this Enquiry: *Firſt, Honeſty is the only, or at leaſt much the greateſt Good; therefore Profit ſhould not be made to oppoſe it; nothing being comparable to the greateſt Good.*

[c] Secondly, *The* Stoicks, *of whom* Panætius *was one, hold that*

ſtantly to maintain, That whatever is Honeſt muſt be alſo Profitable, and whatever is Profitable muſt be alſo Honeſt. 'Tis true had *Panætius* been one of thoſe, who aſſert that Virtue is therefore only deſirable, becauſe it brings ſomething of Profit along with it; like [d] ſome, who think nothing any further worth a-ſeeking for, than as it begets Pleaſure, or Exemption from Pain; we could then have allow'd him the liberty of ſaying, That Profit is ſometimes repugnant to Honeſty. But ſeeing he was one of [e] a different Sect, and thinks *nothing* to be *Good* except that which is *Honeſt*; and avows that whatever is contrary to *Honeſty*, and appears to us under the Notion of *Profit*, can neither, if we have it, make Life ever the better; nor, if we have it not, ever the worſe; he ſhould not, methinks, have brought in ſuch a Deliberation, wherein that, which ſeems Profitable, comes into Competition with that, which is Honeſt. For that, which [f] the *Stoicks* call their *Sovereign Good* [to live in Conformity with the Dictates of Nature] means, I ſuppoſe, no more than this, That we ſhould always live agreeably to the Rules of Virtue; and ſhould uſe other things, which are ſuited and adapted to our natural Inclinations, no further than Virtue permits and allows 'em. Now this being ſo, there

that Profit and Honeſty are really the ſame thing; therefore he ſhould not have brought in this Head, wherein they are ſet in oppoſition to each other.

[d] *Epicurus* and his Diſciples; and alſo *Hieronymus Rhodius*, whom our Author often mentions in his Works. He liv'd about the 440th Year of *Rome*, and had been Scholar to *Ariſtotle*.

[e] *Viz.* That of the *Stoicks*.

[f] Thirdly, *The* Stoicks *make the whole Happineſs of Man to conſiſt in Living conformably to the Rules of Honeſty; therefore Profit ſhould never have been brought in in oppoſition to it.*

[g] To

there are ſeveral of opinion, That this general Head, wherein Profit and Honeſty are compar'd with one another, was improperly brought in; and that there ought not to have been given any Rules or Directions upon this Subject. [g] Now your *Perfect Honeſty*, which is truly and properly call'd by that Name, is only to be found in your *perfectly Wiſe* Men, and can never be poſſibly ſeparated from Virtue: But thoſe Men, who have not this Perfect Wiſdom, muſt by no means pretend to ſuch a Perfect Honeſty, tho' they may have ſome Shadows and Reſemblances of it. For all *thoſe Duties*, of which we are treating in theſe Books, have the name of *Middle ones* given 'em by the *Stoicks*, which are common indifferently to all Men in general, and are not confin'd to any particular number of them. But ſeveral get 'em either by the peculiar Happineſs of their Natures, or by a conſtant progreſs in Study and Learning. Whereas *thoſe others*, which they call *Right ones*, are perfect and conſummate, or (as they 'emſelves expreſs it) *have all their Numbers*, which none can attain to, but the *perfectly Wiſe*. 'Tis true that the Vulgar, as ſoon as they ſee any Action of ſuch a nature, as indeed is no more than a *Middle* kind of Duty, are immediately thinking it a *Perfect* and *Compleat* one: [h] For the common ſort

[g] To what has been objected it might have been reply'd, *That there's a double ſort of Honeſty; the one* Perfect, *and belonging to none but a perfectly Wiſe Man; the other* Middle, *and which ordinary Men are capable of: That Profit ought never to be oppos'd to the former, but perhaps to the latter imperfect one it might.* Here he gives a large account of this Diviſion of Honeſty, [See *chap.* 3. *Book.* 1.] and ſhews that the *Second*, or *Middle* ſort of Honeſty, ought no more to be parted with for the ſake of any Profit, than the *firſt* or *conſummate* one.

[h] Men judge of the Perfection or Imperfection of any thing, according as it comes up to, or falls ſhort of their Idea's. He,

ſort of People can't tell what is Perfect, and by conſequence don't know how much any Virtue or Excellency comes ſhort of it: but finding it anſwer the higheſt of their Conceptions, they imagin it wants nothing of being as perfect as can be. Juſt as it happens in judging of Poems or Pieces of Painting, and other ſuch like; thoſe who aren't Judges, are generally pleas'd with and praiſe thoſe things, which by no means deſerve any Praiſe or Commendation: Becauſe, I ſuppoſe, there may be ſomething that's Good in 'em, which ſerves well enough to take with thoſe that are ignorant, and who han't ſo much skill as to be able to diſcover their ſeveral Imperfections: Therefore when they are inſtructed by thoſe who underſtand it, they are brought with no great difficulty to forſake their Opinions.

He, whoſe Idea is ſhort and imperfect, will think a very mean piece of Work to be excellent, becauſe he has no Notion of any thing that is more ſo: But an Artiſt will judge it (as it really is) ordinary, becauſe his Conceptions are more refin'd and exquiſite. This is the Reaſon why the Vulgar imagin the imperfect Virtues to be Perfect and Compleat; becauſe they fully anſwer their Idea of Perfection, which is but an half and inadequate one. It ought to be read here *propterea quod*, in the Latin; and not *propterea*; as *Grævius* has it.

CHAP. IV.

The greateſt Men that have been in the World, were not perfectly Wiſe. Profit ought not to be compar'd with the Middle, any more than with the Perfect Honeſty. How Men come to compare 'em together, or to doubt upon this Subject. This illuſtrated by an Example. One certain Rule neceſſary for our Guidance in this caſe. The Doctrin of the Stoicks *preferable to that of the* Peripateticks.

THoſe Duties therefore, which make up the Subject of this Enquiry, by the *Stoicks* are counted a kind of *ſecond-rate Honeſty*, which is not confin'd to their Wiſe Men only, but is common and open to all Mankind: and therefore all thoſe, who have any kind of Sence or Inclination for Virtue, are very ſenſibly touch'd and affected with *it*. For you aren't to imagin, when we call the two [a] *Decii*'s or [b] *Scipio's Magnanimous*, and give [c] *Fabricius* and [d] *Ariſtides* the Appellation of *Juſt*, that we ſet them for Patterns of ſuch Juſtice and Magnanimity, as we

[a] Two famous *Romans*, Father and Son, who both in the time of their Conſulſhips devoted 'emſelves freely for the Good of their Country: The Father in the War with the *Latins*, about the Year of *Rome* 412; and the Son in *that* with the *Samnites*, about forty Years after. *See the form of it*, Liv. *Book* 8. *chap.* 9. *Book* 10. *chap.* 29.

[b] The two *Africani*, mention'd before.

[c] A noble and valiant Conſul of *Rome*, General in the War againſt *Pyrrhus* and the *Samnites*: ſo ſtrictly Juſt and Honeſt, that tho' both *Pyrrhus* and the *Samnites* offer'd him Preſents, he refus'd to accept them; and yet ſo Poor, that when he dy'd, he did not leave enough behind him for his Funeral; and his Daughters had Portions paid out of the publick Treaſury. *See ch.* 22.

[d] Such another at *Athens*, as *Fabricius* was at *Rome*. *Themiſtocles* being his Rival in the State, got him baniſh'd by *Oſtraciſm*: [*See his Life in* Plut. *and* Nepos.] But *Xerxes* afterwards

we ſuppoſe to be in thoſe who are perfectly Wiſe. For they were none of them *Wiſe* in that exalted Sence, which we would here be underſtood to mean by *that Word*. Nay thoſe who were counted and ſirnam'd the *Wiſe*, ſuch as *Cato*, for Inſtance, and *Lælius*, and particularly the [e] famous Seven; yet in Truth and Reality were not ſuch: but by frequently practiſing that *middle* ſort of Duties, had gotten a ſort of Shew and Reſemblance of *true Wiſdom*. As no Profit therefore ought ever to be put in oppoſition to that, which is *truely and perfectly* Virtuous and Honeſt; ſo neither ſhould any Intereſt, or Convenience of Life, be ſet up againſt that, which is *ordinarily* call'd ſo, and which is follow'd by thoſe, who deſire to be counted Men of Honeſty and Integrity: And *we* ſhould be as careful of living up to that Honeſty, *whereof we are capable*; as the *perfectly Wiſe* are of keeping cloſe to that, which is truly ſuch, and may in ſtrictneſs of Speech be call'd by that Name. For whatever Attainments we have made in Virtue, they will never ſtand us in any mighty ſtead, if we ben't thus careful of holding conſtantly to our Duty——. What has hitherto been ſaid can be apply'd to thoſe only, who make Goodneſs conſiſt in living according to their Duty: But [f] thoſe Men, who meaſure the Goodneſs of things by ſome [g] *Profit* or *Advantage* they bring

terwards invading *Greece*, they were glad to recal him again to defend his Country, which he did very valiantly. At laſt, after having born the greateſt Offices in the Republick, he dy'd as poor as *Fabricius* did, and Portions were given to his Daughters by the Publick.

[e] The ſeven Wiſe Men of *Greece*, ſo much talkt of among the Ancients.

[f] *Viz.* The Followers of *Epicurus* and *Hieronymus Rhodius*.

[g] 'Tis to be remembred, That under the Notion of the word Profit, he comprehends Pleaſures, Honours, *&c.*

bring along with them, and who let *theſe* prevail more with them than Virtue and Honeſty; frequently in deliberating uſe to put that, which they take to be Profitable, into the Ballance againſt Juſtice and Honeſty; but good and wiſe Men never offer to do it. [h] I'm therefore of opinion, when *Panætius* tells us, *That Men uſe to deliberate, in conſidering which of theſe two they ſhould chuſe*; that he meant no more than what his Words ſtrictly ſignifie, *viz.* That they *uſe* to do this, and not that really they *ought* to do it. For 'tis infinitely ſcandalous, not only to preſer a pretended Advantage before Duty and Conſcience; but ſo much as to bring 'em to the Conteſt and Competition, and to *doubt* whether the one of 'em ſhould be choſen before the other. If this be ſo, you'll be ready to ask me, *How then comes there to be any Doubt at all? And what is it that requires Conſideration upon this Subject?* I ſuppoſe 'tis this, That it ſometimes happens [i] Men are not ſo very certain, *Whether the Action deliberated upon be Honeſt, or not Honeſt*: For that which is uſually counted a piece of Villany, is frequently chang'd by the Times or Circumſtances, and is found to be the contrary. To lay down one Inſtance,

[h] Having brought all the Arguments urg'd againſt *Panætius*, for propoſing this Head, he now ſhews that they have all miſtaken his Meaning; for that he does not ſay Profit *may* be oppos'd to Honeſty, but only that Men ordinarily *uſe to* oppoſe it; and explains what is the true meaning of this Head, and how People come to deliberate upon it.

[i] The Subject therefore of this Book is not, *When a plain Duty ſeems oppoſite to our worldly Intereſt*, viz. *Riches, Pleaſure, or the like, to deliberate which of thoſe two we ſhould follow, our Pleaſure* (ſuppoſe) *or our Duty*: the very deliberating in ſuch a caſe being impious, as he often ſays. But the Deſign of the Book is, *When an Action on the one hand is apparently for our worldly Advantage; and on the other is ſomewhat doubtful, whether conſiſtent with our Duty or not; then to teach us how to determin our ſelves ſo, as that* a ſeeming *Intereſt may't*

ſtance, which may ſerve to give ſome Light to a great many others: Pray what greater Wickedneſs can there be upon Earth (if we ſpeak in general) than for any one to Murder, not only a Man, but a familiar Friend? And ſhall we therefore affirm that he's chargeable with a Crime, who has murder'd *a Tyrant*, tho' he were his Familiar? [k] The People of *Rome* I am ſure won't ſay ſo, who count it one of the glorioufeſt Actions in the World. You'll ſay then, *Does not Intereſt here carry it againſt Honeſty?* No, [l] but rather Honeſty voluntarily follows Intereſt. [m] If therefore we would, upon all Emergencies, be ſure to determin our ſelves aright, when that which we call our Advantage or Intereſt, ſeems to be repugnant to that which is Honeſt; we muſt lay down ſome general Rule or Meaſure, which if we will make uſe of in judging about things, we ſhall never be miſtaken as to point of Duty. Now this *Meaſure* I would have to be conformable to the Doctrin and Principles of the *Stoicks*, which I principally follow throughout this Work. For tho' I

mayn't betray us into that, which is oppoſite to our real *one*, i. e. *our* Duty *and* Honeſty. He gives one Inſtance of killing a Tyrant, which may eaſily be apply'd to a great many other dubious Caſes; in giving Directions about which he continues to Chap. 7. where he begins again his former Diſcourſe. *See the latter end of chap.* 6.

[k] The *Romans* thought no Duties ſo great, as thoſe that regarded the Maintenance of their Liberty; for the ſake of which they would break thro' all other Obligations whatever. Nay there was a Law among them, That he who kill'd a Tyrant ſhould not be queſtion'd for it.

[l] That is, A Tyrant is not therefore to be kill'd, becauſe 'tis a profitable Action, tho' contrary to Honeſty: but becauſe 'tis an Honeſt, as well as a Profitable one. For what can be more honeſt or agreeable to Nature, than by taking off one Man to preſerve a whole Community?

[m] Having ſhewn what is the Subject of Deliberation in this Book, his next Buſineſs is to lay down ſome Method of determining our ſelves aright. In order to which he propo-

I confeſs that the ancient *Academicks*, and your *Peripateticks*, [n] which were formerly the ſame, make Honeſty far preferable to that which ſeems one's Intereſt: yet [o] thoſe who aſſert, *That whatever is Honeſt muſt be alſo Profitable*, and *Nothing is Profitable but what is Honeſt*, talk much more bravely and heroically upon this Subject, than [p] thoſe who allow, *That there are ſome things Honeſt, which are not Profitable*; and *ſome things Profitable, which are not Honeſt*. And we have very great Liberty given us by our *Academy*, ſo as never to be ty'd up to ſuch and ſuch Tenets, but are left free to defend what we think moſt probable.

ſes a general Rule and Standard, which is always to be made uſe of in ſuch occaſions of Doubt.

[n] *See chap.* 1. *Book* 1.

[o] *Viz.* The *Stoicks*.

[p] *Viz.* The *Peripateticks* and ancient *Academicks*.

CHAP. V.

The Rule or Meaſure mention'd in the former Chapter. The ill Effects of Mens Injuring others for their own Advantage. Every one allow'd to take Care of himſelf in the firſt place; but not ſo as to Injure any other, tho' to ſave his own Life. Two Errors, that occaſion Mens Acting contrarywiſe, and the Abſurdity of 'em.

BUt to return to our General Rule or Meaſure: [a] There's nothing upon Earth then ſo contrary to Nature, neither Death, nor Poverty, nor Pain, nor

[a] For nothing being ſo agreeable to Nature as Conjunction and Society, that which tends to the Ruine and Diſſolution of this, muſt needs be of all things moſt contrary to Nature. Now

nor whatever other Evil can befal a Man either in his Body or Fortune, as to take away any thing wrongfully from another, and do one's ſelf a Kindneſs by injuring one's Neighbour. For, in the firſt place, it ruins all manner of Society and Entercourſe amongſt Men; ſince 'tis plain, that if once Men arrive at ſuch a paſs, as to Plunder and Injure the reſt of their Neighbours, out of hopes to procure ſome Advantage to themſelves, there muſt follow of courſe a Diſſolution of that Society, which of all things in the World is moſt agreeable to Nature. Should we ſuppoſe, for Example, that the bodily Members had, every one of 'em, gotten an Opinion, that to draw to its ſelf all the Vigour of its Neighbours, would very much ſerve to encreaſe its own; 'tis certain the whole Body muſt decay and periſh: And juſt ſo, ſhould every one amongſt us deprive other People of their Profits and Advantages, and take away all he could get from them, with deſign of applying it only to his own Uſe; the general Society and Fellowſhip of Mankind muſt of neceſſity be broken. For tho' 'tis no more than what Nature will allow of, That each Man ſhould look after himſelf in the firſt place, and furniſh himſelf with the Neceſſaries of Life, before he takes care to provide for other People; yet the ſame Nature will by no means permit, that any one ſhould riſe by his thruſting down another, and encreaſe his own Fortune by the Spoils of his Neighbours. And not only Nature, that is the univerſal Law or Con-

Now the very End and Deſign of Society is the mutual Help and Aſſiſtance of each other, without which 'tis impoſſible it ſhould ever ſubſiſt; *Ita naturalis eſt ſocietatis utilitatum communio* (ſays the learned *Grotius*) *ut ſine ea nequeat Societas conſiſtere.* Thoſe Men therefore, who, inſtead of profiting, injure their Fellows, do what directly tends to the Ruine of Society, and conſequently what of all things is moſt contrary to Nature.

Conſent of Nations; but particular Laws, by which ſeveral Countries and Commonwealths are govern'd, have commanded likewiſe, *That no one be ſuffer'd to do an Injury to another, for the ſake of procuring any Advantage to himſelf.* For the very Deſign and End of Laws is to keep up Agreement and Union amongſt Citizens; which whoever deſtroys is by them puniſh'd, not with the loſs of his Goods alone, but with Priſons, Baniſhment, or even Death it ſelf. But Nature and Right Reaſon, as being at once both an [b] Human and Divine Law too, command this Duty with much greater Authority; and whoever obeys them (as all Men muſt, who propoſe to live according to the Rules of Nature) will never be guilty of coveting what's another's, or applying to his own Uſe what had firſt been injuriouſly taken from his Neighbour. For certainly Greatneſs and Elevation of Soul; as alſo the Virtues of Courteſie, Juſtice and Liberality, are much more agreeable to Nature and Right Reaſon, than Pleaſure, than Riches, than even Life it ſelf; to deſpiſe all which, and regard 'em as juſt nothing, when they come to be compar'd with the Publick Intereſt, is the Duty of a brave and exalted Spirit: whereas to rob another for one's own Advantage is (as has been ſhewn) more contrary to Nature, than Death, than Pain, or any other Evil whatever of that kind. Again, Thoſe Men live much more according to Nature, who ſuffer perpetual Troubles and Labours, for the Good and Preſervation, were it poſſible, of all Men; (like *Hercules* of old, whom Men, as a grateful Requital for his Benefits, report to be plac'd among the number of the Gods) than thoſe

[b] *Humane*, becauſe conſented to and acknowledg'd by all Mankind, and natural to them: *Divine*, becauſe whatever Right Reaſon commands us, God himſelf, who has given us that Reaſon, does in effect command us too.

[c] Ha-

thoſe who conſume all their Lives in Retirement, where they're not only free from Diſturbances and Vexations, but are furniſhed with all the Pleaſures and Conveniencies of Life; and have moreover the advantages of Strength and Comlineſs ſuperadded to them. And accordingly we find it to be ſo in effect, that all the moſt great and extraordinary Geniuſes, have prefer'd all the Troubles and Difficulties of the *former*, before the Quiet and Eaſe of this *latter* way of Living. From all which laid together it unanſwerably follows, That whoever lives agreeably to the Dictates of Nature, can never be guilty of Injuring another. [c] In fine, He that Injures another to do himſelf a Kindneſs, either thinks he does nothing that's contrary to Nature; or that the *doing an Injury* is a leſs degree of Evil, than Death, or Poverty, or Pain, or loſs of Children, Friends, or Relations. If he thinks that in Wronging and Abuſing of others, he doth not do any thing that is contrary to Nature; 'tis in vain to diſpute any longer with ſuch a one, who takes away from Man the diſtinguiſhing Part, and very Characteriſtick (as it were) of his Nature: But if he allows that 'tis indeed an Evil, only thinks that ſome others, ſuch as Poverty, Pain, or Death, may be worſe; he's groſly miſtaken in being of Opinion, That the Ills which touch nothing but the Body or Fortune, can be greater than thoſe which affect the Soul.

[c] Having laid down his general Rule or Meaſure, and prov'd the Truth of it from Reaſon, Laws, and the Examples of the greateſt Men; he now ſhews the Abſurdity of the two contrary Principles, which are the Grounds or Cauſes of Mens Injuring one another, *Viz. Either they think 'tis not contrary to Nature*, &c.

CHAP. VI.

The Intereſt of Particulars inſeparable from that of the whole Community. The Rule of not Wronging another for our own Advantage, extends not only to Relations, or Fellow-Citizens, but to all Mankind. The breaking of it, ruins all Juſtice, Liberality, &c. Several Caſes about it, put and reſolv'd. Tyrants no Members of Human Society.

[a] WE ſhould all of us therefore propoſe the ſame End, and every one think his own Intereſt in particular, to be the ſame with that of the Republick in general: which if each one endeavour to draw ſolely to himſelf, all Union and Agreement amongſt Men will be diſſolv'd. [b] And if *Nature* enjoyn us, That *every Man* ſhould deſire and procure the Advantage of another, whoever he be, tho' for no other reaſon than becauſe he is a Man; it neceſſarily follows, That *all* Men are joyn'd, by the ſelf-ſame Nature, in one common Intereſt: which if it be true, then all Men are ſubject, and live equally under the *ſame* Law of Nature: and if this be true too, then certainly they're forbid by that *ſame* Law of Nature, any ways to Injure or Wrong one another: But the firſt of theſe is undoubtedly certain, therefore the laſt muſt needs

[a] This is a Concluſion from the foregoing Diſcourſe; ſeeing for one Man to injure another is ſo very pernicious to Human Society; it follows, That no one ſhould do any thing for his own Intereſt, as diſtinct from that of the whole Community.

[b] To what he has prov'd in the former Chapter, *That the Injuring of others for our own Advantage is the ruin of Society, and conſequently moſt unnatural*; it might have been anſwer'd, *That this holds good only as to leſſer Societies, and in reſpect of our Kin*, &c. *but as for thoſe who are of a different Tribe or Country, we are under no ſuch Obligation of not Injuring*

needs be ſo likewiſe. For as to what is uſually ſaid by ſome Men, That they would not take any thing away from a Father, or Brother, for their own Advantage; but there is not the ſame reaſon for their *ordinary* Citizens; 'tis fooliſh and abſurd: For they thruſt 'emſelves out from partaking of any Priviledges, and from joyning in common with the reſt of their Citizens, for the Publick Good: An Opinion that ſtrikes at the very Root and Foundation of all Civil Societies. Others there are, who are ready to confeſs, That they ought to bear ſuch a Regard to Fellow-Citizens; but by no means allow of it in relation to Strangers: Now theſe Men deſtroy that univerſal Society of all Mankind; which if once taken away, *Kindneſs*, *Liberality*, *Juſtice* and *Humanity* muſt utterly periſh; which excellent Virtues whoever makes void, is chargeable with Impiety towards the immortal [c] Gods: For he breaks that Society, which they have eſtabliſh'd and ſettled amongſt Men; the cloſeſt Cement or Bond of which, is the being of Opinion, That for Men to Injure and Wrong one another for their private Intereſts, is an Evil that Nature is much more averſe from, than all thoſe which happen either to the *Body* or *Fortune*; [d] nay, and I might add to the *Mind* alſo, provided only they ben't contrary to Juſtice; for that one Virtue is as 'twere, a kind Miſtreſs and Queen of all the reſt.

But

ring them. He therefore here ſhews, in anſwer to this, the extent of this Obligation; and proves that 'tis not confin'd to thoſe of the ſame Family, City, or the like, but equally comprehends all Mankind; foraſmuch as all are alike ſubject to the ſame Law of Nature, *&c.*

[c] For tho' the Offence more immediately concerns the Perſons that are injur'd, yet 'tis alſo a Sin againſt God himſelf; ſince 'tis a Breach of his Laws and Commands.

[d] That is, To take away any thing from another, which is an Act of Injuſtice, is not only a greater Evil than any of Body

But what? (perhaps ſome Men will be apt to ſay) if a Wiſe Man be ready to periſh for Hunger, muſt not he take away Victuals from another; tho' a perfectly uſeleſs and inſignificant Fellow? Not at all; for Life it ſelf is not ſo dear to me, as a ſetled Reſolution of doing no Wrong for my private Advantage. But ſuppoſe this good Man, almoſt dead with Cold, ſhould have it in his power to take *Phalaris*'s Cloaths away, one of the moſt ſavage and inhuman of Tyrants; would not you have him to do it? There's no great difficulty in determining ſuch Caſes: For 'tis certain if you take away any thing from another, tho' never ſo uſeleſs and inſignificant a Creature, *for no other End but to Benefit your ſelf by it*; 'tis an inhuman Action, and plainly contrary to the Laws of Nature: But if you are one, who by Living will do very great Service to the Republick, or perhaps to the Society of Mankind in general, and *for that only reaſon take ſomething from another*; 'tis an Action that is not to be found much fault with. But in all other Caſes, every Man's bound to bear his own Misfortunes, rather than to get quit of 'em by Wronging his Neighbour. You'll ſay then, Is not it more contrary to Nature, *To Covet or Seize what belongs to another, than to be in Sickneſs, or Want, or any ſuch Evil? Yes; but withal 'tis as contrary to Nature, to abandon all Care of the publick Intereſt*; for 'tis a piece of Injuſtice: [e] From whence it follows, That an *honeſt*, *prudent* and *valiant* Perſon, whoſe Death would bring a great Diſadvantage on the Publick, may

Body or Fortune, but of Mind too, (*i. e.* than any other Vice) except only thoſe, which are Offences againſt Juſtice as well as it ſelf.

[e] 'Tis true the Laws of Nature, or Right Reaſon, forbid Men to take away ought from another, for their own Advantage; for it would be the Ruine and Diſſolution of Society,

may take from an idle and uſeleſs Citizen, ſuch things as are *neceſſary* for the Maintenance of Life, without any Offence againſt the Laws of Nature; which aim at the Preſervation and Intereſt of the Publick: *provided that* he don't make the Love of himſelf, and Conceit of his own more than ordinary Merits, an occaſion of Injuring and Oppreſſing others. For he'll perform but the Duties which Juſtice require of him, by thus taking care to be ſerviceable to the Publick, and upholding that (which I am often forc'd to mention) univerſal Society between all Mankind. As for the Queſtion propos'd about *Phalaris*, 'tis eaſily anſwer'd: For Tyrants aren't Members of Human Society; but rather its greateſt and moſt peſtilent Enemies; nor is it unnatural, if it lie in one's power, to *Rob* that Man, whom 'tis even a Virtue and a Glory to Murder. And 'twere heartily to be wiſh'd, That this whole deſtructive and impious Race, were utterly baniſh'd and excluded from amongſt Men. Juſt as we cut off thoſe Members of the Body, which have got no longer either Bloud or Spirits in 'em, and ſerve but to infect and corrupt the reſt; ſo ſhould thoſe Monſters, which under the Shape and Outſide of Men, conceal all the Savageneſs and Cruelty of Beaſts, be cut off, as it were, and ſeparated from the Body and Society of Mankind. [f] Of much the ſame Nature

ciety, which they eſpecially deſire to maintain: But if it ſhould at any time chance ſo to happen, that the doing of a Damage to any third Perſon, ſhould be neceſſary to the Support and Maintenance of that Society, then the doing it is not only allow'd, but commanded by the Law of Nature.

[f] Theſe Words ſhew what has been the Drift and Deſign of his Diſcourſe from *chap.* 4. [*See there Note* [b].] *viz.* To ſhew how we ſhould determin our ſelves in thoſe particular Caſes, where the Knowledge of our Duty depends ſo much upon Times and Circumſtances; as in the Inſtance there given of Murdering a Tyrant, tho' a familiar Friend. He now takes again the Thread of his Diſcourſe.

ture are all thoſe Queſtions, in which the Knowledge and Underſtanding of our Duty, depends upon the Knowledge of Times and Circumſtances.

CHAP. VII.

Cicero *will finiſh what* Panætius *left imperfect.* *All his Deciſions taken from this Principle,* That Honeſty alone, *or at leaſt* chiefly, is deſireable for its own ſake. *The true Meaning of* Panætius, *in making Profit and Honeſty be compar'd with one another.*

I Believe then *Panætius* would have diſcours'd upon ſuch things as theſe, but that ſome Accident, or perhaps other Buſineſs, put a ſtop to his Deſigns. However there are Precepts enough laid down in his former Books, to reſolve all Scruples and Doubts concerning 'em; from which we may learn, *What that is which is Wicked, and therefore to be avoided*; and what *that*, which therefore is not to be avoided, becauſe not at ſuch Times, and in ſuch Caſes wicked. But ſince I am going (as it were) to *crown* [a] a Work, which was left imperfect by the Author of it, tho' wanting but little of being brought to Perfection; I ſhall follow the Method of the *Geometricians:* And as they don't uſe to demonſtrate every thing, but demand to have ſome things allow'd 'em before-hand, by the help of which they more eaſily explain and demonſtrate their Deſigns: ſo I demand of you, Son *Mark*, if you can, to grant me this following *Poſtulatum*, *That nothing is deſirable for*

[a] He means *Panætius*'s Work about Duties, which (as before was obſerv'd) he left imperfect: and *Cicero* in this Book deſigns to add, what *Panætius* either would not, or for ſome reaſon could not finiſh.

[b] For

for it ſelf alone, but that which is Honeſt: Or however, if [b] *Cratippus* won't permit you to do that; yet at leaſt, I am ſure, you muſt grant me this which follows, *That Honeſty is deſirable for its own ſake, above all things in the World:* Either of the two is ſufficient for my Purpoſe, and the one is *probable* as well as the other, and [c] nothing elſe beſide them is ſo upon this Subject. And here in the firſt place we muſt do Right to *Panætius:* who does *not* ſay, (as indeed he ought not) That *that*, which *is* Profitable, could ever be contrary to that, which is Honeſt; but only *that*, which has the *appearance* of ſuch. And he often avows, That nothing is Profitable, but that which is Honeſt; and, That whatever is Honeſt is at the ſame time Profitable: and declares their Opinion, who firſt made a difference between thoſe two, to be the greateſt Evil that ever yet ſpread it ſelf abroad amongſt Men. Therefore when he ſpeaks of a Contrariety between them, he means an *appearing*, and not a *real* one; which he therefore laid down for one of the Heads of his Diſcourſe, not as tho' 'twere lawful for Men ever to give *Profit* the Preference before *Honeſty*; but only that they might be able to determin themſelves aright, if theſe two at any time ſhould ſeem to interfere and be inconſiſtent with one another. This Part therefore, which he has omitted, I ſhall now ſupply; not with any borrow'd Aſſiſtance from others, but purely (as we ſay) by my own Strength. For I never had any thing come to my Hands upon this Subject, that I could any ways approve of, ſince the time of *Panætius.*

[b] For being a *Peripatetick* he could only allow that, which immediately follows, *That Honeſty is much the moſt deſirable Good:* not, *That 'tis the only one,* which was the *Stoick* Opinion.

[c] *Viz.* Not the Opinions of *Epicurus, Hieronymus Rhodius,* &c.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

What we ought to do, when any thing presents it self under the appearance of Profit. Proof that whatever is Profitable must also be Honest, and whatever is Honest must also be Profitable. The contrary Opinion the great Source of all Wickedness. Infamy a certain Punishment of Villany. 'Tis a Wickedness even to deliberate whether Profit should be preferr'd before Honesty, or not. Nothing to be done out of hopes of being conceal'd.

WHenever [a] therefore any thing comes in our View, which carries the appearance of *Profit* along with it, we can't but immediately be somewhat affected with it: But if, upon taking a nearer View, we find there is any thing Base and Dishoneſt, in that which appear'd to be Profitable at firſt, 'tis our Duty to reject it: Which is not to deprive us of what is *really* Profitable, but only to let us underſtand, That nothing Diſhoneſt can poſſibly be ſuch. Now if nothing [b] be ſo *contrary* to Nature as Baſeneſs, and nothing ſo *agreeable* to Nature as true Profit, (which is certainly ſo; for ſhe always deſires

[a] Having laid down his *Poſtulatum, That Honeſty is the only,* or at leaſt *chief Good*: He proceeds now to draw ſome Concluſions from it; as firſt, *That however a thing may carry the appearance of Profit along with it, yet it is to be rejected if it have any Diſhoneſty in it*: becauſe it would deprive us of our Virtue or Honeſty, which is our *greateſt*, if not *ſole* Good; and conſequently however it may bring us Riches, Pleaſures, *&c.* muſt be *really* unprofitable. For 'tis impoſſible there ſhould be any Profit, where the Loſs is Honeſty.

[b] He ſhews that, *Whatever is truely Profitable muſt be Honeſt alſo*; ſince Profit and Diſhoneſty (being one of 'em *contrary*, and the other *agreeable* to Nature) can never meet both in the ſame Action: and therefore in rejecting Pleaſures, Riches

deſires what is Right, and Becoming, and Conſiſtent with it ſelf, and abhors the contrary) then it neceſſarily follows, *That whatever is Profitable can ne're have any Baſeneſs, or Diſhoneſty annex'd to it.* Again, [c] If we were born for Virtue or Honeſty, and this be the *only* deſirable Good; (as [d] *Zeno* would have it) or at leaſt *ſo much more*, ſo, than ev'ry thing elſe, as to outweigh all that can be put in the Scale againſt it; (which was *Ariſtotle*'s Opinion) it muſt certainly follow, *That Honeſty's the only*, or however *the greateſt Good:* Now whatever is Good muſt certainly be Profitable; from whence it follows, *That whatever is Honeſt muſt alſo certainly be Profitable.* 'Tis a villanous Error of ſome naughty Men therefore, when any thing ſtrikes 'em with *an appearance* of Profit, to ſeize it immediately and enjoy it as ſuch, without ever conſidering its relation to Honeſty. Hence come Aſſaſſinations, Poyſonings, and making of falſe Wills: Hence Stealing, Embezling the Publick Monies, Plundring and Oppreſſing both Citizens and Confederates: Hence the unſufferable Power and Inſolence, which ſome Men exerciſe, who are grown too great for the reſt of their Citizens: In fine, Hence Ambition, and the Deſire of Rule, have produc'd their moſt curſed and deplorable Effects, even in free Commonwealths; than which nothing can be thought of more odious and deteſtable. For Men look upon the fancied *Advantages* of things thro'

Riches or Kingdoms, *&c.* when accompany'd with Diſhoneſty, we don't reject what is *really* our Intereſt, but only that which *appears* to be ſo.

[c] Having ſhewn that, *Whatever is Profitable muſt alſo be Honeſt*; he here ſhews back again, *That whatever is Honeſt muſt alſo be Profitable*; upon which two Propoſitions all this Book is grounded.

[d] Founder of the *Stoick* Sect; ſirnam'd *Cittieus*, from *Cittium*, a Town in *Cyprus*, where he was born.

[e] He

thro' a falſe Perſpective; but as for the *Puniſhment* appendant to 'em, (I don't mean of the Laws, which they frequently break thro'; but of Baſeneſs and Diſhoneſty, which is much the more grievous) *that*, I ſay, they never ſo much as think upon at all. Such People therefore are impious and abominable, and deſerve to be excluded from all Society, who deliberate with themſelves, and make it Matter of Doubt, Whether they ſhould chooſe what they ſee to be Honeſt, or wilfully commit what they know to be a Villany. For the very making a Queſtion of ſuch a thing is Criminal, tho' one ſhould not proceed ſo far as to Execution. Thoſe things therefore ought not to be deliberated at all upon, where the very Deliberaiton is Scandalous and Diſhoneſt. [e] And whene're we do deliberate upon any kind of Subject, we ſhould never do any thing out of Hope, and Expectation, that our Actions will be conceal'd: For we ought to take this as a conſtant Maxim, if we pretend to have made any progreſs in Philoſophy, *That tho' we could hide from the Eyes of all Men, and even of the Gods themſelves, whatever we go about; yet we ſhould be careful to abſtain from the Vices of Coveteuſneſs and Injuſtice, of Laſciviouſneſs and Incontinency.*

[e] He now proceeds to a ſecond Concluſion, drawn from his general Principle laid down, which is, *Never to venture upon any thing that's Ill, out of Hopes of being conceal'd:* For if Diſhoneſty be of it ſelf the greateſt Evil, 'tis not the being conceal'd that can make it otherwiſe. This he illuſtrates by an excellent Fable, taken out of the ſecond Book of *Plato de Repub.* toward the beginning.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

He illuſtrates his Rule laid down in the former Chapter with the Story of Gyges, *taken out of* Plato. *He ſhews himſelf a Villain, who acknowledges he would do wickedly, if he could with Secrecy.*

TO this purpoſe *Plato* brings in that remarkable Story of [a] *Gyges:* A Gaping in the Earth being made by reaſon of ſome violent Showers, as the Story tells us, *Gyges* went down into the hollow of it, and found there lying a brazen Horſe, with a Door in his ſide. This he open'd, and looking in, diſcover'd a dead Man's Body, of an unuſual bulk, with a Ring of Gold upon one of its Fingers. This he pulls off, and puts it upon his own Finger; and then coming up, goes and joyns himſelf to the reſt of the Shepherds; (for he was Shepherd to the King at that time.) Here he obſerv'd, That upon turning the Stone toward the Palm of his Hand, he became inviſible to every body elſe, tho' others did not become ſo to him; and that upon turning it to its proper place, he immediatly became viſible again, as before. Making uſe therefore of this lucky Opportunity, he found out a way to enjoy the Queen, and by her aſſiſtance to Murder the King, his Lord and Maſter, and to make away thoſe, who might prove any hindrance or ſtop to his Deſigns; nor could any one poſſibly ſee or diſcover him in any of theſe Villa-

[a] He was a Friend and Favorite to *Candaules*, King of *Lydia*, who having an extraordinary beautiful Wife, was continually bragging of her, and would needs have *Gyges* look upon her naked. At which the Queen was ſo provok'd, as that ſhe perſwaded *Gyges* to murder *Candaules*; which he did, and obtain'd both his Wife and Kingdom after him. His performing this with very great Eaſe by the Wife's Aſſiſtance, gave *Plato* occaſion to invent this Fable.

Villanies; ſo that he quickly, by the help of this Ring, from a ſimple Shepherd became King of *Lydia*. Now had a truly Wiſe Man had the keeping of this Ring, he would not have thought himſelf ever the more privileg'd to be guilty of any Action that is wicked or deteſtable: For good Men deſire to be Virtuous and Honeſt, and not to be Secret, that ſo they may Sin without Danger. And here ſome Philoſophers, Men of more Honeſty, than Acuteneſs or Subtilty, cry out, *That this Story of* Plato's *is a meer Fiction*: As tho' he had ſaid either that it *really* was, or indeed *could be* done. No; the Meaning and Deſign of this Example of *Gyges*, and the Ring, is this: Suppoſe you could do any diſhoneſt Action, for the gratifying a luſtful, covetous or ambitious Deſire, ſo as that no one living could either know or ſuſpect it, but both Gods and Men muſt be kept perfectly in Ignorance; whether in ſuch caſe, would you do it, or no? *Ay, but*, ſay they, *this is an impoſſible Caſe*: tho' 'tis not perhaps ſo impoſſible neither: But that which I ask 'em is, *What they would do, ſuppoſing that poſſible, which they deny now to be ſo?* The manner of their Arguing is ſomewhat odd and illiterate; for they ſtill deny the Poſſibility of it, and that they will ſtand to; not it ſeems, underſtanding what the Force and true Import of this Suppoſition is. For when we put the Queſtion to 'em, Whether they would do ſuch an Action, or not, *ſuppoſing they could conceal it?* we don't ask 'em, Whether they *can conceal it, or not?* but put 'em, as 'twere, to the Rack or Inquiſition; that ſo, if they ſay *they would* gratifie ſuch Deſires upon aſſurance of Impunity, we may know 'em to be Villains by their own Confeſſion: But if they deny it, they may be forc'd to grant, that every baſe and diſhoneſt Action, is, barely as ſuch, to be ſhun'd and deteſted. But to re-

return to our Purpoſe, from which we have digreſſed.

CHAP. X.

Several Caſes, wherein Men doubt, whether that which appears to be Profitable be not Honeſt. The Caſe of Brutus *baniſhing* Collatinus; *of* Romulus *murdering his Brother* Remus. *Men may do what's for their own Advantage, provided they do no Injury to another. An excellent Saying of* Chryſippus *to that purpoſe. How far a Man may honeſtly, and ought to go, upon a Friend's Account: Illuſtrated by the Example of* Damon *and* Pinthias, *two loving Friends.*

[a] THere frequently happen a great many Caſes, which diſturb Mens Minds, and put 'em into ſuſpence, by the ſhew of ſome Profit which they ſeem to contain in 'em. *Not* when Men deliberate, Whether they ſhould leave and abandon their Honeſty, for the ſake of any Profit, be it never ſo great; (for that's a peice of Wickedneſs, as was before obſerv'd) *but*, Whether that Action, which appears to be Profitable, mayn't ſafely be done without tranſgreſſing againſt Honeſty. It might not ſeem

[a] He has ſhewn in the two laſt Chapters, That when an Action is *certainly Diſhoneſt*, 'tis impious to deliberate whether we ſhall do it, or not; or to hope for Secreſie, that ſo we might do it without Danger; whatever *ſeeming Profit*, ſuch as Kingdoms, *&c.* it may bring along with it. He now proceeds to determin ſome Caſes, wherein 'tis doubted whether the Action be Honeſt, or not. As *firſt*, The deſire of Honour, Empire, *&c.* is apt to blind Peoples Eyes, and either make 'em in ſuſpence about the Juſtice of an Action; as in the Caſe of *Brutus*: or even Act plainly contrary to Juſtice and Conſcience, as *Romulus* did. [b] The

ſeem honeſt in [b] *Brutus*, for Example, to depoſe *Collatinus* his Brother-Conſul from his Office; whoſe Wiſdom and Conduct he himſelf had made uſe of in Expelling the Kings. But ſince the chief Men in the Government had ſo order'd, That the Kindred of [c] *Superbus*, and very Name of the *Tarquins*, ſhould be baniſh'd the City, and no Marks or Footſteps be ſuffer'd to remain of Monarchical Government; 'twas not only Profitable, thus to conſult for the Safety of his Country, but ſo Honeſt too, as that *Collatinus* himſelf ought joyfully to have acquieſc'd in it. That which was Profitable therefore prevail'd, becauſe 'twas Honeſt withal; which had it not been, it could never have been Profitable. I can't ſay the ſame in relation to [d] that King, by whom this City was firſt founded: For a bare ſhew of Profit got the better over him, when he imbrew'd his Hands in the Blood of his own Brother, becauſe it ſeem'd more Profitable to Reign by himſelf, than in Conjunction with another: He broke all the Ties both of brotherly Affection and common Humanity, for the obtaining of an End, which

[b] The firſt Conſul of *Rome*, after the Expulſion of King *Tarquinius Superbus*. *L. Tarquinius Collatinus* was his Colleague, who had been Husband to *Lucretia*, and aſſiſting to *Brutus* in Expelling the King. However *Collatinus*, upon the Senate's commanding it, was depriv'd of his Conſulſhip, and expell'd the City by *Brutus*, only becauſe he was of the Name and Family of *Tarquinius Superbus*. *See* Livy, *and* Plutarch's *Poplicola*.

[c] The laſt King of the *Romans*, ſo call'd for his Pride and Haughtineſs. He was expell'd his Kingdom by *Brutus*, &c. and at laſt dy'd in Exile.

[d] *Romulus* the Founder of *Rome*. The Hiſtorians generally tell us, That as he was building the Walls of his City, his Brother *Remus* (who himſelf was founding a City juſt by) came to ſee his Work; and leaping with Scorn and Contempt over his new Wall, was murder'd by *Romulus* for that Affront. But *Cicero*, it ſeems, thought there was ſomething more in it, *viz. That he might Reign alone.*

which appear'd to be Profitable, and yet really was not so. He pretended however, for a shew of Honesty, that 'twas done to revenge an Affront of his Brother's, who leapt with Contempt over his new-rais'd Wall; a frivolous Excuse, and if true, not sufficient to serve his turn: By his Favour therefore, whether [e] *Quirinus* or *Romulus*, I can't but think he did a very ill Action. Not that Men are bound to be careless of their own Interests, or to part with that to others, which themselves stand in need of; but ev'ry one may do what he thinks for his own Advantage, provided it be no Injury or Prejudice to another Person. [f] *Chrysippus*, amongst a great many very good Sayings, has this one in particular: "He "that's running a Race ought to strive and endea-"vour, *says he*, as much as he is able, to get be-"fore his Antagonist; but must not trip his Heels "up, or thrust him aside with his Hands: So in "Life 'tis *allowable*, that every one should get what "is useful and convenient for his comfortable Sub-"sistence, but 'tis not *so* to take it away from other "People. [g] But 'tis no where more difficult to keep to one's Duty, than in the Affair of Friendship: For as

[e] A Name given by the *Romans* to *Romulus*, after he was suppos'd to be taken up into Heaven, and enroll'd in the number of the Gods.

[f] A *Stoick* Philosopher, one of the chief Upholders of that Sect, Scholar of *Cleanthes*, so famous for Logick as that 'twas usually said, If the Gods were to make use of Logick, 'twould be that of *Chrysippus*. *Cicero* often quotes him, and says, He was a Man of a sharp Wit, and very curious in all History. He left Seven Hundred Volumes, of which Three Hundred were Logick behind him, which are all lost. The *Athenians* had so great a Value for him, as that they put up his Statue in a place of their City call'd *Ceramicus*.

[g] As People may sometimes be drawn to do wickedly for the sake of Honour, Reigning alone, *&c.* so may they also for the sake of a Friend: concerning which he gives one short and excellent Rule; *Never to prefer*, &c.

[h] For

as not to do every thing that one handſomly can, for the ſake of a Friend; ſo to do any thing that's Baſe or Diſhoneſt, are both of 'em equally contrary to one's Duty. But there's one very ſhort and yet eaſie Rule, which may ſerve to direct us in all Caſes of this nature; and 'tis this, Never to prefer that which *only ſeems* Profitable, ſuch as Honours, Riches, Pleaſures, and the like, before a Kindneſs to a Friend: but never to do any thing for the ſake of a Friend, that's an Injury to the Publick, or a Breach of one's Oath, or other ſolemn Engagement: For whoever does this, 'tis impoſſible he ſhould ever be *a good Man.* Should ſuch a one therefore be Judge in his Friend's Caſe, he would not by any means be biaſs'd in his Favour, but would wholly lay aſide the Perſon of a Friend, as ſoon as he took upon him that of a Judge. Perhaps he might do ſo much for Friendſhip ſake, as to wiſh that his Friend may have the juſter Cauſe; and allow him as long time to ſpeak for himſelf, as [h] the Laws will permit of: but when he's to give in his Sentence [i] upon Oath, he'll then remember that he calls God to Witneſs, that is, (I conceive) his own [k] Soul and Conſcience, the divineſt thing that God has granted to Man. 'Tis a good Cuſtom therefore we have receiv'd from our Anceſtors, if we did but obſerve it, of *Deſiring the Judge to be as favourable to us, as his Oath will permit him.* The meaning of which Requeſt is no more

[h] For there was a Law amongſt the *Romans*, allowing the Plaintiff but ſo many Hours to ſpeak in; and the Defendant one more.

[i] For the Judges among the *Romans* were ſworn always to Judge impartially.

[k] For the Soul or Conſcience, according to the Ancients, is nothing but a kind of *God* in us, and the Voice of one is indeed the Voice of the other. Hence *Plato* call'd all wicked Men ἄθεοι Atheiſts, for acting in oppoſition to their Reaſon and Conſcience, that is, to the God dwelling within them.

[l] Be-

more than this, That he'd do ſo much for us, as I juſt now ſaid might very honeſtly be done by a Judge for his Friend. For if Men were oblig'd to do every thing preſently, that their Friends ſhould deſire of 'em; ſuch Agreements as theſe ought to be counted not Friendſhips, but dangerous Conſpiracies. I ſpeak here only of the ordinary ſort of Friendſhips; for [1] in thoſe which are found between perfectly Wiſe Men, there can be no danger of any ſuch thing. [m] *Damon* and *Pinthias*, two of *Pythagoras*'s Followers, were ſo cloſely united to one another in their Affections, that when *Dionyſius* the *Sicilian* Tyrant had appointed a time wherein one of 'em ſhould die, and the Party condemn'd had beg'd a few Days reſpite, wherein he might provide for his Children and Family, and recommend 'em to Somebody, who would take care of 'em after his Death; the other deliver'd up himſelf in his ſtead, voluntarily to die in the room of his Friend, if he did not accordingly make his Appearance. The Priſoner came back at the Day appointed, in order to his Execution: which the Tyrant perceiving, was ſo greatly amaz'd at their extraordinary Faithfulneſs, as to deſire he might be admitted a third Man in their Friendſhip. In Friendſhip therefore, when that which ſeems *Profitable* comes into competition with that which is *Honeſt*, the latter ſhould always be preferr'd before the former: but Faith and Religion ſhould be preferr'd before Friendſhip, whenever it demands any thing that is not reconcilable with Virtue and Honeſty. Which one Rule, if but carefully attended to, is ſufficient for the Purpoſe we are now upon; which is to diſcover, upon every occaſion, what are thoſe Duties which Friendſhip requires of us.

[1] Becauſe Men of perfect Wiſdom will never deſire any thing, but what is Honeſt and Reaſonable, one of another.

[m] A famous pair of Friends, and often mention'd as ſuch by ancient Writers. *See* Valer. Max. Plutarch, *&c.*

CHAP. XI.

In the Management of Publick Affairs, the appearance of Profit makes Men relinquish Honesty. Several Examples of it. Examples of the contrary, when the appearance of Profit is rejected for the sake of Honesty.

[a] THe appearance of Profit is also an occasion, in publick Affairs, of making false Steps, and doing several things that are contrary to Duty. Thus our Fathers, for Instance, did ill in destroying and razing of *Corinth*. The *Athenians* yet worse in making an Order, That the People of [b] *Ægina* should all have their Thumbs cut off, because they were powerful with their Navies at Sea. This, no question, was thought a profitable Decree; for *Ægina* seem'd to threaten their Port *Piræum*, by reason of its nearness: But nothing can truely be Profitable, that's Cruel; for the Nature of Man, which we ought to follow as the Guide of our Actions, of all things in the World is most opposite to Cruelty. Those do ill likewise, who banish all Strangers, and forbid 'em the City; as [c] *Pennus* did in the preceeding Age, and [d] *Papius* but late-

[a] Having shewn how far the Love of Empire, Friends, *&c.* draws particular Men from their Duty: he now goes to shew, How whole Republicks have been drawn to what is ill, by the appearance of some pretended Profit.

[b] A little Island in the *Sinus Saronicus*, almost over-against the *Piræum*, a Port of *Athens*, somewhat distant from the City, but joyn'd to it by a mighty Wall, built by *Themistocles*.

[c] *M. Junius Pennus*, a Tribune of the People about the Year of *Rome* 657. 'Tis quoted by some under the Name of *Lex Petronia*.

[d] *C. Papius*, Tribune of the People *An. U. C.* 688, two Years before *Cicero* was Consul.

[e] In

lately. For tho' 'tis but fair, that he who's no Citizen ſhould not have the Priviledges of thoſe who are; (which was made into a [c] Law by two very wiſe Conſuls, *viz. Craſſus* and *Scævola*) yet wholly to exclude 'em from having any thing to do there, [f] is plainly againſt the Dictates and Laws of Humanity. And as theſe things are bad in the Government of a State, ſo nothing's more ſplendid and glorious on the other hand, than for that, which appears to be the Intereſt of the Publick, to be rejected in the compariſon with Juſtice and Honeſty. Our own Commonwealth can abundantly ſupply us with [g] Examples of this nature, as on other occaſions, ſo more eſpecially in the ſecond *Punick* War: when after the loſs of that fatal Day at *Cannæ*, it ſhew'd more courage and bravery of Reſolution, than ever it had done upon the greateſt Succeſſes. There was not any ſign of Faintheartedneſs ſeen, nor ever any mention of Peace once heard of: ſo great is the glory and brightneſs of Honeſty, as that it utterly overwhelms the appearance of Intereſt. [h] The *Athenians* knowing they ſhould never be able to reſiſt the *Perſians*, reſolv'd by conſent to abandon their City, and carrying their Wives and their Children to [i] *Troezene*, to defend by Sea the Liberties of *Greece*: and when one *Cyſilus* try'd to perſuade 'em not to leave their Ci-

[c] In the Year of *Rome* 658, call'd, *Lex Licinia & Mucia*. *See Note on chap.* 17. *of this Book.*

[f] This is true, provided thoſe Strangers live peceably under the Government, and no ways prejudice or endanger the State; for then to let 'em live there is a thing *innoxiæ utilitatis*: Otherwiſe there are ſeveral Caſes, wherein 'tis allowable to expel Strangers from a City.

[g] Some Examples of the contrary Practice, of thoſe that would not ſuffer a ſeeming Advantage to make them do any thing contrary to their Duty.

[h] *See* Plutarch's *Life of* Themiſtocles.

[i] A City of *Peloponneſus*, in Alliance with the *Athenians*.

City, but receive *Xerxes* into it, they took him and ſton'd him. Not but that the Man would have drawn 'em to a thing, which was *ſeemingly* Profitable: but that ſeeming Profit was *really* none at all, being contrary to Honeſty. *Themiſtocles*, [k] after that notable Victory in the *Perſian* War, told all the People in a general Aſſembly, That he had thought of a thing, *which* might prove of great Uſe and Advantage to the Publick, but *which* 'twas not convenient that every body ſhould know of: whereupon he deſir'd they'd appoint him ſome Perſon, to whom he might ſafely communicate it in ſecret. *Ariſtides* was immediately appointed accordingly: *Themiſtocles* told him, *'Twould be no hard matter to fire in private the* Spartan *Fleet, which was laid up at* [l] Gytheum; *whereby the whole Power of that Republick muſt neceſſarily be ruin'd. Ariſtides*, as ſoon as he knew the Buſineſs, went back into the Aſſembly, (which was big with Expectation of what he had to ſay) and let 'em all know, *That* Themiſtocles's *Counſel indeed was Advantagious, but by no means Honeſt or Creditable for the City.* The *Athenians* therefore, thinking what was Diſhoneſt not to be truly Profitable, rejected immediately the whole Propoſal, without having heard ſo much as what it was, upon nothing elſe but this Report of *Ariſtides*. How much better and more honeſtly did they do, than we; who can ſuffer even Pirates to live free from Moleſtation, and yet demand Tribute of our [m] Confederates and Allies?

[k] At the Iſland *Salamis*, mention'd *chap.* 18. *Book* 1.

[l] A Port of the *Lacedæmonians*, where their Fleet was laid up after the famous Battel at *Salamis*.

[m] 'Tis probable he means thoſe of *Marſeilles*, and King *Deiotarus*; whom *Cæſar* either depriv'd of their Liberty, or made pay great Sums of Money, for taking part with *Pompey* in the Civil War.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

The Opinion, that a thing may be Profitable, tho' 'tis not Honeſt, very pernicious. A Caſe put, wherein 'tis doubted, Whether that, which ſeems to be Profitable, be Honeſt or no. *The Arguments on either ſide, of two Philoſophers, differing in their Opinions. The Difference between* to Conceal, *and* not to Tell. *The Society of Mankind, how far it obliges.*

LEt us lay down this therefore as a ſtanding Maxim, *That whatever is Diſhoneſt can never be Profitable: no, not tho' we ſhould arrive at the full poſſeſſion of all thoſe Advantages, which we propos'd to obtain by it.* Nay, this very Perſuaſion, *That a thing may be Profitable, tho' 'tis Baſe and Diſhoneſt*, is one of the greateſt Misfortunes and Calamities, that could ever have happen'd to the Life of Man. [a] But there often fall out (as was before obſerv'd) ſome peculiar Caſes, wherein that which is Honeſt has *a ſeeming* Repugnance with that which is Profitable; ſo that it requires ſome farther Conſideration, to know whether this Repugnance be certain and real, or whether they mayn't be brought to a fair Agreement. To this Head belong ſuch Examples as theſe: Suppoſe we, for Inſtance, an honeſt Merchant, when Corn was ſcarce and extreamly dear at *Rhodes*, to bring a large quantity thither from *Alexandria*; and withal to know, That a great many Ships, well laden with Corn, were in their way thither from the ſame City: Should he tell this now to the People of *Rhodes*, or ſay nothing of

[a] He now propoſes ſeveral particular Caſes, wherein the Philoſophers themſelves diſpute; whether Profit and Honeſty be oppoſite, or not.

of it, but ſell his own Corn at the beſt Rates he could? We ſuppoſe him a Virtuous and Honeſt Man, and don't here diſcourſe of the Deliberation of one, that would hold his peace if he thought 'twere Diſhoneſt; but of one, that doubts whether it be Diſhoneſt, or not. In ſuch ſort of Caſes [b] *Diogenes* the *Babylonian*, a Man of great Credit and Note among the *Stoicks*, is of one Opinion; and *Antipater* his Scholar, an extraordinary ſmart and ingenious Man, of juſt the contrary. *Antipater* would have every thing be plainly told, that ſo the Buyer might be ignorant of nothing in what he buys, that the Seller himſelf knows of: *Diogenes* thinks it enough in the Seller, to tell the Faults of his Goods as far as the Laws require it; and, as for the reſt, tho' to uſe no Cozening, yet, ſince he's come with deſign to ſell 'em, to get as much Money for 'em as ever he can. *Here*, may the Merchant ſay, *I have brought my Corn; I have expos'd it to ſale; and ſell it no dearer than other People do*; (nay perhaps he'll ſay *cheaper*, there being now a greater quantity, than there was before) *and pray where is now the Wrong I have done to any Body?* *Antipater* argues upon a different Principle: *What ſay you*, (quoth he) *are not you oblig'd to do Good to Mankind; and be ſerviceable to the Society of all Men in general?* [c] *Were not you born under ſuch an Obligation? And had not you ſuch Principles ingrafted into you by Nature, which 'tis always your Duty to follow and obey,*

[b] Scholar of *Zeno* the *Zidonian*, born at *Seleucia* a Town near *Babylon*, and thence call'd the *Babylonian*. He was a wiſe Politician as well as a Philoſopher; and was ſent by the *Athenians*, together with *Critolaus* and *Carneades*, to manage their Buſineſs with the *Roman* Senate. Here he got acquainted with *Africanus* the Elder, the Wiſe *Lelius*, &c. who all delighted to hear his Lectures. *See* Cic. de Orat. *Book* 2. *chap.* 37.

[c] *See Book* 1. *chap.* 7, 9. *Book* 3. *chap.* 5, 6.

[a] *Di-*

obey, that your ſingle Intereſt ſhould be the ſame with that of all Men; and again that of all Men ſhould be the ſame with yours? And will you, *this notwithſtanding, conceal from the People what Plenty there is a-coming, the knowledge of which might be of ſo great Uſe and Advantage to 'em? Diogenes* perhaps will reply upon him thus: *'Tis one thing to* conceal, *and another* not to tell; *nor can I be ſaid to* conceal *from you now, tho' I* don't tell you, *what the Nature and Eſſence of the Gods is, and what the Happineſs or chief Good of Men; things which 'twould do one much more Kindneſs to know, than that Quantities of Corn are like to be here ſhortly. But if any thing be Profitable for you to hear, 'tis none of my Duty to come and tell it you immediately. Nay but you'll find that it is your Duty,* (may the other reply) *if you'll pleaſe but to remember, That there's ſuch a kind of thing, as a mutual Relation, and Society amongſt all Men. Well, I do remember it;* (may the other reply again) *but, I pray you, is that Society of ſuch a Nature, as that no Man, who lives in it, muſt have any thing that's his own? If this be ſo, then there's no more* ſelling, *but we muſt e'en* give every thing away that we have.

CHAP. XIII.

Another Caſe put, Whether he that ſells a bad Houſe, be oblig'd to tell the Purchaſer 'tis ſo? *The Arguments* pro *and* con *of* Antipater *and* Diogenes. Cicero's *Determination of it, as alſo of that in the foregoing Chapter. What 'tis properly to Conceal.*

YOu plainly perceive, that 'tis never once ſaid in all this Diſpute, *Tho' ſuch a thing's not Honeſt, yet I'll do it becauſe 'tis Profitable:* but the [a] one ſide de-

[a] *Diogenes.*

defends the Expediency of it, *no farther than 'tis Honeſt*; and the [b] other denies that it ought to be done, *becauſe 'tis not Honeſt*. Again, Suppoſe a good Man were to ſell an Houſe, becauſe of ſome Defects which he himſelf knows of, tho' others do not: Suppoſe it to be unhealthy, for Example, but eſteem'd quite the contrary; Serpents to annoy all the Chambers of it, but no body to know this; made of bad Materials, and ready to fall, but no one to diſcern this except the Owner only: I demand, if he ſells this for more than he expected, and don't tell the Buyer of theſe ſeveral Faults, whether he don't act like a Knave and a Villain? *Yes undoubtedly*, anſwers *Antipater*: *For what is this better, than* not to ſet a Man right, when he is out of his Way, *(which at* Athens *was puniſh'd with publick* [c] *Execrations) thus to ſuffer the Buyer, as it were, to fall headlong, and run thro' a Miſtake into very great Miſchiefs. Nay, 'tis ſomething worſe yet than* not to ſhew a Man his Way; *for 'tis wilfully and deſignedly to draw him into Miſchief.* *Diogenes* on the contrary vindicates the Seller: *Pray did he force you* (ſays he) *to buy his Houſe, when did he ſo much as adviſe you to it? He ſet a thing to ſale, which he did not like; and here you have bought a thing, which you* did *like. For if thoſe Men, who make it be publiſh'd to the World,* Here's a very good Houſe, and very well built, to be ſold; *are not counted Deceivers, tho' the Houſe be not* good, *nor at all* well built; *how much leſs ſhould thoſe who don't commend their Houſe at all? For where-ever the Buyer has the free uſe of his Judgment, what Fraud can there be upon the Seller's part?* [d] *And if a Man is not bound to make good all he ſaid, would you have*

[b] *Antipater.*

[c] A kind of Curſe or Excommunication proclaim'd ſolemnly by the Prieſts. *See* Plut. *and* Corn. Nep. *Life of* Alcibiad.

[d] When, for Example, he cauſes it to be publiſh'd, *Here's*

a

have him make good what he did not ſay? Beſides What, I beſeech you, could be more odd and fooliſh, than for the Seller to tell the Faults of his own Wares? Or what more ridiculous, than for the Cryer to proclaim by the Proprietor's Order, An infectious, peſtilential Houſe to be ſold? And thus you ſee there are ſome doubtful Caſes, in which on the one hand Men argue for Honeſty, and on the other are Advocates for Profit; ſo far as to ſhew, that 'tis not only *Honeſt* to do that which is Profitable, but even *Diſhoneſt* to neglect and omit it: And this is that *ſeeming* Oppoſition we ſpoke of, which often falls out between Profit and Honeſty. [c] But let us now proceed to determin theſe Caſes; for we did not propoſe 'em for meer Queſtion ſake, but that we might give 'em a fair Deciſion. I am then of Opinion, That the Corn-Merchant ought not to have conceal'd from the *Rhodians*, nor this Seller of his Houſe from the Purchaſers of it, the ſeveral things that are mention'd in their Caſes. 'Tis true *not to tell* a thing, *is not* properly *to conceal* it; but not to tell that, which People are concern'd to know, meerly for the ſake of ſome Advantage to your ſelf, I think *is*: And there's no body but knows what *concealing* this is, and who they are that make a Cuſtom of it: I am ſure not your plain, ſincere, ingenuous, honeſt and good ſort of People; but rather your ſhifting, ſly, cunning, deceitful, roguiſh, crafty, foxiſh, jugling kind of Fellows. And muſt it not neceſſarily be Unprofitable for any Man, to lye under this, and a much longer Catalogue, of ſuch black and moſt odious Names of Vices?

a very good Houſe to be ſold; he is not bound to anſwer for its Goodneſs, if it ſhould prove otherwiſe.

[c] Having propos'd theſe two Caſes, he now proceeds to the Deciſion of 'em; and thinks the two were bound to tell all to the Purchaſers; becauſe ſuch concealing is a ſhifting, ſly, deceitful, *&c.* and by conſequence an unprofitable Trick.

CHAP. XIV.

Of those, who are so far from telling the Faults of their Wares, as that they invent Lies to make 'em appear the better. An Example of this kind. Aquilius's *Definition of Knavery, or* Dolus malus.

AND [a] if those Men are thus blamable, who keep the Faults of their things secret; what shall we think of those, who add down-right Lying to it? C. *Canius*, a *Roman* Knight, one that lov'd to be pleasant, and a pretty good Scholar, removing to [b] *Siracuse* for the sake of *Retirement* and not of *Employment*, (as he was us'd to say) gave out he had a great mind to buy some Gardens, whither he might invite his Friends and Acquaintance, and enjoy their Conversation without being interrupted. This coming abroad, there was one *Pythius*, a Goldsmith or Banker at *Siracuse*, who told him, Indeed he had no Gardens to sell, but such as he had were at *Canius*'s Service, if he pleas'd to make use of 'em, as much as tho' they were his own: And withal he desir'd him to come next day, and take a Dinner with him there. When *Canius* had promis'd him to come accordingly, what does he do but send immediately for some Fishermen, (having Interest enough, by reason of his Calling, with all sorts of People) and desires 'em the next day to fish before his Gardens; giving 'em their Instructions

[a] Having shewn that those who conceal are to blame; he proceeds to those who invent plain Lies for the sake of a little seeming Advantage; who must needs be much more faulty.

[b] The chief City of the Island *Sicily*, a very pleasant and delightful place; taken by the *Romans* under the Conduct of *Marcellus*, in the second *Punick* War.

A

ſtructions about what he'd have 'em do. *Canius* came at the time appointed, and *Pythius* had provided a very ſplendid Entertainment for him: Juſt before the Garden, where he could not but take notice of it, was a company of Fiſher-boats; and every one of the Men in particular brought the Fiſh he had caught, and laid 'em down before *Pythius*. *How now* Pythius! (ſays *Canius* to him) *what all theſe Fiſh here? All theſe Boats? O lack, Sir,* (ſays t'other) *that's no great Wonder; all the Fiſh that ſupply the City muſt be taken here: this is their common Water; none of theſe People could ever live, if it were not for my Houſe.* *Canius* immediately was all on fire, and beg'd of *Pythius* that he would ſell him the Place. He pretended abundance of Unwillingneſs at firſt; but at length (to make ſhort of it) was brought to a Compliance. *Canius* buys it, together with all that belong'd to it; and being very Rich, and deſirous of the Purchaſe, gives as much for it as *Pythius* demanded. Security's given and taken for the Money, and the whole Bargain finally brought to a concluſion. The next Day *Canius* invites ſome Acquaintance thither, and he comes himſelf ſomewhat earlier than ordinary; but ſees not one of the Fiſhermens Boats there. Hereupon he enquires of one of the next Neighbours, whether or no that were any Holiday with the Fiſhermen; becauſe he ſaw none of 'em thereabouts. Not that I know of, replies the other; but they none of 'em ever uſe to fiſh here, and therefore I wonder'd what the matter was Yeſterday. This put *Canius* into a lamentable Fret; but how could he remedy himſelf? [c] For *Aquillius*, my Collegue and familiar Friend,

[c] A noble and learned *Roman*, oftentimes mention'd and commended by our Author, whoſe Collegue he was in the Prætorſhip. He was excellently skill'd in the Civil Law, which he learn'd of *Muc. Scævola*, the High-Prieſt. There was no Action

Friend, had not then publiſh'd his Court-forms about Knavery; upon which when he was ask'd what he meant by the word *Knavery*, he anſwer'd, [a] *The making ſhew of one thing, while one's doing another*: a very perſpicuous and plain Definition, as indeed he was a Man very happy at Defining. *Pythius* then, and all others whatever, that make ſhew of one thing, and yet do the contrary, are perfidious, wicked and knaviſh Raſcals. 'Tis impoſſible therefore that any of their Actions ſhould ever be Profitable, when they're under the ſcandal of ſuch a number of filthy and deteſtable Vices.

Action againſt a Man, it ſeems, for this ſort of Knavery before his time. The Occaſion of his making theſe *Formulæ See in* Valer. Max. *Book* 8. *chap.* 2.

[a] Theſe words muſt be taken in an ill Sence: For all *making Shew*, &c. is not *Knavery*, but only that which is joyn'd *cum Malitia*, with an ill Deſign of Cheating, *&c.*

CHAP. XV.

All Hypocriſie and Diſſimulation to be taken away. Knavery, or Dolus malus *puniſh'd by the* Roman *Laws; and Judgments of Equity. A remarkable Action of* Scævola's. He is not a Wiſe Man, who is not Wiſe for his own Advantage; *in what Sence true. A truly Good Man is not content with being as Juſt, as the Laws require. A Definition of ſuch a One. He's very hard to be found.*

IF then this Definition of *Aquillius* be good, all Hypocriſie and Diſſimulation muſt be baniſh'd from amongſt Men; ſo that no honeſt Man will be guilty of either of 'em, for the ſake of buying or ſel-

ſelling to his greater Advantage. [a] Nay this *Knavery* or *Cozenage* has always been puniſh'd by the Laws of the City: witneſs the XII Tables about the Caſe of Guardianſhip; and *Lætorius*'s Law about the Over-reaching of *Minors*. Nay where there was nothing of a Law againſt it, 'twas nevertheleſs puniſhable in thoſe Judgments of Equity, the Form of which was, *Ex fide bona agitur, That all things be done faithfully and honeſtly.* And the ſame ſort of words are in all other Judgments; as when a Wife, for Example, enters an Action for her Dowry, upon a Divorce from her Husband, *Melius Æquius, That things be ſettled better and more equitably:* when any thing had been mortgag'd and pawn'd to another, *Ut inter bonos bene agier, That among honeſt Men there be nothing done, but only that which is Honeſt.* And could there poſſibly be any Knavery allow'd of in that, where the very Court-form was, *Melius Æquius, For the better and more equitable ſetling of things?* Or any thing done thro' Deceit and Roguery, where theſe words are publickly read in Court, *Inter bonos bene agier, That amongſt honeſt Men there may be nothing done, except that which is Honeſt?* Now there's ſomething of this Knavery, as *Aquillus* ſays, in all falſe Shews and hypocritical Pretences: Lying therefore ſhould wholly be baniſh'd from all ſorts of Buſineſs, and Commerce in the World: Nor ſhould Sellers bring People to bid high for their Goods, and enhance their Prizes; nor Purchaſers others to bid under-value, and ſo beat 'em down lower: but each of 'em, if they come to ſpeak about a Bargain, ſhould ſay at a

[a] He proceeds from Natural Honeſty, or the Laws of Right Reaſon, to the Laws of the City; and ſhews that Knavery was puniſhable by thoſe; tho' not in all, yet in ſeveral Caſes.

[b] Men-

a word what he'll give and take. [b] *Quintus Scævola*, the Son of *Publius*, going to buy an Eſtate, deſir'd the Owner to tell him at one word, what 'twas he muſt have for it: the Seller did ſo; and *Scævola* told him, He thought 'twas worth more than what he had demanded for it; and accordingly gave him a thouſand Crowns over. Now there's no one but will grant this was done like an *Honeſt*, but they will not allow 'twas like a *Prudent* Man; any more, than if he had ſold a thing for leſs, than he might have had for it. Here now, you may ſee, is that pernicious Opinion, thus to make a Diſtinction between *Prudence* and *Honeſty*. *Ennius* has a Saying to this purpoſe, *That he would not give a Farthing for a Prudent Man, that could not be prudent for his own Advantage*; to which I am ready to ſet my Hand, if he and I can agree upon one and the ſame Meaning of the word *Advantage*. I find that [c] *Hecaton*, a *Rhodian* Philoſopher, and Scholar of *Panætius*, in his Book about *Offices*, which he wrote to [d] *Q. Tubero*, hath laid this down as a Wiſe Man's Duty, Firſt to conform to the Laws, and Cuſtoms, and Practiſes of his Country; and, when he hath done that, to make the beſt Improvement he can of his Eſtate: ſince we ought to ſeek Riches not only for our ſelves, but our Children, Friends, Relations and eſpecially the Commonwealth; whoſe publick Riches muſt principally conſiſt in the Wealth

[b] Mention'd before, *chap.* 32. *Book* 1.

[c] Mention'd again afterwards, *chap.* 23. He flouriſh'd about the Year of *Rome* 640. All his Works are loſt.

[d] A noble *Roman*, Grandſon to *Paullus Æmilius*, and Nephew to the Younger *Africanus*; belov'd of *Lælius*, *Scævola*, and all the great Men of that time. He was Hearer of the famous *Panætius*, a Letter of whoſe to him is mention'd by our Author; who often commends him for a Man of Wiſdom, Induſtry and Learning. He was a great Admirer of the *Stoick* Philoſophy, which loſt him the Pretorſhip. *See* Orat. pro Muræna, *chap.* 63.

For

Wealth and Stock of its particular Members. This Man can by no means approve of that Action, which I juſt now mention'd of *Quintus Scævola*; and there's nothing, he tells us, that he'd ſcruple to do for his own Advantage, if it be but permitted and allow'd of by the Law; [e] for which I think he does not much deſerve to be thank'd or commended. If then to make pretence of that which never was, and cunningly to diſſemble the real Truth, be pieces of Knavery; there are but very few Actions that are altogether free from it: And if he alone be an honeſt Man, *Who does all the Good he can, and does no Injury to any body*; 'twill be no eaſie matter to find one in the World. The Reſult of what has been ſaid is this, To be Knaviſh and Wicked can never be Profitable, becauſe 'tis attended with Baſeneſs and [f] Diſhonour; and it *always* muſt be Profitable to be Virtuous and Good, becauſe it *always* is Honeſt and Creditable.

[e] For he that has no more regard to Honeſty, than juſt what the Laws of the Publick require; and will ſcruple to do nothing, ſo as he can eſcape their Cognizance, can never be an Honeſt and Good Man. The Laws and Dictates of Nature and Right Reaſon, not only of the City he dwells in, ought to be the Rule of an honeſt Man's Actions; theſe being only a Shadow and faint Draught of that perfect Juſtice, to which we are led by the other. *See chap.* 17.

[f] He does not mean that outward Diſhonour, which Men draw upon themſelves by their wicked Actions, when they come to be known; (for that is avoided when the Action is conceal'd, whereas even then 'tis infamous to be Wicked) but he means the inward Reproach of Mens Conſciences, and the real Scandal and Diſhonour that it is, for a Man to do ſuch things as are unworthy of, and diſagreeable to his Reaſon. This follows every wicked Action, tho' kept never ſo ſecret; and can't be avoided but by living ſuch a Life, as becomes the great Rule of our Actions, Reaſon.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVI.

The Care taken by the Romans, *to make the Seller tell the Faults of the thing to be ſold. An Example or two of Caſes of this nature.*

[a] IN the Matter of buying and ſelling Eſtates, 'tis provided amongſt us by the Civil Conſtitutions, That he who's the Seller ſhould tell all the Faults, that he knows of, to the Purchaſer. For the XII Tables ordering no more than this, That the Seller ſhould be bound to make good thoſe Faults, which were expreſly mention'd by word of Mouth in the Bargain; and which whoever deny'd was to pay double Damages: The [b] Lawyers have appointed a Puniſhment for thoſe, who themſelves don't diſcover the Defects of what they ſell. For they ſo decreed, *That if the Seller of an Eſtate, when he made the Bargain, did not tell all the Faults in particular, that he knew of it; he ſhould afterwards be bound to make 'em good to the Purchaſer. Titus Claudius Centumalus* (to give an Example) had a Houſe that ſtood upon the *Cœlian* Hill, and hindred the Augurs as they made their Obſervations from the [c] *Capitoline* Mount: who therefore gave him

[a] He proceeds to ſome particulae Caſes, wherein Knavery was puniſhable by the Civil Laws: Such as are concealing the Faults of an Houſe, or the like.

[b] For tho' the XII Tables were the Ground and Foundation of the *Roman* Law; yet the Learned by their Interpretations, Inferences from 'em, by their *Formulæ* apply'd to particular Caſes, or the like; added a great many new things to 'em, which paſs'd for a Rule in Judgments, as well as the XII Tables.

[c] For making their Obſervations from the flights of Birds, and that many times at a very great diſtance, 'twas neceſſary they ſhould have ſome high Place, and that nothing ſhould be in the way to hinder their Proſpect.

[d] Son

him orders to pull that down, which was ſuch an hindrance to their Buſineſs. Inſtead of this *Claudius* puts a Bill over the Door, *That the Houſe was to be ſold*; and quickly put it off, *P. Calpurnius Lanarius* being the Man that bought it. The Augurs in a ſhort time ſent him the ſame Orders, and he accordingly took care to perform them. But afterwards coming to underſtand, That *Claudius* had not ſet the Houſe to ſale, till after he had been order'd by the Augurs to demoliſh it; he brought in againſt him an Action at Law, *To receive ſuch Satisfaction, as in Conſcience and Equity he was bound to make him.* *Marcus Cato*, the Father of him that is now living (for as others are diſtinguiſh'd by the Names of their Fathers, ſo he that begot this incomparable Perſon ſhould be nam'd from his Son) ſat as Judge in the Caſe; and gave this Sentence upon the whole matter, That ſince *Claudius* knew this Inconvenience before-hand, and did not diſcover it when he ſold the Eſtate, he was oblig'd in Equity to make it good to the Purchaſer. He judg'd it therefore to be a part of Honeſty, That the Seller ſhould fairly declare to the Buyer, all the Faults which he knows in the thing to be ſold. If then this Judgment were juſt and equitable, neither the Merchant that brought the Corn, nor the ſuppoſed Seller of the infectious Houſe did well in concealing what either of 'em knew. But all the particular ſorts of Concealing could never be taken notice of by the Laws of the City; however ſuch as could were very carefully provided againſt. *M. Marius Gratidianus*, a [d] Kinſman of mine, had ſold an

[d] Son of one *M. Gratidius* of *Arpinum*, whoſe Siſter was Married to *Cicero*'s Grandfather, therefore he calls him his Kinſman. He was adopted by *M. Marius*, Brother of him that was ſeven times Conſul. He was afterward kill'd by *Sylla*'s Order, having been of *Marius*'s Party againſt him.

an Houſe to *Sergius Orata*, which he had bought of the ſame not many Years before. The Houſe, it ſeems, [e] paid a Duty to *Sergius*, which *Marius* never once mention'd in the Bargain. The Buſineſs came at laſt to a Suit in Law, where [f] *Lucius Craſſus* took part with *Orata*, and [f] *Anthony* with *Gratidianus*. *Craſſus* inſiſted very much upon the Law, which ſays, That the Seller ſhall make good thoſe Faults, which he himſelf knew of, and yet conceal'd 'em from the Buyer: *Anthony* on the other ſide argu'd for Equity, That *Sergius* could not but know that Incumbrance, who had ſold the Houſe himſelf but a little while before; and therefore what need was there of telling him of it? That he could not complain of being any ways trick'd upon, ſince he knew very well the condition of what he bought. I have brought you theſe Inſtances only to let you ſee, That theſe cunning ſort of Men were ne're approv'd of by our Anceſtours.

[e] A thing in Law is ſaid, *Servire alicui*, when ſome one has a Right of uſing it ſome way, or hindring ſome thing about it, *&c.* As I may be ſaid to have a *Servitus* upon a Man's Houſe or Ground, when I can of Right demand a Way thro' it; or hinder from Building higher, *&c.* leſt he ſhould hinder my Proſpect.

[f] The two famous Orators mention'd above, and brought in ſpeaking in his *de Oratore*; where he mentions this very Cauſe.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVII.

The different Methods us'd by Law and Philoſophy, for the rooting out of Knavery. Treachery to ſet up Traps, tho' one don't drive the Beaſts into 'em. How the Law of Nature differs from the Civil. The Excellence of the Roman *Civil Laws. The Extent of that Expreſſion,* Ex fide bona. *Knaviſh Cunning very different from true Prudence. How the Laws provide againſt Fraud in Selling of Slaves. Nature forbids one Man to make his Gain of another's Ignorance. The ill Effects of falſe Prudence.*

BUt [a] the Laws take one way to root theſe Frauds out, and Philoſophers another; the *former* medling no further with them, than as they break out into open Acts, and may (as 'twere) be laid hold on by the Hands of Juſtice: the latter endeavouring to hinder their breaking out, and to prevent them by Precepts of Wiſdom and Reaſon. Reaſon therefore requires of us, That we do nothing Treacherouſly, nothing Deceitfully, nothing meerly by outward Shews and falſe Pretences. Now is it not Treachery to ſet up a Trap, tho' one does not raiſe and purſue the Beaſts into it; for the ſimple Creatures of themſelves will run into it, without being driven? Juſt ſo you offer an Houſe to be ſold, becauſe of ſome Faults which you know to be in it; and

[a] The Difference between the Laws and Philoſophers, as to taking away Wickedneſs, is cheifly this: That thoſe can reſtrain the outward Actions only, but theſe inform the Mind and Underſtanding: thoſe can only puniſh the actual Crimes of Delinquents, but theſe by informing the Judgment, and improving the Reaſon, take care to prevent the Commiſſion of 'em; and keep Men from Vice out of a Love of Virtue, whereas the Laws can only terrifie them from it by fear of Puniſhment.

[b] The

and put up your Bill, as it were like a Trap, in which ſome unwary ſort of Body will be taken. I know *that*, at preſent, the depravation of Manners, and prevalence of evil Cuſtom, have made this be counted neither Baſe nor Diſhonourable; and *that* 'tis tolerated by the Laws and Conſtitutions of the *Publick*, but I am ſure 'tis not tolerated by the Laws of Nature. For 'tis to be conſider'd (I muſt repeat it again, tho' I have already mention'd it a great many times) that there is ſuch a thing as Natural Society, which comprehends all Men, and ties and unites 'em to one another: There's a nearer between thoſe of the ſame Nation; and a nearer yet, between thoſe of the ſame City. Therefore our Fore-fathers made a diſtinction, between [b] that Law which is common to Nations, and that which belongs to each City in particular. Whatever we are bound, *by the Civil Conſtitutions*, to do to our Citizens; we are [c] not oblig'd, *by the Law of Nations*, to do the ſame to Strangers: but [d] whatever we are bound by this *latter* to do to others, the ſame we ought to do to our Citizens alſo: But [e] the Law, which at preſent we uſe

[b] The Law of Nations is nothing elſe, but ſome Rules and Maxims of the Law of Nature, which Reaſon tells us we ought to obſerve, in our Actions and Entercourſe with all Men whatever. This is not ſo diſtinct from *that* of particular Cities, as tho' *this* could command any thing contrary to the former. No; the Laws of every City muſt be allow'd by Reaſon, and ſuppoſe it as their Foundation; but they determin ſome things, which Reaſon has left indifferent, and deſcend to ſome Particulars as to Time, Place, *&c.* which Reaſon does not meddle with.

[c] Becauſe the Civil may add, tho' it can add nothing contrary, to that of Nations.

[d] Becauſe *that of Nations* is ſtill in force and obliges, notwithſtanding what the *Civil* may have added to it. The building upon a Foundation does not take away the Foundation it ſelf.

[e] The Laws and particular States conſider Men, as now they

uſe amongſt us, is far from being an original Piece, immediately taken from genuin Right and true perfect Juſtice; 'tis only a Copy and faint Repreſentation of it. However I could wiſh we liv'd up even to this; for 'tis copy'd at leaſt from ſome of the beſt Originals, which were drawn from the Truth and Nature of the thing. For how excellent is that Form in judicial Proceedings, *Utine*, &c. *That I mayn't be Defrauded or brought to an Inconvenience, by truſting to you, and your Honeſty!* And how incomparable that other, *That Honeſt Men do nothing, but that which is Honeſt and without Deſign.* But the great Queſtion is, Who they are *that are Honeſt Men*; and what 'tis *to do nothing, but that which is Honeſt!* [f] *Q. Scævola*, I remember, the High-Prieſt, was us'd to ſay, *That* all thoſe Judgments which had *Ex fide bona, Faithfully and honeſtly*, put into their Forms, were of marvellous Force; and *that Faithfully and Honeſtly* were of very large Extent, and belong'd not only to *Wardſhips, Societies, Truſts* and *Commiſſions*, but to *Buyings, Sellings, Lettings* and *Hirings*, which relate to the Society and En-

they are in the World, and only regulate their outward Actions, ſo as to preſerve the Peace and Safety of the Publick: But thoſe of Nature or Right Reaſon, in the Obſervation of which conſiſts the *perfecteſt Juſtice that Men are capable of*; conſiders Men as they ought to be, and commands all that Purity, Sincerity, *&c.* that becomes the Perfection of a Reaſonable Nature; which is more than the *Civil* can poſſibly do. The *Nature of God* is the true Standard of genuin Right and perfect Juſtice: *Right Reaſon*, which is taken from the Nature of God, is an original Piece; which, tho' in no wiſe equal to the living Standard, is at leaſt agreeable to it as far as it reaches: The *Civil Laws* are taken from Reaſon, and are only a Copy and faint Repreſentation of it; however 'twere to be wiſh'd that, ſuch as it is, it were carefully follow'd. This is the Sence, in which I take this place.

[f] Of whom he ſpeaks *chap.* 1. of his *de Amicitia*, and to whom he apply'd himſelf for Knowledge in the Civil Laws, after the Death of the other *Mucius*, who was Augur. He was

Entercourſe of Mankind; and *that* 'twas the part of an extraordinary Judge, to determin exactly, all theſe Caſes, what one Man ought to make good to another, upon only the bare Principles of *Conſcience and Honeſty*; eſpecially ſeeing Men differ in their Judgments about the greateſt part of 'em. All Craft therefore ſhould utterly be baniſh'd, and that *knaviſh* ſort of *Cunning*, which would fain indeed be *counted*, but is the fartheſt *from Prudence*, of any thing in the World: For Prudence conſiſts in the making a right Diſtinction between Good and Evil, but this kind of Cunning gives the preference to Evil; if, at leaſt, it be true (as moſt certainly 'tis) that every thing is Evil, which is contrary to Honeſty. Neither is it only in *Farms* and *Houſes*, that the Laws of the City, which are copied from Nature, take care to have Cheating and Knavery puniſh'd; but in Slaves they exclude all Fraud in the Seller: For he that's preſum'd to know what the Slave was, if he does not declare whether he be Healthy, a Runagate, or apt to Steal, is anſwerable to the Buyer, by an Order of the Ædiles: But this does not hold in the Caſe of [g] an Heir. From what has been ſaid, it apparently follows, [h] ſince Nature is the Fountain from whence Law is deriv'd, that 'tis agreeable to the Dictates and Rules of Nature, that no

was Coſ. with *L. Licinius Craſſus*, *An. U. C.* 658, whom he call'd *duo Sapientiſſimi Conſules*, chap. 11. of this Book. He was afterwards kill'd by *Marius*'s Order in *Veſta*'s Temple: *Temperantiæ, prudentiæq; ſpecimen* (ſays our Author) *ante ſimulachrum Veſtæ trucidatus eſt*, &c. *De Nat. Deor.*

[g] Becauſe he being newly come to the Eſtate, of which Slaves were a part, is preſum'd not to know whether they are Healthy, *&c.* or not.

[h] That is, The Laws command, that no one ſhould Enrich himſelf by Cheating another; and the Laws are copied from Reaſon; whence it follows, that Reaſon commands, *&c.*

[i] Ha-

no one ſhould endeavour to make his own Advantage from the Ignorance of another. [i] And indeed there is no greater Miſchief in the World, than this Wiſdom, *falſly* ſo nam'd, joyn'd with Baſeneſs and Knavery. From this have ariſen innumerable Caſes, wherein Profit is ſet up in oppoſition to Honeſty: For where almoſt is there a Man to be found, that would ſcruple to Injure and Wrong any other, if he could do it with ſecreſie, and without fear of being puniſh'd?

[i] Having ſhewn by a ſufficient number of Inſtances, That none of theſe Actions can be Profitable, which are contrary to ſtrict Juſtice or Honeſty: he now goes on to thoſe Actions, which are done under the pretence of Wiſdom and Prudence, but indeed are quite contrary to it; and ſhews theſe alſo to be Unprofitable.

CHAP. XVIII.

An Example of a Wickedneſs committed, when there was no Fear of Puniſhment. 'Tis a Wickedneſs to be a Receiver of ill-gotten Goods, tho' you have no hand in the getting 'em. 'Tis Diſhoneſt to get Eſtates by ſervile Flattery. Separating Profit from Honeſty the Cauſe of all Miſchiefs.

LEt us try, if you pleaſe, by ſome Examples of that nature, wherein the common ſort of People, perhaps, think there is no Crime: For we don't ſpeak here of ſuch as cut Throats, Poyſon, *make* falſe Wills, Rob or Embezzle the publick Treaſures; who aren't to be repreſs'd with nothing but Words and philoſophical Diſcourſes, but muſt be vex'd and wearied out with Chains and Impriſonment: But let us conſider here what is done by thoſe, who paſs in the World for Men of Honeſty

neſty and Integrity. A Will that was forg'd, of one *Minutius Baſilus*, a wealthy Perſon, was brought by ſome People out of *Greece* into *Italy*; who, to make it the more eaſily paſs for good, made [a] *Marcus Craſſus* and *Lucius Hortenſius*, the two greateſt Men at that time in the City, Joint-Heirs with themſelves: who, tho' they ſuſpected the whole to be a Forgery, yet having nothing of hand in't themſelves, they made little ſcruple of getting an Advantage by other Peoples Villany. And what then? was that ſufficient to excuſe 'em from Fault, *That they themſelves had no hand in't?* Truly I am fully perſuaded not; tho' I always lov'd [b] one of 'em while he was alive, and don't hate the [c] other ſince he is dead and gone. But when *Baſilus* had deſir'd that *Marcus Satrius*, his Siſter's Son, ſhould bear his Name, and had appointed him his Heir; *(I nominate him*, ſays he, *Lord of my Sabine and Picenian Mannors)* was it any ways a juſt and reaſonable Thing, and not rather an eternal Blot upon thoſe times, that ſome principal Citizens ſhould have a Man's Eſtate, and *Satrius* the Heir be put off barely with his Name? For if he be unjuſt, that don't keep off Injuries from any of his Neighbours, and defend and protect 'em as far as he's able, (as I've ſhewn already in the [d] firſt Book) what ſort of Man ſhall we take him to be, who not only does not keep off an Injury, but rather on the contrary helps to promote it? Nay I, for my part, am wholly of Opinion, That Eſtates which are left Men by *true* Wills, if gotten by kna-

[a] Both mention'd before, *ch.* 8. *Book* 1. and *ch.* 16. *Book* 2.

[b] *Hortenſius.*

[c] *Craſſus*, whom *Cicero* by no means lik'd, as appears from the next Chapter, and eſpecially from his ſixth Paradox.

[d] *Chap.* 7.

[e] *Viz.*

knaviſh and ſervile Flatteries, not by a *real*, but pretended Friendſhip, are Scandalous and Diſhoneſt. But in ſuch kind of Caſes it often comes to paſs, that one thing ſeems *Profitable*, and another *Honeſt*: undoubtedly by a Miſtake; for the ſame [a] thing is the Meaſure both of the one and the other; which whoever perceives not, will eaſily be led into all ſorts of Roguery. For he that begins thus to argue with himſelf, *That* indeed is Honeſt, but *this* is Advantagious; impudently divides, by this groſs Miſtake, thoſe things which by Nature are coupled and united: which is the deadly Root, from which all Frauds, Wickedneſſes and Villanies ſpring.

[a] *Viz.* Nature or Right Reaſon, to which whatever is contrary can neither be Honeſt nor Profitable.

CHAP. XIX.

The Carriage of a truly Honeſt Man, when 'tis in his power to be Diſhoneſt, ſo as not to be diſcover'd. The true Notion of a Good Man. A Saying of Fimbria's *in the Caſe of* Lutatius Pinthia, *to this purpoſe. A Proverb borrow'd from the Country, ſhewing, That nothing Diſhoneſt how ſecret ſoever can be Profitable.*

IF a Good Man therefore ſhould have ſuch a power, as that by ſnapping of his Fingers he could ſlip his Name cunningly into rich Peoples Wills, he'd never make uſe of it: no, not altho' he were fully aſſur'd, that no one living could either *know* or *ſuſpect* it: But give ſuch a power to *Marcus Craſſus*, that by doing the ſame thing he ſhould make himſelf Heir, where he *really* was not ſo, and he'd

[a] Dance, I dare warrant you, publickly in the Market-place. But he that is *Honeſt*, and anſwers to our Notion of a *Good Man*, will never take any thing away from another for the enriching himſelf, and filling his own Coffers; which whoever admires at, let him e'en confeſs at the ſame time, that he does not underſtand what a *Good Man* is. For if any one will thro'ly examin his own Thoughts, and clear up a little his obſcure Conceptions, he'll quickly be able to tell himſelf, that a Good Man is one, *Who does all the Good that he can to others, but never any Harm; unleſs neceſſarily forc'd upon't for his own Security.* I deſire to know then; is not that Man guilty of *Harming* another, that outs the rightful Heirs, as it were, by a Spell, and procures himſelf to be put into their Rooms? How then! (will ſome Men ſay) what, would not you have People conſult their own Intereſt? Yes; but withal I would have 'em underſtand, That nothing can be ſo, that's Baſe or Diſhoneſt: which is a neceſſary Maxim for all thoſe to learn, who ever deſign to be Good Men. I remember I heard my own Father tell, as long ago as when I was a Boy, That *Fimbria*, one who had formerly been [b] Conſul, was Judge in a caſe of *Lutatius Pinthia*'s, a *Roman* Knight, and a very Honeſt Man; who, [c] upon pain of loſing a certain

[a] Dancing was eſteem'd but a ſcandalous Practice, and unbecoming a ſober and prudent Perſon, among the *Romans*: wherefore our Author tells us in his Oration for *Murena*, chap. 6. No body almoſt Dances, unleſs he be Drunk or Mad; and calls it, *Omnium vitiorum extremum*, A Vice that no one would be guilty of, 'till he had utterly abandon'd all Virtue; and *Umbram luxuriæ* that which follows Riot and Debauchery, as the Shadow does the Body. The meaning therefore of this place is, That *Craſſus* would not ſtick at the baſeſt Actions, if he could but fill his Coffers by them.

[b] With *C. Marius*, *An. Rom. Cond.* 649, when *Cicero* was but three Years old.

[c] The Plaintiff in a Cauſe was to lay down a Sum of Money,

tain Sum of Money, was to prove himſelf to be a Good Man. Hereupon *Fimbria* plainly told him, that he'd never paſs Judgment upon ſuch a matter; leaſt either, by giving the Cauſe againſt him, he ſhould ſpoil the Credit of a well-approv'd Citizen; or elſe ſhould be forc'd, by giving it for him, to pronounce that any one was *a Good Man*: which he could not do, conſidering the infinite Virtues and Duties, that are requiſite to the completing any Perſon of that Character. This *Good Man* then, of whom *Fimbria* had a Notion, as well as *Socrates*, will never judge any thing Profitable, that's Diſhoneſt: From whence it follows, That ſuch a one will always be *ſo* far from *doing*, as *that* he will *never* ſo much as *think* of any thing, which he's afraid ſhould be laid open to the reſt of the World. And is it not a ſhame that Philoſophers ſhould doubt of this, when there is not e'er a Peaſant in the Country but aſſents to it? For from *them* we have gotten that common Saying, which is now by long Uſage become a Proverb among us, which they bring in to ſignifie the faithful Dealing and Honeſty of a Man, *He's one* (ſay they) *that you may venture* [d] *to play with at Even and Odd in the dark.* The meaning of which, what can it be but this, That nothing can be Profitable, which is not Honeſt and Becoming, tho' a Man could be certain of being never found out in it? You ſee then according

ney, which if his Caſe was not juſt, he was to loſe. The Defendant was to do the ſame, or give up the Cauſe to the Plaintiff. This Money was call'd *Sponſio* or *Sacramentum*. See *Val. Max.* Book 7. chap. 2.

[d] *Micare* ſignifies to hold up the Fingers; a Play among the *Romans*, ſaid to be in uſe to this Day in *Italy*, wherein one holding up ſuch a number of his Fingers, the other on a ſudden (or ſomething like it) was to gueſs how many they were. 'Twas eaſie therefore to Cheat in the dark, by holding up more or fewer before the other could be able to ſee.

ing to this Proverb, that neither that *Gyges*, whom we mention'd above; nor that other, whom we just now suppos'd to have a power, by the snapping of his Fingers to become all Peoples Heir, can by any means be excus'd. For as that, which is Scandalous and Dishoneſt in it ſelf, however it may be hid from the Eye of the World, can never be brought to be Honeſt and Creditable; ſo alſo *that*, which is not Honeſt and Creditable, can never be brought to be Profitable and Advantagious; the very [e] Nature of the things reſiſting and oppoſing it.

Hence to expreſs a very Honeſt Man, and one that would ſcorn to Cheat, tho' ſure not to be diſcover'd, they us'd this Proverb. *See* Eraſm. Adag.

[e] That which is *not Honeſt* is contrary to Reaſon; that which is *Profitable* muſt be agreeable to Reaſon; otherwiſe it deprives Men of their Good, *viz.* Virtue, and conſequently would be Unprofitable. The Natures therefore of theſe two being oppoſite, can never let the ſame Action be *not Honeſt*, and yet *Advantagious*.

CHAP. XX.

Great Rewards are very apt to make Men forgetful of Honeſty. Examples concerning this. An excellent Rule for our Direction in this caſe. A Man loſes more by doing an unjuſt Action, than ever he can gain by it, be the Reward what it will.

BUT [a] when People expect great Advantages from their Roguery, 'tis a mighty Temptation for 'em to be guilty of it. Thus, for Inſtance, when [b] *Marius* was far from any hopes of obtaining the Con-

[a] He goes on with his Examples of Craft, that pretends to be true Prudence; and ſhews, That tho' it gets Men Honours, &c. as it did *Marius* the Conſulſhip; yet that 'tis truly Unprofitable.

[b] He who afterwards came to be ſeven times Conſul.

A

Conſulſhip, and had lain ſeven Years from the time of his being Prætor, ſo that no one ſuſpected his ſtanding for that Honour; being diſpatch'd to *Rome* by [c] *Q. Metellus*, whoſe Lieutenant he was, an extraordinary Man, and a brave Member of the Republick; he accus'd his General to the People of *Rome* for protracting the War; and told 'em, *That if they would but chooſe him Conſul, they ſhould ſoon have* Jugurtha, *either dead or alive, deliver'd into their power.* 'Tis true by this Artifice he got to be choſen Conſul, but he pay'd for't the price of his Honeſty and Fidelity; who could thus bring an uſeful and excellent Citizen, whoſe Lieutenant he was, and by whom he was ſent, into Hatred and Ill-will by falſe Accuſations? Nor did my [d] Kinſman *Gratidianus* act the part of an Honeſt and Fair-dealing Man, in the time of his Prætorſhip: The Tribunes of the People held a common Conſultation with the Company of Prætors, about ſetling the Value and Rate of Money; which at thoſe times was grown to be ſo very Unconſtant, as that no body could be certain how much he was Worth. They made an Edict by common Conſent, allowing an Action againſt thoſe who tranſgreſs'd it, and appointing a Penalty for thoſe who were convicted. This being order'd, they agreed to meet again in the Aſſembly after Noon, and all of 'em together tell the People what they had done. The Meeting broke up, and the reſt all departed ſome one way, and ſome another: *Marius* only directly from

[c] A noble, valiant and virtuous *Roman*, choſe Coſ. in the War of *Jugurtha* King of *Numidia*, and ſent againſt him; where by his Valour and wiſe Conduct he beat that Prince, and might have ended the War, had not *Marius* ſupplanted him. However he obtain'd a Triumph, and the Sirname of *Numidicus*. *See* Salluſt. Jugurth.

[d] *See chap.* 16. *of this Book.*

from the Court went down to the Aſſembly, and by himſelf alone declar'd that to the People, which all of 'em had agreed upon by general Conſent. If you ask now what was the Event of this; nothing in the World could have got him greater Honour; Statues erected for him about the Streets; Frankinſence and Tapers burnt at every one of 'em; and, in ſhort, never was any Man more ador'd by the Multitude. Theſe are the things, which do ſometimes miſlead Men in deliberating about their Duty; when the Offence againſt Honeſty ſeems very trivial, but the Advantage that's gain'd by it very conſiderable. Thus *Marius* thought it but a little piece of Knavery, to ſteal the Peoples Love from the Tribunes and his Collegues; but a mighty Advantage to be made Conſul by it, which was what he at that time propos'd to himſelf. But in all theſe Caſes there's only one Rule, which I deſire you'd conſtantly take along with you: *Be ſure in the firſt place, that what you count Profitable be no way Diſhoneſt; and if it be Diſhoneſt, then aſſure your ſelf that 'tis not truly Profitable.* And can we then eſteem either the one or the other of theſe *Mariuſes* Good Men? Conſider a little and examin your own Thoughts, that you may ſee what Idea, what Notion or Conception you have of a Good Man. Is it reconcilable then with the Character of ſuch a one, [e] to Lie for the ſake of his own Advantage; to Deceive, to raiſe falſe Reports and Miſrepreſentations of others; [f] to Seize that before-hand, which others have a Right to as well as himſelf? Certainly nothing leſs. And is there any thing then of ſuch excellent Worth? any Profit or Intereſt ſo very deſirable, for the gaining of which one would forfeit the Glory

[e] As the former *Marius* did, in accuſing *Metellus*.
[f] As his Kinſman *Gratidianus* did the favour of the People from the Tribunes, and his Collegues.

ry and Reputation of a *Good Man?* Can that, which we call by the name of Profitable, bring us any thing ſo good as what it takes away from us, if it ſpoil our being counted Men of Honeſty and Integrity? if it occaſion the loſs of our Juſtice and Faithfulneſs; that is, in plain truth, if it change us into Brutes? For where's the great difference between altering our Shapes and becoming real Beaſts; and carrying the Nature and Fierceneſs of Beaſts, tho' under the Outſides and Figures of Men?

CHAP. XXI.

To do any thing Diſhoneſt for the ſake of Power and Authority, *not Profitable. A moſt deteſtable Maxim of* Cæſar's. *Not Profitable to make himſelf King in a Free City. The Unhappineſs of a Tyrant's Life.*

AGain, [a] Thoſe who contemn all Juſtice and Honeſty for the ſake of Power, don't they do the ſame thing that [b] a certain Man did, when he choſe to be Son-in-law to none but one, by whoſe daring Boldneſs he might encreaſe his own Authority? He thought it a very great Advantage no queſtion, to enlarge his own Greatneſs, by drawing Hatred upon another; but he never conſider'd how great a Diſſervice he did to his Country, and how much Scandal and Diſcredit he brought upon himſelf. As for the Father, he

[a] In the laſt Chapter he ſhew'd, That no Trick can be Profitable, if contrary to Honeſty and true Prudence, tho' it ſhould procure a Man never ſo much *Honour*: Here he ſhews the ſame as to *Power*.

[b] *Pompey* the Great, who choſe to be *Cæſar*'s Son-in-law, marrying his Daughter *Julia*.

he had always a couple of *Greek* Verſes in his Mouth, taken out of [c] *Euripides*'s Tragedy of *Phœniſſæ*; which I'll endeavour to tranſlate as well as I am able, perhaps it may be aukwardly, but however ſo as to make their Sence appear,

If ever we may break the Ties of Right,
'Tis when a Kingdom is the glorious Prize:
In other things be ſtrictly Juſt ———

'Twas a villanous thing in [d] *Eteocles*, or rather in *Euripides* indeed, to exempt [e] that one Breach of Right from being criminal, which is certainly of all others the moſt wicked and deteſtable. Why do we ſtop then at Examples of leſſer Rogueries, ſuch as making one's ſelf Heir by Cunning and Spells; Cheats about Buying, Selling, *&c?* Here's [f] a Man for you, that has made no ſcruple of deſiring to make himſelf King of the *Roman* People, and Lord and Governour of the whole Earth; nay, and which is worſe, hath accompliſh'd his Deſire. If any Man call this an honeſt Ambition, he muſt be out of his Wits; for he juſtifies the Subverſion of our Laws and Liberties, and counts the moſt baſe and deteſtable Oppreſſion of 'em, a virtuous, laudable and glorious Action: But if any Man, confeſſing that 'tis

[c] A famous *Greek* Tragedian, Cotemporary and Rival of *Sophocles*; very well known by his Plays, which are ſtill (a great many of 'em) extant.

[d] A King of *Thebes*, Brother to *Polynices*; who were both of 'em Sons of *OEdipus* by *Jocaſta* his own Mother. They agreed to Reign by turns, and the Elder *Eteocles* began firſt, but when his Year was out, would not reſign to *Polynices*. Hence aroſe a War, in which the two Brothers kill'd one another. The Verſes here quoted agree very well with the Perſon of *Eteocles*, who for the ſake of *Reigning*, broke his Faith and Agreement with his Brother.

[e] *Viz.* For the ſake of a Kingdom.

[f] *Julius Cæſar.*

[g] Cæ-

'tis not Honeſt, to get the Dominion in that Republick, which *has been* and *ought to be* always free, will yet ſay, 'Tis Profitable for him that can do it; what Reproofs ſhall I uſe, or what Reproaches rather, to recal ſuch a one from ſo dangerous an Error? Good Gods! Can it be ſuppos'd then ever to be any Man's Intereſt, by the heinouſeſt and moſt unnatural Wickedneſs upon Earth, to ruin and deſtroy his own Native Country; tho' perhaps the Man, who is guilty of it, may afterwards be ſtil'd by his poor oppreſs'd Citizens, [g] *The Father of it?* *Intereſt* therefore ſhould always be meaſur'd by *Juſtice* and *Honeſty*, ſo that theſe two Words, tho' of different Sounds, ſhould yet be underſtood to mean one and the ſame Thing. I know the common People are apt to imagin, that nothing in the World can be better than to Govern; but when I conſider the real Truth and Reaſon of the thing it ſelf, I find on the contrary that nothing can be worſe, when People arrive at it by unlawful Means. Can it poſſibly be Profitable for any Man then, to live in perpetual Cares and Anxieties? to be Day and Night rack'd and tormented with Fears, in a Life full of nothing but Treacheries and Dangers? *Many are Treacherous and Unfaithful to Kings*, ſays *Accius*, *and but few are Faithful.* But of what ſort of Kings did he ſpeak this? Was it not of thoſe, who by lawful Succeſſion had receiv'd the Royal Scepter from [h] *Tantalus* and *Pelops*? How many more then muſt we ſuppoſe to be unfaithful to that King, who with an Army of *Romans* had oppreſs'd and en-

[g] *Cæſar* was call'd ſo, notwithſtanding his Oppreſſions. *See* Sueton. *chap.* 76, 85.

[h] King of *Phrygia*, whom the Poets make Son of *Jupiter*, and tell us he ſerv'd his Son *Pelops* up to Table to the Gods. But they (except *Ceres*, who eat a Shoulder) abhorring the Banquet, reſtor'd *Pelops* to Life, and ſent *Tantalus* into Hell,

enſlav'd the *Roman* People it ſelf? and had forc'd that City, which was not only Free, but even Empreſs of the whole World, to ſubmit her Neck to his tyrannical Yoke? What Uneaſineſs of Mind muſt ſuch a one, think you, be continually under? What Wounds and Twitches of Conſcience muſt he needs feel? How, in ſhort, can that Life be an Advantage to any Man, which has this Inconvenience inſeparably annex'd to it, that whoever is ſo happy as to take it away, will obtain the greateſt Glory and Good-will from all the World? And if theſe things, which ſeem *moſt of all* to be Profitable, yet are found to be the contrary when Unworthy and Diſhoneſt; this certainly ought to convince us all, *That nothing can be Profitable, which is not Honeſt.*

where he was tormented with Hunger in the midſt of Plenty. *Pelops* afterwards married *Hippodamia*, Daughter of *Oenomaus*, and became King of that part of *Greece*, which afterwards from him was call'd *Peloponneſus*, now *Morea*. His Deſcendants were *Atreus*, *Thyeſtes*, *Agamemnon*, &c.

CHAP. XXII.

A brave Example of the Romans *preferring Juſtice before a ſeeming Profit. Glory can never be gotten by Wickedneſs. Riches Unprofitable, if accompany'd with Infamy. Example of Injuſtice in the* Romans. *How an Empire ought to be ſupported.* Cato *too ſevere in exacting the Tributes. An unjuſt Saying of* Curio's.

BUt this has been determin'd, as at many other times by our wiſe Fore-fathers, ſo [a] particularly

[a] *See Book* 1. *chap.* 12, 13. *Book* 3. *chap.* 4.

[b] He

ly by *Fabricius*, then a second time Consul, and the whole *Roman* Senate, in the War with *Pyrrhus*. For when *Pyrrhus* had voluntarily made War upon the *Romans*, and the Contention was held about Empire and Mastery, with a no less powerful than generous Adversary; a Deserter came secretly into *Fabricius*'s Camp, and offer'd, upon condition he might be well Rewarded, to return back again with the same secresie that he came, and to Poyson *Pyrrhus*. But instead of Encouragement, *Fabricius* order'd him to be sent back to *Pyrrhus*, and was afterwards commended by the Senate for so doing. If we look no further now than the outward appearance of what seems to be Profitable, here's a dangerous War, and a powerful Adversary of the growing Empire, might soon have been remov'd by the single assistance of this one Deserter: But then it would have been an eternal Scandal, not to mention the Villany and Wickedness of it, in an honourable War, which was manag'd with a fair and generous Enemy, not to get the Victory by Virtue and Courage, but only by base and treacherous Practises. Whether was more Profitable then for *Fabricius*, who was such in this City as *Aristides* was at *Athens*; or for the *Roman* Senate, which never thought any thing dishonourable their Interest; to contend with an Enemy by Valour or by Poyson? If Empire be desirable for the sake of Glory, why is not Wickedness altogether banish'd, in which 'tis impossible there should ever be any Glory? But if we're for Riches at any rate, we'd do well to consider, that they can never be Profitable when accompany'd with Infamy. That Counsel therefore of *Lucius Philippus*, the Son of *Quintus*, was far from being Profitable, *That those very Cities, which* Sylla *had freed for a set Sum of Money by the Senate's Order, should again be brought under their former Contributions; and yet not the Money, which*

which they had pay'd, be return'd 'em. This Advice of his was follow'd by the Senate, to the great Diſparagement and Shame of the Empire; for even Pirates at this rate will ſooner be truſted, than the *Roman* Senate. Well, but the publick Revenues were encreas'd by it, and *therefore* 'twas Profitable: Heavens! How long will Men dare to call any thing Profitable, which is not Honeſt! Can Hatred then and Infamy be Profitable to a State, which ought to be ſupported by Glory, and Credit, and the Love of its Confederates! In this particular I often diſagreed from my old Friend [b] *Cato*; whom I always thought to be ſomewhat too head-ſtrong, in ſtanding up for the Intereſt of the Publick Treaſury; and exacting the Tributes with ſo much rigour, as not to make any Allowances to the Farmers, and very ſeldom or never grant any thing to the Confederates: whereas we ought always to be kind to the latter, and to deal with the former, as we would do with our own Bayliffs; and that ſo much the more, becauſe all the Safety and Welfare of the Republick depends upon the Agreement of [c] the ſeveral Orders in it. Nor leſs Ill than *Philip*'s, was the Counſel of [d] *Curio*; who, in the Caſe of the [e] People inhabiting beyond the *Po*, tho' he confeſs'd their Demands were but juſt and reaſonable, yet always added, *Vincat utilitas*; *Every thing muſt give way to the Intereſt of the Publick.* He ſhould rather have ſaid that they were not juſt, becauſe not comporting with the Publick Intereſt; than thus have declar'd that they did not comport with it, and at the ſame time confeſs 'em to be juſt and reaſonable.

[b] He that was Sirnam'd *Uticenſis*, mention'd above.
[c] The Senators and Equites: which laſt were Farmers of the Publick Taxes.
[d] *Curio* the Father. *See chap.* 17. *Book* 2.
[e] Who deſir'd to be made free of the City of *Rome*, but were denied.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIII.

Several Caſes put by Hecaton *the* Rhodian. Diogenes *and* Antipater *oppoſe one another. Whether bad Money receiv'd for Good ſhould be put off?*

[a] *HEcaton* propoſeth, in his ſixth Book of Offices, ſeveral Queſtions ſuch as theſe which follow: Whether a Good Man, in time of great Scarcity, may refuſe to give Victuals to the Servants of his own Family? He diſcourſes indeed upon either ſide the Queſtion, but at laſt concludes, That he ſhould rather be guided by his Intereſt, than Humanity. He demands again, If a Merchant in a Storm be forc'd to throw his Goods over-board, whether of the two ſhould he chooſe to caſt away, a very valuable Horſe, or a Servant that's good for nothing? Here Intereſt, and the ſaving of his Goods draws one way, and compaſſion of Human Nature another. Should a *Fool* in a Shipwrack have gotten a Plank, may a *Wiſe* Man take it away from him if he can? He anſwers, No; becauſe it would be plainly a piece of Injuſtice: But what if the Owner of the Ship ſhould come? may not he take it away when it properly belongs to him? No, not at all; no more than he may throw a Man out of the Ship, under the pretence that the Ship belongs to him: For till they are arriv'd whither the Ship was hired for, it does not more properly belong to the Owner, than it does to the Paſſengers by whom it was hired. Suppoſe two Men, that are equally Wiſe, ſhould both of 'em in a Shipwrack lay hold of the ſame Plank; may either of 'em ſeize upon it forcibly to himſelf, or ſhould

[a] One of *Panætius*'s Scholars, mention'd *chap.* 15.

[b] What

ſhould one of them voluntarily yeild it to the other? Let one yield to the other; provided *that* other will be more ſerviceable to the Publick, or there is more depending upon his Life and Preſervation. But what if *theſe* are equal in either of them? Why then there's no more to be ſaid about it, but it muſt e'en be let alone for Chance to determin, as tho' they ſhould caſt Lots, or [b] play at Even and Odd for it. What if a Father ſhould rifle Temples, and dig Paſſages under-ground into the Treaſury? Should the Son diſcover him to the Publick Magiſtrate? No; that were an horrid unnatural Impiety: he ſhould rather on the contrary defend his Father, if any one elſe ſhould pretend to accuſe him. But what! ought not the Intereſt of my Country to be conſulted, before that of any one elſe whatſoever? Yes undeniably; but then it is very much the Intereſt of your Country, to have Citizens that are dutiful and obedient to their Parents. But if a Father ſhould attempt to make himſelf King, or any ways endeavour to betray his Country; ſhould a Son in ſuch a caſe hold his Tongue and Conceal it? In the firſt place, let him *beg* of his Father to deſiſt: if that does no good, let him proceed to rebuke and even to threaten him about it: but if at laſt he perceive that it *directly* tends to the Ruin of his Country, he ſhould prefer *its* Safety before that of his Father. Another of the Queſtions he propoſes is this, Suppoſe a Good Man to receive, by an overſight, bad Money for good, and afterwards come to underſtand that 'tis bad; may he pay it for good, if he owes another any thing? *Diogenes* thinks he may, but *Antipater* not; whom I rather aſſent to. Suppoſe a Man be a ſelling a Veſſel of Wine, which he knows won't keep; is he bound

[b] What *Micare*, the word here us'd, ſignifies. *See ch.* 19.

[c] For

bound to tell of this? *Diogenes* thinks he's under no ſuch Obligation; *Antipater* will have it to be every honeſt Man's Duty. Theſe are the things, which whether they are Right and one's Duty or not, is often controverted amongſt the *Stoicks*. In ſelling a Slave is one bound to declare what his Faults are or not? I don't mean thoſe, which unleſs they are told, the Law it ſelf commands he ſhall be return'd upon our Hands; but his being a Liar, [c] a Filcher, a Player at Dice, or a Drunkard. One's of Opinion we ought to declare 'em, and the other not. Should an ignorant Body ſell a quantity of Gold, and ſuppoſe it to be Copper; is a good Man oblig'd now to tell him that 'tis Gold; or may he buy for a Penny what is worth a thouſand Pence? 'Tis plain enough by this time what my Thoughts are, and wherein conſiſts the Controverſie between [d] the forementiond Philoſophers.

[c] For if he be a down-right Thief, the Seller's bound to tell it by the Law, otherwiſe his Slave will be turn'd upon his Hands; as appears from *chap.* 18.

[d] *Diogenes* and *Antipater*.

CHAP. XXIV.

Whether a Man's oblig'd to perform all his Promiſes, or not; tho' at the Expence of his Life or Reputation. Some Examples upon it.

ARe we bound to perform all thoſe Promiſes and Bargains, which (in the Prætor's Language) have neither Force nor Fraud in them? Here's a Man, for Example, that has gotten the Dropſie, and another preſcribes him an infallible Cure for't, upon

upon Condition that he'll never make uſe of it again. The Man recovers by its help at preſent, but falls again, ſome time after, into the ſame Diſtemper. Suppoſe now that he, to whom he made ſuch Promiſe, will by no means allow him to uſe the Cure again; what would be his Duty in ſuch a Caſe! Why, ſince he, who denies him the Requeſt, is Inhuman, and 'tis [a] a thing that will do him no manner of Prejudice, 'tis the beſt way to take care of his Life and Safety. A Good and Wiſe Man is deſir'd by one, who appoints him his Heir, and leaves him by Will a conſiderable Eſtate, that before he enters upon the Poſſeſſion of it, he ſhould Dance at Noon-day in the open Streets; and this he accordingly Promiſes to do, becauſe otherwiſe the Teſtator would not make him his Heir: would you have him perform now what he promis'd, or not? I could wiſh that he never had promis'd it at all, which I think would much better have ſuited with his Character: But ſince he *has* done it, if he think it diſhonourable to Dance ſo in publick, the beſt way will be not to ſtand to ſuch a Promiſe, provided he takes none of the Money that was left him. Unleſs the Money may be turn'd to ſome very great Benefit and Advantage of the Publick; ſo that 'twould be no Diſgrace for a Man [b] even to Dance, when it brings ſo much Good to his Country along with it.

[a] No one's oblig'd to perform any Promiſe, when 'twill but bring a Loſs and Inconvenience on himſelf, and do no Service to the Perſon 'twas made to. For why ſhould that be demanded of me, which can do no body any Good, but me a great Diskindneſs? Or what reaſon is there a thing ſhould be done, which brings a great deal of Harm, and no manner of Good with it?

[b] For an Action offending againſt outward Decency and Modeſty, ſuch as Dancing is, ought to give place to an Action of Juſtice; ſuch as is the doing a real Kindneſs to the Publick.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXV.

Several other Caſes, wherein a Man is not oblig'd to perform his Promiſes and Vows; nor to give up a Truſt. The Method he deſigns to take in the following part of the Work.

NEither is one bound to perform thoſe Promiſes, which are hurtful and prejudicial to the Perſons they were made to. Thus Father *Phœbus* (a that we may return to our Fables) promis'd to grant b *Phaethon* whatſoever he ſhould deſire; and the mad young Fellow deſir'd to get up into his Father's Chariot. 'Twas accordingly granted him; but before he could get to be well ſetled in it, he was ſtruck down with Lightning. How abundantly better had it been, in ſuch a Caſe, if the Father had refus'd to perform ſuch a Promiſe? The ſame may be ſaid of another, which c *Theſeus* obtain'd of *Neptune*: This God had promis'd to do any three things for him, whatever he ſhould requeſt: and he requeſted the Death of his own Son *Hippolytus*, upon a falſe Suſpicion, that he had been naught with his Mother-in-law. He obtain'd what he ask'd; which occaſion'd him very much Sorrow

a For he mention'd 'em in *Book* 1. and the Fable of *Gyges* in *chap.* 9. of this.

b *See* Ovid's Metamorph. *Book* 2.

c *Theſeus* married *Hippolyte*, Queen of the *Amazons*, by whom he had *Hippolytus*. Afterwards he married *Phædra*, Daughter to King *Minos* of *Creet*, who fell in Love with *Hippolytus*. He neglecting her, ſhe (in Revenge) complain'd to her Husband, That he would have lain with her. *Theſeus* in a rage deſir'd *Neptune* to deſtroy him, which he did. But the Truth afterwards coming out, *Theſeus* was grievouſly afflicted. *Seneca* and *Euripides* have written Tragedies upon it.

d *Diana*

row and Affliction. Again, [d] *Agamemnon* had vow'd, for a Sacrifice to *Diana*, the moſt beautiful thing that was born that Year in his whole Dominions. To be as good as his Word, he was forc'd to offer his Daughter *Iphigenia*, than whom nothing that Year had been born more beautiful. Had not it been [e] better to have broke his Promiſe, than have done ſuch an horrid and unnatural Action? In ſome Caſes then a Man is not oblig'd to perform his Promiſes: no more is he to reſtore what was given him in Truſt. Suppoſe, for the purpoſe, a Man in his Wits had entruſted you with his Sword, and ſhould demand it of you again when he's beſide himſelf; your Duty would be not to give it him again, and if you did, you'd be guilty of a very great Errour. Again, [f] ſhould a Man put a large Sum of Money in

[d] *Diana* being angry with *Agamemnon* for having ſlain a Stag of hers, kept the *Grecian* Fleet, that was going to *Troy*, at *Aulis* by contrary Winds. *Agamemnon* to appeaſe her, vow'd to Sacrifice the beautifulleſt thing at that time in his Dominions; which proving to be his own Daughter, he ſacrific'd her. Others ſay the Goddeſs put a Hart in her ſtead, and carry'd her away to be her Prieſteſs at *Taurica*. *See* Eurip. Iphigenia.

[e] Unlawful Oaths, Vows or Promiſes are not to be kept, becauſe no Man can ever oblige himſelf to that, which is contrary to a former and ſuperior Obligation. We are all by God oblig'd to the Performance of ſuch and ſuch Duties, therefore we can't be oblig'd to the contrary by an Act of our own. But here we muſt diſtinguiſh between thoſe which are Unlawful *as to the Manner* or Circumſtances of them, and thoſe that are Unlawful *as to the Matter* they are about. The firſt is by ſome call'd *Jaramentum illicitum*; and the ſecond, *De re illicita*. All haſty and raſh Oaths are Unlawful in the firſt Sence, by which we are oblig'd for all that; provided the Subject they are about be Lawful. Then an Oath is Unlawful in the ſecond Sence, when a Man ſwears he'll do any thing that is wicked; which can't oblige him for the Reaſon above given. However he ſins in Swearing ſuch a thing.

[f] Oaths, *&c.* don't bind, when the keeping of 'em will hinder ſome greater Good, or bring ſome great Evil. *See* Grotius, de Jure B. *and* P. Sanderſon de Oblig. Jur. *&c.*

[g] *See*

in your Hands, and afterwards raiſe a Rebellion againſt his Country; would you deliver up your Truſt, if demanded it by him? Certainly no; for this would be to act againſt the Publick Intereſt, which ought to be preferr'd before every thing elſe. Thus a great many things, which are Honeſt of themſelves, we may ſee ceaſe to be ſo when the Circumſtances alter: to perform a Promiſe, for Inſtance, to ſtand to an Agreement, or deliver up a Truſt, ought not to be done when they become Unprofitable. This may ſuffice to have been ſaid of thoſe things, which a [g] pretended Wiſdom would fain count Profitable, tho' contrary to Juſtice. But having laid down four general Heads *in the Firſt Book*, from which all Offices or Duties are deriv'd, I ſhall diſcourſe upon each of the ſame *in this*; and make out, that what's contrary to any of thoſe Virtues, is only in ſhew, and not really Profitable. Of *Prudence* then, which a knaviſh ſort of Cunning endeavours to imitate; as alſo of *Juſtice*, which is never but Profitable, we have diſcours'd already. It [h] remains that we ſpeak of the other two general Heads of Duty; the one of which conſiſts in the Greatneſs and Excellency of a couragious Soul; and the other in ſuch a Regularity of our Actions, as is conformable to the Precepts of Temperance and Moderation.

[g] *See Note* [i] *on ch.* 17.

[h] He has ſhewn that thoſe Actions, which may ſeem to be *juſt* and *prudent*, but really are not ſo, whatever Advantages of Wealth, Honours, or the like they bring along with them, are not truly Profitable, becauſe contrary to thoſe two parts of Honeſty. He now proceeds to ſhew the ſame of the other two remaining parts, *viz.* Courage and Temperance, That nothing can be Profitable that's contrary to either of 'em. And firſt of Courage; ſee the next Chapter.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVI.

That nothing can be Profitable, which is contrary to the Virtue of Fortitude, ſhewn from the Examples of Ulyſſes *and* Regulus.

Ulyſſes thought 'twould be Profitable for him, (if what the Tragedians tell us be true; for *Homer*, a Writer of the greateſt Authority, never once inſinuates any ſuch thing) but the Writers of Tragedy accuſe *Ulyſſes*, for feigning to be Mad that he might avoid the War; a Deſign that was by no means Honeſt and Creditable: *Well, but 'twas Profitable* (will ſome one ſay) *to ſtay and govern at his own home, and enjoy himſelf quietly in his Iſland* [a] Ithaca, *together with his Parents, his Wife and Son. Is there any ſuch Credit in the daily Dangers and Fatigues of War, that you can ever think comparable with living ſuch a Life of Tranquility and Security?* Yes; I wholly deſpiſe and contemn your *Security*, being fully perſuaded that it can never be Profitable, ſo long as 'tis [b] Diſhoneſt. Pray what would they have ſaid, do you think, of *Ulyſſes*, ſuppoſe he had continued in his pretended Madneſs? when after his [c] glorious Atchievements in the War, he had yet theſe Reproaches thrown upon him by *Ajax*,

Tho', you all know, he *firſt propos'd this* [d] *Oath,*
Yet he's *the only Man that would have broke it.*

He

[a] An Iſle in the *Ionian* Sea, now call'd *Theaca*, which *Ulyſſes* was Prince of.

[b] Becauſe cowardly, and ſo contrary to the Virtue of Courage.

[c] He Conquer'd *Rheſus*, ſtole away the *Palladium*, &c. *See* Ovid's Metamorph. *Book* 13.

[d] The *Greeks* took an Oath, at their preparing for *Troy*, never to ceaſe till they were reveng'd on the *Trojans*. Notwith-

He first endeavour'd not to join i'th' War,
Faint-hearted Coward! feigning to be Mad.
And had not prudent Palamede *found out,*
By Cunning, this his impudent Deceit;
The Villain, notwithstanding all the Ties
Of sacred Oaths, had certainly gone off.

'Twas much better for him to bear all the Hazards, not of the War only, but of the Sea too, (as at last [e] he did) than not to make one among the rest of the *Grecians*, then resolving, by Consent, upon a War with [f] the *Barbarians*. But to remove the Scene from Foreign Countries, and fabulous Relations, that we may come nearer home, and to a thing that really happen'd: *M. Atilius Regulus*, then a second time Consul, was surpriz'd in *Africk* by [g] *Xanthippus* the *Lacedæmonian*, and made a Prisoner, ([h] *Amilcar*, Father of *Hannibal* being General of the *Carthaginians*) and was sent by the *Carthaginians* to the *Roman* Senate, upon solemn Oath given, that, unless some remarkable Prisoners were restor'd 'em, he should himself return back again to *Carthage*. Now as soon as this Man arriv'd at *Rome*, he could not but perceive what *appear'd to* be his Interest, but withal was persuaded (as the Event

withstanding which *Ulysses* would have escap'd. These Verses are taken out of a Tragedy of *Pacuvius*, about *Ajax* and *Ulysses* contending for *Achilles*'s Arms. The Person spoken of in them is *Ulysses*, and the Speaker *Ajax*.

[e] Wandring ten Years, after the War was ended, before he could get home.

[f] So the *Grecians* call'd all other People beside themselves.

[g] Who was at that time made Leader of the *Carthaginians*, and gave the *Romans* a notable Overthrow in the first *Punick* War. *See* Polib. *Book* 1. *chap.* 32.

[h] A noble and valiant *Carthaginian*, at the latter end of the first *Punick* War, counted the greatest General of his Age, who not only defended, but enlarg'd the *Carthaginian* Empire. *See* Polybius *and* Corn. Nepos.

[i] That

vent declar'd) that it *only appear'd ſo.* The Caſe was thus: Here he might have ſtaid in his Native Country, and have liv'd at home quietly with his Wife and Children; might have judg'd his Misfortune, receiv'd in the War, no more than what all Men in that State are liable to; and might ſtill have continu'd in his old Degree of Honour among thoſe of conſular Dignity. *And who can deny now,* (will any one ſay) *that all theſe things are Expedient and Profitable?* Who do you think? why [1] *Greatneſs of Soul,* and true *Courage* deny it. Can you deſire any greater and more illuſtrious Authorities?

[1] That is, 'Twas not really expedient and profitable for him to ſtay at home, tho' it might ſeem ſo; becauſe contrary to Courage and Greatneſs of Soul.

CHAP. XXVII.

What Courage and Greatneſs of Soul teach us. A continuation of the Story of Regulus.

THeſe are the Virtues, by which we are taught to be afraid of nothing, to deſpiſe all the outward Concerns of Life, and count nothing intolerable that can poſſibly befal a Man. *Well, but pray what did this* Regulus *do then?* He came into the Senate, and told 'em what 'twas he was ſent about, and refus'd to give his own Vote in the Caſe, foraſmuch as he was not to be counted a Senator, as being by Oath under the Enemy's Power. And in his Speech, which he ſpoke to the Senate upon that Subject, *(Fool that he was,* ſome will be ready to ſay, *and an Enemy to his own Intereſt!)* he told 'em, *'Twas beſt not to give up their Priſoners; that they*

they were young Men, and might make able Leaders; but that he, for his part, was grown almoſt uſeleſs, and worn away with old Age. The Senate were ſo far perſuaded by his Speech, that they reſolv'd the Priſoners ſhould be detain'd in Cuſtody, and he himſelf return'd back again to *Carthage*; not all the Love which he had for his Country, his Friends and Relations, being able to detain him. And tho' he knew well enough what a barbarous Enemy, and what [a] exquiſite Torments he was going to return to; yet he thought it his Duty, whatever came of it, not to violate his Oath. I think he was in a better condition therefore, even whilſt he was murdred by being kept from Sleeping, than e're he could have been, had he ſtay'd at home, and liv'd under the Scandal of being an old Captive and a perjur'd Nobleman. *But was not it very great* Folly *and* Madneſs, *if he would not perſuade the Releaſing of the Priſoners, yet to go and diſſuade it as much as he could?* Pray how *Folly* and *Madneſs?* What, tho' 'twere conducive to the Good of the Republick? or can any thing be Profitable to a private Citizen, which brings a Diſadvantage to the Commonwealth in general?

[a] He was put into a little Place, ſtuck all about with ſharp Points, ſo that he could neither lye down, lean on one ſide, nor ſtand upright: beſide that his Eye-lids were cut off, and the Sun let ſhine upon his Eyes, ſo that he could never ſleep, *&c.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVIII.

To ſeparate Profit from Honeſty, is to pervert the firſt Principle of Nature. All Men naturally deſirous of Profit. The Reaſons given by thoſe, who think Regulus *did ill in returning.*

THoſe Men, who ſeparate Profit from Honeſty, wholly pervert the [a] firſt Principles of Nature: For we all of us naturally deſire our Intereſt, toward which we are carried with ſo ſtrong a Biaſs, as that 'tis not in our power to turn the other way. For who is averſe from? or rather, who does not moſt eagerly follow his own Advantage? But ſince we can find out no real Advantage, except in what's Honeſt, Becoming and Commendable, therefore we count theſe the principal things; and take the word Profit to ſignifie ſomething, which only relates to our outward Neceſſities, and the ſupplying of them; without all that glorious and ſhining Excellence, which appears in the Actions of Virtue and Honeſty. [b] *But after all is done*, perhaps ſome Men will ſay, *pray what is there in an Oath, that he ſhould be afraid thus to break it?* What! was it *Jupiter*'s Anger that he dreaded? But this is agreed on

[a] The firſt Principle of Nature is, That every one deſire his own Happineſs, which is certainly his true and greateſt Profit. Now this conſiſting in Virtue or Honeſty, the right uſe of this Principle is, to conduct and lead Men on in the ways of Virtue. But thoſe who make Mens Intereſt ſeparate from Honeſty, pervert this Principle, and make it conduct Men to other things inſtead of Honeſty, *viz.* Riches, Power or the like.

[b] He brings all the Arguments of thoſe Men, who would have that *Regulus* did fooliſhly in returning: as, *Firſt*, That he could not fear the Anger of the Gods, if he had ſtaid at home; for they are never Angry. *Secondly*, If they had been

on by all Philoſophers; not only thoſe, [c] who maintain that the Gods lead an idle Life, neither buſying themſelves, nor diſturbing others; but [d] thoſe who affirm they are always buſie, and always doing ſomething that relates to the World: in this thing, *I ſay*, they are all agreed, That the [e] Deity neither hurts, nor is angry with any one. But ſuppoſing the worſt, Pray what hurt could *Jupiter*'s Vengeance have done *Regulus*, greater than what *Regulus* did to himſelf? It could not be any thing of Religion therefore, that hindred him from following what appear'd to be his Intereſt. Again, Was he afraid of the Baſeneſs and Diſhoneſty of the Action? *As to that* in the firſt place, Always of two Evils chooſe the leaſt: and where was any Evil in the Baſeneſs of the thing, ſo great as was that of the Torments which he endur'd? Beſide, pray remember that Sentence of *Accius*, which however it might be ſaid by an impious King, is yet generally acknowledg'd to be very well ſaid, who when one told him, *You have broken your Oath to me:*

been Angry, they could not have hurt him worſe, than he did himſelf by returning, *&c.* To all which he anſwers in the following Chapters.

[c] The *Epicureans*, who made the Happineſs of the Gods conſiſt in Eaſe, and Freedom from Diſturbance; and deny'd a Providence.

[d] The *Stoicks*, *Academicks*, &c. who held that the Gods took care of the World and the Affairs of it: only *Ariſtotle* confin'd his Providence to the heavenly Bodies.

[e] *See Note on chap.* 3. *Book* 2. The Deity 'tis true is never Angry as Men are, never tranſported with violent Paſſion. But this was not ſo meant (by thoſe I mean who allow'd a Providence) as tho' the Gods were not diſpleas'd at Mens Sins, their Breaches of Oaths, and the like; and did not Puniſh them too as they thought fit: But theſe Philoſophers well underſtood, That the Gods puniſhing Offenders was not a Hurt, but a real Good: if not to the puniſht Perſon, yet at leaſt to the reſt of the World.

me: answer'd, [f] *I neither am, nor have been tied by Oath to any treacherous Deceiver.* Again they tell us, That as *we* affirm some things *seem* Profitable, which *are not so*; so *they* affirm some things *seem* Honest, which *are not so*: As this, for Example, of returning to be tormented, rather than break one's Oath; which *is not* Honest, tho' it may *seem to be* so; because no Man's oblig'd to perform that Oath, which was [g] extorted from him by the force of his Enemies. And *lastly* they argue, That whatever makes very much for one's Profit and Advantage, thereby becomes Honest, tho' before it did not seem so. This is what is generally brought against *Regulus*; but let us see and examin all the parts of it in order.

[f] The force of this Argument is, Men are not oblig'd to keep their Oaths to Deceivers and treacherous People; and such the *Carthaginians* were; therefore *Regulus* needed not have kept his Oath to them.

[g] These Words contain two Arguments, which are afterwards distinctly answer'd: First, *'Twas made to an Enemy.* Secondly, *Extorted by Force.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIX.

He answers the first part of the Arguments brought against Regulus. *The Sacredness of an Oath. The Divinity of* Faith. *Pain none, or at least not the greatest Evil. Dishonesty the greatest, if not only Evil. Faith to be kept even with those who are Treacherous. Oaths made to Enemies should be kept. Not so those made to Pirates, and why. What 'tis to Forswear one's self. The Form of Oaths among the* Romans. *Laws of War to be kept inviolable.*

[1] FIrst then they say, *He could fear no Harm from the Anger of* Jupiter, *who neither can be Angry, nor do Harm to any body.* This proves as strongly against all Oaths in general, as it does in particular against this of *Regulus*. But the thing to be consider'd in Peoples taking of Oaths, is not what Danger they are in, shou'd they break 'em; but what a sacred and powerful Obligation is laid upon 'em. For every Oath is a religious Affirmation; and whatever is promis'd after such a manner, as it were calling God for a Witness to your Words, ought certainly to be perform'd. For now *Faith* and *Justice* require it of us, and not any Fear of that Anger of the Gods, which is not incident to their Divine Natures. That *Faith* I mean, of which *Ennius* has got these incomparable words:

O Faith All-glorious and Divine!
In lofty Temples fit to shine;

Ev'n

[1] He begins with answering the first Argument brought against *Regulus*; and shews what is to be regarded when People take Oaths.

Ev'n [b] Jove *himſelf by thee doth Swear!*

Whoſoever therefore doth not perform his Oath, affronts the [c] Deity of that Divine Faith, which was (as *Cato* in his Speech informs us) ſet up by our Fathers in the Capitol it ſelf, even next to the Statue of the great God *Jupiter*. [d] But, ſecondly, they tell us, *Suppoſing* Jupiter *had been Angry with* Regulus, *he could not have brought any Evil upon him, greater than what* Regulus *brought upon himſelf*. This, I confeſs, would be very true, if there was no other Evil but only Pain: But *that* is ſo far from being the greateſt Evil, that, if we may credit ſome of the [e] chief Philoſophers, it is not ſo much as any Evil at all: Among whom, I pray you, let *Regulus* be counted of *no ſmall* Authority; if I may'nt rather ſay of the *greateſt and moſt weighty*: For what greater Teſtimony can any one deſire, than that of a principal Man among the *Romans*; who rather than be wanting in any point of his Duty, choſe to undergo the moſt exquiſite Torments? [f] *But of two Evils*, ſay they, *always chooſe the leaſt*: That is, in plain words, *Rather be a Rogue than undergo any Calamity*. Can any Calamity then be greater, than that of Baſeneſs and Injuſtice? For if even the Filth and Deformity of the *Body* be loathſome and of-

[b] Men and the inferiour Gods might ſwear by *Jupiter*, who was above them; but *Jupiter* himſelf could ſwear by none, but the inviolable *Faith* of his Word and Promiſes.

[c] The Heathens made Deities almoſt of every thing, *viz.* Faith, Concord, Luck, *&c.*

[d] He comes to anſwer the ſecond Argument againſt *Regulus*.

[e] The *Stoicks*, who (as was before obſerv'd) allow'd nothing to be Evil, but what concern'd the Soul and Conſcience; calling the Calamities of the Body or Fortune, ſuch as Pain or Poverty, indifferent things.

[f] The third Argument againſt him, anſwer'd.

[g] The

offensive; how much more so must *that* of the *Mind* needs be, when 'tis cover'd and polluted with Shame and Dishonesty? Those Philosophers therefore, who discourse of these things with most Closeness and Severity, venture bodly to affirm, *That nothing is Evil but only what's Dishonest*: and even those themselves, who do it more loosly, yet always acknowledge, *That 'tis the greatest however of all Evils.* [g] That Saying of the Poet's indeed is good, *I neither am, nor have been tied by Oath to a treacherous Deceiver*; but 'tis therefore so, because when *Atreus* was brought upon the Stage, he was to make him speak that, which was suitable to his Character. But if once they begin to lay down this for a Maxim, *That Faith, when given to those who are treacrous, is not to be kept*; they had best have a care, that this be not made a Refuge and Cover for Perjury. [h] *As for his Oaths being made to an Enemy*; even War it self has Laws that belong to it; and Faith, except in some very few cases, is always to be kept even with our greatest Adversaries. For whatever you swear, for Example, in such a manner, as that [i] your Conscience tells you it ought to be done, you are bound most inviolably to perform it: But where it is otherwise, you don't lie under any such Obligation; and are not perjur'd, tho' you should not perform it. Suppose, for the purpose, you had sworn to a Pirate, That you would pay him such a

[g] The fourth Argument, taken out of *Accius*'s Tragedy of *Atreus*, answer'd.

[h] Answer to the fifth Argument, *His Oaths being made to an Enemy.*

[i] So I understand the words, *Ut mens conciperet*, &c. not as tho' it were *Mens deferentis*; for I am not bound to perform whatever I Swear, according to the Mind of him that gives the Oath; for it may be unlawful, or the like. Beside 'tis unreasonable to interpret Oaths, just according to the Mind of the Imposer: He may have his private Meanings,

a Sum, if he'd ſpare your Life; it would not be Perjury, tho' you ſhould not pay it him. [k] For a Pirate is by no means a lawful Adverſary, but rather a common Peſt and Enemy of Mankind; ſo that no one's oblig'd to keep his Faith or Oath with him. For to Swear to a thing, and yet not perform it, is not immediately to *Forſwear* one's ſelf: But then a Man is properly ſaid to be *Perjur'd*, when he Swears [l] upon his Conſcience (as our Form runs) to do ſuch and ſuch things, and yet does not do them. For that of *Euripides* may be ſaid in [m] ſome Caſes to be very good, *My Tongue indeed Swore, but my Conſcience did not Aſſent.* But had *Regulus*, in his Caſe, done any thing contrary to the Laws, and Conditions, that are kept between Enemies, it had been down-right Perjury. For the *Carthaginians*, with whom he had then to do, were a lawful

&c. as well as the Receiver. *See upon this whole Subject* Sanderſ. Grotius, *&c.*

[k] *Grotius* does not like this Deciſion of *Cicero's*: becauſe in an Oath we are not only to conſider the Perſon's Right whom we Swear to; but God alſo, by whom we Swear. 'Tis true, the Pirate can demand nothing in this caſe, but the Majeſty of God, by whom I ſwore, lays an Obligation of Performance upon me. But *Pufendorf de Jur. N. & G.* Book 4. chap. 2. §. 9. ſeems rather to favour our Author's Opinion.

[l] That's the meaning of *Ex Animi ſententia*, and not *with deſign of Obliging your ſelf.* Oaths would ſignifie juſt nothing at all, if they oblig'd no further, than People deſign'd to be oblig'd by them. 'Twas the Form of Oaths among the *Romans*, Do you Swear ſuch a thing is ſo or ſo, *Ex Animi tui ſententia?* which words ſignifie either *according to your Mind*, or *upon your Conſcience.* Hence that Jeſt which our Author quotes in his *de Orat. Cato* the Cenſor ask'd a Man, Have you a Wife or not, *Ex Animi tui ſententia?* meaning, *upon your Conſcience* or Oath: To which he anſwers, *Non quidem ex Animi mei ſententia*; meaning, *Not according to my Mind or Liking.*

[m] When, for Example, a Man only reads or repeats the words of an Oath, or the like. *See* Grot. *Book* 2. *chap.* 13. §. 2. [n] *See*

ful Adverſary, between whom and us there is all [n] the Fecial, and ſeveral other Laws that are common to Nations. For had it been otherwiſe, 'tis certain the Senate would never have deliver'd up ſome [o] eminent Perſons in Chains to their Enemies.

[n] *See chap.* 11. *Book* 1.

[o] Generals, who had made Leagues with the Enemy, without Power from the Senate and People.

Chap. XXX.

Examples of ſeveral eminent Romans *given up to the Enemy. Anſwer to the reſt of the Arguments brought againſt* Regulus.

But they *did* deliver both [a] *Lucius Veturius* and *Sp. Poſthumius*, in their ſecond Conſulſhips to their Enemies, the *Samnites*; becauſe, being beaten at the Paſſage of *Caudium*, and the Legions being diſarm'd and ſent away with Diſgrace, they had concluded a Peace of their own Heads, without any Orders from the Senate or People. *T. Numicius* and *Q. Melius*, who were Tribunes of the People at the ſame time, becauſe by their Authority the Peace was concluded, were likewiſe deliver'd; that ſo we might be freed from any Obligation of keeping it. And all this was done upon the Propoſal and Advice of *Poſthumius* himſelf, who was the Perſon deliver'd. The Caſe of [b] *Mancinus*, a great many Years after, was exactly

[a] About the Year of *Rome* 433, *Caius Pontius*, whom he mention'd *chap.* 21. *Book* 2. was then General of the *Samnites*. *See* Livy, *Book* 9. *chap* 1.

[b] *C. Hoſtilius Mancinus*, Coſ. about the Year of *Rome* 613, who being brought into very great Streights by the *Numantines*, was forc'd to make a diſhonourable League with them.

actly the ſame; who having, without any Orders from the Senate, ſtruck up an Alliance with thoſe of [c] *Numantia*, was the firſt Man that ſpoke for that Bill in the Senate-houſe, which by *L. Furius* and *Sext. Atilius* was carried to the People; and which they agreeing to, he was deliver'd to the Enemy. He did more honeſtly than [d] *Sext. Pompeius*, who being concern'd in the ſame ſort of Crime, made Intereſt to be excus'd from undergoing the ſame Puniſhment; and by that means eſcap'd it. This Man now let the Appearance of Profit prevail over Honeſty; but in all the others mention'd, the Authority of Honeſty eaſily carry'd it from the pretended Profit. [e] But to go on with *Regulus*: Another thing urg'd by his Adverſaries is this, *That he ſhould not have perform'd what was forcibly put upon him.* As tho' a Man of Courage could be wrought upon by Force. *But why*, ſay they, *did he go at all to the Senate, being reſolv'd to diſſwade the Delivery of the Captives?* This is to blame him for that, which particularly deſerves Commendation: He would not depend upon his own Judgment, but pleading for that which he thought moſt Profitable, leſt it to be determin'd by the Judgment of the Senate: And had not it been for his Counſel in the Caſe,

them. The Senate that they might not be bound to the League, deliver'd the Author of it up to the Enemy. But they refus'd to receive him, as the *Samnites* had *Poſthumius* before. *See* Vell. Paterc. *Book* 2. *chap.* 1.

[c] A ſmall Town in *Spain*, which with a very few Men held a War againſt the *Romans* fourteen Years, and beat them ſeveral times: At laſt 'twas raz'd by the Younger *Africanus*.

[d] Coſ. the Year before *Mancinus*, who made the firſt ſhameful League with the *Numantines*; but by his Intereſt and Entreaties eſcap'd being deliver'd up to them. He was the firſt of the *Pompey*'s that ever was Coſ.

[e] He returns to his Defence of *Regulus*, and anſwers the other Arguments urg'd againſt him.

[f] *Fieri*

Caſe, the Priſoners had ſurely been ſent again to *Carthage*, and he remain'd ſafe in his Native Country: But this he concluded would be a Prejudice to the Publick; and therefore eſteem'd it to be no more than his Duty, to ſpeak what he thought, and endure what might come of it. Laſtly, They add, *That whatever makes highly for one's Profit and Advantage, thereby becomes Honeſt.* I anſwer, That it[f] may indeed antecedently *be* ſuch, but can never *thereby become* ſuch: For nothing is Profitable but what is Honeſt; and things don't *become* Honeſt by their firſt being Profitable, but *become* Profitable by their firſt being Honeſt. I conclude therefore, That of all thoſe great and wonderful Examples, which might eaſily be brought upon this Subject, 'twill be hard to find any more illuſtrious and commendable, than this of *Regulus*.

[f] *Fieri* ſignifies to be made, and *eſſe* actually to be: The meaning is, That a thing which is very Profitable may *be* alſo Honeſt; but it can't *be made* Honeſt by its being Profitable, if it were otherwiſe Diſhoneſt.

CHAP. XXXI.

Regulus's *Returning to* Carthage *a Commendation of thoſe Times. The Sacredneſs of an Oath, tho' extorted by Force, among the ancient* Romans. *This illuſtrated by the Example of* Pomponius *and* Manlius.

BUt the only thing that deſerves our Admiration, in all this glorious Conduct of *Regulus*, is his perſuading the Senate not to reſtore the Capives. As for his returning again to *Carthage*, 'tis true we admire it in our Days, but at thoſe times he could not have poſſibly avoided it. The Age, I think,

therefore ſhould rather be commended for *that*, than the Man. For there's nothing our Anceſtors took greater care of, than that the Tie of an Oath ſhould be always held as moſt Sacred and Inviolable. This appears plainly from the XII Tables; it appears from thoſe Laws which are call'd [a] *Sacratæ*; it appears from the ſtrict Obſervation of Leagues, by which we're oblig'd to keep Faith even with Enemies; and laſtly, it appears from the Puniſhments and Penalties which have been inflicted by the Cenſors; who in no one thing have been more ſevere, than in puniſhing thoſe, who had tranſgreſs'd their Oaths. *M. Pomponius*, a Tribune of the People, once enter'd an Action againſt [b] *L. Manlius*, the Son of *Aulus*, who had been Dictator, for holding that Office ſomewhat longer than he ſhould have done. And amongſt other things brought in this too againſt him, That he kept his Son *Titus*, who was afterwards *Torquatus*, from Converſation with the World, and had ſtrictly charg'd him to live ſolitary in the Country. As ſoon as the Son heard his Father was in Trouble about this Buſineſs, he's reported immediately to have ſet out for *Rome*, and come early in the Morning to *Pomponius*'s Houſe. *Pomponius* was no ſooner told of his coming, but he got up immediately; and thinking the Youth, out of Anger, had brought ſome Complaint againſt his Father, commanded all others to depart the Room, and him alone

[a] Becauſe the Commons, thinking they were oppreſs'd by the Nobles, rais'd a Sedition, and retiring to a place call'd *Sacer mons*, refus'd to return till ſuch and ſuch Privileges were granted them by the Senate. The Laws made upon that occaſion were call'd *Sacratæ*. *See* Livy *Book* 2. *chap.* 32, 33. *and* Paul. Manut. de Leg. Rom. *pag.* 39.

[b] Sirnam'd *Imperioſus*, a valiant and noble *Roman*; he was thoſe Dictator upon a Religious Account, for driving a Nail into *Jupiter*'s Tempel, [*Livy* Book 7. chap. 3.] but a War fal-

alone to be brought in to him. As ſoon as the young Man was got into the Room, he drew his Sword, and ſwore he would immediately kill *Pomponius*, unleſs he'd promiſe him upon Oath, to meddle with his Father no further. *Pomponius*, out of ſudden Apprehenſion of the Danger, did ſwear to him accordingly, and diſcharged his Father from any more Trouble; having firſt reported the Matter to the People, and told 'em why he was forc'd to let fall his Action. Thus ſtrict and conſcientious were People at thoſe times, in obſerving their Oaths. And this *Titus Manlius* is that very Perſon, who, being afterwards challenged by a mighty French Man, [c] kill'd him in a Duel by the River [d] *Anien*, and was Sirnam'd *Torquatus* from wearing a Chain, (in Latin *Torquis*) which he took from his Neck. The ſame Man again, in his third Conſulſhip, put to flight and defeated the *Latins* near [e] *Veſeris*. He was indeed a very great and extraordinary Perſon; who as he ſhew'd his Love, in this Caſe, to his Father, ſo he was [f] unnaturally Cruel to his Son.

falling out in the mean time, he would have manag'd that too, imperiouſly forcing the Youth to take Arms; which got him the Hatred of the Tribunes, and made *Pomponius* accuſe him; about the Year of *Rome* 393.

[c] The Year of *Rome* 394, *T. Quintius Pennus*, being Dictator. *Livy* Book 6. chap. 9, 10.

[d] A River in *Italy*, that falls into the *Tiber* a few Miles above *Rome*; whence 'tis now call'd *Teverone*, that is, the little *Tiber*.

[e] Another River in *Italy*, not far from the foot of the Mountain *Veſuvius*.

[f] His Son fought a ſingle Combat with *Geminius Metius*, a ſtout *Latin*, and overcame him; but becauſe he did it without Leave from him who was General, he commanded his Head to be cut off, for his Breach of Military Diſcipline: Hence *Manliana Imperia*, us'd to ſignifie any unnatural Rigor and Barbarity.

CHAP. XXXII.

The Severity of the Romans *against the Breakers of Oaths. The Example of ten ſent by* Hannibal *to the Senate, upon Oath of returning. Fraud not ſufficient to excuſe a Perjury. A reſolute Action of the Senate in not redeeming eight Thouſand Priſoners. The Concluſion of this Head.*

BUt as *Regulus* did well in performing his Oath; ſo thoſe ten, who, after the Battel at *Cannæ*, were by *Hannibal* ſent to the *Roman* Senate, upon Oath of returning to the *Carthaginian* Camp, if they could not obtain an Exchange of Priſoners; did ill if they did not return accordingly: Concerning whom Writers have differ'd in their Relations. [a] *Polybius*, an Author of very good Credit, informs us, Ten Perſons of conſiderable Quality were ſent to the Senate; and that nine of 'em honeſtly return'd to the Camp, not having been able to obtain what they went about; but the tenth ſtaid behind and remain'd at *Rome*. This Man, as ſoon as he was out of the Camp, pretending he had forgot to take ſomething along with him, went back thither again; as thinking his returning under ſuch a colour, was a very ſufficient Performance of his Oath. But certainly he was miſtaken; for Cunning's ſo far from excuſing a Perjury, [b] that it

[a] An eminent Hiſtorian, Native of *Achaia*, and Son of one *Lycortas*, a Prince of that Country; but afterwards brought to *Rome*, where he was admir'd for his Learning by all the Great Men, *Scipio*, *Lælius*, &c. He wrote in Greek a Hiſtory of the World, containing forty Books; moſt of which are now loſt.

[b] For all departure from the Simplicity of an Oath *(they are the Words of a very great Man)* is a Degree of Perjury; and a Man is never a whit the leſs Forſworn, becauſe his Per-

it aggravates it rather, and makes it the more criminal. This therefore was no more than a fooliſh piece of Craftineſs, impudently pretending to paſs for Prudence: Whereupon the Senate took care to order, that my crafty Gentleman ſhould be ſent back in Fetters again to *Hannibal*. But the glorioufeſt Action of the Senate was this: *Hannibal* had [c] eight Thouſand of our Soldiers his Priſoners; not ſuch as had either been taken in Battel, or had fled from any imminent Danger of their Lives; but were left in the Camp by *Paullus* and *Varro*, the then two Conſuls. The Senate decreed that theſe ſhould not be Ranſom'd, tho' it might have been done with a ſmall Sum of Money; for no other end but to let our Soldiers ſee, that either they muſt reſolve to Conquer, or Die. Upon the News of which, as the ſame Author tells us, *Hannibal* preſently began to be diſheartned, when he ſaw that the Senate, and People of *Rome*, had ſo great Reſolution even in the midſt of their Misfortunes. Thus, we ſee, Honeſty gets the better in the compariſon, againſt that which has only the Appearance of Profit. But [d] *Acilius*, who has written an Hiſtory in Greek, ſays, More of 'em return'd under this Pretence to the Camp, hoping by ſuch a Trick to get quit of their Oaths; and *that* they were all of 'em branded with Shame and Diſhonour by the Cen-

Perjury is a little finer and more artificial than ordinary. And tho' Men think by *ſuch Devices* to ſave themſelves harmleſs from the Guilt of ſo great a Sin, they do really increaſe it, by adding to their Iniquity the impudent Folly of Mocking God, and Deceiving themſelves.

[c] After the Battel at *Cannæ*, where *Paullus* and *Varro* the two Conſuls were defeated by *Hannibal*.

[d] A learned *Roman*, who was Quæſtor and Tribune of the People. He writ the Annals of the *Roman* Empire in Greek, which are thought to have been tranſlated into Latin by *Q. Claudius Quadrigarius*, and to be the *Claudii Annales Aciliani*, quoted by *Livy*.

Cenſors. But let us now put an end to this third Head; ſince from what has been ſaid 'tis apparently manifeſt, That whatever is contrary to the Virtue of *Fortitude*; that is to ſay, whatever is done with a timerous, mean, diſheartned, abject Spirit, can never be really and truly Profitable, becauſe it is wicked, diſgraceful and odious. And ſuch would this Action of *Regulus* have been, had he either, in delivering his Sence about the Captives, ſpoke what was for his *own*, not the *Publick* Security; or afterwards choſen to remain at home, inſtead of returning to fulfil his Oath.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Nothing contrary to Temperance, &c. can be truly Profitable. Who thoſe Philoſophers were, that made Happineſs and Miſery conſiſt in Pleaſure and Pain. This Opinion ruins all Virtue, Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance and Juſtice: However theſe Philoſophers endeavour to clear themſelves of this Imputation; but can't get well off. Pleaſure oppoſite to Honeſty. The Abſurdity of thoſe, who would have made Happineſs to conſiſt in both theſe. A ſhort Recapitulation of this laſt Book. How far Pleaſure may be allow'd. A Concluſion, by way of Exhortation to his Son.

WE have now finiſh'd our third Head, [a] the fourth and laſt remains only to be ſpoke to, which contains in it Decency, Modeſty, Moderation, Continence and Temperance. And can any thing

[a] He has ſhewn that nothing can ever be Profitable, that's contrary to three of the general Virtues, *Juſtice*, *Prudence*, and

thing be Profitable, that is oppoſite to a Train of ſuch excellent Virtues? There hath been however a Sect of Philoſophers, Scholars of *Ariſtippus*, who were call'd [b] *Cyrenaicks*; and others, who had the Name of [c] *Annicerians* given them, that affirm all Good to conſiſt in Pleaſure, and count Virtue it ſelf *therefore* only deſirable, becauſe of ſome Pleaſure which it brings along with it. But theſe being now almoſt worn out of Date, *Epicurus* is mightily come into Vogue, the great Supporter, and, as 'twere, ſecond Founder of the ſame Opinions. With theſe we muſt fight (as they ſay) with might and main, if ever we think of ſupporting the Cauſe, and maintaining the Intereſt of Virtue and Honeſty. For if what [d] *Metrodorus* has written paſs for Truth, *That whatever can truly be call'd our Profit, nay and all the Welfare and Happineſs of Life, conſiſts in a firm Conſtitution of Body, and a well-grounded Hope of its laſting Continuance*; it is certain *this Profit*, nay *this ſovereign Profit* (for ſuch they account it) muſt ſometimes be ſet in oppoſition to Honeſty. [e] For what, in the firſt place, will be the Office of *Prudence*? only to cater and look about for Pleaſures?

and *Courage*: It only remains that he ſhew the ſame of the fourth, *Temperance*; which he endeavours to do in this Chapter.

[b] Becauſe *Ariſtippus* [*chap.* 14. *Book* 1.] was born at *Cyrene*, a Town in *Africk*.

[c] So call'd from one *Anniceris*, a *Cyrenian*, Scholar of *Paræbates*, a *Cyrenaick*. He corrected a little the *Cyrenaick* Opinions, and therefore was call'd Founder of a new Sect. See *Menage* on *Laertius*'s Life of *Ariſtippus*, where he ſhews there were two call'd *Anniceris*: the former Contemporary with *Plato*, and his Redeemer when a Slave in *Ægina*; and the latter of this Sect.

[d] An *Athenian*, Scholar and moſt intimate Friend to *Epicurus*; often mention'd by our Author.

[e] He proceeds to ſhew, That this Opinion ruins all the Virtues; as firſt, *Prudence*.

That

ſures? How miſerable a caſe is that Virtue in, which is thus made a Servant and Pander to Pleaſure? But what ſhall be her Buſineſs in this Office? to taſt and diſtinguiſh ingeniouſly betwixt Pleaſures? Suppoſing this to be a pleaſant Buſineſs, 'tis certainly the moſt ſcandalous one that could ever have been thought on. Again, Can he that makes Pain be the greateſt Evil, have ever ſuch a Virtue as *Fortitude* in him, the very Nature of which conſiſts wholly in deſpiſing of Pains and Difficulties? I know *Epicurus* upon ſeveral Occaſions, and this in particular, ſpeaks very couragiouſly as to the matter of Pain; but we muſt not conſider ſo much what *is* ſaid, as what *ought to be ſaid* by a Man of his Principles, who makes Pleaſure and Pain to be the ultimate Bounds of Man's Happineſs and Miſery. So again, if you'd hear him about *Continence* and *Temperance*, he tells you abundance of extraordinary things in a great many places; but he's gravell'd (as we ſpeak) and can never be able to acquit himſelf handſomly. For with what Face of Reaſon can he commend *Temperance*, who places his Happineſs in the Enjoyment of Pleaſures? [f] when the ſenſual Appetite follows after Pleaſures, and 'tis the Buſineſs of *Temperance* to correct that Appetite. [g] But ſtill they endeavour, in each of theſe Virtues, to bring themſelves off by one little Shift or other: Thus *Prudence* is admitted, and deſin'd

[f] That is Pleaſure (*Epicurus*'s Happineſs) conſiſts in indulging the ſenſual Appetite; but Temperance conſiſts in oppoſing this Appetite; therefore Temperance and Pleaſure can never agree; and conſequently *Epicurus* is inconſiſtent with himſelf, when he commends Temperance, and yet makes Pleaſure his ſoveraign Good.

[g] Having prov'd that this Opinion ruins all the Virtues; he proceeds to ſhew, how theſe endeavour to bring themſelves off in each of them.

fin'd to be *The Skill of ſupplying us with Pleaſures, and defending us from Pains:* And they make out *Fortitude* as well as they can, by ſaying it conſiſts in deſpiſing Death and enduring Torments: They do bring in a ſort of *Temperance* too, tho' not without a great deal of Straining and Difficulty; but however they make a ſhift, after ſome faſhion, by ſaying, they count it the greateſt Pleaſure, if they can but be exempt from Pain and Uneaſineſs. Thus theſe three Virtues ſtand up pretty well; but *Juſtice*, the fourth, totters mightily with them, or rather indeed is quite fal'n to the Ground; with all thoſe Duties, which relate to the maintenance of Human Society: [h] For what Kindneſs, Liberality, Affability or Friendſhip can there be amongſt thoſe, who deſire theſe Virtues not purely for themſelves, but only in relation to their Pleaſure or Advantage? To make ſhort then, I ſhall only ſay, that as I have ſhewn before, That nothing can be Profitable which is contrary to Honeſty; ſo now I do affirm, That Pleaſure in general is contrary to Honeſty. I the more blame therefore [i] *Dinomachus* and *Callipho*, who thought this Diſpute might be brought to an Iſſue, if they joyn'd both Pleaſure and Virtue together, like a Man and a Beaſt as it were in the ſame Yoke. For Virtue can never admit of this Conjunction, but abhors and diſdains it; nor can ever the ſoveraign Good and Evil, which muſt be one ſingle and ſimple thing, be made up and compounded of ſuch different Principles. But of this, which is a thing of the greateſt Moment, I have written at large in [k] another Work: Let us now re-

[h] *See Note* [b] *on Book* 1. *chap.* 2.

[i] Two Philoſophers often mention'd by our Author, who made Happineſs conſiſt in Pleaſure and Honeſty joyn'd together.

[k] His Books *De Finibus Bonorum & Malorum.*

He

return to our preſent Subject: What has been ſaid in this laſt Book, I hope, is enough to let any one ſee, How 'tis his Duty to determin his Choice, if that which ſeems uſeful and expedient for him, ſhould come into competition with that which is Honeſt. But if it ſhould be ſaid, That even Pleaſure carries with it the appearance of Profit; let it alſo be conſider'd, That it never can be brought to an Agreement with Honeſty: For the moſt that can poſſibly be ſaid for Pleaſure, (that we mayn't ſeem wholly to exclude it) is, That it ſerves by way of Sauce, to give a Reliſh to things, but has no true Profit or Advantage in it ſelf.

This is the Preſent, dear Son *Mark*, that your Father ſends you, and in my Opinion 'tis a very good one; but that muſt be judg'd of according to the uſe you your ſelf ſhall make of it. However entertain, among *Cratippus*'s Lectures, theſe three Books, and ſhew them at leaſt the Civility due to Strangers. Had it been my fortune to have come to *Athens* ([1] which had ſurely been done, if I had not been recall'd by the Cries of my Country) you might then perhaps ſometimes have heard my Lectures: However ſince now, in peruſing theſe Sheets, you'll have my Voice, as it were, by Proxy; Pray beſtow upon them as much time as you can, and I am ſure *you can* as much as you pleaſe. When I hear you take a pleaſure in this ſort of Studies, 'twill delight me to talk to you (which I hope may be ſpeedily) face to face; or however to write to you, tho' at never ſo great a diſtance. In the mean time Adieu, my dear *Cicero*, and aſſure your ſelf,

[1] He was on his way thither; but was ſent home again by ſome who told him, That his Preſence would be very advantagious to the Publick. See his own Relation of it, at the beginning of his firſt *Philippick*.

ſelf, that *tho'* no one in the World is more dear to me than you are, *yet* you'll hereafter be much more ſo, if I find you take Delight in ſuch Writings and Inſtructions.

FINIS.

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☞ *The first Figure refers to one of the Three Books, the second, &c. to the Chapter of that Book.*

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